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The thesis considers the politics and ideology of Belfast's 
Protestant working class (PKC). It is also conceived as a 
contribution to discussions concerning the nature and theory of 
, ideology' within the Marxist tradition. Traditional Irish Marxism 
has been dismissive of the PWC reducing their politics to the 
protection of marginal privelege sustained by Britain's Imperialist 
presence. This thesis argues that such a perspective is inadequate. 
It is essential to move away from the concept of loyalist ideology as 
a systematised form of false consciousness, rather it is necessary to 
look at the ideology of Protestant workers at the level of day to day 
experiences and practices. Such collectively lived experiences give 
the-alternative sets of practices embodied in working class culture. 
It is therefore important to draw on the sociological tradition of the 
community study. To fully understand PWC images of society it is 
necessary to construct the relationship between, local ideologies and 
the theoretically developed ideologies, generated by national 
institutions. 
In order to do this the thesis looks at the social structure and 
politics of a particular PWC commmity in Belfast. The thesis then 
outlines by way of case study how the PWC have reacted to the 
contemporary political and social situation in Northern Ireland. The 
thesis draws on interviews with residents, political activists and 
paramilitary members. In particular it identifies the politics and 
ideology of those active in the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and 
the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). In overall terms it highlights 
the ideology by which Protestant workers make sense of, and give 
meaning to, their social and political worlds. 
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This thesis considers the politics and ideology of Belfast's 
Protestant Working Class (PWC). The thesis is. also conceived as ýa 
contribution to discussions concerning the ýnature and theory of 
, ideology' mainly within the Marxist tradition. Theoretically it 
seeks to challenge the dominant analysis of the Protestant Working 
Class which is projected by, -. the Irish left. The current phase of the 
Northern Irish crisis is now, in its third decade. Throughout that 
time the 'left, has remained, at best, marginal to events. Indeed, 
the Irish case is often cited as a standard refutation of the central 
tenets of Marxism. In the north, the proletariat has no working class 
organisation of its own, is highly polarised, and segments of it are 
more willing to ally themselves with bourgeois co-religionists, than 
recognise, let alone try to improve their position as a class. 
Central to this is the position of Protestant Workers in Northern 
Ireland. As Lysaght put it: 
"As a problem it is an acid test for anyone 
claiming to operate the Marxist method ... The 
problem about the Protestants of Northern Ireland 
is this: a colonial conmmnity bearing certain of 
the stigmata of a nation insists that it has the 
right to adhere to the metropolitan imperial powers 
in defiance of the claims of the majority of the 
island where they both live". 
_(Lysaght, 1973: 40) 
Despite this recognition there has beenlittle serious attempt by much 
of the Irish left -to analyse the 
ideology and politics of the 
Protestant Working Class. More often than not they are dismissed as 
"pawns in an imperial game" (unity, 15 September 1984), locked into a 
false consciousness. A grouping who "at partition ... surrendered its 
independence and tied itself to its bosses in return for a small share 
in the profits" (Troops Out Movement, nd: 19-20). In such analyses 
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the desire of Protestant workers to remain part of the United Kingdom 
is reduced to the protection of marginal privilege, sustained by 
Britain's Imperialist presence. 
The resulting analysis of the political ideology of Protestant 
workers is static. There is no notion of PKC ideology evolving or 
being modified in relation to changing historical circumstances. It 
is only in the works by Bew, Gibbon and Patterson that we find any 
notion of a dynamic in the politics of the Unionist bloc. Their 
contribution will be discussed more fully in Part One. At its most 
basic level their analysis has succeeded in identifying almost 
continuous conflict within unionism, surrounding tensions between 
populist and anti-populist traditions (Bew et 
lal, 
1979, Bew and 
Patterson 1985, Patterson 1980). Their works have however remained 
located at the level of the state. This thesis is located at the 
level of the community, the everyday lives, and local representatives 
of the Protestant Working Class. The thesis marks out the terrain on 
which real, concrete political expressions are shaped by the 
interaction of class positions, rooted as they are in productive 
relations and other forms of social relationships, most notably 
sectarianism. The articulation of class structures through political 
identity and activity does not derive from some form. of 'pure class 
consciousness, but rather it is expressed in activities which are 
mediated by the social relations of particular localities. Giddens 
has made this clear when he argued,, 
_ 
"In class society, spatial division is a major 
feature of class differentiation ... such spatial differentiations always have to be regarded as 
time-space formations in terms of social theory. 
Thus one of the important features of the spatial 
'differentation of class is the sedimentation of 
divergent regional 'class-cultures, over time: 
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class cultures which today of course, are partly 
dissolved by new modes transcending time-space 
distances. " 
(Giddens, 1979: 206) 
To move away from the concept of loyalist ideology as a 
systematised form of false consciousness, it is necessary to explain 
how such ideologies are expressed and based in everyday life. That is 
not to deny that certain aspects of PWC ideology can represent the 
interest of the ruling class. That does not mean however that this is 
done as part of a conspiracy. To understand this it is necessary to 
look at the ideology of Protestant workers at the level of day to day 
experience and practices. Such experiences are different, not only 
between classes but within them. Protestant workers, experiences 
generate their own consciousness and their own culture. Collectively 
lived experiences give the alternative sets of practices embodied in 
working class culture. The consciousness which is generated is seen as 
'commonsensel. members of the Protestant working Class learn through 
experience what is, and what is not, acceptable, what can and cannot 
be done in given conditions. This is an ideological construct because 
the conditions are given, therefore they are not questioned. 
The politics of locality remain central. It is important 
therefore to draw on the sociological tradition of the community 
study. To understand Protestant Working Class images of society it is 
necessary to construct the relationship between local ideologies and 
the theoretically developed ideologies generated by national 
institutions. In doing so, it is again necessary to move away from a 
conceptual framework which portrays PKC culture as homogeneous. 
The thesis begins by considering the dominant conceptual 
typologies of the Protestant working Class as constructed by the left 
in Ireland. Part Two of the thesis looks at the social structure and 
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politics in the Protestant Working Class community of Ballymacarrett. 
It draws on interviews with residents and political activists in that 
community. The third part of the thesis further draws on this 
interview material as well as a survey of 300 Ballymacarrett 
residents. It outlines by way of case studies how the PKC have 
reacted to the contemporary political and social situation in Northern 
Ireland. Throughout Parts Two and Three of the thesis, all the names 
used, apart from those of leading Unionist politicians are pseudonyms. 
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PARr I 
McKIBBEN: I think the solution's simple. Always do a deal 
with the Employers beforehand so that we get any 
disputed work, even if it means doing the job at a 
cheaper rate. At least it ensures we get it. 
JOHN: And you regard yourself as a Trade Unionist? 
MCKIBBEN: Why not? 
JOHN: Because any Trade Unionist can see that the present 
situation whereby the Employers can play, the work 
off two Unions, wouldn't arise if we were one, 
strong Union. Catholic dockers' and Protestant 
dockers. That's common sense. 
HENRY: Common sense my arse. our job goes no further than 
to protect the rights of our members. Against the 
Protestant Union if necessary. 
JOHN: But they're Trade Unionists too. Two Unions at 
Belfast Docks defeats the very purpose of organised 
labour. Larkin didn't ask anybody's religion when 
he led the workers of Belfast to bring the city to 
a standstill in 1907. How it ever got to the stage 
of two Unions I'll never know. '- 
McKIBBEN: Because they're Protestants and we're Catholics 
JOHN: But we're all dockers 
McKIBBEN: That's got nothing to do with it 
Extract from Martin Lynch's play 'Dockers, 
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CHAPTER CNE MAIMST ANALYSES OF THE WaRIUNG CLASS 
This chapter outlines the major Marxist analyses of Northern 
Ireland. Two broad schools are identified: the anti-imperialist 
analysis which argues that British Imperialism is responsible for 
sectarian division; and a broad 'revisionist' school which 
concentrates on internal divisions in the development of the Northern 
Irish crisis. Particular attention is given to the position 
Protestant workers occupy in these theories. 
The traditional Marxist analysis of Ireland can be summarized as 
follows. In any capitalist society the natural conflict is between 
the native bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In the north of Ireland 
however, the development of this conflict has been distorted by 
British imperialism. The latter has sought to divide the working 
class and the country, to further the ends of the British ruling 
class. Partition in the 1920s is thus considered the product of a 
conspiracy to retain control of as much of Ireland as possible. The 
Northern Ireland 'state' was an artificial creation "arbitrarely 
carved out of the State of ulster" (De Paor, 1970: xv). This 
conspiracy involved an alliance between the Unionist bourgeoisie and 
the British ruling class, in order to protect imperial markets in 
addition to other economic and strategic reasons (Farrell, 
1976: 325-326). 
To ensure support for a campaign against Irish independence, and 
deny the possibility of a united labour movement, the British and 
Unionist ruling classes pursued a number of divisive strategies. most 
important of these was the attempt to ensure the support of the 
Protestant working class. Orangeism was fostered as the dominant 
ideology among the Protestant masses. This ideology was given a 
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material base by the pursuit of active discrimination, particularly in 
employment, in favour of, working class Protestants., This gave the 
Protestant working class (PWC) an interest in protecting their 
relatively "secure and well paid jobs" (Farrell, 1976: 199). 
Both the ideology of Orangeism and discriminating practices were 
institutionalised in the form of the "Stormont Statelet'. However 
the material base for such sectarian politics is said to have begun to 
erode in the early 19601s. This was largely due to the arrival of 
monopoly capitalism in Ireland. Multi-nationals had no real interest 
in maintaining employment patterns based on sectarianism. They were 
more, concerned with better relationships between both parts, of Ireland 
and Britain (Boserup, 1972). For Farrell however, 10rangeism, had 
assumed "a virulent life of its own", it was no longer merely a weapon 
in the arsenal of the Ulster bourgeoisie, but rather had "become the 
dominant force in Northern Ireland" (Farrell, ý1976: 331). - 
The growth of the Civil-Rights Movement, and the loyalist reaction 
to it had by 1968 prepared the ground for confrontation. What emerged 
was a classic anti-imperalist struggle for national liberation. The 
revolution of 1921 was seen as incomplete, and moreover had led to 
continued economic dependency in the, south and continued territorial 
domination in the north. British rule it was argued survived through 
an "unreformable, client fascist regime, the existence of -which 
depended on depriving the Catholic population of basic human rights, 
while at the same time material privileges were distributed to the 
Protestant population. Further if the northern struggle could be 
linked to the economic discontent'in the rest of the island -it could 
lead-to a socialist revolution. *The first step of this revolution was 
to abolish British control in Northern Ireland which would pave the 
way for a reunited island'(cf Farrell, 1976: 330-335). ,-- 
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in contemporary works, such a, traditional ? anti-imperalist, 
analysis is best represented by the works of De Paor (1970), Bell 
(1976,1984), McCann (1972) and Farrell (1976,1983). The perspective 
also underlies much of the analysis concerning Ireland by the radical 
left in Britain and by Sim Fein. , It is often asserted that such 
views flow directly, from the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Engels. 
Such claims can no longer be taken at face value and must be subjected 
to critical appraisal. Marx and Engels did have a lively interest in 
Ireland, and while a volume on their writings on this subject contains 
some 400 pages it can in no way be seen as a systematic analysis. 
Marx's involvement in 'the Irish question dates- from the 1860's 
following his disappointment--in the failure of the depression of, 1857 
to radicalise the English workers. His thoughts on Irish independence 
and social questions were inseparable, and Ireland was seen as a 
possible spark for the revolution in England. - This is still the 
position taken*by several Marxist groupings in Britain (Reed, 1984). 
Capital, where MarxFs most interesting writings on Ireland appear is 
not an economic history of Ireland, (or even England for that matter), 
rather the aim of this work was to illustrate the general -laws of 
capitalism. While some Irish Marxists make much of the fact that Marx 
and Engels saw Irish independence as necessary, they tend to abstract 
such references from their correct historical setting, and fail to 
recognise that Marx was much more concerned with the balance of class 
forces in Europe than in, Irish independence 'per, sel. For all of 
Marx's interest, the Irish struggle was invariably treated either in 
the context of a broader -political concern, or appeared in a work 
which did not have the Irish social formation as a primary object. In 
the same way Lenin supported the uprising in 1916, not because -he 
believed the Irish had a 'right' to independence but because he saw it 
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as part of the international struggle against imperialism. To do 
justice to Lenin it must be recognised that imperialism is not just 
colonialism,, a feature of a number of modes of production. Rather 
imperialism is characterised by a growing concentration of industrial 
and financial capital with the former dominant. There must also be 
some recognition of how imperialism reproduces itself on a world wide 
basis. 
In fact, much of the work of the anti-imperialists owes more to 
the teachings of James Connolly than any of the founding fathers of 
Marxism. Connolly "who lived his life as a socialist,, and died as a 
nationalist" (Morgan, 1980: 178) is a key figure on whom the Irish left 
has been inordinately dependent. His works, particularly those on the 
relationship between nationalism and socialism, and on sectarianism in 
Ulster, have been highly influential both within and beyond the shores 
of Ireland. Connolly saw independence for Ireland as impossible 
unless it was accompanied by a social revolution. Political 
independence represented a first step towards socialism, but English 
domination would continue unless real (economic) independence could 
also be secured. Consequently socialism was, is, and will be 
impossible in Ireland until it is free from Britain. In turn, the 
national liberation struggle is part of the wider socialist struggle. 
The Ulster Protestants were an "integral part of the Irish nation" 
(Connolly, 1915: 8) but their opposition to 'Home Rule, was because of 
"skilful use, by the master class of religious rallying cries" 
(Connolly, 1915: 31). 
Connolly still represents the best (the only? ) socialist tradition 
in Ireland, and has given the left a foothold, albeit a tenuousone, 
in Irishý politics. His relationship with nationalism however has 
weakened his socialist critique. He is all things to all people, and 
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both nationalists and socialist sift through his works in support of 
the national revolution, the social revolution and confusingly a form 
of analysis which is particular to Irish marxism which is a mixture of 
both. 
There are two essential Comollys. The first, the socialist who 
supported contemporary (British) Marxism. The second, the nationalist 
who may or may not have remained a socialist (Morgan, 1989). in 
consequence of this something of a dilemma confronted those Irish 
socialists who interpreted the Irish -situation through Connolly's 
eyes - In short, they became impaled on the simple problematic of 
Irish nationalism - 'Brits Out! and A United Ireland'; indeed much of 
their vocabulary has become synonymous with that of revolutionary 
nationalists. Many have either 'joined the forces of- the national 
revolution or 'tail-ended' it. Hence in the third decade of crisis in 
the north, the Irish left has done little other than to reproduce much 
of Northern Ireland's indigenous sectarianism -, and uphold the 
centrality of the national question in Irish politics. 
There are other cracks in the armour of the - anti-imperialist 
school. Surprisingly there has been little analysis of-the concept of 
imperialism itself; nor is there any clearly agreed definition of 
imperialism, from those who make up the school?. De Paor, for 
example, sees the essence of imperialism as the "exercise of 
responsibility in the affairs of other people, however well meaning" 
(De Paor, 1970: xx). Little attention is given to any economic 
considerations. For McCann and Farrell, however, imperialism is 
perceived in the extremely broad terms of economic, political and 
military domination of the north ýby Britain. Here again- little 
attention is paid 'to the nature of capital accumulation or to the 
changing face of the class struggle; either in Ireland or at a global 
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level. Marx never proposed a theory of imperialism. In the absence 
of this, while it must be said that studies of imperialism since Marx 
have contributed much to our understanding of history, writers have 
found it difficult to ground their findings in Marx's own theoretical 
framework. The result has been a proliferation of approaches to the 
subject (cf Brewer, 1980; Barratt Brown, 1972; Roxborough, 1979; 
Wallerstein, 1974; Fieldhouse, 1973; Owen and Sutcliffe, 1972; Kemp, 
1967). However, the debate on the meaning of modern, imperialism has 
had little impact on Irish Marxism. There has been little attempt to 
apply such concepts to Ireland itself. The traditional marxist school 
in Ireland seems content to argue that as long as Britain occupies a 
part of the island, then British imperialism must have a continued 
role and remain an important force within that society. More 
seriously, there has been no thoroughgoing attempt to analyse what 
British interests are, how these are advanced by maintaining a 
presence in Ireland today, or if these interests have changed since 
partition. 
It would be wrong of course to view the writers mentioned as 
forming a coherent or monolithic school, and recent years have seen 
the development of some debate from within their own ranks. O'Dowd, 
Rolston and Tomlinson (1980) for example, have challanged the 
traditional Marxist analysis of the relationship between monopoly 
capital and sectarianism. The imposition of direct rule, they argue, 
has made little difference to the divisions in Northern Irish society. 
They argue that the initiative has failed, not because of Provisional 
IRA violence, but because of the nature of sectarian divisions and the 
basic functioning of a capitalist state. In their view such 
sectarianism cannot be treated as a superstructural phenomenon but 
rather sectarianism is a "material reality which has been constructed 
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and reconstructed throughout the history of capital accumulation and 
class struggle in Ireland" (1980: 25). They further argue that the 
Northern Irish state is deeply penetrated by sectarian class 
relations. The Northern Irish state itself is part of the 
reproduction of sectarian relations. The problem is not, one of 
opposing the hierarchical division of the working class, but rather 
removing the structural cause of sectarianism, which even under direct 
rule remains the Northern Irish state itself. They also reject the 
claim that multi-national capital has in any way played a progressive 
role in Ireland. Far from eroding sectarian division the 
multi-nationals merely "constructed -it in a contemporary form" 
(1980: 63). Hence the restructuring of the Northern Irish econoray 
actually widened the socio-economic gap between Protestant and 
Catholic workers. While'these authors concede that the actions of the 
Protestant working class cannot be rejected simply as a product of 
groundless ideology, they maintain the PKC continue to have a strong 
material interest in preserving British rule. 
It is of course the position of the Protestant working class which 
provides the main evidence for questioning the approach of the 
traditional Marxists. Within the anti-imperialist framework the 
stereotype of this class is that of a willingly subservient group 
manipulated by evil capitalist masters. Since the mid-1960s the 
position of the Protestant workers has been even less worthy of 
defence. Formerly their reason for supporting the bourgeoisie in 
Ulster was that it ensured preferential treatment. This no longer 
being so evident it is asserted that their present actions are 
determined by a redundant and baseless ideology. It must be said that 
nowhere in the writings of the anti-imperialists is there an 
explanation of how Orangeism made the transition from a reflex 
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reaction to defend economic advantage, to the determinant and 
dominant,, position it has assumed in contemporary Northern Irish 
society. 
In this respect the work of Geoff Bell (1977,1984) represents an 
advance in socialist writing on Ireland. He treats working class 
Unionism with more sympathy than is usual arguing that this support 
cannot be seen as mere ruling class manipulation. However, he too 
believes that such support is based on economic privilege, and 
continues to treat Protestant workers as a homogeneous privileged 
mass. He thus remains firmly located within the traditional 
anti-imperialist position. He dismisses evidence of any progressive 
potential within the Protestant masses. This means that he is unable, 
or unwilling, to account for the nature of political divisions and 
alliances within the Protestant 'bloc'. For Bell the 'false 
consciousness, of the loyalist masses, flows directly from the attempt 
to maintain material privilege. Hence, 
"The support given by the Protestant working class to ý 
the 1912-14 Ulster rebellion is a case in point, for of 
course the establishment of an all-Ireland parliament in 
which Catholics would be a majority would have meant the 
end to Protestant privilege. Similarly, although the 
1974 power sharing proposals were hardly far reaching, 
they still contained a logic which the Protestant 
workers feared would ultimately threaten the superiority 
they had enjoyed in the Northern Ireland state". 
(Bell, 1976: 68) 
Such an argument, that is, that the partition of Ireland was an 
imperialist plot ignores the importance of the uneven development of 
capital in Ireland. More importantly perhaps, as Nairn (1981) has 
pointed out, it seriously understates the extent to which the 
Protestants of the north of Ireland had, and continue to have, social, 
political and religious reasons, as well as economic ones, for 
rejecting Home Rule. 
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In 1968,, the Irish left was ill prepared for a crisis of state. 
The crisis created ý by a Catholic movement protesting against 
discrimination changed the-nature of the question and the new issue 
was the very existence of the State of Northern Ireland itself. As 
intercommunal and state violence increased, socialists became deeply 
entrenched within their own communities. The re-invigoration of 
Unionist and Nationalist- politics with their latent antagonisms 
polarized left opinion on the Nationalist side still further. 'The 
dynamic of events was legitimised by ignoring much of Connolly's 
socialism in favour of his nationalism. Thus many Irish socialists 
increasingly concentrated on the collectivity of the 'Irish people,, 
and socialist aspirations were -expressed within nationalist 
ideologies. The burden ofthis theoretical approach was to highlight 
imperialism which manifested itself An the British presence. The 
Leninist imperative of 'smash the state' (meaning the bourgeois state) 
was invoked in support of the Provisional IRA's military campaign but 
was subverted to the 'nationalist, imperative of - smash the British 
state' in Northern Ireland. A creative development of Marxism in 
Ireland was possible through Lenin; with his view of the national 
question as an aspect of social revolution. - Instead Lenin was 
discovered only through his 'endorsement' of Irish nationalism. 
overall the anti-imperialists have added little ýto the works of 
Connolly written some 70 years previously. Commentators have been 
content to repeat many of his ideas, rather than to re-evaluate them 
in a contemporary light. Much of the anti-imperialist argument makes 
sense only in terms of the additional notion that Ireland is an 
ancient nation which should be re-united. Morgan appears justified 
when he points out that "the red socialists of 1968 have become green" 
(Morgan, 1980: 188). 
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Criticisms of the anti-imperialist analysis have led to the 
development of another 'school' of Marxist writings. These have 
questioned and rejected much of the basic analysis and the solutions 
offered by the traditional Marxist grouping. This revisionist, 
school found expression in the works of the British and Irish 
Communist Organisation (BICO) (1972a, 1972b, 1975a, 1975b), Boserup 
(1972), Gibbon (1975), Nairn (1977,1981), Probert (1978), Bew, Gibbon 
and Patterson (1979), Bew and Patterson (1985), Patterson (1982, 
1985), Bew, Hazelkorn and Patterson (1989). 
There is something of a paradox here. At the outbreak of the 
contemporary phase of the conflict, there were two major prognoses of 
the situation. one was based on the view derived from the application 
of certain works of Connolly which are noted above. The other-was the 
view taken by some Marxists who achieved a leading role in the Civil 
Rights Movement and Peoples' Democracy'. Whilst acknowledging the 
lincompletion, of the national revolution, they saw it as a by-product 
of the social revolution- rather than the other way round.. Socialism 
was seen as a secular force capable of uniting the northern workers. 
The Northern Irish state was not fascist; it was rather, 
"in many respects though not in all an 
ordinary bourgeois state" 
(McCann, 1969: 55) 
going through a crisis of modernisation. The strategy adopted by the 
Civil Rights movement then was to speed up this modernisation. and 
provide a basis for class unity. The Catholic masses were to be 
detached from their traditional leadership, with the hope of 
eventually uniting them with radicalised Protestant workers. This 
prognosis was generally abandoned in the early 1970s, the authors 
convinced that the Northern Ireland state could not be reformed. 
Today with few exceptions they espouse a modified version of the 
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former prognosis (that is that the conflict in Northern Ireland is an 
anti-imperialist struggle). 
The belief however that Northern Ireland is an 'ordinary 
bourgeois state" provides a base line for those in the revisionist 
school. These authors share the view that imperialism is not of 
crucial importance in Ireland today, and indeed for some never was. 
The emphasis is placed on internal factors, such as the uneven 
development of capitalism on the island in the 19th century. This 
uneven growth is attributed to different systems of land tenure, the 
existence of different modes of production on the island, or the 
natural consequence of the development of capitalism. ýThese processes 
are offered as an explanation for the emergence of two distinct 
communities in the north, giving the- Protestant population the 
material interest, by way of Ulster's industrial i sation, to reject 
Home Rule. 
As imperialism cannot be'regarded as a major factor in Northern 
Irish society, the current campaigns which the PIRA and other military 
Republican organisations are pursuing cannot be identified with the 
struggle for socialism in Ireland., On the contrary the 'struggle, 
actually inhibits the development of class unity by 'perpetuating 
divisions within the working class and driving Protestant workers back 
into the arms of loyalist ideology. As one leading member of the 
Communist Party of Ireland (CPI) put it, 
"[The Provisionals'] actions permitted the unionists, 
especially the extreme right wing to whip up sectarian 
hysteria amongst the Protestant section of the working 
people and so blind that section to the need for the 
struggle for democratic rights" 
(J. Stewart, Marxism Today, August 1973) 
of course the solutions suggested by the revisionists differ greatly 
from those proposed by the traditional school. Bew et al (1979) 
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believe the only hope of a progressive solution is through uniting the 
working class in a reformed structure of the Northern Ireland state. 
Probert (1978) believes the establishment of a genuinely democratic 
assembly is the pre-requisite to any solution, while Nairn contends 
that the rights of the Ulster Protestants to self-determination must 
be recognised if a socialist solution is to be found. For the BICO 
the way forward is by way-of a united British and Irish working class-, 
It was the BICO which produced the earliest version of this 
approach and has developed it in, a series of theoretical pamphlets 
since -1972. Much ý of their theory of the uneven - development of 
capitalism as it applied to Northern Ireland rested on the now 
somewhat, discredited notion of the 'Ulster custom" of land tenure 
which is said to have given rise to two nations in Ireland. Crucially 
however for the BICO the Protestant people of the north constitute a 
separate nation and -have the right to self-determination. moreover 
the Protestant workers are the separate proletariat of a separate 
nation. Partition was not only economically inevitable but actually 
in -the 'interests of the Ulster working class. BICO has left 
unanswered the question as to whether it regards the Protestant 
working class as part of the British nation or if it possesses the 
potential to become an independent nation, but in their analysis, 
Ulster workers are definitely not Irish. 
There are many problems with BICO's analysis. - Republican 
socialists refer to struggles for a nation-state (meaning an 
all-Ireland state) as anti-imperialst. ' -In doing so' they -do not 
transcend the national frame of reference. However in trying to 
refute the central tenets of this analysis,, ' the BICO tends simply to 
reverse the values of its adversaries. Imperialism thus is seen as a 
force for good, as BICO put it 
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"The*working class has no cause either to regret, or to 
feel guilty about the development of capitalism .... 
capitalist imperialism has revolutionised and drawn 
together the world in a relatively brief period" 
(BICO, 1975b: 4) 
The BICO analysis at various points is static and arbitrary. -For 
them, socialism in Northern Ireland is 'dependent on ýcapitalist 
development, which in turn is dependent upon the British state. 'In 
practical terms it is non-creative. Republican socialists have 
impaled themselves on the sword of national revolutionaries, with the 
PIRA acting as self styled anti-imperialist 'freedom fighters'. As 
long as the British state retains a presence in Ireland they will 
quite happily grind the axe of anti-imperialism regardless of the 
direction, or strategy, of, the struggle., However, if it is true that 
those in the anti-imperialist camp are "green before they are' red" 
(Whyte 1978: 261)ý,, then BICO's brand of socialism is distinctly 
'orange, in its hue. What is more, the imperialist sword is 
double-edged and orange socialists have suffered considerable self 
inflicted wounds. In the North this means that they are torn between 
supporting the British state on the one-hand and being incorporated 
into the loyalist struggle on the other, a struggle which occasionally 
lapses into the -pursuit of Ulster nationalism, and even outright 
independence (Workers Association Strike Bulletins, 1974). 'Although 
the BICO no longer publish a theoretical journal, several of their 
leading members have continued to write concerning Ireland. The 
central tenets of these works, is that there are ýtwo nations in 
Ireland, have remained unchanged (B. Clifford, 1985,1986, A. Clifford 
(Ed) n. d. ) 
The notion that there are "two potential national communities and 
states in Ireland" (Nairn, 1981: 241-245) is something which Nairn 
supports in his book 'The Breakup of Britain, (1981), where in general 
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he is sympathetic to peripheral nationalist movements. He goes on to 
argue, however, that due to the inability of Protestants in Northern 
Ireland to construct a strong 'Ulster, nationality, there are not two 
nations which correspond to these two communities. The Protestant 
community suffers from a 'double isolation',, caught between 
objectively being part of Ireland but with a strong desire to remain 
British. Although often suspicious of British intentions they have 
elevated their British identity above a specifically Ulster, one 
(Nairn, 1981: 237). The economic strength of the Protestant community 
has been used to force Britain to intervene on its behalf. However 
this intervention has merely increasedýthe dependence on Britain and 
set further obstacles in the path of an emergent Protestant nation. - 
Nairn identifies two major forms of nationalism in the United 
Kingdom. Firstly, that type - of nationalism -ý associated with 
under-developuent, such as that found in Wales, in 19th century Irish 
nationalism and in contemporary Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland. 
Secondly, there is a form of nationalism associated with economic 
over-development by a political core. It is in this category that he 
places Ulster Unionism, which he regards as a potentially progressive 
force. He accepts the point that the national question' must be 
resolved before the emergence of socialism is possible, but for Nairn 
this does not mean the establishment of an all-Ireland state. Rather 
it means the granting of the right to self-determination to the 
Protestant conmmity, if it is ever to adopt any form of progressive 
politics. Nairn believes that the most likely development is "the 
formulation of a more than nominal Ulster nationalism" which will lead 
to the establishment of an independent Ulster. He argues that 
"imperialism, is the loose meaning of capitalist or metropolitan 
domination.... and has no interest whatsoever in saving the Protestant 
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state" (Nairn, 1981: 241). 
Although he is highly critical of its position it is possible to 
see some resemblance between the work of Nairn and that of the 
BICO. For the latter, Protestant ideology is s6en as the legitimate 
expression of economict cultural, and political fears. For Nairn they 
represent 'lunatic' and 'aberrant' substitutes for nationalism. Both 
however fail to come to terms with the essence of that ideology; 
neither is there any serious attempt to deal with divisions within the 
Protestant grouping which is treated as if it was a monolistic whole. 
The relationship between the Protestant 'bloc, and the Stormont 
state is the main concern of the analysis of Bew (et al). Based on 
the work Of Balibar (1977) they, are critical of the work of Eamonn 
McCann and Michael Farrell arguing that they have regarded the state 
merely as an arena for political conflict. In doing so its 
fundamental significance, as a uniter -of the dominant classes and a 
divider of the dominated classes has been overlooked., -In other words, 
"their position was blind to the character of the 
bourgeois state as the site of the operation of specific 
bourgeois strategies, operationalised by the leaders of 
specific parties to secure specific bourgeois political 
objectives" 
(Bew et al, 1980: 155) 
The objectives of Unionist leaders were three-fold: to secure the 
territory from southern control; to secure the greatest degree of 
autonomy from London; and to maintain class unity within the Unionist 
'bloc'. In the early years of the state these objectives became 
finstitutionalised', incorporating private violence in the state 
apparatus in order to deter attack upon it. The northern bourgeois 
were-forced to concede a portion of class power, to the orange section 
of the working class, "so as to retain hegemony over this class" (Bew 
et al, 1979: 49). The Protestant masses were thus incorporated into 
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the state apparatus and the result was the emergence of a 
predominantly populist regime. 
As the overt threat to the new Unionist state represented by 
militant Republicanism receded, the main concern of the' Unionist 
leaders shifted to securing unity-within their own 'bloc,. There can 
be little doubt that the main strategy adopted to accomplish this 
involved continuing , the sectarian divisions, both within the 
repressive apparatus and without. The most important consequence of 
the latter was workplace discrimination. The state therefore proved 
itself responsive to the needs of the Protestant community, while 
simultaneously pursuing a policy of visibly and ritually excluding 
Catholics. This strategy further integrated the Protestant working 
class into the dominant class alliance, while it deepened divisions 
within the working class as a whole. 
Class conflict however could not be totally submerged and erupted 
at various times such, as 1919,1932, and between 1943 and 1945. In 
the 1950's significant sections of the Protestant working class 
escaped from bourgeois control, and transferred support to the 
Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP) It has been argued that this 
support has been significantly exaggerated, and was, 
"less an adventure into secular politics, than an 
attempt to extract more from within their own 
exclusive class alliance" 
(Martin, 1982: 66). 
Nevertheless, the NILP was the party of Ulster's trade union movement, 
and more importantly it could lay some claims to non-sectarianism. It 
attempted to operate the Westminster model and had a socio-economic 
programme which looked beyond the basic constitutional question. 
In the post-war period, as sectarianism became less significant, 
it became increasingly necessary for the unionist leadership to 
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emphasise its ability to preserve economic growth, the essential 
condition for maintaining inter-class unity. However this was never 
meant to be at the 'expense of sectarianism'. O'Neill took no 
initiatives whatsoever to reform the state, while the efforts of 
Chichester-Clarke must be interpreted in this direction, in the light 
of the more sweeping reforms he anticipated from the British state. 
The reforms he did make, precipitated a crisis, both within Northern 
Ireland, and between the Northern Irish and British states. 
Paradoxically it was the efforts of Unionist leaders to maintain 
centralised control over the state apparatus which led to the collapse 
of the-state. Such tendencies were present long before the Ulster 
Workers Council took to the streets in may 1974. 
Clearly the revisionist schools of thought haveýchallanged many 
of the assumptions underlying the traditional Marxist approach in 
Ireland. The 'Revisionistr approach has succeeded in the attempt-to 
focus on internal developments, and move beyond general theories, of 
nationalism and imperialism. The latter theoriesý are often 
inadequate, not only because the national question left unresolved in 
the post decolonisation period, requires specific analysis to unravel 
its complexities, but also because such theories fail to come to grips 
with the specific political, ideological and economic factors which 
shape an epoch. 
This is particularly true when it comes to evaluating-the role of 
the Protestant working class. By focusing attention on the complexity 
of the class position of this group, the frevisionists, have 
highlighted an important-weakness in the traditional Marxist approach. 
Previously the Protestant working class was conceived of as a pliant 
group, easily manipulated by its masters, but which one day will 
awaken, or be awakened to its 'real' interests. The way would thus be 
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clear for Protestant workers to join forces with their true comrades, 
Catholic workers, in a struggle for independence. The revisionist 
analysis may not be flawless, but at least it allows questions to be 
asked regarding the dynamics and tensions of the'Protestant 'bloc' and 
the position of the Protestant masses. Traditional treatments cannot 
even permit questions, of divisions and conflict within that class. In 
addition the state is identified as the instrument of the Unionist 
ruling class. 
However, there are also problems, with, the revisionist approach. 
The revisionists' are concerned almost exclusively with the Northern 
Ireland state. There is little reference to the possibility of its 
being in any way subordinate to the British state,, at best it is 
conceived of as responding to 'imagined, pressures from Westminster. 
Smyth, (1980) believes this position-to be false. For him, Britain's 
role in- Ireland cannot -be reduced to a series of uncoordinated 
external interventions, rather Britain's role was both constant and 
Planned and proved decisive 'in the development, - of capitalism in 
Ireland. The formation, of Unionist and Nationalist politics,,, which 
have a firm material base,, was thus a product of both internal 
conflicts and conflict with Britain-(Smyth, 1980: 40-42). This point 
must be taken seriously, as iti-is difficult to see how one can 
theorise the state in terms of divisions imposed on oppressed classes 
without some reference to the role of Britain in maintaining divisions 
to at least some'extent. 
Several differences exist in the debate within the left regarding 
Northern Ireland. - Two concepts are central to this debate. The first 
concerns-the Protestant masses and the Protestant labour aristocracy. 
The second is about the uncompleted national revolution and the role 
of imperialism, and it is necessary to briefly consider both. 
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The traditional view as noted above identifies the Northern 
Ireland-'state with the material deprivation of Catholics and the 
preference given to the Protestant masses in the provision of better 
jobs and houses. The Northern Ireland state is therefore deemed to be 
unreformable because the task of,, persuading Protestants to give up 
such advantages by way of a reform programme ' seems in-possible. 
Further the relationship between this labour aristocracy and the state 
is such that there is no possibility of winning over-the Protestant 
masses to socialism until that state (Northern Ireland) 'has been 
destroyed. 
Farrell uses the term labour aristocracy to refer to Protestant 
manual workers (1976: 11,16-17). It seems however improbable that 
this class was lbought, offl by such differentials, and conversely it 
is even more difficult to see how working class Catholics were 
revolutionised by the process of differential allocations. Protestant 
unskilled workers-are simply ignored. The term labour aristocracy is 
coterminous with Protestant skilled workers. There are additional 
problems with the analysis. Historically, skilled Protestants -have 
been the most politically progressive. , It was amongst the poorest 
section of the working class, that militant loyalism, was most likely 
to be found. Bew (et'al) have shown that the Protestant working class 
often opposed the Unionist bourgeoisie, in secular terms, through the 
NILP. Further the 'power base, of the NILP was within the Belfast 
engineering -, works, "the aristocracy' within the labour aristocracy" 
(Bew et al, 1979: 218,220). 
In fact the traditional approach involves a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, in that identifying all Protestant workers as a_ labour 
aristocracy makes it impossible to act upon divisions within the 
Protestant 'bloc' to counter reaction. In addition the crucial 
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criterion for membership would seem to have less to do ýwith 
differentials, than with support for the British' state. The labour 
aristocracy being equated with all Protestant workers is thus regarded 
as socially elitist and hence politically reactionary. This 
'Protestants as reactionaries, theme is further developed by those who 
continue to identify Marxism with Nationalism. Indeed for Farrell the 
choice has become devastingly simple, between, 
"on the one hand a semi-fascist orange statelet in the 
North, matched by a pro-imperialist police state in the 
South, and on the other hand,, an anti-imperialist and 
socialist revolution". 
(Farrell 1976: 231) 
The only political position offered by such an analysis is the 
continuing pursuit of the 'national liberation struggle'. - This 
Position rules out any strategy for consolidating whatever support for 
progressive politics exist within the Protestant community. If the 
national struggle was realised the new structure would have to be 
imposed, undoubtedly by force,, on the majority of the people , in 
Northern Ireland. Like its counterpart, a return to the old Stormont 
system, it would involve further restrictions to democratic rights. 
Neither of these solutions is likely to provide a base for any form of 
progressive politics. 
Another problematic surrounds this notion of the unfinished 
national revolution. For McCam the strategy of the left should be 
to, 11 
"Complete the national revolution by making the 
theoretical and practical link between what we are doing 
now and what was fought for in 1916". 
(McCann 1972: 176) 
To recap, in this perspective partition is seen as the product of a 
British conspiracy to hold as much of Ireland as possible. Ideology 
which manipulated division amongst the Irish working class, and the 
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selfish material interests of the Protestant masses are offered as 
explanations for the behaviour, both past and present, of the northern 
Protestants. The struggle of the Catholic minority against the 
northern state became the struggle of the Provisional IRA against the 
British state and 'was legitimised as. part of the international 
struggle for socialism. 
Mainline Marxist analysis is based on social classes and political 
forces. The relationship between the two must be empirically 
constructed for given times and places. The idea of a nation, 
articulates the notion of a community- of social classes where 
'nationalism' is an important political force. It is possible to 
invoke Stalin's authoritative definition of a nation as a historically 
evolved stable community of language, territory, -economic life and 
psychological make-up, manifested in a community of culture (Stalin 
1971,1971a). It is possible then to see nationalism as an element in 
Marxist analysis. It is important however not to -ignore internal 
contradictions and succumb to the subjectivity, and sentimentality' of 
nationalism. A nation is the unity of social classes, expressing an 
ideological and cultural link and mobilized into a nation statei 
Lenin's great achievement was to shift Marxism from a national to 
an international frame of reference, to try and make some sense of the 
global environment. The era since the second world war has seen the 
creation of a whole- host of new nation states, but the creation of 
, independence, or socialist movements is a rarer phenomenon. More 
often independence' -has meant continued economic and political 
dependence within --the capitalist world economy. The self styled 
anti-imperialism of the third world would be better conceptualised as 
anti-colonialist. 
In Ireland the identification of many socialists with the Catholic 
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minority occasioned a reaction of socialist empathy for the northern 
Protestants. The resulting 'Two Nations' theory gave equal status to 
Irish Catholics and northern Protestants, while Lenin's themes 
formerly used by nationalists, were invoked to justify 
self-determination for each of the two nations'. OKange socialists 
identified with the British state as an an 'a priori, progressive 
force and the basis of Protestant politics was given rational 
justification in terms of material self interest. 
Like those who claim self determination, in the third world, both 
Republican and orange socialists remain pre-Leninist, employing 
national f rames of reference. Republican socialists regurgitate a 
left-nationalist concept of- imperialism. The struggle for' a 
nation-state is seen, either as a preliminary, or more ambitiously as 
the actual struggle for socialism itself. - Anti-imperialism is seen as 
being merely anti-British. 
The ftwo-nationsl of orange socialism, on the one hand, and its 
green counterpart on the other which brands anyone who dares question 
the subjectivity of Irish nationalism, have little to do with Marxism. 
Lenin's legitimisation of the events of '1916 as anti-imperialist for 
example, had nothing to do with the participants" consciousness of a 
'free Ireland'. It was anti-imperialist, not because it was 
anti-British, not because, it was the beginning of an Irish revolution, 
but rather that Lenin perceived the war against the British state as a 
focal point in the international struggle for socialism which might 
spark off the proletariat elsewhere. An Irish nation state was 
considered necessary, not because it would create an Irish utopia, but 
rather that it would break the logjam of Irish/British antipathy in 
both countries. - The 'national, democracy, of Republican and orange 
socialism is simply that of dominant traditions, the alternative 
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versions of Lepinism, simply being the subjectivity of Irish or British 
nationalism. 
It is basically incorrect to view Unionism as being sustained by 
the 'prop, of British imperialism. Such an idea for one thing assumes 
that Irish nationalism is, a natural' state of mind, absent only under 
artificially created circumstances. Rather nationalism and Unionism 
are ideologies created by specific groups of Irish 'people at a 
specific historical conjuncture: to advance and defend different 
interests. If somehow the 'prop" was removed those different 
interests would not disappear as well. Rather it-seems they would be 
intensified as the different interests struggle for advantage. For 
socialists a united independent Ireland should mean a united 
independent group of people, not a geographical unit. It is-foolish 
to assume that the barricades on the road to such a goal are staffed 
only by the forces- of the British Army. - While the actions of 
opposition parties such as the PIRA may have helped to produce 
'awakening experiences, within the-loyalist community, and encouraged 
independent working class' activity, they ý have also increased 
intransigence and -deepened sectarian divisions within- the northern 
proletariat. -- tI 
In practical terms the anti-imperialism of Republican socialism 
creates nothing but problems. McCann claims the Provisional IRA "are 
the vanguard of the anti-imperialist struggle in Ireland", and 
furthermore "there is no such thing as an- anti-imperialist who does 
not support, the' Provos and no such thing as a" socialist who is not 
anti-imperialist" (McCann 1972: 176). That there is no organisation 
of the ýleftl in Europe which enjoys more support than Sim Fein (the 
political wing of, the PIRA), cannot be denied. However one must 
question whether there is a coherent socialist- philosophy behind its 
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strategy. It is also questionable whether support has been won on the 
basis of its socialist claims, rather than in spite of them. Gerry 
Adams has written of the need for Republicans to "pinpoint the 
relationship betwen the social-economic issues and the national 
question, and present sound logical, social and economic reasons for 
Irish independence" (Fortnight, Sept 1985). The dominant perspective 
within the Irish left is to explain -the crisis in terms of the 
presence of British imperialism and colonialism. As Adams explains, , 
"Sectarianism will only be defeated when its source 
is removed. The removal of the cause of 
sectarianism, of the British prop which sustains 
it, will initiate a coming together of all our 
people and the undoing of sectarian influences, 
violence and politics. " 
(Adams 1986: 167-168) 
The starting point for any solution is seen as British withdrawal. 
This is a perspective which has tended to incorporate the views of 
nationalist comuentators, the burden of which is to demonstrate 'that 
Ireland is colonially oppressed by Britain. Such commentators have 
been highly critical of, and impatient with, those on the left who 
have tried to pinpoint social, and economic issues. They consider that 
the solution, lies in the simple fact of British withdrawal. Whether 
by choice or necessity the Provisionals have shown themselves to be 
inarticulate theoretically and-are content to mine the limited support 
of nationalist areas to the exclusion of a wider audience. The message 
from Republicans 'is that socio-economic issues 'are almost 
insignificant compared to the priority of the"war". - 
The task facing progressive - forces in Ireland is enormous. 
Traditionally the left has supported Irish nationalism on the grounds 
that any struggle against imperialism, must be progressive. Even 
liberal opinion, whilst rejecting the physical force element in Irish 
nationalism has offered little, except an alternative conception of a 
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unitary state. It is an indication of the weakness of what passes for 
Marxism in Ireland that those who question the traditional analysis 
are often dismissed as unduly economic -in their-outlook. In Ireland 
leconomism' means refusing, to accept the primacy of the national 
question. The dangers of such a view are demonstrated by the 
experience of the left in the Republic of Ireland. Here the long 
fixation of the left on the unfinished, national revolution, has 
meant, that until very recently, little attention has been paid to the 
analysis of the existing bourgeois state. This aspect of southern 
politics embodies a conception of the situation as one in which all 
classes have a common interest. 
In the north, the fluid nature of the political situation makes 
the reassessment of the social system a pressing necessity. The 
disarray and fragmentation in the Unionist camp since the signing of 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement, for example, contradicts the nationalist 
dogma of a Unionist hegemony. A closer look at the post war economy 
would seem to point to a realignment, both ideologically and 
economically of various sections of the working class. That is not to 
deny that the average Protestant remains 'better off' than the average 
Catholic, or that the two communities occupy different spaces in the 
context of the economy. However the notion of a Protestant labour 
aristocracy cannot take account of the overlap between 'poor' 
Protestants and 'better off 'Catholics, nor crucially of the level and 
strength of Protestant resistance. In addition, the state's major 
role becomes no more than reproducing marginal privileges established 
in more prosperous times. 
much of the left continues to see British domination as the 
source of all problems in Ireland. The divisions amongst Irishmen are 
the result of 'false consciousness', the consequence of the 
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divide-and-rule policies of imperialism. In this-way the Northern 
Ireland situation is subsumed under the broader Irish question'. In 
turn the quest for socialism is subsumed under a national liberation 
struggle to free Ireland, with the PIRA as the leading force. in the 
anti-imperialist struggle, (Irish 'Freedom Movement 1983: 107). Thus 
the fight to unite Ireland, 
"is not only a means of liberating six county Catholics 
from Unionism, it is also a means of liberating the men 
of the Shankill Road, and the surest road to socialism". 
(Greaves 1972: 214) 
obviously the greatest problem this perspective encounters are 
precisely those men (and women) of the PWC and the Protestant 
community, whose opposition to Irish nationalist aspirations is 
unwavering. In the past the problem of Ireland's one million 
Protestants has been glossed over by defining the Irish people as a 
homogeneous nation. By characterising the Unionist workers as 
, unwilling dupes, it is possible to understate seriously the economic, 
political and ideological bases of their resistance. much of the 
anti-imperialist stance remains utopian, since it ignores the 
structural bases which give coherence to the Unionist position. At 
the same time it continues to set obstacles in the way of the 
incorporation of the Unionist people in an all-Ireland Republic. 
Another fixed notion of the left is that there is no possibility 
of a reformist solution in Northern Ireland becuse the state is 
founded on bigotry and is essentially irreformable. Little attention 
is paid to the fact that since 1974 the same government has ruled on 
both sides of the Irish sea and since 1979, Northern Ireland has been 
subject to the same tThatcherite, administration as the rest of the 
U. K. Of course, some may reply that this is precisely the problem, 
Britain is a foreign - state which has no place in Northern Ireland. 
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That however is not the same as saying Northern Ireland is 
irreformable. That is to reject the pursuit of reform on a 
principle, but the principle is not socialist. 
Two scenarios have been advanced in relation to the Protestant 
working class. The first is that they are historically redundant and 
therefore no accommodation can be sought. At best the Protestant 
working class are irrelevant to the pursuit of national liberation, at 
worst they are an obstacle. The struggle for reunification should 
therefore be pursued whatever the consequences for this section of the 
working class. The following statement explains this position, 
The structure of oppression built into the six counties 
state means that most social conflict takes the form of 
Nationalist resistance against Loyalist repression. The 
Protestant working class has no political existence as a 
class - it acts and fights as part of the Loyalist 
community. 11 
(Irish Freedom Movement 1983: 85) 
The, second scenario suggests that the Protestant working class 
will only be capable of participating in revolutionary politics after 
the event of national liberation. The following statement f rom Sim 
Fein members makes this position clear, 
"Over the centuries, Protestant workers and farmers have 
been taught that Loyalty to the British crown guaranteed 
them marginal privileges over their Catholic neighbours. 
Loyalism. has thus become hopelessly entangled with the 
British state's military presence in Ireland, creating a 
colonialist aristocracy of labour dependent to a large 
degree on the British military machine for employment. 
Before Loyalist workers can ever discover their real 
class interests, that military machine must be 
destroyed. Any attempt to delay struggle until the 
majority of Loyalists allow the scales of imperialism to 
drop from their eyes is misplaced. " 
(Sim Fein members cited in CPI 1987: 7) 
It is the British state, or rather the guarantee from that state of a 
link with British imperialism, which ensures that the Protestant 
working class can never emerge from a state of false consciousness. 
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There are considerable problems attached to labelling a whole 
section of the working class as lirreformable', and trying to sweep 
from the stage the highest concentration of the proletariat in 
Ireland. Not least amongst these problems is the'denial of a whole 
range of working class experience. To assert that the 
principal problem is that of British Imperialism, exercised through 
simple colonialism in the north, and neo-colonialism in the south, and 
therefore that the only possibility of the emancipation of the working 
class lies in the resolution of the 'National Question', is to accept 
a position which is more moralistic than Marxist. it is theýrange of 
PWC experience which is identified in this thesis... Firstly however it 
is necessary to consider-the notion that PWC politics and ideology is 
reducible to the protection of marginal - privilege. This itself is 
seen as a device of British Imperialism which anti-imperialist 
theorists believe continues to pursue an active strategy in Ireland. 
- 
* 
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CHUYM TWO THE ESTANT WORKING CLASS -A LABOUR ARISTOCRACY? 
- As the previous chapter has indicated, Irish Marxism has, long had 
difficulty in accounting for the perceived lack of revolutionary 
potential by Protestant workers. -ýIrish Marxism has tended to 
characterise the Protestant working class-in two main ways:, either it 
is 'written off'. in bitter polemic, or alternatively ultimate faith is 
placed in the inevitable development of 'historical forcest which will 
sweep it from the historical stage. The fundamental argument put 
forward to explain the ideology of Protestant workers is that, it was 
the result of 'false consciousness' implanted and nurtured by a 
self-interested bourgeoisie who sought to inhibit the realisation of 
Protestant workers, 'real' class interests. The argument is 
elaborated by the introduction of another factor which highlights the 
alleged role of a labour aristocracy. 7he Irish Marxist position 
remains firmly located within ruling class conspiracy theory, but 
additionally credence is given to some possible social, and crucial 
material bases for the process. The section of the Irish left who 
define the problem as imperialist domination by Britain, identify the 
core of the resistance ýby Protestant workers- with the defence of 
material interests. The following encapsulates their position well, 
"The Protestant working class, (then), has had sound 
material reasons for supporting the political and 
economic status quo ...... (similarly), although the 1974 
power sharing proposals were hardly far reachingo they 
still contained a logic which the Protestant workers 
feared would ultimately threaten the superiority they 
had enjoyed in the Northern Ireland state. For 50 years 
that state had protected the "poor white' Protestant 
privileges against the 'black' Catholics, an imbalance 
which the 1974 general strike and all of Paisley's 
campaigns aimed to preserve. To quote the threadbare - Unionist clichý: 'This we will maintain"' 
-(Bell 1984: 67-68) 
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The adoption of this position has helped legitimise the idea of a 
Protestant labour aristocracy evident in some analyses of popular 
unionism (Bell 1976,1984, Farrell 1976,1983). The consequence of 
this argument is however to reduce Protestant working class ideology 
and politics to little more than the protection of privilege. In 
seeking to challange this viewpoint this -chapter will examine the 
implications of the changing composition of the local labour force 
which in turn is heavily influenced by the forms of capitalist 
organisation on the island. It will begin by briefly examining the 
pre-partition period, a time which is perceived as central by those 
who support a theory of labour aristocracy. It will then examine the 
changing economic base of Northern Ireland, outlining important 
changes in the deployment of capital, and the consequences of the 
latter for PWC politics. No claim will be made that changes at a base 
level imply automatic and (or) immediate changes at the 
superstructural level. 
The industrial i sation of Ulster began with the rapid development 
of Belfast in the mid nineteenth century. In the decade beginning 
1860 the population of Belfast increased by around 40%, from 121,602 
to 174,412. The American Civil War precipitated a cotton shortage 
which meant a major boost for the linen industry in the north of 
Ireland. The linen industries rapidly became Belfast's largest 
employer, the numbers employed trebling between 1850 and 1875 (Weiner 
1980: 13). 
The core of the industrial development in the north east of 
Ireland, however, was shipbuilding. Belfast had a history of 
shipbuilding from as early as 1791 but the real growth of the industry 
began in the 1880s and by the turn of the century! it employed around 
20,000. (Patterson 1980: 88). 
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Linen and shipbuilding also occasioned the emergence of a large 
number of auxiliary industries and, 
"rope making, vehicle building, heating and ventilation, 
machine making and armaments followed in rapid 
succession, together with food and drink manufacturing 
and the service industries". 
(Budge and O'Leary 1973: 75) 
More importantly the north of Ireland rapidly became integrated into 
the British industrial market place. As one commentator noted, 
"the occupations of the people of Belfast were in broad 
type very similar to the occupations of the people of 
Leeds or Bradford or Newcastle. About threequarters of 
the gainfully occupied population was employed in 
industry, just over one-twentieth in the professions and 
about one-twelfth in domestic service ...... Belfast was 
much more like Leeds than Dublin". - 
(W. Black, 1967: 158) 
Belfast contained the only significant concentration of capitalist 
industrial organization in Ireland. Its development however has been 
incorrectly identified with the imperial export of capital from 
Britain to Ireland. By the end of the nineteenth century the momentum 
of unionism had moved away from the Landlord fraction towards 
manufacturing. Capitalist development was autonomous to the same 
extent as in places such as Clydeside, Liverpool or Tyneside. How it 
differed from these conurbations is that its foundations remained 
perilously narrow; highly concentrated on engineering and textiles. 
In all other crucial respects however it was a core region of the 
British Empire. As opponents of Home Rule pointed out, 
"Belfast had done very well under the union: her 
population had quadrupled in 50 years; her wage rates 
were higher than anywhere in Ireland and in some cases 
up to British standards; as to her customs revenue she 
ranked as the third port in the United Kingdom, being 
exceeded by only London and Liverpool; she had the 
largest weaving factory, the largest shipping output, 
the largest tobacco factory and the largest ropeworks in 
the world". 
- (Cited in Budge and O'Leary 1973: 107) 
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The labour force in the north of Ireland had a number of important 
characteristics. Central were cleavages along the lines of genderi- 
skill and geographical location. Female industrial activity for 
example was high. Workers in textiles and clothing were almost 
exclusively women, and almost completely ununionised. There were 
several reasons for this. most of the tasks in the mills could be 
quickly learnt, and the supply of labour, swelled by large numbers of 
migrants from rural areas, meant the market position of textile 
workers was weak. As the workforce was predominantly female it failed 
to attract the sympathies of male trade unionists up to the 1890s. 
The level of Ilocalism., was high with employers encouraging daughters 
to follow their mothers into the same mill (messenger 1980: 314,205). 
The influence of such paternalistic employment practices should not be 
underestimated. The role of the employer extended beyond promoting 
loyality to conservative politics. For those working in mill villages 
or in mills housing, the consequences of losing one's job were 
considerable. 
Historically researchers have looked at this industry for evidence 
of sectarian divisions. The 1911 census showed Catholic women were 
ove r- represented in textiles and more likely to be employed in 
spinning than weaving. Much of the evidence however suggests-that the 
industry was reasonably free of sectarian divisions (messenger 1980). 
Those divisions along sectarian lines which did exist appear to have 
been determined by spatial location within Belfast (see Chapter Four). 
The pattern for male employment was characterized both by 
sectarian divisions and differences in the levels of trade union 
organisation. At this time it is possible to identify two almost 
discrete labour forces in the north of Ireland. The first was skilled 
and Protestant and was concentrated in the industrial heartland, the 
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second was Catholic and unskilled and was located primarily in the 
service industries. Sectarianism was most sharply felt- in 
shipbuilding and engineering. This pattern should not be regarded as 
exceptional, indeed it was to be found in some other important British 
industrial centres such as Merseyside and Clydeside. There were then 
two proletariats on the island, an unskilled labouring proletariat, 
common to the whole of Ireland and a manufacturing skilled 
proletariat, highly unionised and almost exclusive to Belfast. Of 
course a large percentage of workers in industrial production around 
Belfast were unskilled. However engineering employment, especially in 
the shipyards, was the main sources of jobs for male, adult, skilled 
and semi-skilled workers. This situation gave those workers- a 
disproportionate influence on the labour movement in Belfast and on 
unionist politics in general. East Belfast was central to these 
processes. An important feature of skilled workers was their intense 
sectionalism (Patterson 1980: 176-177, Reid 1980: 117-120). Bew notes, 
"They were obsessively concerned with the protection of 
their place in the labour market and the work process. 
Inevitably therefore there were regular disputes with 
other workers, skilled and unskilled". 
(Bew 1983: 143) 
The fact that the organised section of --the working class was 
disproportionately Protestant has led some commentators to assert that 
PWC politics can best be explained by the' notion of a I'labour 
aristocracy'. Engels first put forward the notion that a fraction of 
the proletariat might have a material interest in upholding bourgeois 
ideology. It was however James Connolly who successfully implanted 
this notion in Marxist discourse in Ireland. He regarded popular 
religion and the reaction of Protestant workers as an 'atavistic 
survival,, deliberately fostered by an unscrupulous ruling class. 
This notion has since been developed, most notably in the works of 
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Hobsbawm, (1964,1973) Foster (1974) and Gray (1976,1977). 
Although these approaches differ they share common problems. 
Firstly there is a common assumption that workers 'naturally' unite 
around progressive ideologies. If this process does not occur then 
the situation is abnormal and requires an 'exceptional, explanation to 
account for such exceptional circumstances. one consequence of this 
approach is that the development of a capitalist mode of production 
necessarily produces a system 4hichý replaces the diversity of 
pre-capitalist popular strata with 'a simplified class structure 
consisting of two, and only two contending classes. Hence 'all 
political action is determined by economic interest. 
Secondly there are problems of definition. Hobsbawm's approach 
reduces the social position of skilled workers to little more than a 
classification based on high and stable wage earnings. Some of the 
difficulties surrounding this approach are recognised by Foster and 
Gray. Both take an income based definition as their starting point 
but seek in ý addition to, analyse relationships between skilled and 
unskilled labour at the point of production. Foster identifies the 
labour aristocracy as a conduit for the transmission of bourgeois 
ideology. - Gray ýintroduces a sophisticated notion of hegemony 
developed from Gramsci and Anderson and Nairn. -He acknowledged the 
possibility of a labour aristocracy with a level of ý autonomy --from 
capital, but noted that any ensuing struggles must remain locked 
within a framework of subordination. 
various problems occur with the application of the concept 11abour 
aristocracy' to the Belfast working class. 'If it is accepted that, the 
social position of skilled workers can be identified with earnings, 
the immediate problem is how to distinguish a Ilabour aristocracy, 
from adjacent or even overlapping strata. The method by which a 
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distinction can be made between occupations with similar incomes is 
nowhere elaborated. An inability to 'distinguish between the petty 
bourgeoisie and the labour aristocracy may be used to 'explain 
reformist ideology by the latter. The difficulty in drawing a 
distinction between the labour aristocracy and other well paid lower 
social groups has made this area of research a minefield of 
contradictions. 1ý 
In respect to wages, two considerations must be made overt. 
Firstly there is a division between 'high-wage' industries, such as 
shipbuilding, and low-wage' work such as linen. This distinction 
refers to the industrial setting. Secondly it is equally important to 
note the divisions within the same industry between'skilled and often 
unionised workers and the mostly non-unionised unskilled workers and 
women. 
In Ulster, the period between 1841 and 1912 saw the hired labourer 
all but disappear from Irish agriculture., There was little or no 
other source of employment. Thus the position of employers, 
particularly if situated in an agricultural hinterland was favourable. 
They were guaranteed a supply of labour to fill unskilled jobs. Low 
rates of pay were common to all unskilled workers, including labourers 
in engineering. The relative position of the unskilled worker 
remained desperately weak until at least the period immediately after 
I 
World War one. 
Gibbon (1975: 93-96) uses the term labour aristocracy to 
characterise one identifiable section of Protestant workers, those 
employed in the Belfast shipyards. This marks a departure from 
traditional applications of the notion of a labour aristocracy by 
introducing the concept of the class alliance and class fractions 
thereby recognising internal differentations within Protestant working 
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class. Comparing the working conditions of linen workers and those 
employed inýshipbuilding Gibbon has this to say of the latter, 
"Possessing trade qualifications as they did, they were 
generally free from reliance upon conditions of purely 
local prosperity to find work ...... They were not tied to the mechanical indefinite repetion of the same tasks, 
but had a fair discretion of job selection, freedom of 
movement and could work more or less on their own time. " 
(Gibbon 1975: 83) 
It is clear that conditions for skilled workers were, superior to 
those of employees in unskilled work, for example the linen industry. 
Those conditions however were, however, relative, and should not be 
over emphasised. Shipbuilding was subject to , severe trade 
fluctuations. Between 1902 and 1920 unemployment figures for 
unionised shipyard workers averaged 6% and in the depression years of 
1903-5 and 1908-9 it reached 20% (Patterson 1985: 171). As Reid 
points out concerning skilled shipyard workers, 
"high earnings have to be evened out over periods of 
lower rates, under employment and unemployment. Thus 
skilled workers, overall earnings may not have been 
significantly greater than those of unskilled workers as 
has normally been assumed. " 
(Reid 1980: 117-118) 
Privilege did exist but only for a minority of Protestant workers. 
The majority of unskilled workers were also Protestant. It is 
extremely difficult to see how the politics of this section of workers 
can be explained by reference to privilege. Moreover it was from 
within the privileged fraction of Protestant workers that the most 
progressive albeit mainly reformist ideas of the era emerged. 
Security of employment had been assured through trade union activity. 
The position of the skilled worker involved economic and 
organisational contradictions. The Trade Union movement in Ireland 
was far from unique. It developed as a class based organisation 
opposing capital, but equally it developed within the context of 
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subordination to capital. Organised labour in Ireland as elsewhere 
accepted the logic of capitalism, namely the necessity to exchange 
labour power for wages. Shipbuilding remained highly labour intensive 
centered upon a nucleus of skilled labour until around the outbreak of 
World War Two. The shipyard workforce exhibited a highly developed 
division of labour . The conditions of skilled workers varied greatly 
at the actual point of production and with their dependence upon the 
industry. Intense competition for work and the perceived necessity 
for maintaining skill boundaries defined day-to-day life., The 
marginally greater-earnings of skilled workers could-only be protected 
by effective Trade union organisation and activity and this was an 
index of insecurity as much as it was of privilege. 
Among those who applied the notion of 11abour aristocracy' to the 
north of Ireland, Bell and Farrell have achieved the most prominence. 
Both however tend to simplify the complexities of relations at the 
point of production. This permits them to portray the Protestant 
labour aristocracy as a homogeneous and national social fraction. 
They therefore produce a uni-dimentional analysis of the Northern 
Irish state. The PWC are seen to give unquestioning support to that 
state and this in turn becomes the primary mechanism for the defence 
of privilege. By restricting the concept in this manner Bell and 
Farrell depart from the classic use of the tem. The te mis an 
indisputable part of the analysis of the capitalist state and labour 
aristocracy is conceived as one of the means by which the bourgeoisie 
attempt to resolve contradictions in, their own interest. The use of 
labour aristocracy theory to advance an anti-imperialist 
interpretation of events seriously underestimates the difficulties 
faced by the Unionist bourgeoisie in its attempt to win and hold 
power. To conceive of labour aristocracy as synonymous with marginal 
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privileges raises additional problems, as the following indicates, 
"The Protestant working class are very much captives of 
their own history. They have been fed on marginal 
patronage, they have been almost indoctrinated into a 
position that anything radical jeopardises the unionist 
base" (therefore) "certainly on all major issues you 
have to remove the reason for that illness before you 
can perfect a cure" 
(J. Austin, Sim Fein spokesperson cited in Stack 
1986: 20) ý 
It is doubtful if such statements have, any explanatory value. 
Assertions about unionised and skilled workers are generalised without 
warrant to incorporate all Protestant ý workers. . Groups of unskilled 
and unemployed workers such as those in East Belfast are either 
ignored or subsumed under a general category of an aristocracy of 
labour. 
more seriously, this use of the - concept is ý essentially 
ahistorical. The labour aristocracy, can be usefully conceived as a 
temporary product of a particular phase in the development of British 
capitalism. many of the arguments put forward by the anti-imperialist 
left have relevance only in the period up -to the formation of the 
state. It is this period which most clearly produced a homogeneous and 
privileged Protestant working class. Contemporary anti-imperialistic 
analysis merely transpose social and political relations of the 1880s 
onto the 1980s. No serious attempt has been made to periodise 
capitalist development in Ulster. 
The remainder of this chapter will be concerned with changes in 
the organisation of production and the implications these - had -for 
PWC politics. These implications-are derived from the re-organisation 
of capital and are not -simply a byproduct, as some commentators have 
argued, of the fact that multi-national capital in Northern Ireland is 
administered by people who ignore 'or areý insensitive to sectarian 
divisions (Boserup 1972, Probert, 1978). 
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Post-partition capitalist organisation can be separated intoýthree 
distinct phases: 
(i) the period from the formation of the state until'the end of 
World War Two. 
I (ii) the time- from the imediate post-war period up to the 
outbreak of the current phase of the troubles. 
(iii) the contemporary period from around 1970. 
The first of these phases will be dealt with very-, briefly. By the 
mid-1920s it was becoming increasingly obvious that the role 'of 
Belfast as the site for autonomous. capital in Ireland was becoming 
increasingly less viable (Isles and-Cuthbert 1957: 158). The linen 
industry was facing increased competition from synthetic products. By 
1930 over 20,000 linen workers were unemployed in' Belfast. In 
shipbuilding the situation was equally grim. Employment in the 
shipyards dropped from 20,000 in 1924 to just over 2,000 in 1933. The 
pillars upon which Ulster's phenomenal industrial- expansion had been 
built were crumbling. The industrial-base remained extremely narrow, 
with the vast majority of production workers concentrated in very few 
industries. Furthermore these staple 'industries were largely 
dependant on markets outside the newly formed Northern, Irish state. 
The Northern Irish governmnent remained- intensely suspicious of 
any form of economic intervention policy (cf Probert 1978: 71, Farrell 
1976: 81-121, Bew, et al, 1979: 102-128). As, the depression began to 
bite there were increased' demands' ýfor some form of centralised 
control. The response finally came in the shape of the 'New 
Industries Development'Acts' of 1932 and 1937. These provided grants 
to new industries which would produce goods- which were-not already 
being manufactured in Northern Ireland. one consequence was that the 
autonomous nature of the ownership of Northern Irish industry was 
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lost. Up until this time the typical unit of production had been the 
"family firml. Although it remained resistant, Northern Ireland like 
other areas in the U. K. was affected by the rise of monopoly capital. 
The general movement towards the concentration of capital in advanced 
industrial countries and the de-localisation of control applied to 
Northern Ireland as it did to all of the other industrial heartlands 
of the United Kingdom (Parson 1980,1984). The interwar years saw a 
crucial reconstruction of private capital which changed the economy 
and had implications for the Unionist political bloc. Although the 
second world war, like the first, brought short term industrial 
prosperity to Northern Ireland the underlying trends were clear. The 
decline -of the traditional industries had led to an increased 
dependence on foreign investment. Agriculture remained the main 
employer, industrial production remained concentrated in shipbuilding 
and linen and further there was an overdependence on exports. The 
Unionist government increasingly began to recognise the need for state 
action to alleviate the problems facing capital. 
Between 1945 and 1953 Stormont governments introduced a further 
series of ? Industrial Development Acts, aimed at providing financial 
aid to new and expanding industries. Different fractions of the 
unionist leadership tried to ensure that these reforms reflected their 
own particular interests. Thus the government felt constrained to 
respond to that section of capital identified most readily with the 
traditional Unionist leadership. The leaders of- the linen industry 
mustered their remaining influence within the Unionistý party to win 
substantial aid from the 'Re-equipment of Industries Acts' of 1951 and 
1953. Nevertheless the-post war economy of Northern Ireland seemed to 
be driven in another direction which-was to create new conditions of 
dependence. Modernization was the new aim. , 
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There had been an unconvincing attempt to attract new industry in 
the 19301s. This attempt had been only marginally successful and had 
little ef fect on the economy. In the post-war period Goverment 
policies throughout the U. K. increasingly accepted this need for state 
intervention especially in the f ield of employment. In the immediate 
post-war period there were a number of agreementsýbetween Stormont and 
the British Labour government in the areas of finance, social services 
and education which laid the foundations for local participation in 
the welfare state. Such reforms significantly left the local control 
of employment in Unionist hands. There were however a number of 
important and unforseen developments. The Catholic middle class were 
making increasing political demands on the state. Within the Unionist 
bloc liberal Unionism re-emerged and there were increasing demands 
from the PWC that their -circumstances should not return to pre-war 
conditions., In 1962 the shipyards and engineering workers ofýBelfast 
marched on Stormont to protest against, unemployment. In early 1963 a 
Unionist backbencher from the Shankill voted with the NILP in a 
censure motion on unemployment. The threat of wide scale defections 
to the NILP suddenly seemed real as their party mounted their most 
successful post-war electoral campaign (Bew, et all, 1979: 168-170). 
The - response of state and capital can best be 'described in 
geo-political terms. The period saw a marked movement to an active 
'regional policy, everywhere in Britain (Pickvance 1981: 239-241). 
In- Northern Ireland this manifested itself in the formation of the 
Regional Economic Planning Council. Such policies found support in 
the 'new generation' of the Unionist Party: O'Neil being prominent 
among them. One of O'Neill's first acts when he assumed power was to 
commission the Wilson economic plan in 1965. This report, set targets 
for three key employment areas: 30,000 new jobs in manufacturing, 
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30,000 in service 5,, 000 in construction. A regional survey was 
carried out and a comprehensive plan was proposed by Sir Robert 
Matthew. The Matthew Plan recognised that labour remained highly 
concentrated around Belfast, and that relocation should be pursued and 
could be achieved by implementing the following policies: 
(i) The creation of a Istoplinel to prevent the further 
unplanned expansion of Belfast. 
(ii) The establishment of 8 growth centres to take both the 
overspill from, Belfast and, to further the development- of new 
industrial centres. one of these was to be 
(iii) A 'new city, to be located between Lurgan and Portadown. 
The Industrial Development Act of 1966 introduced these policies 
and provided initial finance through a system of goverment loans, 
grants and subsidies. These inducements, together with the high rates 
of unemployment and low wages (around 70% of the U. K. average) meant 
Northern Ireland was able to find favour with mobile capital (Paor 
1970: 127). The physical reconstruction (predominantly state inspired) 
was paralleled by pressure for the reform of the -welfare state to 
bring it more into line with the British model. Goverment strategy 
precipitated a period of destabilisation fuelled by Catholic dissent 
and expressed through the civil rights movement. Resistance also 
emerged from within the PWC. The development of class based 
parliamentary politics by way of the NILP continued to be of major 
concern to the ruling elite. The continued success caused "panic 
among unionists in Belfast, who feared the NILP had not reached the 
limit of the Protestant vote" (Buckland, 1981: 109). Unionist regional 
strategy had been directed towards solving the problem of mounting 
Protestant unemployment. The PWC had achieved -a central position, 
economically and politically, in the state. This it achieved by the 
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ability to dominate the unionised, higher skilled selection of workers 
in shipbuilding and engineering. Its political position was 
maintained by state patronage - especially in housing and job 
allocation. However although vehemently opposed to the civil rights 
movement, which most saw as a direct threat to the state, the PWC was 
not unaware that regional policies -had inbuilt class priorities 
(Weiner 1980: 132-147). These policies seemed to place more emphasis 
on upgrading the, infrastructure than providing new homes for 
Protestant workers. While the PWC could embrace demands for social 
and economic reform it refused to do so at the expense of its central 
political position in the state. - Divisions within Unionism 
intensified between the fraction who advocated progressive reform and 
hard liners reluctant to lose power. , O'Neill's 'technocratic 
Unionism' sought to convince voters that the benefits of changes to 
welfare outweighed some loss of patronage wielded hitherto by the 
Unionist state. Growing class and sectarian pressures led to the 
break-up ý of local- political control; the Unionist party split openly 
thus'precipitating O'Neill's resignation in April 1969. His successor 
Chichester-Clark suffered the same, fate in 1971. The latter was 
followed by Brian Faulkner whose position was constrained not only, by 
the continued splits in Unionism but-the-fact that Catholic opposition 
to the state had become institutionalised in the shape of the'SDLP. 
The Unionist party fragmented, leaving the British state little option 
but to assume full responsibility.. 
These events did not however mark any substantial change in the 
direction of Regional Policy. The main aims of successive British 
governments were to promote the' continued- attraction of capital 
investment and the quelling of social unrest which it was assumed 
could be achieved by the reduction of unemployment levels. I 
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The Matthew plan was expanded through the 'Development Programme 
1970-1975F. The main features of this policy were the continuation of 
the Belfast Stop Line and an up-grading of the growth-centre policy. 
It also highlighted the continued need to attract industry by way of a 
comprehensive package including the upgrading of facilities for 
training, education and tourism. The most important features of this 
programme were the commitment to redevelopment and housing and 
proposals concerning the Belfast Urban Motorway. The combined effect 
of this programme it was thought would 'encourage' Belfast's working 
class residents to relocate in one of the 'growth centreslin the 
province. It was the settled working class communities in Belfast 
which were to bear the cost of this wide scale social disruption. 
Weiner has shown in detail some of the consequences of these policies 
for one Protestant working class area in Belfast (Weiner 1980). 
Another such area was inner-East Belfast. We shall see in later 
chapters that 'politics of territory' remains the focus for residents, 
community activists, (including paramilitary groups) and local 
politicians. 
The 'Development Programme, was followed by a discussion paper 
'Regional Physical Development Strategy 1975-95, issued by the 
Department of Housing, Local Government and Planning. The main 
purpose of regional strategy it asserted was to: "develop a settlement 
pattern which will be conducive to the provision, at economic cost, of 
the full range of infrastructure.... throughout the province" (para 
6.01). 
These proposals were formally adopted when the Regional Physical 
Development Strategy was published in 1971 by the Department of the 
Environment for Northern Ireland. The plan's objective was to develop 
a pattern of settlement which "will favour the attraction of new 
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industry" (para 3.01) and this was to be achieved by the continued 
depopulation of Belfast with a resulting population increase in growth 
and key centres (para 4.06). Thus it is possible to trace the central 
impetus of the strategy directly back to the Matthew Plan. 
State economic policy towards Northern Ireland has been heavily 
reliant upon state sponsored industry. The capitalist- state plays a 
crucial role in the accumulation process and in social reproduction. 
Regional - and urban imbalances are continually reproduced by the 
process of capitalist economic and political development. These forms 
of development change with variations in the mode of accumulation 
itself characterised by different forms of the labour process and 
differences in the types of reproduction of the labour force. The 
implications of the changing process of capitalist development both 
for the composition of the labour force, and for working class 
politics in Northern Ireland, are often overlooked. 
Initially the government's strategy sought to bring about 
industrial diversification, and create large numbers of, jobs to 
replace those being lost in the traditional sectors of shipbuilding 
and engineering where the numbers employed declined dramatically from 
24,648 in 1960 to around 6,000 in 1984. The textile sector has in the 
same period seen the almost total disappearance of the linen industry. 
The numbers employed in textiles fell from 74,000 in 1952 to 11,000 in 
1983. In the post-war period around 60,000 worked in over 400 linen 
factories which were mainly small family firms (O'Dowd, 1986: 206). 
Between 1960 and 1973 these firms had to come to terms with the active 
promotion of the synthetic fibre industry as a core element of 
industrial strategy. The synthetic fibre industry was characterised 
by newly arrived multinational firms which were highly capital 
intensive. These multinationals (among them Courtaulds, ICI and 
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Enkalon) relocated away from the established centres of linen 
production to the nqw growth centres such as Antrim, Carrickfergus and 
Coleraine. 
This new industrial sector had a high proportion of male workers 
and was located in predominantly Protestant- areas. It offered 
employment which was relatively well paid, and more highly skilled 
than was. the case with the traditional linen sector. one further 
important feature was that these plants were part of international 
capital and family firms no longer had a role to play. Unemployment 
fell to 31,000 in 1961, and did not rise above 38,000 for the rest of 
the decade. 
This manufacturing upturn while long term was not however 
permanent. The equilibrium between developed and under-developed 
countries was disturbed by the 1973 OPEC oil crisis. The 
transnational companies, which had been the engine of growth in 
Northern Ireland, survived by transferring production to minimal 
labour-cost economies. The Northern Irish economy proved highly 
vunerable to this new international division of labourl. 'The basis 
upon which Northern Ireland had attracted, new industry had been low 
cost overall, comprising an attractive package of grants, low wages 
and promises about a docile labour force. However such advantages 
were quickly eroded by external developments. Between 1973 and 1979 
manufacturing production -fell by 9% and between that year and 1983 
overall production fell - by a further 12% (DOED Press Notice 
27/l/1984). The volume of industrial output in 1986 was 17% below the 
1978 figure and 21% below that of 1973 (Morrisey and Gaffin, 1986: 8). 
more significantly entire industrial sectors were lost. This has been 
the case in synthetic fibres, where - Enkalon, Courtaulds and ICI 
closed; in rubber production, with the withdrawal of Goodyear and 
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Michelin; and in other areas with the closure of Grundig and STC. 
TABLE 2.1: NET EMPLOYMENT CHANGE IN SELECTED MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES 
1960-1970 
1960-1970 All Manufacturing Employrunnent - -2.1% 
Very High Growth (100%+) 
Animal and Poultry Foods; Synthetic Resin, Plastic Materials, 
Synthetic Rubber; Industrial Plant and Steel-work; Pumps, Valves and 
Compressors; Telegraph and Telephone Apparatus and Equipment; 
Insulated Wires and Cables; man-made Fibres; Hosiery and Knitted 
Goods; Footwear; Rubber; Miscellaneous Plastics. 
High Growth (50 to 99%) 
Domestic Electrical Appliances; Motor Vehicle manufacturing. 
Medium Growth (20 to 49%) 
Bacon Curing,, meat and Fish Products; Milk and Milk Products; 
Fertilizers; Surgical Instruments and Appliances. 
Low Growth (0 to 19%) 
Bread and Flour Confectionery; Tobacco; Textile machinery; Electrical 
Machinery; Carpets; Men's and Boy's Outwear; Miscellaneous Dress 
Industries. 
Low Decline (-19 to 0%) 
Broadcast Receiving and Sound Reproducing Equipment; Electronic 
Computers; Aerospace Equipment; Woolen and Worsted Textiles; overalls, 
Men's Shirts, Underwear; Dresses, Lingerie, Children's Wear. 
(Continued) 
medium Decline (-20 to -49%) 
General Chemicals; Radio and Electronic Components; Spinning and 
Doubling on the Cotton and Flax Systems; Textile Weaving; Textile 
Finishing. 
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High Decline (-50% or more) 
Made-up Textiles; Women's and Girl's Tailored Outerwear. 
TABLE 2.2 NET EMPLOYMn CHANGE IN SELECTED FlANWACTURING, INDUSTRIES 
1970-1978 
1970-1978 All Manufacturing Employment - -18.2% 
High Growth (50 to 99%) 
Domestic Electrical Appliances. 
Medium Growth (20 to 49%) 
Synthetic Resin, Rubber, Plastics; Radio and Electronic Components; 
Broadcast' Receiving and Sound Reproducing Equipment; Carpets; 
miscellaneous Plastics. 
Low Growth (0 to 19%) 
Milk and Milk Products; Fertilizers; women's and 'Girl's Tailored 
Outerwear; Rubber. 
Low Decline (-19 to 0%) 
Bacon Curing, meat and Fish Products; Animal and Poultry, Foods; 
Tobacco; General ýChemicals; Surgical Instruments andý-Appliances; 
Electrical Machinery; motor Vehicle manufacturing; man-made 'Fibres; 
Miscellaneous Dress Industries. 
Medium Decline (-20 to 49%) 
Bread and Flour Confectionery; -Tobacco; Industrial Plant -and 
Steelwork; Pumps, Valves, Compressors; Telegraph -and Telephone 
Apparatus and Equipment; Insulated Wires and , Cables Aerospace 
Equipment; Spinning and Doubling on the, Cotton and Flax Systems; 
Textile Weaving; Woollen and Worsted Textiles; Hosiery, Knitted Goods; 
Made-up Textiles; Men's and Boy's Tailored Outerwear; Overalls,, Mens 
Shirts, Underwear; Dresses; Lingerie, Children's Wear; Footwear. 
54 
High Decline (-50% or more) 
Electronic Computers, Textile Finishing. 
Note: Industries selected employed at least 750 people at some time 
during the period. 
Source: DMS Gazette Nos 1,3. 
After some initial success the regional industrial strategy has 
been in crisis since the mid 1970s. The flow of mobile capital has 
dried up and the only major concerns attracted since then have been in 
high risk, high cost ventures. Among these De Lorean Motors and Lea 
Fan Jets proved to be most spectacular disasters (OHearn 1981: 35) 
The net employment change in selected manufacturing industries between 
1960-1978 can be seen in tables 2.1 and 2.2. Since the turn of the 
decade manufacturing employment in Northern Ireland has increasingly 
come under state influence. Between 1946 and 1982 state agencies 
promoted 170,000 manufacturing jobs, 137,000 of which materialised. 
By 1982 only 40,000 of these remained. In addition the state financed 
around 82,000 jobs in small industries between 1971 and 1983. Of 
these only 46,000 still existed in 1983 (O'Dowd 1986: 207). Between 
1950 and 1970 those employed in the industrial sector did not vary 
significantly and settled at a level around 45% of the workforce. By 
1984 however -this figure had fallen to around 27%. Table 2.3 shows 
the changes which have occurred in more detail. 
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TABLE 2.3 PERCENTAGE OF OVERALL MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT IN MAJOR 
INDUSTRIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1952-1984. 
SHIPBUILDING/ENGINEERING 
TEXTILES/CLOTHING 
TOTAL 
1952 1965 1971 1984 
26 22 21 27.5 
51 42 39 28.5 
77 64 60 56.0 
N 161,480 110,883 102,176 56,040 
Sources: Isles and Cuthbert (1957: 63), DMS Gazettes 1978-9, 
Unpublished DOED statistics, O'Dowd (1986: 25) 
TABLE 2.4 RATES OF NET CHANGE IN EMPLOYEES IN SERVICES EMPLOYMENT 1950-1980 
Standard Industrial 1950- 1960- 1965- 1970- 1975- 
Classification Order % 1958 1965 1970 1975 1980 
21. Gas, Electricity, Water 10.3 4.6 17.9 - 6.7 
22. Transport and 
Commmication -11.8 - 6.4 -10.2 - 1.4 - 7.1 
23. Distributive Trades 6.1 2.5 - 8.6 - 8.1 - 5.3 
24. Insurance, Banking, Finance 
Business Services 11.4 28.8 21.8 33.8 
25. Professional and Scientific 
Services 37.8 26.5 28.6 34.8 17.4 
26. miscellaneous Services 5.1 16.4 15.9 12.5 30.0 
27. Public Administration 
and Defence 2.1 4.8 11.5 38.1 7.4 
Total 4.1 9.1 8.5 16.8 13.4 
Note: 1950-58 figures are on a different basis and are not strictly 
comparable. miscellaneous Services in 1950 includes Gas, 
Electricity and Water, Insurance et c and mis cellaneous Services 
including motor vehicle repairs. 
Source: Digest of Statistics, DMS Gazette 
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TABLE 2.5 PATES OF NET CHANGE IN PUBLIC SECTM CIVIL EMPL(MMENT 
1961-1978 
1961- 1965- 1970- 1975- 1974- 
% 1965 1970 1975 1978 1978 
United Kingdom 3.4 10.2 13.3 1.9 7.6 
NI: estimated 9.4 15.4 31.1 5.9 14.9 
NI: actual - - - 8.8 16.9 
Source: DMS Gazette Nos 1,3; "Employment in the Public and 
Private Sectors 1961-1978" Economic Trends Nov 1979 CSO 
Since 1979, rising unemployment, the 'New Right' dominance in British 
politics, and the reconstruction of the Welfare State have all moulded 
the shape of a state dependent service sector in Northern Ireland. 
Since 1974 public expenditure has increased at twice the British rate 
(The Economist, June 1984: 41-2). The pattern remained constant 
until 1979 when 40% of the workforce were state employees. By 1983 
the figure had risen to 46% (O'Dowd 1986: 209). These increases have 
been confined to particular sectors: 'Health and Education', 'Public 
Administration' and 'security,. The latter category for example 
provided over half (56%) of male public sector employment in the 
period 1974-79. Part time employment has also increased. Between 
1971 and 1978 part time jobs increased at a rate of 5,644 per annum. 
and since then the rate has averaged 2,332 per annum. The majority of 
such workers are women. In 1971 part time work comprised 19% of 
female employment, in 1977 the corresponding figure was 37%. 
These general trends obscure important differences in employment 
patterns between (1) men and women, and (ii) Protestant and Catholic 
workers. Between 1959 and 1980 manufacturing in Northern Ireland lost 
14,000 (14%) of its male workforce and 31,000 (40%) of its female 
workforce. It has been the growth of services which has provided 
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employment for those women moving out of manufacturing. Between 1950 
and 1976 public administration grew by 13,000, over half the increase 
in jobs being for females. In finance and other services there were 
an additional 17,000 jobs, 9,000 of which were female jobs (Byrne 
1980: 90). 
am-ployment in the service sector not only absorbed women workers 
f rom manufacturing but increased the total number of females in the 
labour force. Between 1959 and 1980 female employment in services 
increased by over 129%, while the -equivalent growth in male service 
workers was 22%. The service sector in Northern Ireland is heavily 
dependent on part-time female labour. 
The labour force in Northern Ireland is characterised -by a 
massive decline in industrial employment and an equally noteworthy 
increase in service employment. The shift is most marked in female 
employment patterns and particularly the replacement of full time 
women's work in manufacturing by part time service work. 
MUME 2.6 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTICK OF MALE AND FEMALE EMPLOYEES IN 
MAJOR INDUSTPJM SECTORS. 
1952 1971 1983 
M M M 
Female Male Female Male Female Male 
manufacturing, -55 39 35 37 16 27 
Services 44 40 63 45 82 61 
Agriculture/ 
Construction 1 21 2 18 2 12 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sources: Isles and Cuthbert 1957, D. M. S. Gazette, D. O. E. D. Statistics, 
O'Dowd 1986. 
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These changes in the composition of the service sector have to be 
set in the context of the developing productive forces within Northern 
Ireland imposed by the logic of the contemporary organisation of 
capital. of primary importance is the obliteration of that sector of 
the economy which was heavily reliant on-skilled male manual workers. 
In Northern Ireland this is of crucial significance since it is this 
section of employment which has, traditionally provided the backbone of 
Protestant employment. 
The overall vunerability of the economy in Northern Ireland has 
received much attention (cf Isles and Cuthbert 1957, Byrne 1981, 
Harvey and Rea 1982, -Rowthorn 1981,1983,1985). The decline 
continued into the 1980s with the virtual disappearance of entire 
industrial sectors. The structure of employment reflects these 
changes as can be seen in the following table 2.7. 
TABLE 2.7 EMPLOYEES (000, S) IN NORTHERN IRELAM 1965-1985 
1965 1985 %CHANGE 
MANUFACTURING 174 101 -42 
PUBLIC SERVICE 112 207 +85 
PRIVATE 116 113 -3 
CONSTRUCTION 45 23 49 
Source: Coopers and Lybrand (1986: 4) 
The latest strategy for industry in Northern Ireland has been the 
plan published by the Industrial Development Board (IDB). The core of 
the plan is to shift the balance of development away from a service 
ethos, towards an entrepreneurial one. The strategy is highly reliant 
on market led private sector development and little or no attention is 
given to the expansion of the public sector. Implicit in this approach 
59 
is the idea that success in private production would overcome 
sectarian divisions. There is little that is-, novel in this approach 
of the IDB. It is merely an attempt to modernise the approach 
initially introduced in the 1960's. The contemporary period, of 
international mobile capital, or rather, the new international 
division of labour which has channelled capital to other locations, 
has made such a strategy redundant. 
ý The full limitations of this development strategy are apparent in 
the, unemployment figures for Northern Ireland. in the 1960s and 1970s 
the rate of job creation 'ranged from 5,000 to 8,000 per year. Such 
jobs helped offset the rapid decline in staple industries. After 1975 
however the numbers of jobs created fell-below 3,000 per,, annum. 
Although the 1980s has seen an increase in the numbers of jobs created 
(see table 2.8) they have had little overall effect on employment 
levels. 
TABLE 2.8 JOB PROM)TIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1981-85 
YEAR IDB L. E. D. U. TOTAL 
1981/82 1700 1600 3300- 
1982/83 3800 2600 6400 
1983/84 3600 3700 7200 
1984/85 5300 4000 9300 
Source: Coopers and Lybrand (1986: 32) 
The level of unemployment has increased, from 27,300 in 1974 to 
127,800 in February 1986. It is within manufacturing industry that 
the process is most obvious. - Between 1970 and 1980 employment in 
manufacturing fell by around 10% and in 1987 the numbers employed in 
manufacturing dropped below 100,000 for the first time in the history 
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of the Northern Irish state (Teague 1987: 12). Historically 
manufacturing has been highly concentrated in and around Belfast. 
This reflected ý the late 19th century' division of labour and the 
domination by male Protestant workers in industry. Spatially the 
divisions created at this time have remained- constant with East 
Belfast dominant. 
The relationship between sectarianism and space will be dealt 
with more fully in the next -chapter. It is impossible however to 
discuss employment patterns without making reference to the social 
construction of,, space. - Catholics are disproportionately represented 
in West Belfast and in the west of the Province generally. Since the 
outbreak of the present phase of conflict the -tendency for Catholics 
to locate in West Belfast has heightened-(Rolson and Tomlinson 1988). 
Within Belfast there are vast variations in employment -and 
unemployment rates. The figure in West Belfast has been, estimated at 
between 25-30%, while in East Belfast, the figure is considerably lower 
at around 15-20%(see Chapter Four). These figures indicate not only 
the creation of Ilabour reserves' in response to an ongoing process of 
capitalist restructuring, - but also show the different relationship 
Catholic and Protestant workers have to capital., East Belfast relies 
heavily on public expenditure in the , form. of state subsidies to 
manufacturing. -There is also a concentration of administrative jobs 
in East Belfast due to the location of Goverment Departments. , West 
Belfast'is of course also dependent on Goverment expenditure, but in a 
radically different way. Employment in West Belfast is highly 
dependent on education and health services, much of which is female 
and part-time, broadly following the pattern indicated previously in 
this chapter. 
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In general terms capital is seeking to develop productive forces 
within Northern Ireland in accordance with that logic imposed by the 
contemporary forms of the capitalist system. of primary importance is 
the abolition of that section of employment occupied by skilled manual 
males. Historically it is that sector of employment which has 
provided the material base for Protestant workers and is now being 
rapidly eroded. Although employment in the security, forces does 
provide a safety net for many Protestant workers, many Protestant 
working class communities, including East Belfast, are , now 
experiencing unemployment levels not seen since the 1930s. That is 
not to deny unemployment rates among Protestants remain lower than 
among their 'Catholic, counterparts. Nevertheless the unemployment 
rates now being experienced by loyalist communities are extremely high 
relative to the position they have, come to expect. The Protestant 
working class has neither a tradition of, nor the informal networks to 
deal with, such levels of unemployment. The impact on Protestant 
working class consciousness is therefore a question of some 
importance. 
Clearly Northern Ireland has many features which make it 
distinctive. It is possible to agree with Massey that regions have 
specific histories which internalise general trends in both national 
and global- economies in particularý ways (Massey 1983,1984,1986). 
Developing this theme Cooke has outlined -the following five features 
which distinguish class relations'within specific regions. These are: 
i) The Productive Base 
ii) The Labour Process 
iii) The ownership of Capital 
iv) Specific Social Relations 
V) Institutional specificities (Cooke 1985: 213-241) 
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In supporting this theme in general terms one must be careful not to 
overstate the case to the point where the integration of the Northern 
Irish economy into the British economy is obscured. 
The role of the capitalist state in the process of accumulation 
and social reproduction is crucial. Patterns of development and 
underdevelopment of the economy are shaped by state policy and state 
institutions. Variations in state policy, including regional policy 
must be situated in the context of the accumulation process and take 
account of variations in class structures. The - current economic 
crisis, for example, has had an uneven effect across the various 
Regions of the United Kingdom. Historically the North-East of Ireland 
developed an independent regional manufacturing base specialising in 
Shipbuilding and Textiles. The decline of this base throughout this 
century is part -of a pattern which manifested itself in other weak 
peripheral regions such as the North East of England and South Wales 
(Blackman 1985). The State in Northern Ireland has had to secure 
conditions for the continued accumulation of capital in the same way 
as any other western state. The working class in Northern Ireland 
were however much more divided, both economically and culturally, than 
was the case in other capitalist societies. Apart from, this there was 
little that was unique about the position of Northern Ireland an 
advanced capitalist state. As elsewhere the decline in manufacturing 
has led to the creation of a, ? reserve army of labour'. The needs of 
the state to reproduce workers as wage labour, or as a reserve army 
has shaped post-war working class experience, both Protestant and 
Catholic, in Northern Ireland. 
At the outbreak of the present phase of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, world markets -were increasingly being organised by 
transnational-capital. Against this, local business dominated by the 
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Unionist elite was helpless. Stormont was forced to intervene 
directly in the economy and adopt measures (recommended for -many 
years) to Imodernisel capital. O'Neill's policies were conceived to 
accommodate increasing demands from Protestant industrial workers and 
to meet the needs of international corporations. The former were 
making increased demands to reap some of the benefits of the post-war 
capitalist boom conditions while the latter were seeking to secure the 
best conditions for profit maximisation. Politically O'Neill 
attempted to weaken Irish nationalism and thus to secure both, the 
legitimacy of the stateý and the liberalisation of Unionism. It was 
this which was successfully resisted by the rise of 'Paisleyism'. The 
Unionist mandate crumbled under pressure f rom. both Protestant and 
Catholic workers who, although not acting in unison were making 
increasing demands on the state. The latter were concerned with 
establishing 'Civil Rights, within the state, while the former sought 
to confirm their central position, both economically and politically. 
The break-up of the Unionist hegemony was therefore precipitated at 
least as much by the problems Northern Ireland faced as a capitalist 
state, as it was by being a sectarian one. Attempts to restructure 
Northern Ireland's economic base in the 1960s were based on British 
regional strategy. one of the major results was the high level of 
dependence upon external capital. Northern Ireland, like other 
regions in the U. K., became increasingly vulnerable to changing 
investment patterns at both the national (British) and international 
levels. Thus while Northern Ireland has its own particular features 
it was and remains, fully integrated into the British economy. 
Seeing the Northern Irish economy in a wider context and, in the 
context of other British regions is gaining increasing validity. The 
current economic crisis has had an uneven effect across the regions of 
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the U. K. Some areas have been virtually by-passed by closures and 
redundancies and indeed benefitted from net investment. In Northern 
Ireland the economic crisis has had a devastating effect, threatening 
to obliterate whole communities. This has exaggerated the tendency of 
some cormentators, particularly those who adopt an anti-imperialist 
stance, to see Northern Ireland's problems as unique. This view 
ignores similarities across regions in order to emphasise differences. 
The view of the anti-imperialist left is that, in Ireland, social 
relationships can best be understood in terms of the dominance of 
Ireland by 'British Imperialism'. Although anti-imperialists have 
dealt in minute detail with the way internal divisions have manifested 
themselves in the Northern Irish state they have consistently failed 
to locate these in any adequate conception of the social structure. 
Furthermore the economic relationships between Ireland, Britain and 
the rest of the international capitalist economy are not adequately 
explored. Such issues are subsumed under an all embracing term of 
'imperialism' which explains the position of Protestant workers as the 
defence of economic privilege and nothing else. 
In broad terms 'Imperialism, can be characterised in three main 
ways: the export of surplus capital from advanced industrial countries 
to less developed regions; the super exploitation of such regions; and 
the political and military subjugation of such regions. The 
application of the concept of imperialism to Northern Ireland raises 
problems. Firstly the assumption that Britain benefits materially 
from the union must be questioned, in terms of both profit and 
spatial-military gain. A second assumption is that there is a unity 
between the British ruling class, the British state and multinational 
capital in ideas and programmes of action. There is now a 
considerable body of literature which illustrates the tensions between 
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different fractions of capital, different state apparatuses and 
different fractions of the ruling class (Poulantzas 1973,1978). The 
assertion that there is a coherence of purpose between the various 
sections of the British ruling class,, concerning policy towards 
Ireland, fails to address this important body of literature. 
From a historical perspective the concept of 'Imperialism, is 
equally problematic. Capitalist accumulation in the north of Ireland 
is not easily confined within the boundaries of the state. By 1900 
Belfast was a major location, of international capital. It'formed part 
of a huge industrial triangle including Clydeside and'Merseyside. The 
dramatic growth witnessed in the latter part of the 19th century 
concentrated economic and political power in the hands of 'the 
indigenous bourgeoisie. Linen, Shipbuilding and Engineering formed 
the basis of the class alliance whose material interests rested firmly 
on the union, City of London Finance' and Imperial' markets. It is 
difficult however to see in what ways the region was more dependent 
than other regions such as the north west of England. While it is 
true that Ireland was the 'scene of subjugation, both economic and 
political, it nevertheless had characteristics which were distinctive 
and which provided the basis for loyalism to Britain. 
Partition institutionalised class and sectarian relationships, 
confirming both the strength of the Protestant Alliance and the 
rejection of the state's legitimacy by many of the Catholic population 
at the time when Unionism achieved politcal autonomy. The 
manufacturing base, which was highly concentrated around shipbuilding 
and linen, entered a sustained period of decline. The contraction of 
the industrial base and the political reinforcement of sectarian 
divisions meant Northern Ireland maintained an essentially 19th 
century social structure until after the second world war. 
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The situation - in Northern Ireland has not however remained 
static. it is no accident that the outbreak of the present conflict 
coincided with the modernisation of the Northern Irish economy and the 
increasing penetration of transnational capital. In retrospect the 
late 1960s and early 1970s seem the highpoint of employment and 
affluence, but, even in its finest hour, capitalism could not contain 
the aspirations its, rhetoric was generating. 
The working class in Northern Ireland continues to be deeply 
divided. The state has a complex role to play in the reproduction of 
social order. This is especially the case in Northern Ireland where 
both communities have considerable control over the agencies of social 
reproduction. The relations involved in the reproduction of class 
politics are far from stable. For-this reason the arguments forwarded 
by Bew, Gibbon and Patterson (1979) must be given a central position 
in any analysis. ' It is they who provide the most important evidence 
concerning class responses to the reproduction of capital-labour 
relations in Northern Ireland. The Protestant class alliance is best 
conceived of as a product of uneven capitalist development. It has 
been pointed out that, 
Loyalism as an ideology involves, a deeply rooted set of 
social practices and beliefs whose base is the 
industrial development of the North East of Ireland 
which had been integrated thoroughly into British 
markets and British capitalism. The revolt by , 
Protestant workers against Home Rule in the early part 
of the century was not a manipulated departure from real 
class interests. It was rather a rational expression of 
the belief that the Victorian prosperity of Belfast 
could only be maintained through the continued 
integration of the British and Northern Irish economies" 
(Morrisey 1981: 74) 
The Home Rule period saw the construction of a loyalist bloc, which 
was ideologically coherent. While it is true that Protestant workers 
formed the solid foundation of this bloc, it was nevertheless subject 
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to fissures and tensions. Furthermore only those who supported 
partition were allowed to make decisions concerning the structure and 
direction of the state. 
While relations within the loyalist bloc fell some way short of 
total cohesion the intra-group divisions were obscured by the apparent 
depth of inter-group conflict. The divide can be described in a 
number of ways such as Protestant-Catholic or Unionist-Nationalist. 
This divide was the main focus of interest and has led to an over 
concentration on the peculiarities of the situation in Northern 
Ireland. It will be argued here that seeing the events in Ireland as 
"unique' gives an extremely distorted view of politics in Northern 
Ireland. The writers who concentrate on the particular aspects of the 
situation are led to give precedence to the national struggle, as for 
example in Farrell (1976,1983) or else to describe the Protestant 
workers as 'duped' as in Bell (1976,1984). Rather than this reading 
of social life in a mechanistic fashion, based on a single process, 
what is needed is A detailed class analysis of relations within 
unionism. Neither the notion of Ilabour aristocracy, nor the all 
embracing concept of imperialism' provide the necessary tools for 
such an analysis. Protestant working class culture is not 
unidemensional. As a class it is not necessarily passive to ruling 
ideas, even if its perspectives are often constrained by more 
immediate political concerns. The temptation of a premature closure 
of the debate, dismissing the Protestant population as an 
undifferentiated reactionary mass, must be resisted. An effective 
analysis of class formation must start without any presupposition of 
its fom. Furthermore it must incorporate all aspects of behaviour 
which sustain the social structure. To do otherwise is to dismiss a 
vast range of working class experience. As Allen says, 
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"Class analysis based in the. concrete reality of 
capitalism should tell us about the formation and 
distribution of political allegiances not simply through 
voting patterns but through an identification with 
policies over everyday affairs" 
(Allen 1977: 64) 
It is this behaviour, and the expression of the politics of everyday 
affairs within a loyalist community that the rest of this thesis seeks 
to examine. 
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PART II 
"The Sectarian Divide that poisons the air of 
the community I write about is a smoke screen, 
a camouflage to obscure the social problems. 
Belfast is, after all, no different from other 
industrial cities, with the usual 
contradictions between rich and poor, 
privileged and underpriviledged. It is a city 
of high unemployment and bad housing where the 
working class has been nourished on mistrust. 
Probably no other working class in Europe has 
been so divided, so alienated... 
unemployment, poverty# illiteracy are not acts 
of God but conditions of men; they are 
remediable, not inevitable. " 
John Boyd, Introduction to Collected Plays 
pp vii and viii 
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CEMPTER TEPM METHODS OF INVESTIGNTION 
Towards a Rationale for the methods Chosen 
The assessment of contemporary PWC consciousness must be at least 
two-fold. Not only must it be concerned with the major political and 
social issues, but attention must also be given to the relevance of 
being Protestant in areas of day to day life. As Lockwood once 
pointed out, people, 
"visualise the class structure of their society from the 
vantage points of their own particular milieux, and 
their perceptions of the larger society will vary 
according to their experiences of social inequality in 
the smaller societies in which they live out their daily 
lives" 
(Lockwood 1966: 249) 
Questions asked at this level should show where, when, and how 
divisions and contradictions within classes are made relevant in the 
context of political and economic divisions. They should also 
identify the socialisation processes, image construction and framework 
of thought within a given community. It is through such processes 
that classes alter their composition. 
The thesis rests on the periods of fieldwork I spent in 
Ballymacarret, a Protestant working class area of Belfast (see Chapter 
four). Obviously both the theory and methods used very directly 
influence the transposition of the social reality which is recorded. 
The chapter begins therefore by considering some of the more general 
problems in fieldwork and how they were related to fieldwork in 
Ballymacarrett. It further considers the relationship between theory, 
method and substantive claims in participant obseivation, the main 
information gathering technique used. 
My research was orientated'by a theoretical interest in political 
ideology and the way in which political action is sanctioned and 
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understood within certain communities. The exampleý chosen was the 
social and political consciousness of a section of Belfast's 
Protestant working class. This was investigated by identifying those 
elements which are most relevant in creating and maintaining, the 
various components of PKC ideology. It was particularly concerned 
with how PKC consciousness affected peoples' attitudes not only to the 
major political issues in Norther Ireland but also how it determined 
relevance in areas of day to day life. Underlying this it sought to 
identify divisions based on class within the Unionist block and to 
understand how these contradictions within classes were made relevant 
in the context of political and economic divisions. 
Concerns at this level of analysis led to the adoption of the 
method of participant observation and the use of depth interviews as 
my major tool of empirical method. This was supplemented by a small 
scale structured questionnaire and these supplemented theoretical and 
historical inquiry. As in many anthropological studies there was in 
my case a Oprima facieO argument for employing the research methods I 
did. Quite simply many of the activists within Ballymacarrett were 
active, in paramilitary organisations, or in other community based 
groupings who often had close links with paramilitary organisations. 
Even if they were in party political groupings they often had to play 
a complex role in mediating between those active in Ballymacarrett in 
other organisations. In the case of the former it was unfeasible to 
survey or formally interview many of these people, or in the latter 
grouping structured interviews simply couldnot draw out the multitude 
of reasons to explain their reasons for taking on their Opublic role'. 
To obtain any meaningful response frpm, such individuals meant entering 
and establishing myself in the community (in basic terms 'winning 
their trust'). If this had not been done it seemed unlikely that the 
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response to interviews would have been meaningful. It was only after 
considerable' time in Ballymacarrett that I attempted to conduct a 
small scale structured questionnaire survey. Indeed it was only after 
the' same period that, I began to suggest conducting and then taping 
, depth interviews, with individuals, some of whom I had met on several 
occasions before. 
The Setting of the Research 
In all I spent 12 months in Ballymacarrett. Initially I was faced 
with the traditional problem of many wishing to employ anthropological 
methods, that of making contacts in a community which is at best 
semi-closed, both geographically and culturally. obviously in any 
social setting it is impossible to observe everything or interview 
everyone. my initial selection of a' research site -was reasonably 
unproblematic. As I was concerned with the relationship between - 
class, identity and social and -political *consciousness the research 
site had to include a large aggregate of urban working class. As 
Belfast is Northern Ireland's only large industrial city it was the 
obvious choice. The choice of exact location was determined by two 
other considerations. Firstly, -the only other ethnographic studies 
of a PWC community are largely located in the Shankill Road in the 
west of the city (Weiner 1980,. Nelson 1984). As such they had several 
special features, namely: the 'Shankill, is highly symbolic in 
loyalist culture, it has a long and direct interface with neighbouring 
Catholic di stricts, its political representatives have a higher than 
usual independent tradition, and finally the most influential 
paramilitary grouping is the UVF., Counter to this, Ballymacarrett is 
overwhelmingly Unionist/Protestant. The only Catholic/Nationalist 
area -on the east side of the city being the Short Strand. It also 
contains much of what remains of the old shipyard community with its 
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associated traditional patterns of kin and social structure. - Since 
the mid 1970's there has been a marked increase in, activity by the 
parliamentary Democratic Unionist Party and the UDA is by far the most 
influential paramilitary grouping. 
Once I had decided where to do research, the next major decision 
was 'who' to research. It obviously was not easy for the outsider to 
determine just who was active in parliamentary and paramilitary 
organisations in Ballymacarrett, (the second grouping being more 
difficult to identify than the first). I attempted to resolve this by 
means of snowball sampling, whereby informants are used by the 
researcher to introduce other members of the group. This method has 
been successfully employed by several researchers seeking to interview 
'sensitive, groupings (cf Plant 1975, West 1980, McCall 1980, Hoffman 
1980). Key contacts not only provided detailed data on the research 
setting but also introductions to other contacts, to people in other 
organisations and to other situations. my major problem was to set 
the 'snowball' rolling. I -adopted two main routes. Firstly I wrote 
to all the local- councillors for East Belfast. Secondly I 
re-established some contacts I had made the previous year while 
working on a research project studying community groups for the 
Department of Education (NI) (McAuley 1983a, 1983b) I had decided not 
to make any formal approaches to paramilitary groups but hopefully to 
make contacts through introductions and snowballing interviews. At 
first the strategy seemed to be failing. Although I had some success 
in making contact with community workers I had no response from those 
belonging to political organisations. After several weeks a DUP 
councillor agreed to meet, in fact he contacted me by telephone. 
Thereafter I had little problem making contacts. Not only did the 
councillor set up directly several other interviews but others whom I 
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had approached agreed to an interview. Although I'was never able to 
confirm it, it seems my ever obvious presence in the district was 
legitimised by that initial interview. It is possible of course that 
the use of keyý-contacts can actually close-of f situations. Contacts 
have a central gate-keeping role as they facilitate access for the 
researcher. It was the use of keyý-contacts however which gave me 
access not only to others but legitimised ray presence at group 
meetings, such as housing associations or political party branch 
meetings, where I could expand on my range of contacts and often talk 
to people not known to the key contact on anything other than a casual 
basis. Although it is far from comprehensive Fig 3.1 illustrates the 
way in which contacts were made through snowballing interviews. 
Events 
According to Schatzman and Strauss (1973) it is vital for 
fieldworkers to distinguish between three discrete types of events 
they may encounter. These are the routine, the special and the 
untoward. Within this thesis I have tried to give examples of the 
significance of each. By routine events Schatzman and Strauss mean 
events which regularly occur. Here I have discussed the significance 
of everyday events in Ballymacarrett in the socialisation process and 
image building within that commmity. Special events are defined as 
situations which are fortuitous but can be anticipated. In this 
context I have discussed the confrontations over housing in 
Ballymacarrett and the 1985 local council elections. Finally untoward 
events are defined as emergency situations and Chapter nine of the 
thesis discusses in detail loyalist reaction in Ballymacarrett to the 
signing of the Anglo-Irish agreement in November 1985. 
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Participant observation and conventional problems : The case of 
Ballymacarrett 
much has been written about 'how to do field -research?, without 
any definite answer to that question. It may well be possible that to 
search for a specific guide to doing research is in itself futile. As 
Freilich states, 
"No specific techniques exist to help the young 
ethnographer transform a group of hostile natives into 
friendly informants; no specific and operationally 
useful rules exist for translating raw data into 
information that is meaningful for anthropological 
analysis; and no specific techniques exist for drawing 
productive generalisations from such information" 
(Freilich 1977 p. 15) 
Nevertheless, no matter which tactics are adopted by the researcher 
they must overcome a number of conventional problems associated with 
fieldwork. one of the primary concerns must be that the perceptions 
and interpretations of the research will be contingent on the values 
of the researcher. It is argued that the intellectual make-up of the 
sociologist determines the type of judgement attached to events. At 
its most negative, it suggests that the data collected may be corrupt 
or invalid because the researcher's findings have been subject to the 
particular outlook of the researcher, who might be biased, culturally 
or ideologically. It is therefore suggested that the researcher's 
'findings' may bear little relationship to the reality of the actors 
social world. The problem is usually seen as being resolved by 
treating the researcher as a variable and by some overt declaration by 
the researcher of those facets which the author believes may influence 
their perceptions. Thus at this point it would be normal for me to 
declare that I am from a PWC background in Belfast, a socialist and so 
on. However I tend to agree with Burton that such an approach while 
honourable remains problematic, if not naive. As Burton explains, 
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"In the first instance, who defines what elements of a 
researcher's personality are relevant? Second, all the 
sincerity in the world does not remove the possibility 
of the theorist's operating with 'biases' he is not 
aware of. We rarely do see ourselves as others see us. 
But the most important objection is that the mere 
stating of one's 'position, is an entirely different 
matter to weighting the effect that an individual's 
biography has on the monographs he produces. A problem 
is not resolved by admitting it exists" 
(Burton 1978: 168) 
It would be futile of course to claim that once an observer joins 
a social situation that they can hold that situation static or 
constant. I was not (nor would I have wished to be, even if it were 
possible), simply an external observer. my observation was interlaced 
with periods of participation. For example, at various times during 
my fieldwork I acted as 'secretary'-at a Housing Association meeting, 
helped deliver copies of the UDA magazine 'Ulster, and helped out with 
phone calls and enquiries at the DUP advice centre in Ballymacarrett. 
At such times a few people knew that'I was conducting research (or 
'writing a book, ), but the vast majority did not. Mostly however' I, 
did not indulge in covert participation, because of the physical 
dangers involved. The traditional fieldwork methods of nipping into 
back rooms and making notes, could easily be misunderstood in Belfast. 
There was another reason for adopting an overt approach. The central 
problems in participant observation are not solved by covert 
participation. No matter which, role the researcher createsý (or is 
assigned) it will affect the quality, of the social interaction with 
respondents. If the role makes the researcher aloof then they are in 
great danger of missing much useful material. If the role means they 
are to I go native' there is the danger of over romanticising the 
actions and behaviour of those involved. I tried therefore to adopt 
an approach somewhere between the two. There are of course further 
problems to be aware of here. The researcher, may make acquaintances 
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and contacts which mean his or her acceptance by others is limited, or 
even excluded. on the other hand, however, if the researcher tries to 
be all things to all people, with contacts in all the different social 
worlds of the milieu studied, he or she is likely to remain 'marginal' 
to all these events. Developing the researcher's role is dependent on 
many of the same factors as other relationships. Factors such as time 
spent in other persons, company and the personalities of both 
researcher and researched. The building of trust involves creating a 
situation where people become more and more willing to give 
information. As Whyte (1981) pointed out, the type of information a 
sociologist is given, is contingent upon the type of person they are. 
Consequently I undertook the research with the assumption that if I 
put up -a f ront, people would recognise it as just that. I tried (as 
far as me has to try) to simply be myself'. obviously this may well 
have upset some people who no doubt took a dislike to me. on the 
other hand, it hopefully endeared me or at least made me seem 
accessible to some others. Being oneself' involved talking to people 
and projecting one's views, not as dominant, but as a form of 
generating discussion. Again no doubt, airing ray own views, may well 
have closed off several contacts, but hopefully it created responses 
from others. The vast array of social skills necessary to undertake 
social research cannot be learnt from textbooks. There is no 
prescribed set of rules concerning tact, on the spot decision making 
and the politics of research. The researcher is better to 'be 
themselves, than to play a role of being a neutral' observer. Many 
sociologists have shown just how fraught with difficulties reseach is. 
As Hughes put it, 
"The observer, in greater or less degree, is caught up 
in the very web of social interaction which he observes, 
analyses and reports. Even if he observes through a 
peephole, he plays a role: that of spy. And when he 
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reports his observations made thus he becomes a kind of 
informer. If he observes in the role of a member of the 
group, he may be considered a traitor the moment he 
reports. Even the historian, who works upon documents 
get caught in a role problem when he reports, unless 
there is no person alive who might identify himself with 
the people or social group concerned. -The hatred 
occassionally visited upon the debunking historian is 
visited almost daily upon the person who reports on the 
behaviour of people he has lived among; and it is not so 
much the writing of the report, as the very act of 
thinking in such objective terms that disturbs the 
people observed. It is a violation of apparently shared 
secrets and sentiments. " 
(Hughes, 1960: xii) 
Field research itself is a social process in which the researcher 
plays a major role. However it is necessary not onlyýto focus upon 
the level of intrusion the researcher makes up the setting studied but 
also upon justifying why the researchers comments are the ones that 
they are. 
Analysing Field Data 
. Another major problem is therefore any potential abuse in writing 
up, and after the fact explanations. This can involve ignoring 
material which does not fit in with desire for reporting material in a 
conceptually tight way. Results produced by participant observation 
can be rewritten, reworked and reshaped. As Malinowski explained when 
studying the Kula ring, 
"In fact I have written up an outline of the Kula 
institution at least half a dozen times. while in the 
field and in the intervals between my expeditions. Each 
time new problems and difficulties presented 
themselves. " 
_(Malinowski 
1922: Ch 18) 
During the course of my fieldwork I amassed a variety of, data from 
different sources. The data originated not only from different 
sources but from distinctly different types of intrusion. For 
example, through the use of a social survey I attempted to gather 
information on such areas as population, social structure, marriage 
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patterns and political perspectives. In broad terms this was an 
attempt to establish the general characteristics of Ballymacarrett. 
Another source ofýdata was comparing respondents' statements with 
observed behaviour. This allows the researcher to compare material 
relating to specific incidents' and identify structural, and social 
reasons underlying various types of behaviour. It is thus possible to 
begin to construct a multifaceted model of the community studied. 
Statements and actions can then be evaluated according to an 
individual's social position, organisational membership etc. The 
internal logic of local social systems can be uncovered and by the use 
of case studies, for example, the 1985 local council elections, can be 
used to validate the deductions made by the researcher concerning 
political support. I also introduced case study material to try and 
deal with changes over time. PKC identity and culture is often 
presented as static, as frozen in time. Loyalist identity results 
from events which took place before I was in the field and part of the 
analysis was therefore retrospective to show how present behaviour 
forms part of a sequence of events. Indeed a major characteristic of 
Ballymacarrett is the strength of shared identity, values and beliefs. 
The 'tool' for this was the depth interview. A series of 
conversations where respondents were asked to relate, in their own 
terms, experience and attitudes which were relevant to PWC social 
consciousness. Depth interviews provided, 
"the opportunity for the researcher to probe deeply, to 
uncover new clues, to open up new dimensions of a 
problem and to secure vivid, accurate, inclusive 
accounts that are based on personal experience. " 
(Burgess 1982: 107) 
The researcher is not constrained by rigid questionnaire design, 
designed to ensure that the same questions are asked of all 
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respondents in exactly the same manner. Depth interviews were used to 
develop the implications of data which emerged. 
All research means making choices. Such choices depend on the 
nature of the research topic, on the particular information sought 
about the topic, on whichever model, or theoretical perspective is 
adopted by the researcher and the research setting. Something which I 
hadn't fully appreciated was that research is also dependent upon very 
practical concerns such as time, energy and indeed money available to 
do research. There are numerous methods researchers can construct for 
themselves for analysing data. We all use routines and tools'which we 
have found and feel comfortable with. I would make no claim for this 
to be, or to have followed a best, method of undertaking research. 
What I tried to do was to follow a programme which made it possible to 
make sense of the ways in which others make sense of their realities. 
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FIGURE 3.1 AN EXWLE OF 'SNOWBALLING' INTERVIEWS AND CONTACTS IN 
BALMOMMETT. 
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The Survey of Ballymacarrett Residents 
The kind of participant observation outlined above seeks to 
explain particular local facts by reference to their involvement in a 
complex set of interconnected variables that the observer then 
constructs as a theoretical or descriptive model which best explains 
the data assembled. 
I decided to try and formalise this, through the use of a 
questionnaire, and survey data. There was another reason for 
conducting a small scale survey. There was the possibility that 
participant observation may have produced 'biased' results because it 
may focus upon those most active, and 'public' in any given social 
situation. The major purpose of the survey was to provide background 
and context to the qualitative material in the thesis. The target 
sample was 300, taken from the electoral register for the two 
innermost wards of East Belfast, Ballyrnacarrett and Mount. The main 
results of this survey are presented in -Chapter seven. The 
questionnaire itself is reproduced as Appendix A. 
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CHAPTER F(XJR SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF BALL)MMUlRETT 
The main task of this chapter is ethnographic. It will outline 
the social and physical structure of the study area, Ballymacarrett. 
This will provide important background information which will make the 
content of subsequent chapters understandable. The descriptive 
material seeks to present the overall sense of 'community', allowing 
the latter chapters to draw on the ethnographic material presented. 
This chapter also portrays an important theoretical position. This is 
the inter-relationship between a pre-existing common culture and 
social change. - What is sociologically important about the study area 
is the manner in which it has reacted as a community to the 
contemporary phase of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The community 
of Ballymacarrett has been- threatened by redevelopment, physical and 
social change, physical and social conflict. Under these dramatically 
changing circumstances the existing social structure plays a central 
role in the reaction to events and the development of organisations 
articulating reaction to such change. 
The area chosen for study is inner East Belfast, known locally as 
'Ballymacarrett', after the original townland on the east bank of the 
river Lagan. The area is roughly covered by the innermost wards of 
the Pottinger local electoral district. There are several reasons for 
choosing this area,, 
(i) It contains a large concentration of the urban working class 
(ii) Parts of the district are in direct (physical) contact with 
a Catholic working class area. 
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(iii) It contains much of what , remains of the old shipyard 
community, and provides important evidence of the breakdown 
of that commmity and is directly relevant to examining 
notions of a tlabour aristocracy'. 
Uv) The area has a political tradition of both labour and 
independent unionist representation. 
(v) Since 1979 there has been a marked increase in electoral 
support for and activity by the Democratic Unionist Party in 
the area. 
To understand fully the key features of life in the area it is 
necessary to examine the historical development of Ballymacarret, its 
cultural tradition, and the degree of physical segregation which 
recent population movements and conflicts over territorial boundaries 
have emphasised. 
At the beginning of the 19th century, Belfast was a small town 
with a population of under 20,000. The 'Falls', 'Shankill't 
'Andersonstown, and 'Malone, districts of the town were mostly rural. 
So too was Ballymacarret which was in reality a distinct entity, 
linked to Belfast by the long bridge'. The exception to this was a 
small industrial complex which had grown up at the 'Bridge End'. 
Around 1830, Belfast began to grow rapidly and it expanded to 
around 50,000. An important feature at the time was high levels of 
migration from rural districts. This was compounded by the effects of 
the 'Famine,, which forced many to flee to Belfast, Ireland's only 
industrial city. - The route many took was down the 'Lurgan corridor' 
through Lisburn and into Belfast by its western and southern 
approaches. There the rapidly industrialising Falls and Shankill 
absorbed many of the newcomers. This is one reason why Ballymacarret 
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traditionally has had such a small Catholic population. Few of the 
substantial number of Roman Catholic migrants to Belfast ventured 
across the river, and those who did, remained encamped in a small 
enclave, immediately on its eastern bank. 
By the mid 19th century Belfast was a 'boom town'. Between 1835 
and 1850 the population doubled and in the next 50 years it increased 
four-fold. As Jones notes, the period, 
"saw rows of artisans' houses spreading rapidly 
westwards and bursting over the Lagan to Ballymacarrett; 
a minor port became a major one in this half century, 
linen manufacturing became a symbol, and shipbuilding 
grew from nothing to challenge the great shipyards of 
the entire world". 
(Jones 1967: 109) 
The stage for such phenomenal growth had been set during the 
previous 30 years. During this time linen had replaced cotton as the 
major manufacturing industry, especially as the American civil war had 
significantly restricted the supply of cotton. The increased 
mechanisation of the industry provided much of the catalyst for the 
growth of engineering in response to the demands for the provision and 
repair of machinery. 
In the absence of any natural raw materials, pressure. on Belfast's 
port facilities grew and in the 1850's shipbuilding was transferred to 
the east side of the river. Ballymacarrett had now been joined to 
Belfast by two new bridges and had been almost completely absorbed 
into the city. As Brett describes it, 
"row upon row of working class houses spread up the hill 
sides and across the sloblands of Ballymacarrett". 
(Brett 1967: 124) 
Ballymacarret became synonomous with engineering and in particular 
shipbuilding as it developed along Connswater. In particular Harland 
and Wolff shipbuilders attracted workers not only from the west of the 
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city but from other British industrial centres such as Clydeside and 
Merseyside. 
This migration had important-consequences as Bardon explains, 
"The working class remained packed into the warrens of 
Ballymacarrett, the Docks, North Queen Street and 
Fredrick Street, Millfield, Smithfield, the lower 
Shankill, the Pound and Sandy Row. Most were recent 
immigrants and they had chosen where they had settled 
with care. Belfast has been described as a collection 
of villages; certainly, almost self contained 
communities clustered round the mill but the invisible 
dividing lines running through these districts were 
primarily a reflection of sectarianism imported from the 
Ulster countryside". 
(Bardon, 1982: 107) 
One of these 'clusters, was predominately Catholic and settled in the 
'Docks' on either side of the Lagan. This provided the locat ion for 
the only significant Roman Catholic population in Ballymacarrett. In 
1824 the decision was taken to form the parish of Ballymacarrett and 
build a Protestant church. The circular issued stated, 
"The parish of Knockbreda contains a population of eight 
thousand and three persons of which number two thousand 
five hundred are computed to be members of the 
established church. Four thousand belong to different 
sects of Protestants and one thousand five hundred are 
Roman Catholic". 
(cited in Redmond, 1960: 2) 
Then as now Catholics were physically concentrated within an area to 
the west of the townland of Ballymacarret - now known as 'Short 
Strand,. 
__ 
When in 1884, St. Matthews, the local Roman Catholic church 
was built, Ballymacarrett's Catholic population was 3,100 (Redmond, 
1960: 5). 
A further feature of city life was a series of outbreaks of 
sectarian rioting. These first occured during the 1832 election 
campaign. Serious trouble however largely by-passed the east of the 
City at this time, and remained concentrated on the boundary between 
the 'Protestant' Sandy row and the 'Catholic' Pound districts in West 
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Belfast. A further series of riots in 1845,1857, and 1863 forced a 
clear pattern of demarcation along sectarian lines. As many native 
workers reacted to the perceived threat of continued -migration of 
Catholic workers (Boal 1980) working class neighbourhoods in Belfast 
took on a recognisable form as the city rapidly industrialised. This 
entailed the development of distinct local social structures and 
segregation between Catholic and Protestant workers (Gibbon 1976). 
The relations between Catholic and Protestant workers worsened in 
the latter part of the 19th century and the early part of the 
twentieth century as the ideologies of Unionism and Nationalism began 
to take shape. ' It was during this period that cultural differences 
became crystalised into a social division of labour. As Gibbon points 
out, i 
"the development of ethnic from purely local 
hostilities was to prove one of the decisive conditions 
of the success of conservatism and nationalism among the 
Belfast working class". 
(Gibbon'1976: 85) 
By the time Belfast city expanded-its boundaries in 1896, the 'Falls' 
and 'Smithfield, wards in the west were predominant 'Catholic' and 
'Victoria' in East Belfast was overwhelmingly Protestant. The dual 
features of industrialisation and sectarianism created patterns of 
residential segregation which were identifiable, in Belfast up until 
the outbreak of the contemporary phase of the conflict. 
Throughout that period the Short Strand remained the only 
significant concentration of Roman Catholics in East Belfast. During 
the 1950s however there had been a general, if limited process of 
integration in Ballymacarrett. This continued in the 1960s with the 
building of new housing estates on the East and South fringes-of the 
city. 
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At the outbreak of the current phase of the conflict, 
Ballymacarrett contained a broadly integrated area,, of both Catholic 
and Protestant-residents, around the Short Strand inferface (Poole and 
Boal and murray, 1976; Boal, 1975,1975). However following a series 
of riots in 1969 and 1970, sectarian residential patterns quickly 
re-emerged. As one man who lived on an estate in outer East Belfast 
explained, 
"we cleared that lot (Roman Catholics) out of here early 
on, most of them jumped on a lorry one weekend and ran 
to the Short Strand" 
(Mark, East Belfast resident) 
This process reached a climax in August 1971, when following the 
introduction of internment there was heightened conflict on the 
streets. The sectarian residential patterns were concentrated, as 
intimidation, both physical and psychological was widespread. As 
Darby notes, 
"Protestants who left their homes tended to move to 
, safe' estates on the outskirts of the city and to other 
parts of the province. Catholics crowded into the 
already over-populated Catholic areas especially West 
Belfast and the Short Strand". 
(Darby 1986: 1959) 
By 1972, seventy one percent of Protestant households resided in 
streets that were almost entirely Protestant; sixty six percent of 
Catholics resided in streets that were almost exclusively Catholic. 
(Boal, Pode and Murray 1976: 77). As a Belfast housing manager 
explained, 
"Although before August 1969 the different religions 
lived in separate areas, the lines of demarcation had 
become blurred, mainly through the movement of Catholics 
into Protestant districts. After that August the trend 
was reversed and we moved about 1,200 Catholic families 
out of Protestant areas. Then the lines were drawn more 
sharply than ever before". 
(The Times 18/9/1971) 
Ballymacarrett as elsewhere experienced this phase of the conflict, 
which was characterised by widespread intimidation between Catholics 
I- II 89 
and Protestants. In a short period following 1969 the mixed, areas 
surrounding the Short Strand-Ballymacarrett interface evaporated. 
These became sectarian divides separating ethnically homogeneous areas 
in Ballymacarrett. These sectarian demarcation lines became more 
clear cut as continued street violence saw the destruction of private 
housing, pubs, halls and shops in the intermediate zone. The 
'frontier' between 'Cathol ic 
_Short 
Strand, and 'Protestant East 
Belfast' was bounded by the Newtownards Road and Alberthridge Road to 
the south and north, and by Templemore Avenue and the River Lagan to 
the East and West (see map 4.1). The divisions were institutionalised 
in July 1970 when the British army erected a series of semi permanent 
barricades around Short Strand following a series of violent conflicts 
between residents and loyalists. 
One of these incidents, the events surrounding an extending period 
of gunfire on 2 June 1970, r- emains deeply impressed on the 
consciousness of Protestants in Ballymacarret. Following a night of 
petrol bombing, rioting and intermittent gunfire, heavier gunfire 
broke out and aeveloped into an extended Igunbattle' between 
nationalists in the Short Strand and loyalists on the Newtownards and 
Woodstock Roads. In the confrontation two Protestants were killed. 
This incident was referred to by several of the older residents who 
alleged that gunmen had been firing from the spire of the local Roman 
Catholic Church, St'. Matthew's. Indeed one resident considered the 
incident as central to his attitudes concerning the situation in 
Northern Ireland, as he explained, 
"I was a moderate man up till that night. But after I 
seen what happened it changed me. I'm getting on now 
(growing older) but ever there's the chance to get rid 
of them (Short Strand residents) I'll be at the front of 
the charge". 
(Bert, Ballymacarrett resident) 
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Bert further explained, that our boys' (loyalist paramilitaries) had 
on that night shot several of the -nationalist gurmen but these had 
been 'smuggled out' of the church by priests, and residents of the 
Short Strand. 
There is little evidence to support the allegations. However what 
I is important is that the incident has become a historical reference 
in the local community. It was referred to with equal authority by 
older residents and those who could not possibly have been-old enough 
to have actually experienced it. Such 'community myths' are far from 
unique to Ballymacarrett. These reference points are the building 
blocks from which working, class Protestants construct their social 
world. They fom part of the conceptual and material backdrop"against 
which much social behaviour-must be understood. 
unlike other areas which have been studied, such 'as the 
Shankill-Falls interface (Boal 1978) or the Suffolk Estate (Darby 
1986) the situation in East Belfast is not one where'Unionist and 
Nationalist 'heartlands, -meet and come into physical confrontation. 
The Short Strand is a peripheral nationalist area in Belfast. As a 
Catholic resident of West Belfast graphically explained, 
"If trouble breaks out you could find safety anywhere on 
the Falls - this does not apply to the Short Strand 
where there are one hundred thousand Protestants all' 
around them". 
(cited in Boal 1978: 76) 
Unlike other Protestant communities in the city, Ballymacarrett has 
never been perceived by its inhabitants as being under direct physical 
threat. Physical location is partly the reason why Ballymacarrett has 
not experienced the strength of community identity comparable to that 
of Protestant communities in west Belfast (cf Weiner 1980, Nelson 
1984). 
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Nevertheless Ballymacarrett does have a strong community identity 
built up over several generations and located in kin, class, religion, 
residence and occupation. Although no specific study of East Belfast 
exists it can be reasonably suggested that community identity there 
was similar to other traditional loyalist working class areas in the 
city. These communities were densly populated and in many cases 
practically self contained. Their social structure was organised 
around the extended family, close friendship networks, geographical 
stability and cultural homogeneity (Crawford, 1987, Devlin 1981, 
Weiner 1980: 70-71, Munck and Rolson, 1987, Hammond 1986: 12.35). The 
position has no doubt been somewhat romanticised. The description 
should also include such everyday events in working class communities 
as wife beating, family conflicts, unemployment and other types of 
dependency. Neverthless such communities did provide some form of 
supportive environment for collective dissent, making much life public 
through a plethora of shared beliefs, values, tradition and shared 
'knowledge' or -world view which were held as a common possession of 
the group. 
The development of physically segregated areas between Protestants 
and Catholics also entailed the development of distinct local social 
structures and district cultures. The values of this culture are 
imposed on all- aspects of experience: not merely physically, in the 
networks of streets, housing, pubs etc, but also socially in the 
common culture outlined above. This sectarian culture is not 
confined to the ideological sphere but it is also embodied in concrete 
social institutions, in education, politics, work and leisure which 
reflect and/or determine ideological differences. 
Before the outbreak of the contemporary phase of the conflict, the 
Northern Irish state had been widely perceived as resting upon an 
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essentially paternalistic relationship between the Unionist 
bourgeoisie and PKC(Probert 1978: 48-56, Griffiths 1979: 165-68). The 
belief of Protestant workers that their livelihood rested upon support 
for the Stormont government, the Unionist Party and the orange order 
was encouraged by the middle and upper class leaders of those 
organisations especially at election time. one loyalist paramilitary 
member describes the scene, 
"Coal lorries bedecked with union jacks and carrying 
flute bands appeared as if by magic. Unionist 
candidates (they were always Orangemen) would appeal to 
the working class electorate with impassioned pleas. 
They always resurrected the border issue along with the 
orange card, and our people would turn up on polling day 
voting en masse for an Orangeman. These same candidates 
would then disappear for another four years, leaving us 
in the belief that Catholics were second class 
citizens' and we had more going for us as Protestants% 
(S. Sloan, Fortnight No. 185: 18) 
It was within this system that sectarian ideology was powerfully 
reproduced. Boyd in an autobiographical work recounts part of his 
early socialisation, 
"Fight for Billy', 'Fight for Billy', 'Fight for the 
Cock o1the Northil That was one of our best songs, and 
we used to shout it at the top of our voices as we 
paraded-along the smelly back entrys in defiance of the 
Catholics who were preparing to attack us. That none of 
us had ever seen a Catholic or knew anything about the 
'Cock of the North' didn't matter in the least. 
Somewhere near us there was a big fight going on and we 
Protestants wanted to be on the winning side". 
(Boyd 1985: 176) 
This socialisation into sectarianism is reinforced by each, community's 
ignorance of the others life patterns. 'A small collection-of 
biographies and- oral histories of childhood in working class 
Protestant areas is now developing. one of these describes attitudes 
in Belfast in the late 1950s, 
"Our ignorance of the Catholic world was profound. I, 
for instance believed that Mickeys existed only in parts 
of Belfast and nowhere else except the Free State and 
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Rome itself. That many Catholics were living in London, 
or were allowed to live in London with our Protestant 
King seemed impossible. 
(Harbinson 1960 131: 132) 
Such attitudes seem to have changed little in contemporary 
Ballymacarrett. one woman told me, 
"It's the Catholic church son, they cause trouble 
wherever they get a foothold. Look at Poland there was 
never any trouble there till they started. " 
(Greta, resident) 
Another was equally concerned to lay the blame for the troubles on the 
nationalist community. 
"Its bred into them, they're taught to hate us. They're 
bitter. They've ruined this country. No-matter what 
they get they wreck'it. They're taught when they grow 
up to wreck this place so they get an All-Ireland. 
(Mike, retired shipyard worker) 
Central to the understanding of day to day life in-'East Belfast is 
an understanding of the social relations of loyalism and sectarianism. 
It is these relations which underlie attitudes both within 
Ballymacarrett and between local residents and the wider society. '-It 
is also these relations which provide the conceptual -background 
against which basic social divisions can be understood. 
Sectarianism in its contemporary form, is located in a strong 
common identity'and manifests itself in the high levels. of physical 
and social segregation. 'Loyalist' Ballymacarrett is cemented by 
strong traditions, which are institutional i sed, and a common view of 
the 'enemy, based on a common perception of histroy. ' This history 
(i. e. floyalist history') is highly selective (as is' 'Republican 
history'). Several commentators have pointed out the way in which 
history is put to use in everyday life. - (Burton 1978: 39, Barritt and 
Booth 1972: 1. Hickie and Elliott 1971: 33). - As Rose'suggests, 
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"Ireland is almost a1and without history because the 
troubles of the past are relived as contemporary 
events". 
(Rose 1971: 75) 
It is possible to give a brief outline of the main reference points 
for the construction of contemporary loyalist ideology. Such an 
outline is of course both crude and over simplified. Nevertheless it 
will introduce several of the major themes in terms of which loyalist 
attitudes developed and found expression. It concentrates on the 
situation since the mid-1960s and indeed these are the most frequently 
referred-to events by those respondents interviewed which are reported 
on in the following chapters. The particular and specific awareness 
and understanding of these events orders loyalist sectarian 
consciousness in Ballymacarrett. 
The passing of Northern Ireland's premiership from Lord 
Brookeborough to Terence O'Neill in 1963 seemed to mark a turning 
point in Unionism away from an overtly discriminatory state towards 
modernity. O'Neill's limited modernisation plans were accepted by a 
growing Catholic middle class. This reconstruction, became linked 
with the formation of a reform movement which began to articulate 
itself around demands for the dismantling of the more overt Unionist 
institutions. Such changes however were far from uniformly welcomed. 
major tensions emerged within Unionism between those who, supported 
O'Neill's policies and those who strenuously opposed his conciliatory 
actions as undermining their traditional position. In 1964 Belfast 
saw the worst riots and street confrontations since the 1930s. These 
events were precipitated by the flying of a Republican emblem and 
brought to centre stage a totally obscure Protestant cleric, the Rev. 
Ian Paisley who along with his-followers reacted with hostility to the 
visit of the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic. During 1966 the 
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first political murders for many years took place in Belfast and the 
emergence of what appeared to be an organised but underground example 
of loyalist resistance was manifested. 
By 1967 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) had 
developed from the reform movement and proceeded to articulate middle 
class grievances, particularly concerning unfair housing allocation 
and an unfair system of voting rights at local government level. The 
Northern Irish state reacted strongly mobilizing the IBI specials, an 
exclusively Protestant reserve security force organised along 
paramilitary lines. By mid 1969 the liberal faction had lost its 
control of the Unionist party. By August, following widespread street 
violence in Derry and Belfast the. British Army was called in by the N. 
Irish prime minister James Chichester-Clark. He had replaced O'Neill 
after the latter's resignation following the general election which. 
O'Neill had called in a futile attempt to isolate his opposition 
within Unionism. 
Violence escalated as the British Army became involved in 
'Policing'. Conflict with the IRA became overt as they began to 
reorganise and re-arm. following their stand down in 1962, after -a 
border campaign had been abandoned due to lack of support. This phase 
culminated in the introduction of interment without trial in August 
1971, following which there was widespread and prolonged violence in 
nationalist areas. The early 1970's saw an escalation as violent act 
followed upon violent act, including the Provisional IRA's bombing 
campaign against civilian, targets and the loyalist assassination 
campaign against equally civilian' individuals. 
In the spring of 1971 Brian Faulkner replaced Chichester-Clark as 
Northern Ireland's Prime minister. His short lived premiership is 
best characterised as a series of ýtotally contradictory political 
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initiatives. In March 1972 westminster suspended Stormont and imposed 
direct rule. 
Following this, local vigilante associations in many Protestant 
districts began to amalgamate to form the Ulster, Defence Association 
which quickly boasted 40,000 members (Flackes 1980: 229). ' The 
organisation was created 'largely in 'response, to the- continued 
Provisional campaign. This development seemed legitimate to many 
working class loyalists given their social construction of the world. 
The following statement captures well the general feeling, 
"Uncertainty aroused great fear among Protestants that 
their presumed millenium, of Stormont solidarity secured 
by whatever the government of the day might impose under 
the Special Powers Act under the Protection of 
Westminster Statute - and the convention of Westminster blind eyes- was suddenly vulnerable. " 
(McKeown 1984: 44) 
The deteriorating relationship between the British administration and 
the Protestant working class was characterised by illegal marches, 
industrial stoppages and the setting up of loyalist 'no-go' areas for 
security forces, -such as the one, centered around Dee Street in 
Ballymacarrett. Politically the UDA marked a departure in Northern 
Irish politics. It was, and, as we shall, see in a later chapter, has 
remained essentially a working class movement, often acting outside 
the arena of traditional unionism and party politics. 
In 1973, the Northern Ireland Assembly met. It was a 
'power-sharing, administration, in that ý it included members of the 
Catholic, opposition, the Social Democratic 'and Labour Party on its 
executive body. It faced widespread resistance, both from the 
Provisionals and Unionists, the latter's interests co-ordinated by 
Politicians such as Ian Paisley and Bill Craig. In May 1974, ' the 
Ulster Workers Council, an ad hoc organisation based largely in the 
shipyards and power stations, along with the UDA organised a general 
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'strike' by Protestant workers. It forced the power sharing executive 
to resign within 14. days. 
Since then the general situation has been one of political 
stalemate. In 1975 the report of the constitutional convention, set up 
with a majority of loyalist members, demanded a return to Unionist 
Government from Stormont. In 1980 a round table conference succeeded 
only in further dividing unionism. The Northern Ireland Assembly ran 
its 'Course and was, abandoned in 1986, having again failed to win 
cross-comuLmity support or produce any hint of compromise. Direct 
rule by a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, responsible to the 
Westminster Goverment was established and continues to this date. 
The Secretary of State-is supported by a local goverment organisation 
largely administered through executive boards, responsible either-for 
education or health and social services and appointed by the Secretary 
of State. Local councils have little real power with most public 
service functions being controlled by central goverment agencies such 
as the Northern Ireland Housing Executive who are responsible for 
housing. 
The latest initiatives have concerned the, Anglo-Irish agreement 
signed between the British and Irish governments in November 1985. 
The events surrounding this and loyalist reaction to it will be dealt 
with in detail in Chapter eight. In overall terms the -Anglo-Irish 
agreement must be seen as a continuation of the above process. The 
signing of the agreement was interpreted within loyalist history, as 
yet another lost battle. Indeed in November 1985 it was projected'by 
many unionists as the ultimate defeat. 
The above account is of course partial. However it is by 
selective reference to these events that- the world of Protestant 
working class people in Ballymacarrett is constructed. One example of 
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this is that the UWC strike which was used as a constant reference 
point by people when expressing their opinions or creating their own 
self portraits. The 'Big Strike', as it was usually referred to, to 
distinguish it from the failed strike of 1977, or the many one day 
strikes which have occurred, has become a dominant folk memory in 
Ballymacarrett. Despite evidence of widespread intimidation the 'Big 
Strike' is now remembered as one where loyalists took control of their 
own destiny and saved Northern Ireland from destruction. As one man 
expressed it, 
"that was the last time we won anything. The Protestant 
people took control". 
(Mike, retired shipyard worker, May 1985) 
This 'sectarian socialisation' is not however all embracing. The 
development of a distinct sectarian culture which binds together 
loyalists is cross-cut by external forces. The structure of work and 
workplace links the local labour force to wider economic institutions. 
The overall effects of these cross-pressures is to create conditions 
which scnially are highly complex. Williams (1983) has called the 
general process bonding, and goes on to say that, 
"the institution of modem industry, especially in the 
most modem aggregated forms of factory, mill, mine, 
dock, shipyard has produced in otherwise diverse 
cultures and societies, the characteristic forms of 
unionisation and s regular minority association of 
these with socialism". 
(Williams 1983: 166) 
It would seem strange to argue that this process has completely 
by-passed Belfast and the PWC- In Ballymacarrett, as elsewhere, 
spacial unevenness of production combined with local particularities 
such as relationships with fellow workers, kin, neighbourhood and 
recreation patterns to generate characteristic forms of expression. 
One example of this was the strong sense of shared occupational 
experiences based on the shipyard which gave Ballymacarrett the 
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distinctive characteristics of a classical occupational comuunity 
(Lockwood 1966; Salaman 1971; Bensman and Lilenfield 1973). As one 
ex-shipyard worker recently explained, 
Even while they are socialising, out, say having a drink 
in a pub or even at a dance or anything like that, 
you'll always find that the shipyard has come up in 
their conversation. They are always bumming about how 
good their trade is and about this particular ship they 
are building, and about this particular oil rig that 
they worked on. There is great rivalry. The shipyard 
is in their blood as they'll tell you". 
(Harry Fletcher cited in Hammond 1986: 23) 
The following quotations give some indication of the consequences of 
these patterns of socialisation for the patterns of life in 
Ballymacarrett, which itself is based on the extended family and 
friendships built up over many generations, 
"Well the street I grew up in was Ulsterdale Street.... 
it was a great street for shipyardmen. The next door 
tenant he was a Boilermaker on one side, the other was a 
plater and there were fitters, riveters and shipwrights 
and people like that scattered about the street. It was 
dominated by the shipyard as far as employment was 
concerned and of course there were some people who 
worked in the ropeworks which was also quite 
convenient". 
(Tom Boyd, cited in Hammond 1986: 15) 
"There's been four generations of our family with the 
shipyard up to now. There's me, my father, his father 
and his father before him. " 
(Peter Waddell, cited in Hammond 1986: 15) 
The PKC community in Ballymacarrett has been employed in one main 
industry, shipbuilding and its 'spin off' industries. Generations of 
families of workers have experienced particular and specific types of 
social relations at work. Ballymacarrett residents still largely 
possess homogeneous skills (or perhaps the lack of them) in the labour 
market. Their experience, attitudes, resources and life chances are 
dominated by local labour markets. As Chapter two has indicated such 
localised markets have altered dramatically in recent years, with 
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subsequent effects on the employment levels of Protestant workers. - 
It would therefore be incorrect to describe Protestant working 
class culture as simply sectarian, it is more complex than this. The 
area has a strong tradition of both independent unionist ý and ýIabour, 
albeit reformist, allegiance. The Northern Ireland Labour Party 
(NILP) found considerable support in Ballymacarrett in the late 1950's 
and early 19601s. This followed the general trend in Belfast where 
the party gained 26% of the votes cast in the 1962 Stormont General 
Election. This led some commentators, to claim that it was through the 
NILP that, 
"important sections of the Protestant proletariat have, 
come under the influence of relatively secular 
labourism" 
(Bew, et al, 1979: 221) 
Activists in several organisations ranging from the Democratic 
Unionist Party to the Ulster Defence Association consider themselves 
to be the contemporary representatives of this tradition. 
Differential access to power and privilege are crucial concerns 
in the analysis of Northern Irish society. It would, however, be a 
mistake to overestimate the direct effect of economics. The 
capital-labour relationship is not the only significant material 
relationship which acts as a determinant of political consciousness 
(O'Dowd, et al, 1980). In Ballymacarrett a social class identity has 
to compete with an ethnic one for saliency in the lives of 
individuals. The working class in most societies is internally 
differentiated in ways not directly attributable to economic 
interests. In advanced capitalist society dual and segmented labour 
market theories have emerged to account for both racial and sexual. 
discrimination (Barron and Norriss 1978, Blackburn and -Mann 1979, 
Edwards, Reich and Gordon, 1975). Protestant working class ideology 
101 
is, not unidimensional, it is a dual consciousness where sectarianism 
does not exclude labourism or vice-versa. These ideologies co-exist. 
This'-should be remembered when considering therest of this chapter 
and also when interpreting the views expressed by working class 
loyalists in much of the thesis. 
There are several other key features when considering the local 
social structure in Ballymacarrett. The first of these is the 
changing physical structure. In the last 15 years East Belfast has 
been changed drastically by redevelopment. Such changes can 
originally be located in the plans in the early 1970s to build a 
Belfast Urban Motorway. The plan which intended a major new road 
scheme through Ballymacarrett has been shelved, largely because of the 
opposition it encountered from local residents. Nonetheless the area 
has been subject to widescale redevelopment which has produced a 
complex physical structure. New housing of high quality, redeveloped 
housing and housing which dates from the original expansion of 
Ballymacarrett in the late 19th century exist side by side. Despite 
extensive work by the Northern Ireland Housing Executive' (NIHE), - who 
have reduced the level of unfitness in Belfast's housing from 30,000 
in 1974 to 17,000 in 1979, much of the housing remains of poor quality 
and lacking either a bath or a hot water supply. --This'has led the 
local M. P. Peter Robinson to claim, 
"I have seen housing conditions that I thought would 
have gone out by the time Dickens was writing. Some of 
the conditions particularly in the inner East Belfast 
area, Newtownards and Albert-bridge Road areas are the_ 
worst in the province". 
(Slate, Summer 1984 No. 1: 3) 
A further insight to the-overall housing situation can be gained from 
table 4.1. Much of the poores t quality housing has been allocated to 
Housing Redevelopment Areas (RDhs). The table summarises the, housing 
102 
conditions in four of the largest RDAs in East-Belfast. 
TABLE 4.1 : HOUSING CONDITIONS IN BALLYMACARRETT 
RDA 49 RDA 54 RDA 75 
No. of Houses 219 372 104 
1 Person Household M 36 39 29 
2 11 to M 32 25 30 
3 it M 16 15 19 
4 'M 9 11 13 
5 M 5 5 6 
6+ M 2 5 3 
O. A. P. 25% 22% 20% 
Unfit Housing 98% 93% 91% 
owner occupied 25% 30% 41% 
RDA 53 
170 
58 
23 
8 
6 
) 
30% 
84% 
N/A 
Source: adapted f rom. NIHE Explanatory Statements for Redevelopment 
Areas 49,54,75,53. 
Housing issues are one of the main focuses for community activity in 
Ballymacarrett. This will be considered as a separate case study in 
Chapter Eight. In the context of this thesis it is important because 
it is in concern over housing conditions that the PWC have most 
readily articulated class issues. Housing however can also be used to 
illustrate the duality of consciousness suggested in this, chapter. 
Part of the, reason housing issues are high-on the agenda in 
Ballymacarrett is not only concern with its quality but also the fear 
that the Housing Executive is attempting to "depopulate Loyalist areas 
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of the city" and to turn East Belfast into'a "car park instead of an 
area with residential accommodation" (Peter Robinson cited in SIATE op 
cit p5). 
Campaigns over various housing issues have been given a high level 
of commitment from all those who are politically active in the 
district. In several Housing Associations representatives of the 
DUP and the UDA compete in order to demonstrate which - organisation 
best represents local interests. The involvement of paramilitaries in 
such matters was not universally welcomed by local residents. At 
several community meetings I attended individuals were pointed out to 
me as IUDA men'. The reason for their involvement was a matter for 
debate. Several thought their main aim was to 'work themselves in', 
so they could take the group over., others thought that they were 
there to 'keep an eye on what was going on'. Others welcomed them as 
long as they were prepared to work. Such views highlight the 
ambiguous relationship between the PWC and loyalist paramilitaries, a 
topic which will be explored fully in Chapter Six. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate two other central features of 
contemporary Ballymacarrett. Its population is both reasonably sparse 
and aging. Those living in Ballymacarrett also display a remarkable 
level of geographical stability. of those who responded to the formal 
survey over 72% had lived in East Belfast for 21 years or more, while 
exactly 50% had lived in their current neighbourhood for more than 21 
years. There was also some evidence to suggest that traditional 
extended family networks remained intact. over half of those 
interviewed (see, Chapter Seven) saw relatives other than those whom 
they lived with several times a week, 34.4% of the total had contact 
with relatives on a daily basis. As in other conm=ities, the 
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TABLE 4.2 EKN LCNG HAVE YOU LIVED IN EAST BELFAST 
Length of Time No M 
0-5 yrs 7 4.5 
6-10 " 9 5.8 
11-15 4 2.6 
16-20 23 14.9 
21-25 30 19.5 
25+11 81 52.6 
n= 154 t- 100 
TABLE 4.3 HOW UXG HALVE YOU LIM IN YOUR CEMENT NEIGHBOUM)OD IN 
EAST BELFAST 
Length of Time No Ml 
0-5 yrs 19 12.3 
6-10 17 11.0 
11-15 19 12.3 
16-20 22 14.3 
21-25 19 12.3 
25+ 58 37.7 
n= 154 t- 100 
primary responsibility for providing domestic services falls on women. 
It is they who are responsible for care for the young, the sick and 
the old, and perhaps most importanly able bodied adult men (most often 
their husbands). Women remain highly restricted by strong family 
networks. In Ballymacarrett they are socialised into strong maternal 
roles, a responsibility for maintaining the family and 'making ends 
meet'. Moreover they are restricted to the domestic domain which, 
with a very few exceptions excludes them from participating in the 
political arena. Political campaigns and tactics are largely 
determined by men. Fixed gender roles are heavily influenced by the 
church, and in organisations are the interface of politics and 
religion, for example the Democratic Unionist Party (DUp). The Rev 
Ian Paisley has claimed, 
"I believe that the husband is the head of the wife and 
the home. I believe that the father should be-prophet,, 
priest and king in his home. As king he should exercise 
rulership. As prophet, he should exercise rulership. 
As prophet he should establish a family altar in the 
home and see that the family gathers around that altar 
in prayer. As priest he should intercede for, and on 
behalf of, his family. 
(Cited in Fairweather et al 1984: 266) 
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There were additionally several more practical encounters which 
demonstrated how women saw themselves as being excluded f rom the 
political process. When collecting data several women simply did not 
believe that I was interested in their views. one woman explained, 
"Oh you'll have to see my husband when he gets home, 
he'll tell you what we think" 
another that, 
"My Brian takes all to do with that sort of thing" 
A few women had become politically active but their activities largely 
revolved around supporting men. The UDA had several women active in 
Ballymacarrett in the Welfare Rights' Department, one of whom 
contributed regularly to the UDA magazine 'Ulster'. These women 
however gained their initial status from being either the wives or 
girlfriends of loyalist prisoners. Mainly they were responsible for 
successfully organising visits and benefits for prisoners, rather than 
holding an individual membership of the paramilitary organisation 
itself. 
In turn, the wives and girlfriends of UDA members sometimes turned 
to the organisation for help or in search of a 'policing, role. one 
clear example of this was when Margaret, the wife of a UDA member 
complained regularly over a period of several weeks to a UDA officer 
about her husband's involvement in'a card school,. Here, on a Friday 
night he regularly lost a considerable portion of his weekly wages 
from Harland and Wolff shipyard. Margaret finally contacted one of 
the UDA's women welfare workers and the next week, the card school was 
rather unceremoniously broken up, by about six masked UDA members. 
In another incident Janet, the girlfriend of a UDA member also sought 
out the UDA for a policing role. Her -boyfriend had been twice 
convicted for drunken driving', but continued to use his car to go 
106 
drinking in the local pub. As he was under a suspended sentence Janet 
was fearful that he would be caught and sent to prison. After a late 
night drinking session he returned to his car to find all the wheels 
removed and the car propped up on bricks. It was made clear to him, 
much to the amusement of those leaving the pub at the same time, that 
if he continued to drink and drive this would be the least he could 
expect. 
Such 'policing, roles, however, "unlike in several nationalist 
areas, were limited to the UDA's ownmembers. It was a role that the 
local brigade were happy to undertake, - because it increased their 
legitimacy. However, the majority, of Ballymcarrett residents, 'both 
men and women, were always likely to turn to the legitimate forces of 
the state for protection rather than paramilitary organisations. 
Not all women were passive; seve ral were active in community 
issues and particularly housing, - as Chapter Eight 'indicates. By and 
large such issues were seen by those men, who professed an interest in 
politics,,, as not concerning real political issues. There is little 
expression of politics in- the private domain in Ballymacarrett. The 
dominant conception of politics was party politics and as such it 
remained firmly located in the male domain. 
Perhaps one of the major ways in which men 'reinforced the notion. 
of politics as a male domain was by drinking in all male groups. 
'Politics' had a central place in pub discussion from which women were 
excluded. many of the clubs in Ballymacarrett had a formal or 
informal male-only rule, while others only allowed women-on certain 
nights 'only (usually Saturday) when they could be signed in by 
members. There were certainly many places for men to exercise their 
autonomy. When a local supermarket, in Ballymacarrett applied for a 
liquor licence, the Bloomfield Residents Association opposed it, on the 
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grounds that within a one mile radius of the proposed off-licence 
there were in existence# 
1144 licenced clubs, 21 public houses, 18 off licences, 3 
licenced hotels and a handful of shebeens". I (cited in SCOPE No. 74, June 1984: 19) 
The many pubs and clubs also provide the environment for the 
maintainance of strong close friendship networks. It was common to 
find in Ballymacarrett ex-residents who had returned to the area to go 
drinking. 'Drinking' also provided the place-for the distribution of 
goods and the circulation of work. During my fieldwork visits I was 
offered everything from socks to high quality electrical equipment. 
Such transactions roughly followed the pattern outlined by Henry 
(1981). Men would also exchange their skills and do small jobs for 
each other. Electricians, plumbers and plasterers for example were 
often asked to do jobs (, homers') for friends or acquaintances. 
Payment for these would either be in cash or an exchange of skills and 
jobs at a later date. 
The central purpose of this chapter has been-to familiarise the 
reader with Ballymacarrett, a loyalist urban working class community. 
One of its key features is well defined residential segregation. 
Several commentators have pointed out that this segregation serves 
several functions (Boal 1976, Darby 1986). Contact between the groups 
is lessened as is the chance of overt conflict in day to day life. 
Residential segregation also, provides the base for the promotion of 
specific cultural heritages and a common set of values, and beliefs. 
This is reflected at many. levels from reading materials to non-work 
activities. Traditional- working class pastimes are popular in 
Ballymacarrett - snooker, darts, football are all well organised in 
leagues, but there is no contact between Protestants and Catholics. 
Such 'avoidance I of course. can never be total. The initial period of 
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mass hostility between residents of Short Strand and Ballymacarrett 
has passed, and there have been no recorded Igunbattles' or rioting 
between the areas for 10 years. However avoidance' manifests itself 
at a much less immediate level. The adjoining 'Catholic' Short Strand 
is a highly self contained community, however its physical resources 
are limited. There is no Post office or Bank for example. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that people from the Short Strand were forced to 
venture into Ballymacarrett. Most local residents, especially the 
women, who have the responsibility for shopping were aware of this. 
Several claimed to be able to identify Ifenians, who came into 
Ballymacarrett to shop, and on occassions groups of women were pointed 
out to me as being f rom the Short Strand. The truth of such claims is 
in many ways unimportant. Their significance lies in the 
reinforcement of Protestant working class culture. The importance of 
'telling', the identification of an opposing group, based on name, 
dress, residence and symbolism has been outlined by Burton (1978, 
1979). In Ballymacarrett, segregation between the two groups was 
never total but there was certainly a very limited level of contact. 
Ballymacarrett is built on a distinct local social structure. The 
values of this culture impose themself at both the material and social 
levels: physically in the networks of streets, houses, pubs, clubs 
etc., and socially in the networks of kin, friendship, neighbourhood 
and recreation patterns. Ballymacarrett is bounded socially and 
economically. At the horizontal level there are the ties which bind 
spaces and institutions to the neighbourhoodo such as local culture, 
heritage and tradition. At the vertical level are those structures 
which lock it into the dominant culture and ideology (Hall# et al, 
1977: 43). Much attention has been given to the way in which the two 
cOMmities have become polarised. Developments within each comunity 
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are less well understood. Contemporary Ballymacarrett has witnessed 
the growth of self help and support groups located mainly in the PWC. 
They find expression through the DUP, UDA and ex-loyalist prisoners 
groups. These have established an organisational platform. which 
potentially challenges the power of the dominant order. Furthermore 
the emergence of these local organisations coincided with the 
fragmentation of Unionist politics at the national level. The 
relationship between the PWC and mainstream political parties can no 
longer be taken for granted but has become a matter for negotiation. 
Both the DUP and UDA have important roles to play, in filling the 
vacuum left by the demise of olderýallegiances. 
PWC culture cannot simply be described as unidimensional. Nor is 
there any linear development in PWC consciousness. Unionist hegemony 
is not universal: it has to be won, sustained and reproduced. Gramsci 
describes the process as a "moving equilibrium" (Gramsci 1977). The 
character and content of this hegemony can only be established by 
looking at concrete historical situations., For this reason it is now 
necessary to examine the role and attitudes of active members of PWC 
organisations, in particular loyalist paramilitary groups and the DUP. 
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CEAPTER FIVE PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS IN BALLYMACARRETT 
By far the most active political organisation in Ballymacarrett 
was the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Despite the success of the 
DUP in Northern Irish politics there has until recently been very 
little serious literature produced on either the party or its 
activists. Those works which do exist have concentrated either on the 
personal attributes of the party's founder and leader, Ian Paisley (cf 
Heskin 1980, marrian 1973, Smyth --1987), or 'Paisleyism' (cf Bruce 
1986, Taylor 1984, Wallis, Bruce and Taylor 1986). A common view is 
that the DUP's success is attributable to Paisley's charismatic 
leadership (Heskin 1980: 117, Smyth 1987: 48). others argue DUP success 
rests on the way in which Paisley has articulated, "the historical 
interrelationship between religion and politics with specific 
reference to the connections between fundamentalist Protestantism and 
Unionism" (Taylor 1984: 59). While the body 'of literature concerning 
Paisley is growing, there is still very little material on the views 
of those members belonging to, and active in the DUP. 
This chapter seeks to examine the social composition and the views 
of those active in the DUP in Ballymacarrett. It will be'argued that 
support for the DUP in East Belfast cannot be understood simply in 
terms of Paisley's charismatic leadership, or as a direct link between 
Paisley's fundamentalist preaching and Protestant working class 
ideology. Rather it is essential to see the rise of Paisleyism and 
the subsequent development of the DUP in the context of autonomous 
political action by the Protestant working class. Support from 
Protestant workers for the DUP has never been predetermined. It is 
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therefore necessary to explain the circumstances under which the DUP 
gained popular support-in Ballymacarrett. 
The first manifestation of political support for Ian Paisley was 
the Protestant Unionist Party (PUP) in 1969. Paisley had come to 
prominence over the previous two years when he had led a series of 
demonstrations, most notably against the visit of the Taoiseach of the 
Irish Republic to Stormont , and mobilised counter demonstrations to 
civil rights marches. Following the introduction of a reform package 
by the Northern Irish Prime minister, O'Neillj Ian Paisley had 
organised a series of ý'O'Neill must go" rallies and when Terence 
O'Neill called a snap election in 1969 in an attempt to isolate his 
opponents, the Protestant Unionist Party, led by Ian Paisley fielded 
six candidates. None of the PUP candidates were elected but in a 
direct contest for Bannside, Ian Paisley came within 1,414 votes of 
defeating the Prime minister. Four of the other PUP candidates took 
the runners-up place in their respective elections. By April of the 
next year however, Ian Paisley had won a by-election seat at Stormontt 
and within two months had won a seat at Westminster. 
It is important to outline briefly the roots of support for 
Paisley's original political movement. The choice of candidates for 
the 1969 election and the constituencies in which they stood all 
suggest PUP support was located amongst the traditional, religiously 
committed, and largely rural Protestant community. A large number of 
Paisley's followers saw the Protestant churches at the time moving 
towards a dangerously ecumenical position. Paisley's central theme 
was the denunciation of theological liberalism. His movement, 
however, also found support in a wider range of Protestant groups. In 
rural areas he was able to mobilise small farm owners and tenant 
workers. In Belfast, his religious teaching also had widespread 
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support amongst the petty bourgeoisie, where he had also made contacts 
with loyalist paramilitary organisations. AS-one commentator put it, 
"Political Paisleyism, was proletarian, but 
religious Paisleyism attracted lower middle class 
congregations which crammed in the ample car parks 
with their Cortinas". 
(Boulton 1973: 126) 
In political terms, 'Protestant unionism, was never a simple 
anti-Catholic phenomenon. one-commentator described its earliest form 
as, 
"certainly anti-republican, and no-doubt many of 
its adherents equate Catholicism and Republicanism. 
But it is fundamentally a working class movement 
whose policies in the social, economic and 
libertarian fields differ very little from such 
Catholic movements as the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party". 
(Harbinson 1973: 224) 
The 'Protestant Unionist, movement Paisley had mobilised quickly 
fragmented as the conflict developed. As a result 'Protestant 
unionism, sought to relocate its social base in the Protestant urban 
working class. The support of Protestant workers was also being 
sought by Bill Craig the former Home Affairs minister, from within the 
Unionist Party, who was attempting to reconstruct the Unionist class 
alliance, under his leadership. In August 1971, Brian Faulkner who 
had taken over the premiership of Northern Ireland introduced 
internment in an attempt to quell criticism from, and recapture the 
support of, rank and file unionist support. This resulted in a 
widespread and rapid expansion of violence in nationalist areas. 
(McGuffin 1973). In Loyalist areas internment precipitated the 
formation of local vigilante groups which eventually came together to 
form the ulster Defence Association. As Faulkner's premiership became 
as insecure as his immediate predecessors, the allegiance of Loyalist 
workers became the key issue. This caused a further realignment in 
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Northern Irish politics. Faulkner's key opponents within unionism 
formed a partnership in opposition. Desmond Boal, a barrister, and mp 
for the Shankill, Paisley and Craig headed a 'Unionist Alliance'. 
Such a short term tactical unity was never likely to hold, however, 
and by September 1971 Boal and Paisley announced the formation of a 
new political party from which Craig disassociated himself. By the 
end of that year, the new party called the Democratic Unionist Party 
had taken on the role of official opposition at Stormont. Boal, 
declared the new party would be right wing in the sense of being 
strong on the constitution, but to the left on social issues'. 
Furthermore after a series of meetings with the SDLP the DUP claimed 
that they were in agreement on their opposition to interment', and 
the need for urgent measures to combat unemployment'. DUP support in 
Belfast was quickly defined both socially and toý some extent 
geographically. It drew on the socially discontented, articulating 
the "social grievances of people left out of the new affiuence, 
squeezed on the one side by the middle class, on the other, by 
Catholics" (Nelson 1984: 53). 
The success of the DUP was however-extremely limited. In the two 
years following its formation recruitment was slow (Calvert 1981: 6). 
Any claim the DUP had to be the voice of the Protestant masses was 
being undermined by the immediate response of Protestant workers to 
the rapidly deteriorating political situation. -- Large sections of 
Protestant workers were finding political expression either through 
joining the embryonic UDA or responding positively to Craig's counter 
initiative, the formation of a new political movement called Ulster 
Vanguard. Vanguard drew heavily on the , traditional unionist 
symbolism, which was discussed in Chapter Four. It organised mass 
rallies throughout Northern Ireland, called for the reformation of the 
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old unionist alliance and a return to Stormont Government. If this 
attempt to reconstitute Stormont failed Vanguard argued the only 
option was a unilateral declaration of independence. Vanguard's 
leadership and ideology were deeply immersed in Unionism's traditional 
form. Its social base lay in the remnants of Ulster's indigenous 
capital. However the movement also succeeded in gaining widespread 
working class support. It was Vanguard who best articulated the 
grievances and sense of betrayal felt by the Protestant masses. This 
manifested itself in a series of demonstrations and one-day general 
strikes. During one of these on 7th February 1973, there was a 
province-wide electricity blackout and throughout the day there were 
eight explosions, widespread rioting and shooting resulting in two 
deaths. 
The justification of such actions by Vanguard's leadership further 
alienated them ideologically from conservative unionists, and when 
Craig announced he was forming the Vanguard Unionist Progressive 
Party (VUPP), several prominent members of the Unionist Party 
immediately disassociated themselves from the new political party. 
Craig resigned from the Ulster Unionist Council, and called on others 
to join him declaring that membership of both Vanguard and the 
Unionist Party was incompatible. 
The opportunity to test loyalist opinion came almost immediately 
in the form of elections to the new Northern Ireland Assembly. The 
British government had outlined its intention to form a 'partnership 
government' in a White Paper published in March 1973. Craig's 
Vanguard Party, the DUP and the 'Anti-White Paper' Ulster Unionists 
were all committed to opposing any power-sharing solution. Both the 
DUP and Vanguard remained hostile to reform and the parties formed an 
alliance to oppose the white Paper proposals. There appears to have 
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been considerable overlap between members of Vanguard and members of 
the DUP. Indeed there was much confusion as to which party several 
individuals were standing for. 
Both Vanguard and the DUP advised their electorate to use their 
second preference vote for each other. Formally Vanguard won seven 
seats to the new Assembly and the DUP eight. Relations between 
Vanguard and the DUP were, however, highly antagonistic. The parties 
had little in common other than their joint opposition to reform. 
Smyth summarises the position well, 
"Though the rival DUP and VUPP parties were agreed 
that the unrest in the Province had been prompted 
by an Irish Republican conspiracy, supported the 
concept of majority rule and opposed the power 
sharing philosophy of Brian Faulkner, the 
supporters of both parties were as antagonistic 
towards each other as Craig and Paisley were 
suspicious of each other". 
(Smyth 1987: 39) 
There was another important aspect to the Assembly results. Ian 
Paisley's political role was now legitimised. He was now placed 
alongside, and on an equal footing with several prominent unionist 
politicians. As Bruce notes, 
"no longer was Ian Paisley some sort of raving 
lunatic on the fringes of unionist politics. He 
was now part of a coalition with people who had had 
cabinet office in Stormont and more than that, his 
party had polled better than one led by an 
ex-minister. 11 
(Bruce 1986: 106) 
In response the DUP began to organise itself along traditional British 
party lines. It employed full time officials and opened a central 
party office in East Belfast. In short it began to construct an 
organised party structure. 
The DUP's electoral position was consolidated by the events of 
1974. In February, a Westminster general election was called which 
the unionists used as a referendum on power-sharing. The electoral 
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pact between the DUP and Vanguard held, and joined by the anti-power 
sharing unionists, the United Ulster Unionist Coalition won 13 out of 
the 14 seats contested. Another major event for unionism was the UWC 
strike which ended the power-sharing experiment, several aspects of 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. Although Paisley was 
initially reluctant to --lend support to the strike- several key DUP 
personnel were highly active at the local level. This was especially 
true in Ballymacarrett where a leading DUP member was responsible for 
co-ordinating several of the groups'active during the strike. 
Loyalist party claims that their actions were supported by the 
majority of the Protestant community seemed justified by the electoral 
success of the UUUC in the Westminster general election of October 
1974, and the Convention election of 1975. It seemed Unionism had 
succeeded in reconstructing itself, including the DUP, into a coherent 
political movement. 
Such an analysis was indeed put forward by several commentators. 
(Farrell 1976, Bell 1976). This perspective ignored the wider 
tensions and divisions which underpinned the reconstruction of the 
Unionist inter-class alliance. UUUC unity was undermined in late-1975 
when Craig proposed an emergency coalition with the SDLP. The 
Majority ofýVanguard convention members disassociated themselves from 
the notion, and Craig was expelled from the unionist coalition. 
Bell's dismissal of this change as purely "tactical" (Bell 1976: 76) is 
misplaced. ý Craig's conversion reflected a final attempt to protect 
what remained 'of, his power- base, Northern Ireland's -indigenous 
capitalists. 
The narrowness of the social base of Craig's core support accounts 
for the movement's failure, The faction within which Craig's support 
was located had by late 1975 almost ceased to exist as an independent 
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social forceý In Ballymacarrett Vanguard were unable to maintain 
support for several reasons. Firstly there was their notion of 
Independence, or rather the concept of a Unilaterial Declaration of 
Independence. Vanguard had always made it clear that if UDI was to 
become necessary it would mean a huge drop in the living standards of 
working class Protestants, including wage cuts and reductions in 
social security expenditure. Increased levels of unemployment in the 
early 1960ts had heightened the awareness within' the Protestant 
working class of the need for welfare provision. It was the DUP who 
best articulated these interests. Frank Wright tracing the demise of 
the NILP and the rise of the Protestant Unionist Party in-the early 
1970s has commented, 
"The major difference was that whereas in the 
former case the tacit assumption was that the 
interests of Protestant and Catholic workers were 
the same as regard to unemployment: in the latter 
case the Protestant Unionist manifesto dwelt on the 
preferential treatment which it was alleged that 
the Catholic working class on the Falls were 
receiving". 
ý(Wright, 1973: 262) 
The DUP attacked the notion of UDI as "not acceptable to the majority 
of loyalist people" (Boulton, 1973: 142). In several areas of Belfast, 
the DUP were also developing close working relationships with loyalist 
paramilitary groups at the local level, particularly the UDA. - 
In the aftermath of the UWC strike it was the DUP who increasingly 
played a leading role in urban working class politics. This was 
reflected in the inability of Vanguard to mobilise widespread support 
in' Ballymacarrett. Given -Vanguard's social 'base outlined, earlier, 
this was hardly'surprising. Probert summarises Vanguard's position as, 
"reflecting the interests of the most reactionary 
sections of the province's business community, 
vanguard was able to mobilise those Protestant 
groups to whom the benefits of the Union with 
Britain were not sufficient to outweigh the loss of 
privileges, both economic and political, stenming 
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from the refom programme. ' In particular Craig had 
the support of the petty bourgeoisie" 
(Probert 1978: 123) 
For many Protestant workers this was a time of uncertainty, socially, 
constitutionally and economically. ' Physical conflict on the streets 
corresponded with urban renewal and deprivation. Increasingly it was 
the DUP who convinced Protestant workers that they would best protect 
their constitutional position and their' wider social interests. 
Vanguard did not contest the 1977 district council elections and 
ceased to be a party in-1978, reverting to its pressure group status 
within the Unionist Party. Craig however still held the Westminster 
seat for East Belfast and stood as a Vanguard Unionist as late as the 
1979 General Election. 
For the reasons already outlined Craig did not have the workers to 
run an effective election campaign in East Belfast, whereas the DUP 
were able to mobilise party workers and supporters in large numbers. 
Smyth describes two key elements in this support, 
"DUP Party activisits, some of whom were members of 
Sandown Road Free Presbyterian Church, worked 
throughout polling day to 'get the voters out', 
while simultaneously a group of UDA men were 
- engaged in taking voters to the poll in support of 
the DUP candidate". 
(Smyth 1987: 165) 
The mobilisation of these different fractions of the PWC succeeded. 
The DUP leader in East Belfast, Peter Robinson'took the seat by 64 
votes. At the same election the DUP took North Belfast. The results 
had widespread consequences for unionism. It was1not merely that the 
DUP had increased its national representation from one to three seats. 
More significantly the DUP had established a base in the Protestant 
working class. As one commentator noted, 
"In the late sixties it was con=nplace for left 
wing writers on the growing crisis in Ulster to 
represent the embryonic Protestant Unionist Party 
of the Rev Ian Paisley as a populist movement 
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destined to capture and articulate the latent 
resentments of the Protestant working class in 
Belfast. Yet a political breakthrough eluded 
Paisley's party. In fact such a breakthrough was 
to come first in rural Ulster. may 3rd 1979 has - 
radically altered Paisley's catchment area. " 
(Irish Times, 8th may 1979) 
The DUPIs victory resulted in attracting several key activists who had 
previously been on the fringe of the party in Ballymacarrett. Several 
of these people are still active in the DUP in the area. one of these 
individuals, now a DUP councillor explainedt 
"initially I was involved in Vanguard and when it 
split up it was significant that I and a lot of 
people who lived in public sector housing moved to 
the DUP while those who lived in large private 
housing joined the official Unionists. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
Alan saw the split in unionism at the time as reflecting clear class 
lines. For others however the reason for the division was much more 
simple. It was the DUP who could best be relied upon to ensure 
unionism's traditional aims. This councillor's views were typical, 
"when things started getting really bad in the 
early 1970s... like a lot of other people I went to 
meetings and rallies like the big ones organised by 
Vanguard. I was really interested in what Vanguard 
were doing and joined the East Belfast Branch.... 
then I was invited to a meeting by a friend of mine 
who had joined the DUP.... when I heard what they 
had to say it really made sense to me. I believed 
that they were the only party that were committed 
to what they were saying, that were committed to 
the union at all costs. It wasn't just a political 
superficial commitment but a real honest 
commitment. I've never considered leaving or 
joining any other party since then" 
(Brian, DUP councillor) 
One of the reasons the DUP have been able to maintain this image is 
because unlike other unionist groupings (such as the OUP) the 
Democratic Unionists have never seen the British government as 
guarantors of Northern Ireland's constitutional position. As this DUP 
member put it, 
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"The very basis of Ulster Unionism was hostility to 
the British goverment to the point of arming and 
saying 'we'll fight you if we have to,, it's no new 
phenomena". 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
It was a common view of those active in the DUP in Ballymacarrett that 
Westminster wanted to 'sell Ulster down the river,. As we shall see 
in the following chapters this view has strengthened in the -period 
following the signing of the Anglo-Irish agreement. 
The DUP in Ballymacarrett continues to - represent itself as , the 
leading defender, of the traditional unionist cause. - This 
straightforward image underplays the complex relationship between the 
DUP and the PKC. This can clearly be illustrated by reference to 
official DUP literature. one example are DUP party manifestos which 
over the last decade have developed a distinct style. - Their early 
sections reaffim the party's steadfastness and resolve to maintain 
the unionist cause. This is true of the material produced for the 
1985 local election which will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 
Eight. The election manifesto for the 1982 Assembly election also 
demonstrates the trend when it declares "the DUP offers the surest 
guarantee against the admission of Republicans to government" and the 
"firmest stand against all attempts to force Ulster down the Dublin 
Road" (The Voice of Ulster, October 1982: 8). , 
The section concludes 
"you know where you stand with the DUP" (VOU October 1982: 8) which in 
fact became the DUP's 1982 election slogan. 
The manifesto then calls for a widespread military offensive 
against the IRA, for extensive "search and seizure operations to root 
out all terrorists from their safe havens and tighter border security 
to cut off external attacks on Ulster". (VOU, October 1982: 8). The 
manifesto further demands the reintroduction of the death penalty as 
"the only suitable punishment for the heinous murders committed in our 
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province". Having re-established their creditials as the current 
manifestation of traditional unionism and'their resolve to 'tackle 
Ulster's enemies' however the manifesto moves on to a wide ranging 
series of proposals on social issues. 
The DUPIs economic and social programmes outline a series of what 
are basically Keynesian proposals. For example it claims the need to 
"cut the dole queues and re-vitalise our economy" and advocates 
"additional but sensible public expenditure". It calls for "ten 
thousand houses" to be "built over each of the next five years" and to 
rally opposition to "the savage economic'cuts which are destroying all 
levels of education". The party then demands that the government's 
(Westminster) running down of hospitals be halted, more facilities be 
provided for the handicapped, and state pensions to be set "at a 
realistic level related to the cost of living". It is only after 
social policies are outlined that religious arguments are introduced 
calling for a "strong and forthright stand.... to be taken in 
accordance with Christian principles on the great moral issues of our 
day". 
A similar set of priorities can be gathered from the party's 
annual conference agenda. The major composite motions usually concern 
"Security" and re-commitment of political postion. Subsequent motions 
however usually tackle socio-economic conditions. For, example at the 
1983 Annual Conference the East Belfast branch had two motions 
accepted. The first on education stated, 
"that the education policy of the present 
government; based on economic criteria and 
educational need, is having a detrimental effect on 
the educational system in Northern Ireland" 
Amongst several proposals it called for, 
"the retention of small but vital-schools 
especially in rural and border areas" 
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and, 
"considerations of other factors such as social and 
political implications before any decision is taken 
to close a school" 
furthermore it condemned, 
"the present-goverment proposals on the 
rationalisation of schools", the "financial 
cut-backs in educational provision", and "any 
goverment proposal to replace student grants with 
a system of student loans". 
(UDUP Annual Conference Agenda 1983, motion No. 6) 
A further motion from the East Belfast Branch stated, 
"That this conference deplores the increasing 
levels of poverty in Northern Ireland and declares 
its opposition to the government policies which 
have exacerbated this problem which has always 
existed in Northern Ireland. " 
(UDUP Annual Conference Agenda, 
1983, Motion No. 1) 
Such motions have to be placed alonside others at the same conference 
such as those re-affirming Party allegiance to Sunday observance. 
However they may also indicate that the ideology of those active in 
the party in East Belfast differs from the mainstream DUP 
consciousness. This is something to which we shall return. In 
general terms, however, DUP literature emphasises 'hardline unionism'. 
They have succeeded in maintaining the image of being the true 
inheritors of traditional unionism. Its propaganda consistently 
projects the DUP as the only trustworthy opponents of any changes in 
the political structure and as totally uncompromising in their 
relationships with nationlists and republicans. Within the unionist 
bloc the DUP stress 'You know where you stand with the DUPI and 
continue to be hostile to the official unionists in particular. The 
DUP continues to attract support for this 'hardline unionism' as 
Chapter Seven confirms. However in Ballymacarrett issues other than 
the link with Britain itself are open to debate. Certainly, it is 
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hard to believe, given the development of social forces in East 
Belfast, that the DUP attracts any widespread support simply because 
of its "strong and forthright stand.... on Christian principles". It 
is this backdrop which provides the context for much of the 
contemporary relations between those active, in and supporting the DUP 
in Ballymacarrett. 
What follows is several-fold. It attempts to outline how DUP 
activists define their loyality, why they joined the DUP and why they 
believe this to be the best expression of their politics. It'also 
examines DUP members views of relationships within' the unionist bloc 
and identifies the role of DUP' activists in day to day issues 'in 
Ballymacarrett. 
There are two- -main dynamics to DUP politics in Ballymacarrett. 
The first concerns those activists whose primary motivation is the 
religious fundamentalism of Paisley's own Free Presbyterian Church. 
The second surrounds that grouping more 'concerned, with social and 
economic issues. Neither grouping exists as a coherent or discrete 
faction and thereis some overlap of membership. The basic beliefs of 
the religious grouping are more easy to describe. Some DUP members 
are convinced that their ability to worship in the Protestant faith 
would be lost'in a united Ireland. As one member of the East Belfast 
branch explained, 
"I believe-one of the problems of'a united Ireland 
is that my religious freedom would disappear. You 
only have to look at any country where Catholicism' 
is in control to understand that religious freedom 
is an awful lot less than that enjoyed by Catholics 
in this country". 
(David, DUP member, East Belfast) 
Another explained the main differences between Catholics and 
Protestants as follows, 
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"When I was brought up I was taught to believe and 
think for myself. Catholics are made to believe. 
They're not allowed to think differently or for 
themselves. They have to accept what they're told 
and not question it" 
(Sarah DUP supporter and member of Free 
Presbyterian Church) 
Some DUP supporters narrowed this argument 
. 
and condemned Roman 
Catholics for what they perceived as their support, tacit or 
otherwise, of the IRA. In particular several referred to the Catholic 
church's failure to excommunicate Republican Paramilitary group 
members, particularly those convicted of murder. Some DUP members 
referred to an alliance of interests between the Roman Catholic Church 
and Sim Fein. This is sometimes reflected in statements by DUP 
officials as the following illustrate, 
"The voice may be that of Cardinal O'Fee (sic) but 
the words are unmistakably those of the IRA in 
whose camp he has firmly confirmed himself to be". 
(Jim Allister, DUP Chief Whip, cited in Irish 
Times 20/7/85) 
"After members of his flock have murdered many 
hundreds of Protestant bombed and buried millions 
of pounds worth of Protestant properties (sic) the 
Cardinal declares that 90% of the bigots in 
Northern Ireland are Protestants. He is seen, now 
as the real black Roman bigot! " 
(Protestant Blue Print Vol 1 No. 7) 
Even although Roman Catholic clergy have consistently condemned 
terrorism, many religious orientated DUP members still refused to 
believe the Roman Catholic church did not support IRA action. One 
overt example of this was that when the Roman Catholic Bishop of Down 
and Connor, Dr. Cahal Daly called on 'Catholics to get out of the IRA' 
(Belfast Telegraph 3/9/85) the official DUP response was as follows, 
"The call by Dr. Daly for Catholics to get out of 
the IRA is as usual riddled with the double speak 
which he is so capable of. 
How on earth can he justify young people having 
become involved with the IRA in the past for 
'idealistic reasons'. What is idealistic about an 
organisation set up specifically to murder people 
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who disagree with it or who standýin the way of 
aims which cannot be achieved by means other than 
violence. 
Dr. Daly's claims of, injustices to the Roman 
Catholic community is an echo of the IRA rhetoric 
used to justify the continuing killings. It is the 
continued harking about mythical injustices which 
have caused Ireland to be covered in the tears and 
blood which Dr. Daly condems. 
His condemnation and implorings whilst qualified in 
the manner which Dr. Daly has done are hollow and 
meaningless and deserve nothing but contempt from 
the Protestant conmmity who have been the butt of 
IRA killings" 
(Protestant Blue Print Vol 1,10 6/9/1989) 
This reflected another widespread belief, that the church maintained 
great control over Roman Catholics. In turn this sometimes merged 
with the view that support for the actions of the IRA was widespread 
within the Catholic community. One councillor argued, 
"Did you see the thousands marching behind the 
coffins in the hunger strikes. You're not going to 
tell me all those people were intimidated into 
going and marching". 
he continued, 
"when a Protestant sees that what do you expect 
them to think. All those people going along with 
and supporting the men of violence. " 
(Brian, DUP councillor) 
Another DUP member argued, 
"If you had Catholics coming out and speaking 
against the Provos Protestants would say 'they're 
not all bad', there's some good ones in there,. 
You would get people in Protestant areas saying 
maybe some of them are all right". 
(George, DUP member) 
One woman stated her case even more bluntly when she said, 
"I still think all Catholics back the IRA. They're 
not all in it, but they look after them and hide 
them". 
(Greta, DUP supporter) 
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Here the lines between religious orientated members and those with a 
more political orientation began to blur. The notion of a conspiracy 
between 'ordinary' Roman Catholics and the IRA was common to many DUP 
members in Ballymacarrett. often this was presented as the 
desirability of the 'ideal type' of the 'Protestant way of life,. The 
perceptions Protestants hold of themselves and Roman Catholics are now 
well documented. (Cf Bruce 1986: 124, Nelson 1975: 155-187, O'Donnell, 
1977: 96-105, McNamee and Lovett 1988: 413-479). The dominant DUP 
stereotype of Roman Catholics is close to that suggested by O'Donnell, 
"they are ordinary enough people but 
Irish-nationalist republicans. They are seen as 
brainwashed by priests, having too many children, 
and as being superstitious and bitter. " 
(O'Donnell 1977: 96) 
On the other hand many Protestants consider themselves, 
"fine ordinary decent, British people.... loyal 
determined to remain in power and maintain their 
hard working, consevative ethic. " 
(O'Donnell 1977: 103) 
These views were well represented within DUP members and supporters in 
Ballymacarrett, as was a 'positive' stereotype of Protestants as the 
following demonstrates, 
"The unionist people are basically hard working 
people who believe you go out and do your day's 
work, bring up your family and get on with it.... 
I think that on the other side there's an attitude 
of I want as much as I can get from the state... 
that's a very different attitude to the one I have 
on life. " 
(Brian, DUP councillor) 
Several DUP members however differentated between what they called 
'ordinary Catholics, and 'Republicans'. The following sums this 
position up well, 
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"I've nothing against the ordinary Catholic, -,, 
especially if he's an ordinary working class man 
like myself... at the end of the day he's likely to 
do all he can to get an all-Ireland and that's 
where we fall out. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
Even with those people who held such views there were obvious limits 
to the possibility they saw for some form of accomnodation between the 
two commmities in Northern Ireland. one DUP councillor explained his 
views concerning ordinary Catholics', 
"If they showed they didn't support violence people 
would be more willing to get along with them. 
You're never going to get peace in Northern Ireland 
but you could have it where people say they're 
Catholics, leave them alone. ' If they don't bother 
us we won't bother them. As long as they didn't 
start shouting about a United Ireland". 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
For such DUP supporters religious fundamentalism was far f rom. the 
primary motivation. -I 
There was a recognition of this amongst those who were both active 
in and who supported the DUP. one coucillor put it this way, 
"People have this stereotype of a DUP man,, a solid 
Christian, goes to Paisley's every week. Must go 
to Paisley's every week and gives all his money to 
the church. That's certainly not the way it works 
round here". 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
Another Branch Officer suggested the following situation, 
"A large part of the party support, say up to 50% 
would be from evangelical Protestants who see the, 
party as the guardians of the moral beliefs that 
they have. The other 50% comes from ordinary 
working class Protestants many of whom would have 
no religious beliefs at all. on a Sunday night 
you'll find half of the DUP supporters in East 
Belfast in church and the other half down the pub 
having a drink". 
(David, DUP member) 
It is important to identify this second non-evangelical element in 
Ballymacarrett. In the early days, Ian Paisley was highly dependent on 
the Free Presbyterian church for political support. (Bruce 
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1986: 130-131). In East Belfast DUP support has drawn on different 
sources. It was located heavily in both the independent unionist 
populist tradition and to some extent Belfast's labour tradition. 
Often this has brought about conflict within the East Belfast branch, 
and confrontation between those-in'E. Belfast and others in the DUP. 
One example of this was the issue of sabbatarianism which was a major 
area of tension between differing factions of support. Those in the 
East Belfast branch. whose position was informed by the evangelicalism 
sought to strengthen 'Christian principles, in branch policy. Some 
expressed it as 'the defence of moral standards'. For example when a 
'sex shop' opened on the Castlereagh Road in the mid 1980s it was the 
local DUP who organised petitions, held protest meetings and mounted a 
perpetual picket outside the building describing it as the 'Soho of 
Belfast' (Voice of Ulster, September 1982: 1). There was friction 
within the local Branch because several members believed the issue was 
not given a high enough priority. 
In part this was true. For others active in the DUP in 
Ballymacarrett such concerns were secondary to articulating those 
social economic and political issues which concerned the PWC. One 
expression of-this was the overt hostility many DUP members expressed 
towards the official Unionist Party, both in terms of ideological 
differences and in terms of their actions at a local level. , These 
criticisms rested on two key themes. Firstly the DUP in general terms 
continue to regard the official Unionists as 'weak' in terms of their 
commitment to the defence of-unionism. Secondly however there was a 
much more specific response, that the official Unionists continued to 
be out of touch with the real needs of people in East Belfa st which 
could only be really understood by the DUP. The first theme can be 
easily illustrated by the following statements from DUP activists. 
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One way DUP members highlighted OUP 'weakness, was to emphasise 
divisions within theý official Unionists. As one DUP councillor 
explained, 
"There isn't an official Unionist Party as far as I 
can see. They're a bit of a bag of dolly mixtures. 
There's those who believe that there ought to be a 
return to a devolved goverment. There's those who 
would be prepared to sit down and negotiate a 
settlement with Sim Fein and these are those whose 
thinking is much the same as us. To be honest I 
find it difficulty to tell why those people are in 
the official unionists at all". 
(Brian, DUP councillor) 
another said, 
"I don't ever see there being one Unionist Party 
again. There's more determination in the DUP. We 
are more determined to smash the IRA'. Many OUP 
members still try to wear the cloak of 
respectability". 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
These views reflect many of the tensions between the DUP and OUP at a 
national level throughout this decade. Throughout the 1980s the DUP 
in East Belfast have presented the Official unionists as hopelessly 
divided between devolutionists and anti-Stormont integrationists. The 
alternative was clear as the DUP was "totally united and determined in 
its resolve to see a Stormont parliament return to Ulster". (Voice of 
Ulster October 1982: 5) Nor can the Official Unionists be trusted# 
they speak with one voice in westminster and another in Northern 
Irelandr. Again the DUP see themselves as offering the true 
alternative for loyalists, because the party, 
"enjoys strong united leadership which knows where 
it is going and how it intends to get there. The 
forthright traditional unionist message is the same 
in Northern Ireland as it is in Westminster as it 
is in Europe. " 
(Voice of Ulster, October 1982: 6) 
There is of course internal conflict and dissent within the DUP in 
Ballymacarrett and. in the party in general (Smyth 1987: 135-137). 
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However in the public arena, activists in the DUP in East Belfast 
always projected themselves as following a coherent programme and 
unified direction. (For example to 'smash Sim Fein, or oppose the 
Anglo-Irish agreement). DUP councillors and supporters used every 
available opportunity to highlight divisions within the OUP and any 
weakness on the part of local OUP representatives. Such views were 
supported by official DUP literature. For example in May 1986 the 
Protestant Blue Print declared that the 
"shameful six break unionist solidarity", 
it went on to explain, , 
"Six official unionist councillors in Belfast broke 
ranks with their unionist colleagues and voted at 
Tuesday night's council meeting to end the 
adjournment Protest campagin... Their despicable 
and reprehensible actions in voting along with the 
enemies of Ulster was naturally welcomed by Tom 
King. " 
(Protestant Blue Print Vol. No. 42 9/5/1986) 
At the time unionist councillors were undertaking a campaign of 
adjourning local council meetings in protest against the Anglo-Irish 
agreement (see Chapter Nine). Following a court action by an Alliance 
Councillor Belfast City Council faced a fine of E25,000 if the protest 
continued. However for the DUP this was evidence of yet another 
'sellout'. The DUP in East Belfast made much of the fact that three 
of the OUP councillors were representatives in East Belfast. As one 
DUP councillor put it, 
"the OUP have chickened out again. They're so 
worried about looking after their own skins they 
don't care if they stand beside Ulster's enemies". 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
There remained only one conclusion, 
"King, Barry and Co. have a surprise in store if 
they think the majority of unionist councillors in 
the DUP, Independents and the rest of the OUP are 
going to simply give up. The twenty-three who 
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stood'firm are determined to bring the work of 
Belfast City Council to a complete standstill 
despite the treacherous and self-serving activities 
of the 'shameful six"'. 
(Protestant Blue Print Vol. 1 No. 42 9/5/86) 
For the DUP this was just another example of, the susceptibility of OUP 
representatives. So in October 1985 the Protestant Blue Print carried 
the banner headline, 
"CUP vote with SDLP and Sinn Fein to break United 
-Unionist stance". 
(Protestant Blue Print Vol 1. No. 14 4/10/1985) 
Several official Unionist members of Belfast City Council voted 
against a DUP led proposal to have all City Council meetings and its 
committees adjourned for one month in protest at the presence of 
elected Sim Fein members on the council. Again the DUP projected 
themselves as the true guardians of Ulster loyalism. As one DUP news 
sheet claimed, 
"Five out of them (OUP) councillors voted with the 
eleven DUP councillors as did one independent 
unionist. The rest of the official unionists and 
independent unionists either abstained or voted 
with the SUP, Sim Fein and Alliance Party again 
adjournment. So much for their election plege to 
do everything possible to "put Sim Fein out of 
business"'. 
(Protestant Blue Print Vol lNo. 14,4/10/1985) 
This notion of official Unionists refusing to stand up to Republicans 
was another consistent refrain from DUP activists. Sometimes this was 
expressed as an overt desire on the part of official Unionist members 
to be seen as 'respectable,. As one councillor coherently argued, 
"I think the difference (between the two main 
unionist parties) is that over the years the 
members of the old unionist party, being in 
government for so long became a part of the 
establishment". 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
while another East Belfast branch member explained, 
"one of the marks of official Unionism has been 
that they want to maintain respectability and if 
unionists are going to deal properly with Sim Fein 
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it involves losing respectability and taking risks. 
I don't think the OUP has shown it's ever prepared 
to take risks of any sort. " 
Sometimes individual unionist councillors were identified, 
"M is like the rest in the OUP ..... all she's 
worried about is being seen with the right people 
and making sure people think she's respectable. " 
(Frank, DUP Branch member) 
However such traits were more generally identified with all official 
Unionists. The following conclusion of a DUP councillor was typical, 
"In the long tem we've got to look to our own 
(DUP) resources because we can't depend on the 
official unionists to keep up the kind of pressure 
that's required. 
he continued with this explanation, 
"if legal ways could be found I've no doubt the OUP 
would support us.... 
(Alan, DUP Councillor) 
As we shall see the justification of methods which counter legality is 
central to the relationship between the DUP, the OUP and loyalist 
paramilitaries. It became increasingly complex in the wake of the 
Anglo-Irish agreement, and will be dealt with in detail in 
Chapters Eight and. Nine especially in the context of loyalist violence 
towards the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). 
For several DUP members the relationship between the DUP and OUP 
was remarkably straightforward, especially in East Belfast. A branch 
member expressed it as follows, 
"there's a very clear difference between us and the 
OUP on social issues, especially in this branch, 
there's a much greater commitment to the community 
by the DUP". 
(George, DUP Branch member) 
while another claimed the essential difference to be, 
"OUP supporters are more subdued and more elderly. 
DUP supporters are more boisterous about their 
loYalism. I still think the DUP are rightwing on 
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the constitution and to the left on sociaLissues. 
Desmond Boal said that a long time ago when the 
party was founded and I still believe in it. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
and one DUP member expressed it as a difference between the class 
backgrounds of the respective party candidate, 
"If you go through the whole of the official 
Unionists Party in East Belfast the only working 
class man on it is X. The rest of them are high 
faluting. with our branch most of the people are 
working class from working class areas and they're 
staunchly loyalist". 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
This idea, that the DUP were more in touch with the needs of the 
community and indeed was part of that working class community was 
central to the consciousness of many DUP stalwarts. In part this too 
represents the contemporary version of the old working class 
independent unionist tradition of militant loyalism, and a populist 
critique of the ruling unionist 'elite'. It was this grouping which 
gave the DUP in East Belfast much of their political momentum and 
enabled , them to' mobilse support. The DUP's position-, in 
Ballymacarrett has in recent years been strengthend by the work of 
several-young councillors. In this respect they have adopted a clearly 
populist line,, which in many ways fills the gap traditionally occupied 
by the Labour grouping, most recently represented in East Belfast by 
the Northern Ireland Labour Party. One of these councillors described 
his motivation for joining the DUP as follows, 
"As an individual I couldn't see any future in the 
official Unionist Party but I did feel a very 
individual need to. become involved in unionist 
politics. So that only really left the DUP which 
if I'm truthful I probably felt a strong 
affiliation to anyway coming from my background and 
-living in inner East Belfast. " 
He continued, 
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"The OUP certainly wasn't the place where I would 
have felt at home ... the majority of people, 
involved 
in it were from upper middle class areas of Belfast 
and I don't think even my accent would have fitted 
in, let alone some of the politics I believed in. " 
(Alan, DUP Councillor) 
It was the work of these young Dup councillors who were highly active 
which proved highly influential in recruiting support and new party 
members, particularly those involved in community work. The following 
illustrates the influence DUP activists had on one local welfare 
worker who had become deeply involved in local politics, 
"Before I joined the DUP I was a welfare worker in 
East Belfast. I remember one meeting with the 
SDLP, the Official Unionists, the DUP and the 
Alliance Party .... I think the Workers Party 
had 
people there too .... the DUP came along and said they would like to see more housing in the area and 
a revitalisation of the economy.... now that made 
sense to me.... the official Unionists came along 
and said 'we want to pull down the slums, .... me 
and half the people I knew were living in these 
houses and they were calling them slums". 
(George, DUP Branch member) 
Indeed one DUP member who was now a councillor had come to the party 
along the same route. He recalled his experience, 
"I came-to the DUP through local community work. I 
was mostly involved in housing issues and 
supplementary benefit work. I saw that the DUP 
were the only people in the unionist side who would 
actually pull up its sleeves and muck in... go to 
housing meetings for example, and not only go when 
there's 50 or 60 people, but go if there's only two 
or three. Go when it's not going to get them a lot 
of votes... and when they go they're not afraid to 
open their mouths. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
The activity of local councillors and workers was important in 
ensuring support for the DUP. one councillor directly attributed the 
party's success in Ballymacarrett to such work when he said, 
SIV.. 'M before other parties we recognised and understood the social problems the people in the area were 
having, especially housing ..... never mind what you hear about West Belfast, the part of the town with 
the worst housing is here in East Belfast... the 
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DUP'have always been active in numerous housing and 
community issues and pushed for improved housing in 
East Belfast... we're always done our best for 
ordinary people in the area and I think people have 
recognised that. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
Another member explained the DUP's success in this way, 
I 
"One, of the reasons we've got in here (East 
Belfast) is that we've worked for ordinary people, 
doing ordinary things like social security 
tribunals for people. Last week for example I 
fought seven. You build up a reputation and people 
see you as someone not just that shouts about the 
security situation but that really knows what the 
community wants or needs. " 
(George, DUP member) 
This view was reflected by another party member when he said, -ý 
"On everyday issues we're (the DUP) not afraid to 
get stuck in, open up advice centres, do 
supplementary benefit work... I spent weeks going 
through supplementary benefit regulations to find 
out what people are entitled to.... how much you 
get for repairs, how much they get for clothing, 
how much for food, how much for heat... that's my 
attitude. " 
The same person went on to expand on his personal political 
philosophy, 
"Since I was elected (as a DUP councillor) IIve 
dealt with hundreds of complaints.... I believe 
that there are certain issues which should cross 
political and religious divides.... poverty and bad 
housing. That's my type of politics. Some people 
would call it socialism. My type of socialism is 
basically about helping people who can't help 
themselves. " 
(Colin, DUP Councillor) 
Another in an extremely frank statement, a DUP councillor, ýexplained, 
"I personally would call myself a socialist, 
although I don't think it would be right to term 
the party a socialist party... if you're a, 
socialist in any way people immediately brand you a 
republican.... though it's surprising if you put 
forwatd socialist policies without calling them 
socialist just how much support they have in the-, 
Protestant community. " 
He expanded, 
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"Well if you go round the doors and put forward-,, 
socialist economic and social policies... if you 
said you were a socialist they'd throw you out. 
But if you explain the policies and don't say the 
word socialist they'd say 'that's right that's what 
needs to be done, ". 
He concluded, 
"I think it would be naive to say that normal class 
politics could operate here given the 
constitutional crisis, but I think it is possible 
to make people more aware of class divisions". 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
This councillor in particular tended to over estimate the willingness 
to embrace these ideas. People would tolerate such views because they 
knew they could depend upon him to represent them on local issues, and 
knew the person as a 'hardline, unionist. Alan- in particular had, a 
wonderful local reputation for representing people. However his views 
on social issues were far from popular with other DUP members and many 
DUP supporters in Ballymacarrett. As one of those DUP councillors who 
liked to call himself a socialist related, 
"I get dog's abuse. You're nothing but a, fucking 
socialist people say. I get called that all the 
time. At a community services meeting one unionist 
member called me a commmist. Afterwards he told 
me it was the worst insult he could think of. All 
I did was stand up and try and get some money and 
better conditions for ordinary people... unionists 
think that everybody who does that is either a 
commie or a republican. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
These criticisms came f rom two main sources. Firstly this small 
grouping of young articulate DUP representatives of fended the more 
conservative members of the OUP. Their views also brought them into 
conflict with those DUP members in East Belfast whose views were 
located in evangelical Protestantism. There was for example 
reluctance to accept DUP motivated initiatives such as grant-take-up 
schemes especially amongst older residents in the area. The following 
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statement -by one frustrated community worker sumilarised this 
perspective well, 
i 
"We have great difficulty in getting people to take 
grants. A lot of people still see it as scrounging 
something that only Rebels do. " 
(Harry, Community Worker, East Belfast) 
Not everyone criticised such schemes, especially after almost ten 
years of the present Conservative administration which had brought 
urban decline, poverty and unemployment to the fore. Certainly DUP 
councillors had formidable reputations for serving the interests of 
electorate. They spent considerable time and effort on local issues 
and problems. There may be several reasons for this. Wi th the 
disappearance of Stormont parliament and the Stormont Assembly, 
councillors, even although they have extremely limited powers, have, 
apart from Westminister M. P. s, become the major tier of public 
representatives in Northern Ireland. Councillors however are much 
more accessible than Westminster M. P. s. This was especially the case 
with the DUP. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the case loads of two DUP 
councillors for two one month periods during 1986. one notable 
feature was that of the 63 people who contacted councillor A, Alan, 61 
did so by personal contact. The figure is similar for councillor B, 
Colin, where 52 out of the 56 people made personal contact. These 
figures indicate a higher level of personal contact than average in 
Northern Ireland if compared with Birrell's findings that 41% of 
electors approached their councillors personally with problems 
(Birrell 1983: 107). These approaches to DUP councillors were not 
restricted to 'surgery hours'. It seemed commonplace for electors 
seeking help to call at the homes of DUP councillors at 'all times of 
the day and night,,. often this drew an immediate response from the 
councillor by way of telephone call. For this reason it may be that 
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the work undertaken by councillors as suggested in tables 5.1 and 5.2 
is an under-estimate. Councillor Alan for example only recorded a 
, case' if it resulted in formal written correspondence. By far the 
most prominent issue was housing, closely followed in both cases by 
Department of Health and Social Services issues. This needs some 
explanation as councillors in Northern Ireland are no longer 
responsible for any of these services. Ballymacarrett residents 
regarded their councillors as important public representatives who 
would best liaise with the appropriate public body on their behalf. 
The excellent reputation on such matters built up by DUP activists 
help strengthen their claim to be 'part of the community,. The 
majority of DUP councillors also lived 'in inner-East Belfast. This 
was especially apparent when compared to their official Unionist 
counterparts who largely lived in Belfast's suburbs or the middle 
class housing on the outer fringe of the Pottinger electoral area. 
This meant that official Unionist representatives could only usually 
be contacted at their ward surgeries which were held in the East 
Belfast branch buildings. 
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TABLE 5.1 : CASE LOAD FOR DUP COUNCILLOR 
COUNCILLOR A 
CASE LIST APRIL 1986 
32 MALES, 31 FEMALES - 63'CONSTITUENTS 
NATURE OF COMPIAINT/ENQUIRY 
NORTHERN IRELAND HOUSING EXECTUIVE 34 
DEPT. HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES 18 
ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY 6* 
BELFAST CITY COUNCIL 2 
DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT 4 
OTHERS 2 
TOTAL 66** 
INCLUDED 3 PEOPLE ARRESTED UNDER SPECIAL POWERS ACT 
SOME PEOPLE HAD MORE THAN ONE COMPLAINT/ENQUIRY 
140 
TABLE 5.2 : CASE LOAD FICR DUP COUNCILL40R 
COUNCILLOR B 
CASE LIST AUGUST 1986 
24 MALES# 32 FEMALES - 56 CONSTITUENTS 
NATURE OF COMPLAINT/ENQUI 
NORTHERN IRELAND HOUSING EXECUTIVE 
DEPT. HEALTH & SOCIAL SERVICES 
ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY 
PRISONERS AID 
INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNIAL 
NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTRICITY SERVICE 
DEPT. OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
OTHERS 
24 
8 
4* 
2 
4 
3 
8 
3 
56 
* INCLUDES 1 PERSON ARRESTED UNDER SPECIAL POWERS ACT 
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One other example of the relationship between the Dup councillors 
and the protestant, working class can be demonstrated by reaction ý of 
the local DUP Branch to the social services review in 1985 by-Norman 
Fowler. Local DUP councillors were extremely hostile to the proposed 
changes in, social security. They helped organise a local campaign 
demanding that the changes be 'scrapped'. DUP councillors from 
Ballymacarrett were also instrumental in calling for a special meeting 
of Belfast City Council to reject the recommendations on the grounds 
that, 
(a) their implementation will increase poverty 
among those forced to live on state benefits; 
(b) the review is a step away from benefit as of 
right, without a means test; 
(c) it introduces the notion of deserving poor and., 
undeserving poor amongst claimants; 
(d) it will create further inequality among our 
citizens. ", 
(Belfast City Council, summons to councillors 
to attend a special meeting, 9th September 
1985). 
The resolution opposing the social security review, was -proposed by 
Seamus Lynch,, a Workers Party councillor, and seconded ýby a DUP 
councillor from Ballymacarrett,, who argued that, - 
"the Labour Leader, Mr. Neil Kinnock, accurately 
described the review by saying it would make the 
poor poorer and the insecure more insecure... many 
fancy political phrases have been used in reference 
to the review but they can all be summed up in one 
word - cuts. " (cited in Belfast Telegraph, 14/9/1985) 
The level of cross-party co-operation should not be over-emphasised. 
At 'the same meeting was the scene of constant disruptions and 
confrontations between rival councillors. Following their election 
pledge to 'smash Sim Fein', DUP members had been trying to stop Sim 
Fein councillors being heard' at Belfast City-Council meetings. This 
involved making as much noise as possible, foot shuffling, heckling, 
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banging desk tops and carrying on loud conversations between DUP 
councillors every time a Sim Fein -member rose to speak. ý This 
behaviour continued at-, the special meeting even though three Sim Fein 
councillors wished to speak in favour of the motion. The same DUP 
councillor, who had seconded the motion constantly interupted the 
council meeting by shouting "Sim Fein members are scum" and later 
declared, 
"It is because we care about the people of Belfast 
that we are not going to allow these people (Sim 
Fein councillors) to present themselves as decent 
citizens. They are scum. " 
(cited in Belfast News Letter, 14 September 1985) 
The meeting was temporarily halted following a DUP motion to suspend 
the meeting. During this time the Lord mayor (an Offical Unionist) 
held private talks with the DUP. However when the meeting was resumed 
it again became the scene of disruption and heckling, -amidst which the 
resolution calling for the withdrawal of Health Secretary Norman 
Fowler's review was passed. I 
Such behaviour can only be understood if the DUP response to the 
constitutional crisis is considered. The DUP from its formation has 
sought to -gain popular support by promoting a more egalitarian 
unionism, claiming to represent Protestant working class interests, 
and undermining the unionist elite. Advocating a more even 
distribution of economic and social resources continues to be given a 
high priority by certain urban DUP activists, especially in areas of 
deprivation such as Ballymacarrett. However this can only ever be 
part of the DUP's appeal and part of the political consciousness of 
their. supporters. The other is their , steadfastness', their 
willingness to take on, and defend Ulster-against its enemies'. It 
is this which is always given priority especially in the public-arena 
such as council meetings. Any truck with 'republicans' is seen as a 
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step on the road to a united Ireland. As one DUP document, put it, 
such "is the antipathy of Northern Unionist to Irish unification that 
even if the alternative was to eat grass and die, they would sooner 
die. To the Northern Protestants of today, just as to their 
forefathers of sixty or a hundred years ago, Irish unification, in any 
form, is an anathema". (The Unionist case, the Forum Report answered, 
n. d. ) 
, -That is not to say that DUP members in Ballymacarrett. do not 
differ in several ways from the mainstream DUP or that other values 
are not negotiable. Firstly, it should be apparent that DUP 
councillors do, in everyday issues at least, continue to have a 
distinct view to social and economic issues. In Ballymacarrett. there 
is no clear correlation between Free Presbyterian Church and 
Democratic Unionist Party. It is possible to suggest that any overt 
emphasis by DUP members on Ichristian principle, may in fact loose 
support in inner East Belfast. In a recent publication the DUP stated 
their position concerning moral issues, declaring the DUP would, 
"Lead opposition.... to such matters as the 
legalising of homosexuality, opening sex shops and 
Sunday opening of public houses. Ulster should 
decide its own moral standards and codes of 
behaviour. " 
(UDuP 1982 Assembly election manifesto: 2) 
Yet such views were far from popular in Ballymacarrett, especially the 
promotion of Sunday observance. As one Branch Officer put it, 
"on the Sunday opening thing. The position round 
here has changed and that's because a lot of people 
around here didn't agree with it, and people in the 
party had to change their position because of local 
opinion". 
(Frank, DUP Branch officer) 
The ability to air such views contributed to the feelings of most of 
those involved in the DUP in Ballymacarrett who believed themselves to 
be part of a highly democratic party political organisation. All 
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spoke of Ian Paisley, or the Doc' as he was known, with respect and 
great warmth. However many wished to point to the autonomy of the 
branch within the DUP. One said, 
"I strongly disagree with all those who say Ian 
Paisley runs the DUP. If you look at his views on 
temperance and not opening things on Sundays he's 
obviously strongly in favour of both. But we had 
to tell him that we had to go easy on both because 
it was losing us votes. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
Another described this incident, 
"People seem to think Paisley comes down to East 
Belfast and says 'I want this' and 'I want that'. 
But that's not right and I can give you a very good 
example. In the last election Ian Paisley wanted 
us to put up four candidates in this area ..... Now 
we said we're confident of getting three in but if 
you put four up we might split the vote and only 
get two in... We had a lot of arguing and fighting 
to do but in the end he decided to relent and let 
us stand three. In the end he saw our point and 
agreed with us. Power just doesn't come from the 
top 
(Brian, DUP councillor) 
While one Branch official summed up his views as follows, 
"I think Ian Paisley is a magnificent leader, and I 
have every respect for him, but I wouldn't say I am 
a Paisleyite. I am a branch officer in the 
Democratic Unionist Party ..... most people in the branch pay great attention to what Dr. Paisley 
says, but I don't think they follow it blindly". 
(Ken, DUP Branch officer) 
This situation needs some explanation as several commentators have 
pointed to the close link between the Free Presbyterian Church and the 
Democratic Unionist Party. As Bruce notes, "in the early stages of 
his political career, Ian Paisley depended a great deal on the Free 
Presbyterian Church" (Bruce 1986: 134). Especially in rural areas the 
Free Presbyterian Church has been, and continues to be, an important 
focus for organising political support for the DUP. Such a direct 
correlation between Church and Party does not exist in Ballymacarrett. 
Here support for-the DUP is likely to be forthcoming because of the 
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emphasis by the DUP on the strength of their commitment to loyalism 
and their articulation of working class Protestant interest, rather 
than any emphasis on evangelical beliefs. - 
It is this emphasis on economic and social issues which gives the 
DUP in Ballymacarrett some sense, of autonomy as well as fostering the 
belief of members that they are part of a genuinely 'democratic' 
organisation. It would be incorrect to over emphasise the branch's 
autonomy within the party structure. There is however another 
important reason why those from Ballymacarrett often regard themselves 
as standing apart from mainstream DUP politics. The DUP has not been 
characterised by its strength of internal debate or tolerance of 
internal dissent (Smyth 1987: 135-137)ý For the first ten years of 
its existence, at least, much emphasis: was placed on personal 
allegiance to Ian Paisley. Anyone seeking to alter policy decisions 
had to do so in a way-which did not bring into question allegiance to 
the Party Leader. Failure to do so often bore due consequences for 
the individual. As Smyth noted, 
"dissenting voices within the DUP have either toý 
accept the limitations which the monolithic nature 
of their Party imposes on them or they have to 
resign". 
(Smyth 1987: 65) 
One exception to this has been Peter Robinson, the Westminister MP for 
East Belfast. Robinson came to prominence by -his effective 
organisation and mobilisation of the local party machine and workers 
in Ballymacarrett. He hasý gone some way towards creating an 
independent social and political base. In Ballymacarrett the'personal 
loyality of several key DUP activisits was to Robinson rather than Ian 
Paisley. In particular Robinson had a less ambivalent attitude 
towards loyalist paramilitary groups, and is more prepared to justify 
direct action, than are many prominent DUP members. This became 
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crucial in articulating specific -responses to the Anglo-Irish 
agreement in East Belfast. 
The development of the - DUP in Ballymacarrett must be seen in the 
context of the fragmentation of unionist politics at the national 
level. This meant the relationship between the PWC and mainstream 
political parties could no longer be-taken for granted but became a 
matter for negotiation. The DUP was to play-'an important part in 
filling the vacuum left by the demise of older allegiances. ý For half 
a century unionism had not permitted economic or"social, issues to 
divide the party, although on some occasions dissension was just below 
the surface. This was often the case in East Belfast with its strong 
labour and independent unionist tradition. ýWhile the'fragmentation of 
unionism has been well documented, there were in addition to the main 
splits,, others, " flowing from working class dissatisfaction. Some 
merely regarded the traditional leadership as being weak in the battle 
with the IRA. others however saw the unionist leaderships completely 
distant from the needs and concerns of the PWC. underlying both was 
a widespread fear of betrayal' by Britain. " In Ballymacarett it is 
the DUP who have best articulated these feelings of the PWC. Having 
split unionism on a- class basis an attempt has been made to 
reconstruct unionist hegemony around the DUP. 
None of the previous fissures within unionism articulating, social, 
grievances produced anything more than short term responses or 
political organisation. it was through the exercise of this special 
kind of power, ' that of'being able to frame alternatives,, and to win 
and shape consent, which Lukes has called the power to- shape the 
agenda' (Lukes 1974: 23-24) that unionist hegemony was maintained. 
One of the most enduring ideological effects of this 'among the 
Protestant masses was their belief that their well being was 
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codeterminous with the existence of the state and the particular type 
of control and repression developed to support the state. - 
As Northern Irish society split along communal lines in the early 
1970's conflict and violence appeared at many levels. The dominant 
unionist class still retained power but its options were increasingly 
reduced. The most striking example of this has been the shift in the 
exercise of control from mecahnisms of 'consent' to those of 
'control,. At one level the DUP have readily adopted this traditional 
agenda, they have been to the forefront of calls for stronger 
, security, measures. It is because they have continued to define the 
agenda as centering on law and order that support has been maintained 
from substantial sections of the PKC whose fear is that the Union is 
increasingly under threat. As this Chapter has indicated the 
relationship between the DUP and PWC however is not a direct one. The 
DUP in Ballymacarrett are quite capable of calling for increased state 
repression while at the same time organising campaigns against 'cuts' 
in the social security system or protests in favour of better housing 
conditions. It is the tensions between the different strands of 
unionist populism and the ability of the DUP to redefine the agenda 
which partly explains the fragmented response of the PwC to the 
crisis. It has been claimed that Paisleyism is the, voice of 
grassroot loyalism and "the best introduction to what the 
consciousness of large sections of the Protestant poor is all about. " 
(Bell 1976: 41-47). Here as elsewhere Bell has underestimated the 
complexity and forms of PKC consciousness. 
-In the present crisis not all sections of the PKC have been 
content to express themselves through any parliamentary political 
party. Loyalist paramilitary groups have been one important source of 
identification for the PWC. The. next chapter will consider the role 
148 
of these groups, and, in particular the ý actions -- and consciousness of 
the largest of these, the Ulster Defence Association, in relation to 
politics in Ballymacarrett. 
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CEAPTER SIX PARAMILITARY ]POLITICS IN BALLYMACARRETT 
Since the early 1970's paramilitary organisations have provided 
an important channel both for articulating social grievances and for 
reproducing sectarian ideology within the Protestant working class. 
By far the most influential have been, the Ulster Defence Association 
(UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The' origins and 
development of the latter have been discussed elsewhere (Boulton 1973, 
Nelson 1984). The most active paramilitary grouping in Ballymacarret, 
both in terms of membership, influence and organisation is the UDA. 
Membership of the UDA remains legal (unlike that-of the-, UVF) and 
historically the UDA have always- been stronger in East Belfast than 
the UVF. (Dillon & Lehane 1973: 168) Members are visibly active in 
Ballymacarret, although not necessarily in the areas where it would be 
expected to find members of a paramilitary organisation. For example 
many of the members who were active in Ballymacarret were involved in 
welfare and conuunity issues. While it is not the intention to deny 
or gloss over those actions by the UDA which have taken the form of 
'military' activity, the major purpose of this chapter will be to 
concentrate on the political development of the organisation and the 
UDA's relationship with the local community. 
As elsewhere in Northern Ireland, in Ballymacarrett the UDA 
emerged in 1971, as a direct response by the PKC to the worsening 
security situation. Throughout that year 'vigilante, groups had been 
oranised in loyalist working class districts of Belfast. Such groups 
were largely uncoordinated and were responsible for the protection of 
individual or small clusters of streets usually by the mounting of 
"check-points, ' at the end of streets. This was Ithe broad pattern 
followed in Ballymacarrett. Local vigilante groups were usually 
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directed by one or two individuals. A circular distributed around 
Ballymacarrett at the time explained their limited aims as, 
"the protection of life and property in the area" 
and, 
"to coordinate (our) efforts with similar groups in 
the immediate vicinity" 
(Hand-circular, East Belfast, 1971) 
It is important' to try and understand the feelings, of those taking 
such actions. There was a widespread feeling in loyalist areas that 
no one was safe from the IRA. Local vigilante groups, ' main desires 
were essentially parochial, "to prevent our city being reduced 'to 
rubble". They also sought to "resist incursions of the common 
enemy... to keep them out of our area, for as long a time as the 
manpower at our disposal will permit" (Hand-circular, East Belfast 
1971). 
In August 1971 there was an attempt to co-ordinate these 
groupings on a widespread basis. A leaflet appeared throughout 
loyalist areas of Belfast which called upon, 
"All members of our Loyalist institutions, and 
other responsible citizens, to organise themselves 
immediately into Platoons of twenty under the 
command of someone acting as Sergeant. Every 
effort must be made to am these platoons with 
whatever weapons are available. The first duty'of 
each platoon will be to formulate a plan for the 
defence of its own street or road in co-operation 
with platoons in adjoining areas. A structure of 
command is already in existence and the various 
platoons will eventually(sic) be linked in a 
co-ordinated effort". 
the leaflet issued further instructions, 
"Under no circumstances must Platoons come into 
conflict with Her majesty's Forces or the Police... 
Members of Platoons must act with the highest sense 
of responsibility and urgency in preparing our 
people for the full assault of the enemies within 
our Province. 
(Hand-circular Belfast August 1971) 
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One, of the earliest to organise was the Shankill Defence Association. 
The group had developed out of another local organisation which had 
been formed to oppose the effects of the Belfast Urban Renewal 
Programme. In response to the initial phase of the conflict it, 
"readily turned into a paramilitary group, ipatrolling ýthe upper 
Shankill and the border with the Catholic Falls". (Buckland 1981: 28). 
Local Defence associations quickly emerged in other loyalist districts 
such as woodvale, - Donegall Pass, Hammer, Newtownabbey, Lisburn Road, 
Seymour Hill, Suffolk and Dundonald. - In East Belfast, the Woodstock, 
Beersbridge, and Castlereagh DefenceAssociations were reasonably well 
established by late August. The next month, a founder member of the 
Woodvale Defence Association made a systematic attempt to bring these 
Defence Associations together under a general council which became 
known as the Ulster Defence Association. 
Again it is important to try and establish the political 
consciousness of those involved. One UDA officerrecalled the events 
as follows, 
"The UDA came about because people in streets 
around here, banded together, to go about after 
dark, and patrol the streets,, vigilante type 
movements... if the IRA had decided to make a 
determined attack I don't know what we would have 
done about it... But, it was a way of releasing 
frustration, the people didn't know what to do, so 
rather than do nothing, they felt they had to do 
something. As the tension increased, the groups 
banded together and you had these defence 
associations all over Northern Ireland and then 
these came together to form the Ulster Defence 
Association... it was, -and suppose still is, the 
product of fear and the tension and the frustration 
of Ulster Protestants who believe they are 
continually under attack". 
(Mike, UDA Officer, East Belfast. ) 
By 1972 the UDA had a membership of around 40,000 (Flackes 1980: 229). 
Throughout 1972 there were a series of, marches featuring mass ranked 
UDA members, wearing military uniforms and marching ý in military 
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formation. on 19th August, 5,000 UDA members marched in companies to 
a rally in East Belfast. 
The emergence of the UDA seemed legitimate to many, working class 
loyalists, given their, social construction -of the world. It is also 
important to realise that the UDA emerged f rom, and were based upon, 
the social structure described in Chapter Four. In its early days in 
Ballymacarett, as elsewhere in Belfast, the UDA's leadership was 
composed of leading members of the local community. Those immediately 
in charge tended to be "shrewd street leaders - local bookies, garage 
hands or small businessmen" (Fisk, 1975: 28). It was the dominance of 
this faction which gave the UDA its initial direction and momentum. 
This was illustrated in the early demands of the UDA to 'wage war on 
the IRA', and that 'Stormont must Rule,. 
Many who joined the uDA fully supported such aims and were 
prepared to do so by military means. However, to generalise this to a 
point which portrays their ideology as homogeneous is misleading. 
From its inception the UDA contained a number of different ideological 
positions. The organisation's history reveals almost continuous 
factional disputes. In Ballymacarrett, as in other urban areas, some 
of this merely reflected the organisation's involvement in 
'protection', the setting up and management of drinking -clubs', and 
the fact that as an organisation with a mass base it contained a 
criminal element. Other disputes involved power struggles aimed at 
demarcating control between individuals in localised areas, or between 
different local paramilitary groups. Serious disagreements also arose 
from differences over the direction of both military and ideological 
struggles. 
One early example of this was the - UDA, s relationship with the 
Ulster Vanguard Movement led by ex-official- Unionist politician, 
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William Craig. Vanguard articulated the sense of betrayal' that many 
working class Unionists were feeling. In doing so it earned 
considerable working class support (see Chapter Five). It was 
Vanguard who first mooted the idea of - independence. During 1973, in a 
series of newspaper advertisements, Vanguard sought to present a 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence as a viable alternative to 
union with Britain. In one pamphlet it declared, - 
"We shall assert our right to take whatsoever 
action we consider necessary to safeguard our 
Loyalist cause... such action to include, if there 
is no alternative, the establishment of an 
Independent British Ulster". 
(Ulster Vanguard, 1972: 10) 
Subsequent calls for an independent Ulster from the UDA, and the 
notion of independence often discussed by UDA members in 
Ballymacarrett, however do not follow on directly from the Vanguard 
notion of independence. Partly this reflects a long standing tension 
between paramilitaries and established Unionist politicians. As early 
as 1972 there were growing voices of dissension within the UDA from 
those who were becoming increasingly articulate in their criticisms of 
middle class Unionist politicians. The following statement f rom the 
then chairperson, James Anderson demonstrates this, position well, 
"I feel that people are beginning to catch on about 
the Unionist government. The ordinary man is 
starting to think for himself about the fifty years 
of misrule that we did have. If a Unionist 
candidate came down a street, all he had to do was 
wave a flag and beat a drum and he was elected for 
the next five years, and you didn't see him for the 
next five years. People are starting to catch on". 
(cited in the Belfast Telegraph 19/9/72) 
Tensions became overt when a section of the UDA issued a press 
statement in which it was claimed that class conscious members were 
forming a new body called the 'Ulster- Citizens Any'. It expressed 
concern that ex-unionist politicians were becoming too influential in 
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UDA planning. The statement continued: 
"These parasites, who never in the past were the 
friend of the Ulster worker, have not changed. 
Their sole aim is still the pursuit of power at any 
price. " 
(cited in Boulton 1973: 178)- 
short time afterwards the Ulster Citizens Army issued a manifesto 
which stated that the UCA had, 
"decided to officially declare its existence as the 
UDA. becomes more weak, ineffective and incapable of 
defending Protestant workers and working class 
homes against attacks by the security forces. " 
It claimed that the UCA was composed, 
11of more socialist orientated and class conscious 
members of the UDA, the Army came into being as a 
result of growing dissatisfaction and frustration 
within UDA ranks" 
(Press statement cited in Lobster 14: 19) 
Such unease could not have been alleviated by the following 
statement from the leader of the largest of loyalist workplace 
organisations, the Loyalist Association of Workers, (LAW), 
"The children of the workers deserve the 
opportunity of higher education... they are not 
getting it here today. Where there ought to be 
rows of terraced houses with modern bathrooms, up 
to date playing fields and old, peoples homes, 
swimming pools and normal necessities of life 
today, the Shankill Road and other workers' areas 
present a bleak picture of desolation... the 
leaders of unionism have not inherited our 
automatic support". 
(cited in Boulton 1973: 138) 
There was much internal friction within the UDA at this time. Because 
of the spontaneous way described in which the UDA developed, the 
command structure within the organisation was extremely loose. This 
meant that much power and decision making was devolved to local 
commanders. These schisms revolved around personalities, 
power-disputes at the local level, and the demarcation of local 
territories. - One of the main tensions was 
between the leadership in 
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West and East Belfast (Dillon and Lehare 1973: 144). In'the west of 
the city, the leadership wanted to integrate with the uvF and to adopt 
a hardline approach. The West Belfast command was also seeking to 
tighten the command structure and to clamp down on racketeering. In 
East Belfast extortion existed at a high level. There was also-a 
reduced threat of attack by the IRA because of the overwhelming 
physical dominance of Protestants (see Chapter Four)'. There were also 
serious ideological differences between two factions. The 'hard men' 
of the west wanted to step up military action. In East Belfast the 
local command was more sympathetic to the moderate element in the UDA. 
At various times this faction was said to have been in discussion with 
Peoples Democracy, the official IRA, the British and Irish Communist 
Organisation and the Communist Party of Ireland (Lobster 14: 20). 
Reaction to this faction was dramatic, rapid and bloody. 
In an intense campaign those within the UDA who were in any way 
associated with this radical line were isolated within the 
organisation. Two of the three people believed to have been behind 
the UCA were assassinated, while the other was forced to flee the 
country. (Dillon and Lehane 1973: 148-9, Probert 1978: 140-1) The more 
conservative leadership of the UDA took control. As a result the more 
military orientated members were unleashed. one result was that the 
I 
number of sectarian murders rose dramatically; as Dillon and Lehane 
explain it, 
"The story of the sectarian assassination in Ulster 
is the story of the Protestant back lash. There 
can be no questioning the simple truth that the 
greater part of the near-200 such assassinations 
were committed by Protestants organised in groups, 
often for this specific purpose... The story of 
this phase of the troubles is that of a small group 
of Protestants concentrated mainly in Belfast, who 
were driven to despair of the legitimate 
constitutional procedures they had been brought up 
to revere by an indiscriminate campaign of killing 
and destruction that seemed all too likely to 
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succeed in its every aim. That the backlash took 
over three years to emerge was due chiefly to the 
fact that the people involved were deeply 
interested in preserving the status quo. only when 
the status quo seemed to be crumbling before them, 
and no other course seemed open did they act. " 
(Dillon and Lehane 1973: 24) 
The UDA's role was however far from settled. They were being forced 
to adopt a number of conflicting positions. For example the UDA 
increasingly found itself in a position of direct confrontation with 
the British Army. This was highlighted during 1972 by the UDA's 
strategy of setting up no-go,, areas (including an area of 
Ballymacarrett), in protest -at the continuance of such ýareas in 
republican districts (Hamill 1985: 129). In October 1972 there was 
serious rioting in East Belfast when two Protestants were killed by an 
army vehicle which crushed them against a wall. The local UDA 
commander for'East Belfast declared, 
"To hell with the British Army. The British 
government and the British Army are now our 
enemies. " 
(cited in Hall 1988: 40) 
The declaration was rescinded within barely eight hours but underlined 
changes in the political thinking of the PWC- The accusations of 
brutality by the British Army, which had surfaced from the Catholic 
community were no longer automatically dismissed as Republican 
propaganda. Furthermore a growing number, of Loyalists were being 
detained under the Special Powers Act. The PWC and those active in 
the UDA were undergoing important perceptual changes concerning their 
position within unionism and their relationship to the British, state. 
Such considerations were however rapidly shelved in the light of 
the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike in. may 1974. The UWC strike 
emerged as an amalgamation of loyalist workplace organisations. The 
events surrounding the 'strike, have been well documented (Fisk 1975, 
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Holland 1982: 110-11, Bell 1976: 4-5, Probert 1978: 141-44, Hamill 
1985: 144-54, Nelson 1984: 155-69, Buckland '1981: 169-173) Briefly, 
the strike began on Wednesday 15th May, following the ratification of 
the Sunningdale Agreement by the Northern Irish Assembly. Initially 
there was much confusion but as the strike progressed, the UWC, 
supported on the streets by the Loyalist paramilitaries, took control 
of the distribution of electricity, gas and petrol. As the strike 
gained momentum the UWC regulated the opening of retail shops, places 
of entertainment, Banks, Post offices and foodstuffs. Daily 
instructions were issued in loyalist areas, by the Ulster Army Council 
concerning movement. The Ulster Army Council was a co-ordinating 
group for several loyalist paramilitary organisations including both 
the UDA and UVF. One commentator summarised the situation as follows, 
"the strike started, slowly at first, with many 
*people unsure of what they were doing. Nor did 
anyone know how the army would react. The 
Protestant paramilitary armies, however, did back 
the strike and the momentum grew. Road blocks were 
established and manned by masked men; transport was 
disrupted and farmers blocked country roads; people 
were intimidated into returning home. The UWC 
controlled everything - milk, bread, petrol, and 
even passes for essential workers like doctors to 
get around. " 
(Hamill',, 1985; 147) 
The turning point in favour of the strikers appeared to be when Harold 
Wilson, the then British Prime Minister made'a speech on the national 
media, in which he declared that 'the people of Ulster spent their 
lives sponging on 'Westminster'. During the following days, in 
Belfast, many wore sponges in their lapels in protest. At best the 
speech was counter productive in its influence on Loyalist opinion. 
As the strike reached its second week, the UWC shut down 
Belfast's gas supply and began to run down to a crisis point the 
electricity supply for the whole of Northern Ireland. 
- 
on Tuesday 28th 
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May the Northern Ireland Executive collapsed following the resignation 
of Faulkner and his Unionist Ministers. The political initiative 
which had begun eighteen months before at the Darlington Conference 
had crumbled. The strike ended the next day. 
Unionist hegemony reconstructed during the strike. However class 
tensions quickly re-emerged. AS Fisk pointed out, 
"the politicians and the paramilitary leaders 
retreated to their old position of mutual 
distrust. " 
(Fisk 1975: 28) 
The strike, had far reaching consequences for relations within the 
bloc. The widespread involvement of the PWC in community action 
during the strike marked a distinct break with what had gone before. 
It is important to understand that both paramilitary groups and many 
subsequent community groups developed from the same social base. 
often they relied upon the same people and drew upon the same physical 
structure. Hugh Frazer commentating on the development of community 
work in Northern Ireland in the 1970's had this to say, 
"Pressures for social change came from a range of' 
different sources inspired by a variety of motives, 
including compassion for victims of misfortune, 
anger at injustice, and fear of unrest. Thus, 
literally hundreds of local self-help community and 
pressure groups have emerged over the past decade 
some to protest at local conditions (eg save the 
Shankill) and some to try and meet immediate needs 
(eg lunch clubs, summer schemes, play groups). At 
the other end of the scale, government, motivated 
by a mixture of fear at social unrest and concern 
for the worst extremes of poverty and deprivation, 
backed community programmes (eg increased 
expenditure on community work, Belfast areas of 
need etc). In the middle, lots of concerned and 
compassionate individuals became involved in 
organisations such as those running children's 
holiday schemes, helping the elderly and so on. " 
(H. Frazer, speech given IVS Workshop 1980, mimeo) 
The experience of the strike led some within the UDA to question their 
own structural position. The uDA leadership was forced to reconsider 
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its fundamental position, in response to pressure from the PWC. As 
one commentator suggests, 
"An important perceptual change was that, "'-after the 
constitutional stoppage of 1974 much of the 
community action within loyalist ghettos moved 
towards the acceptance of basic tenets of 
opposition to the state. " 
(Deane 1981: 15) 
This perspective is still evident in Ballymacarrett and is reflected 
in this statement from a paramilitary spokesperson some ten years 
later, 
"The Loyalist community has been brainwashed for 
years. We are supposed to be the privileged class 
yet we live in atrocious conditions, houses with no 
baths, run down estates, high unemployment; few 
social amentities and whole communities which are 
dying because of the planners and goverment 
policies. Yet for years people have continued to 
vote for politicians who created and allowed these 
conditions to exist. People vote out of fear. " 
(Shankill Bulletin Sept. 1984: 5) 
The immediate response of the UDA was to seek to establish a joint 
working committee with leading Loyalist politicians. The latter, 
however rejected this suggestion and remained intensely suspicious of 
any level of independent action by the FWC. The instability of 
Loyalist party political unity was demonstrated in 1975 when William 
Craig in an incredible volte-face called for an all party coalition 
which would subsequently give way to a conventional parliament. The 
UDA leadership supported the idea but it was opposed by all the other 
Unionist parties. By early 1976 the Convention had failed to present 
any fom of agreed report to Westminster and was dissolved. 
Throughout 1975 the UDA and UVF became involved in a bloody feud 
resulting in the killing of several members of -each organisation. 
Furtherraore there was growing dissension within the organisation. 
Many who had joined the UDA to fight for Ulster, simply weren't 
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interested in, or capable of fulfilling the role of community workers 
(Nelson 1984: 193-202). More seriously for the organisation, the UDA 
were facing a growing crisis of legitimation within loyalist areas. 
In Ballymacarrett there were renewed claims of Igangsterism, and 
'racketeering'. Accusations such as these are still often heard in 
Ballymacarrett, although the actual levels appear to have fallen 
dramatically since the mid 1970s. 
The growing alienation from the wider PwC was heightened in 1977 
when the UDA gave its support to an indefinite strike called by the 
Rev. Ian Paisley. This was an attempt to force the Goverment to 
implement stronger security measures. They were opposed by Vanguard, 
West's official Unionist Party, and the Orange order. The UUUC split 
apart accussing Paisley of seeking UDI. on the f irst day of the 
'strike' many workplaces remained open despite widespread 
intimidation. Unlike 1974, the police responded to incidents of 
intimidation and removed many barricades. Most notably the power 
workers failed to give their support. The segmentation of the 
unionist bloc manifested itself in open hostility between the UDA 
leadership and the Democratic Unionist Party. The strike's abject 
failure, made worse by the obvious comparison with the uWC strike, 
resulted in a further weakening of the UDA, and delegitimization of 
their role in Protestant working class communities. 
The consequences of the 1977 strike for the UDA were profound and 
far-reaching. Andy Tyrie who led the organisation until quite 
recently expressed the position as follows, 
"The British Government stopped taking the 
Loyalist comumity seriously after 1977 because 
they saw them so divided.... the most it (the 
British Goverment) can expect from most Loyalists 
is to march about and protest. But if it means 
taking on the British establishment in a civil war 
situation, that is totally different. " 
(Fortnight No. 204: 5) 
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This line of argument has remained a constant feature of UDA thinking. 
One member expressed similar views when he said, 
"The problem with the loyalist leadership is that 
they run around telling everybody how united they 
are. The politicans are giving the impression that 
they're going to spearhead the attack and if the 
truth were told they just don't know what they're 
doing or how they're going to do it... they've no 
plan of campaign... they haven't got the bottle for 
it... in fact they've nothing up their sleeves but 
their arms... no wonder the British don't worry 
about us. " 
(Nigel, UDA officer, East Belfast) 
The UDA was becoming increasingly alienated f rom the PWC. As an 
organisation it was less than six years old but the agenda had already 
been set for contemporary UDA politics. In Ballymacarrett as 
elsewhere since the 1977 strike the UDA has sought to negotiate and 
legitimise_ its relationship with the PWC and its class relations 
within unionism. 
The UDA resolved its immediate problems by conceding ground to 
those members who were calling for a coherent social and political 
programme. The most immediate political outcome was the formation of 
the New Ulster Political Research Group (NUPRG). It quickly began to 
promote the idea of an 'Independent Ulster' as the solution to the 
Northern Irish conflict. Simultaneously the UDA made a conscious 
effort to strengthen its position at the community level by way of the 
Ulster Community Action Group (UCAG). The following statement from 
the NUPRG's Chairperson captured the mood of the UDA's thinking, 
"The problem to date has been that the UDA has 
always relied on the established politicans to 
represent them politically. But we believe that 
over the last few years representation hasn't been 
reflecting the true feelings of grass-root people. " 
He went on to outline the reasons for such disillusionment, 
"On-the Loyalist side the Loyalist politicans have 
manipulated the Protestant people... on the 
Catholic side they have been used and manipulated 
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by emotional type politicans. Because over the 
years if you look at politics in Northern Ireland 
no one ever talked about pure politics. Every 
election time, all you have is a flag being waved 
at you repeating threats to your constitutional 
position. " 
(cited in Holland 1982: 112-113) 
The major intellectual output of the NUPRG was a discussion 
document, 'Beyond the ReligioUS Divide', first published in March 
1979. It contained a series of proposals for the introduction of an 
'Independent Ulster'. The basis of this was to be a constitution 
based on the American Presidential system and a 'Bill of Rightst, 
This was to be supported by guarantees from both Britain and the Irish 
Republic, both of which would withdraw their claims of sovereignty 
over the Northern Irish State. The document declared that a 
negotiated independence was, 
"the only proposal which does not have a victor and 
a loser. It will encourage the development of'a 
common identity between all of our people, 
regardless of religion. We offer through our 
proposal, first class Ulster citizenship to all of 
our people, because like it or not the Protestant 
of Northern Ireland is looked upon as a second 
class British Citizen in Britain and the Roman 
Catholic of Northern Ireland as a second class 
Irish Citizen in the South. 
(NUPRG 1979: 6) 
The language the UDA were using at the time, 'proper politics, and 
'pure politics"was not expanded upon in Beyond the Religious Divide. 
Guelke suggests that what the authors had in mind was, 
"the development of class based politics that would 
permit a broadly based Labour Party in Northern 
Ireland. " 
(Guelke 1988: 71) 
A further indication of this was given in the Editorial of the weekly 
magazine of the UDA, Ulster' at the time, 
"Unionist politics have dominated Ulster because of 
the absence of a strong labour movement. This 
absence allows Britain to keep a policy of 
conditional support for the union while at the same 
time continuing to explore ways and means of 
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uniting Ireland in cooperation with the Dublin 
Goverment. This is fertile ground for sectarian 
politics. 
The Ulster Defence Association came into being as 
an expression of the mistrust of Ulster working 
people with Unionist politics. The UDA is a 
working people organisation, the only me of its 
kind in Ulster. While its main concern has been 
the maintenance of an armed body of citizens, the 
UDA has found itself in the position of exploring 
its political potential, because of the 
increasingly obvious weakness of Unionist 
politics. " 
(Ulster, Vol. 2, No. 3,1978) 
Under this momentum the UDA extered the field of constitutional 
politics. The Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party (ULDP) was formed. 
The ULDP contested a council by-election, in East Belfast in August 
1981, where they received 8.4% of the vote. Their main spokesperson 
stood in a by-election in South Belfast but only polled 1.3% of the 
vote. The ULDP stood two candidates in the October 1982 Assembly 
elections but again fared extremely badly. In May 1985, the ULDP 
stood on a manifesto which included a pledge to 'utterly defeat the 
IRA', and to oppose any summit between the British and Irish 
Governments., The manifesto went onto outline the ULDP's opposition to 
'health and education cutbacks, to fight for a better deal for 
Loyalists in housing, and to introduce 'Ulster history, culture and 
music to schools and radio and T. V. programmes' (Ulster, May 1985: 2). 
Again there was little response from the electorate. The re were 
however several members in Ballymacarrett who remained committed to 
the political dimension. The ability of the UDA to permeate PWC 
consciousness at the party political level is weak. Even those active 
in the political sphere recognises this, as one member explained, 
"Putting up candidates doesn't really seem to be , 
getting us anywhere. But I don't really know what 
else we can do. ordinary Protestants aren't ready 
for it perhaps... but there's no point voting for 
the established politicians because when it comes 
to the bit... they've no idea, or any ideas they do 
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have don't work. " 
(Sam, UDA member East Belfast) 
Another explained the lack of electoral success this way, 
"Protestants see independence as a stepping stone 
to a united Ireland. There's a fear that if you 
break the link with the U. K. you leave yourself 
wide open and will be sucked into a United 
Ireland... 
he added, 
"I suppose to the Catholics, it seems like some sort 
of a trap... that we're trying to get them into it 
(an Independent Ulster), so that will get the 
British referees out and we'll kick the shit out of 
them... beat them all over the place. " 
(Michael, UDA Officer East Belfast) 
Those active in this 'political wing, were far from autonomous. 
Members overlapped with other UDA members involved in other 
non-military activities (and sometimes military' activities), such as 
welfare and community group work. In particular there was a great 
deal of overlap with those individuals active in loyalist prisoner 
groups. One member Tom was extremely active in the 'Ulster Heritage 
Agency'. This was formally set up by the UDA to 'promote research' 
into Ulster people's beliefs before the beginning of the religious 
conflict in the seventeenth century, but Tom was the only member in 
Ballymacarrett interested in this wing of the UDA. 
Increasingly the UDA has sought to promote their notion of an 
independent Ulster in the idea of a 'shared identity and history 
between Protestant and Catholic'. This involves a historical 
reconstruction based largely on the works of Adamson (1974,1982). 
These seek to show that the origins of the Protestant population in 
the north of Ireland predate the 16th century Plantation of Ulster. 
Adamson argues that the 'Cruthins', the original inhabitants of 
Ireland were driven north by the invading Gaels. The last foothold of 
the Cruthins in Ireland was in what is now Antrim and Down. many 
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however, fled to Scotland, strengthening the historical link between 
the Scottish and those from the north of Ireland. Significantly 
according to this interpretation, 
"the 17th century plantation brought many 
Presbyterian Scots who may be justly considered as 
returning to the home of their ancestors" 
(Adamson 1982: 12) 
This concept is important in UDA thinking, as it becomes possible to 
represent the Plantation as a 'homecoming'. 
The adoption of this interpretation of history has involved the 
adoption of a number of symbols and hero figures from Irish history 
and pre-history which previously have been regarded as the property of 
Irish Republicanism. In particular the UDA have taken the events of 
the Tain bo Cuailnge as central to their ideas. This is the centre 
piece of the eighth century Ulster cycle of heroic tales. The saga 
revolves around the invasion of Ulster by the forces of the King and 
Queen of Connaught. The central hero of the myth is Cuchulainn, the 
Hound of Ulster, who resists the armies of Connaught single handed. 
The adaption of Cuchulaim as a popular image by the UDA is 
particularly important as it was previously highly significant to and 
extensively used in Republican imagery. For exampler a commemorative 
statue of Cuchulainn to the 1916 rebels stands in the GPO in Dublin. 
The Army'of the Republic of Ireland also issues medals which feature 
Cuchulainn. Adamson regards this as a total misrepresentation of 
history and outlines what he sees as the consequences for contemporary 
politics, 
"So total has become the Gaelic domination in 
language and culture that even in these modern 
times Gaelic Ireland is synonomous with Irish 
nationalism, and the Gaelic tongue is unequivocally 
known as Irish. That the Irish Gaels suffered 
under late English domination is but one side of 
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the coin which carries on its reverse the long 
cruel extermination of the population and culture 
of the ancient kindred of the Ulster people. " 
(Adamson 1974: 15) 
Such views had an important impace on the thinking of the UDA 
leadership. For example, from 1978 on, stories concerning the Cruthin 
and Cuchulainn began to appear regularly in the magazine Ulster'. 
One early example of this explained, 
"You are the children of the Cruthin, the sons and 
daughters of the Picts. This is our land, your 
culture, your heritage. You are indeed the people. 
You are older than the Gaels, older than the Welsh, 
older than even the English. You have a right to 
belong here, no less than the trees. You have a 
right to be heard here; you have a right to be 
FREE! " 
(Ulster Vol. 1 NoA: 2,1978) 
Another example of this deals directly with Cuchulainn and political 
culture in Ireland, 
"All through the years in Irish Nationalism there 
has been a constant search for the typical Irish 
hero... Cuchulainn is a most ironic choice as an 
Irish nationalist since he was an Ulsterman and the 
idea he died for was that of an independent Ulsterl 
He lived around 300 B. C. in times as troubled as 
our own. When Ulster was under attack from her 
perpetual enemy - the rest of Ireland, Cuchulainn 
became our champion... Cuchulainn was indeed a 
hero. But a strange one for our enemies to adopt. " 
(Ulster April 1984: 5) 
The interpretation and the appeal to UDA members is obvious. 
Cuchulainn is projected as a prototype UDA member defending the border 
against the ancient enemy'. This reading of Irish history is, at 
best, highly questionable and controversial, and this author would not 
attempt to demonstrate its accuracy. more important however is the 
effect it has had on UDA thinking and strategy and the political 
consciousness of the PWC. one member explained his position like 
this, 
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"I think we're so busy saying we're British... that 
anything that isn't British you didn, t want to hear 
about it. " 
(Tom, UDA member, East Belfast) 
Another leading member put his case quite articulately when he said, 
"large bits of our history were all taken over and 
moulded into this Irish, Nationalist, Catholic 
ideal. One example is Cuchulainn... In 
Londonderry the Provos have a statue of Cuchulainn 
as a commemoration. of the Republican dead. But 
Cuchulainn was an Ulster warrior who fought against 
the Gaels. The idea that Ulster Protestants are 
only here from the seventeenth century is wrong... 
we're not just planters, we belong here, there were 
people going back and forward all the time. " 
he continued, 
"the vast majority of Ulster Protestants don't know 
anything about their history and that's a shame. 
Ulster Prods must stop believing Republican 
propaganda that we don't belong here, that we're 
just planters. " 
(Nigel, UDA officer, East Belfast) 
That a debate on such issues is necessary is attested to by these 
words from a UDA officer, 
"The more we talked to people and asked 'what's it 
all aboutV, the more we got the same answers, 'no 
surrender,, remember 16901, 'fuck the Pope' ... we did a survey asking people when Protestants came to 
Ulster? When was the plantation?, and lots of 
other things. People knew nothing of their 
history, absolutely nothing. " 
(Michael, UDA officer, East Belfast) 
This view was reflected in a recent statement by the then Commander of 
the UDA, Andy Tyrie, who pointed out that, 
"Historically, Ulster people, if they got 
interested at all drifted into British Empire 
Culture; Opera, Ballet and Theatre... we hoped to 
interest people in something besides pop groups and 
TV... we wanted to get back to a sense of our own 
community... our people here often didn't realise 
what was happening'in their own hearts. They took. 
part in demonstrations and then forgot and went 
back to the TN. " 
(cited in Bell 1985: 2) 
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The thinking of the UDA'11 leadership on the subject was perhaps best 
indicated by a play co-written by. Tyrie. Entitled 'This is it', its 
central subject is working class culture. ý In it one, of the central 
characters, claimed, -, 
"We're so par6hoid'ab6ut anything that se ems 
'Fenian' or 'Irish,; we close our eyes to 
everything that, isnlt-'Britishlý which usually 
means English. ',, You talk to an Ulster Prod about 
tranditional music'or, dancing and he'll think 
you're a"Fenian-loverl., 'The bloody Prods have 
denied half of. their,, own, history. They've clung to 
England just to keep the Catholics down. And now 
what's happening?,, England doesn't want to know us, 
and welveýlost our own roots, we now feel like 
homeless orphans. Take any people in the world: 
look at the Palestinians; -they've been knocked 
about from pillar to post, but they know where they 
belong, they can point to their homeland. What 
about us? Well?,, Are we Irish? Northern Irish? 
British? Ulster? West Britons? Scots-Irish? 
(Theatre Ireland 7: 2,1982) 
The play was written in -an overtly populist form. Designed to be 
produced by and for "Ulster worki ng-class clubs and community centres" 
(Theatre Ireland 7: 2,19U) Again its- intellectual stimulus comes 
directly from Adamson's "books. As Cairns and Richards point out 
"History, far from being rejected, is being given a developing role in 
the political campaign of the UDA (Cairns and Richards, 1988: 28). 
There were several examples of how this notion of an Ulster 
identity affected everyday political relations. During one fieldwork 
trip I had arranged to meet a contact in a local pub. While we were 
there a violent verbal confrontation broke out at a table close to us. 
I knew one of the people drinking at the table, who was a UDA member. 
He quickly approached me and asked me to mediate as I 'was a teacher 
and would know the answe rI. The ensuing conservation revealed that 
the group had been discussing politics when one suggested that 
'Ireland had once been united under British Rule'. This was strongly 
objected to by another member of the company and the argument had 
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ensued. Throughout several conversations concerning politics it 
became clear that many UDA members had little idea of -their own 
history or past. Certainly there was little sense of a continuity, of 
history as is found in Republican paramilitaries. one example 
occurred at UDA Headquarters in East Belfast, while waiting to talk to 
a senior officer. I began to talk to the two teenage members who were 
'looking after me,. Although both were keen, to project themselves as 
'fighting for Ulster, there was little sense of a historical identity. 
Neither had heard of the 'Plantation' and one of them suggested that 
'Protestants had come to Northern Ireland just before World War One', 
because his grandfather had died in the war, 'at the Somme'. That is 
not to say that such members were not politically motivated. They did 
however represent a particular grouping of UDA members who -tended to 
be young, militant and not too questioning. The idea of a-distinct 
'Ulster' -identity 
had not permeated the thinking of many UDA members 
in Ballymacarrett. Another example of this can be seen in an incident 
surrounding the attempt by the UDA leadership to promote the idea in 
the 'Ulster' magazine. After much consideration the UDA editor gave 
over the whole of the front page, of the magazine to a line drawing 
representing an ancient Cruthin warrior. It also contained the 
, following text, 
"In 637 AD Congal Claen, the greatest of all 
Cruthin Kings of ulster, massed a huge force of 
Ulstermen and their allies, to confront the Gaelic 
armies. The ensuing battle of Moria (Magh Rath) 
was according to Sir Samuel Ferguson, 'the greatest 
battle, whether we regard the numbers engaged, the 
duration of the combat, or the issue at stake, ever 
fought within the bounds of Ireland'. Congal was 
slain and the Ulstermen's defeat also destroyed 
their last real hope of retaining their 
independence from Gaelic Ireland. Although the 
ulstermen's former dominance of the whole was now 
Irretrievably at an end, they kept their autonomy 
east of the Bann for another 500 years. " 
(ulster, June 1986: 1) 
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This was due to much hard work by a couple of UDA activists involved 
in the Ulster Heritage Agency and made more I significant by several 
factors. Most notably those involved in 'the Loyalist Prisoners 
Association, were also more active than usual in June 1986. There was 
talk of 'another Loyalist Hunger-strike being on the, cards', because 
of the conditions under which Loyalist prisoners were being held. 
There were also claims that following-the violent reaction, - to the 
Anglo-Irish agreement, and the banning of a Loyalist parade at Easter, 
'hundreds of' Loyalists, (mostly teenagers) had been arrested and 
"interviewed by police,. There were also strong rumours that many of 
these people were being subjected to violence at the hands 'of the RUC. 
The -summer of 1986 had also been declared the 'Summer of Destiny' by 
the UDA. (See Chapter Nine) All of these were mentioned in the same 
copy of 'Ulster', any one of which would normally have been'given the 
front page lead. 
The limit of such ideas was alsw readily obvious. on the day 
that the June issue was released I travelled in, a van round East 
Belfast distributing the magazine., The two UDA members delivering the 
magazine were rather bemused by the cover. one explained to the other 
that he thought it was lawfully fenian looking' and the other 
confessed that he didn't see what it had to do with UDA. It is worth 
recording this members view. when asked about --the Ulster identity 
- being promoted by the UDA he replied, 
"that's John (McMichael) and Andy's (Tyrie) baby 
and I don't take much to do with it. " 
(Robin, UDA member, East Belfast) 
This was despite an increased promotion of Ulster's separate 
identity', throughout 1985 and 1986 within the UDA'. "' Some UDA members 
f rom, Ballymacarrett had become involved in- the campaign to save the 
Navan Fort. The campaign surrounded the fate of Emain Macha, the 
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ancient capital-, of Ulster. The Navan Fort 'marked the seat of the 
ancient Kings of Ulster. Emain Macha and its surroundings are the 
landscape of legendary Ulster and the immediate geographical area 
around Navan are supposedly where Cuchullain came as a small boy. 
A small limestone quarry had begun near Navan Fort in the last 
century. Since that time it had expanded towards the very edge of the 
fort. These were further plans for expansion. The site of the Navan 
Fort is the only archaeological site in Northern Ireland nominated by 
the Department of the Environment to UNESCO as a site of international 
importance. The threatened destruction of the site by the expansion 
of the limestone quarry was opposed by the academic establishment and 
a large number of institutions ranging from the National museum of 
Denmark to the Ulster Archaeological Society. Irish Nationalists 
rallied to defend Ulster's ancient capital. The campaign however was 
strongly backed by the UDA. The magazine Ulster, declaring that, 
"Some strange aspect of our natural character 
continually makes us deny our culture, our origins, 
and our ancestry and Navan Fort is an important 
part of all three. If we honestly look around us 
we can see that most of our fellow Ulstermen are 
ignorant of all these points. What is our culture? 
'Where did we come from? - are, questions which the 
average Ulster Protestant would answer with 
Orangeism and Scotland respectively, but what they 
do not realise is that there is more, much more. " 
(Ulster, July/August 1985: 9) 
one leading member had this, to say concerning the campaign, 
"Unionist policiticans didn't want to have anything 
to do with Navan Fort because Sim Fein had stuck 
its spoke in. So once Sim Fein say something 
they've got to be on the other side. What we've 
got is Irish nationalists crying out for the 
preservation of Navan Fort and the Unionists 
totally disowning it. That means it's the Gaelic 
culture that has taken all that over. In 
Londonerry the Provos have a statue of Cuchulainn 
as a commemoration of Republican dead. But 
Cuchulaim was an Ulster warrior who fought against 
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the Gaels, but he's totally unknown by Ulster 
Protestants... there was a civilisation here before 
the Gaels. 
(Michael, UDA Officer, East Belfast) 
Such views in Ballymacarrett were limited to a very few individuals. 
Their views were tolerated but far from understood. UDA members, in 
general, either simply ignored such views or often reinterpretated 
them in an overtly political and sectarian manner. one member had 
selectively reinterpreted such views and saw the notion of an Ulster 
identity, as a weapon in the propaganda was against Sim Fein. Such 
views are reflected in the following statement, 
"The political relevance of culture today can be 
clearly seen when one examines the way our enemies 
especially in Sim Fein have hijacked the so-called 
'Gaelic culture' of Ireland. They have made street 
names and schools into political issues which they 
exploit and by reason of the fact that we reject 
this so-called Irish culture, they claim that we 
are not Irishmen; and therefore have no right to 
claim this country as our own. " 
(UYUC, 1986: 2) 
It would be incorrect therefore to think that the notion of an Ulster 
identity as conceived by the UDA leadership had not permeated PWC 
consciousness. However this 'Ulster identity' was not always 
interpreted in the same way by the membership and supporters of the 
UDA as the leadership. The ideology and the, ideological appeal of the 
UDA can be seperated in part into an 'esoteric, appeal to 
, intellectual' insiders, and a grossly simplified exoteric, appeal to 
the wider membership. 
one obvious way in which the idea of an Ulster identity has 
affected attitudes within the wider loyalist cultural trandition has 
been loyalist popular culture. This can clearly be identified if we 
briefly examine working - class Loyalist literature. Since 1969, a 
large number of poems, prose and 'songs concerning politics have 
emerged. most of these extol the heroic and martial aspects of 
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Loyalist working class life. Such songs were extremely popular in 
clubs and bars in Ballymacarrett especially when social nights were 
organised by Loyalist Prisoners Aid. Sometimes they would be sung at 
parties or late night gatherings'after drinking. one early example of 
, this type of loyalist literature, which is both overtly sectarian and 
supportive of violence is the following piece of prose, entitled dear 
sniper,, 
"You must feel good, now don't you? -, 
A virile rat and strong 
Like others of your witch's brew 
who use the gun and bomb. 
But here's a little food for thought 
That you might contemplate 
Some Vermin run before they're caught 
But Orange Tom Cats fear for nought 
and Rats exterminate" 
(cited in Rolson 1978: 57) 
A contemporary song, in the same vein explicitly praises the military 
prowess of the UDA, 
"This song is near and dear to me 
A song of truth and liberty 
of the boys who'll beat the IRA 
those loyal men of the UDA 
Chorus, 
For 30,000 men have we 
who'll fight to keep our Ulster free 
we're on our guard, both night and day 
For we're the men of the UDA 
Those Rebel scum can't bear the light 
They kill and murder in the night 
but time draws near to their doomsday 
they'll be destroyed'by the UDA 
Now this advice I'll freely give 
to all those Rebels who wish to live 
Lay down your arms this very day 
You camot beat the UDA 
So lift your glass and toast away 
to the UDA and victory 
For they will surely win the day 
So here's good luck to the UDA" 
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Some of these songs have now been in existence since the early 1970s 
but have ýchanged in form and content over the last 20. years. One 
early and extremely popular example was the following song, sung to 
the tune of the 'Red River Valley', 
"Have you heard of the Battle of the Shankill 
where most of the fighting was done 
it was there that a young UDA man 
was shot by an IRA gun 
As he lay on the battlefield dying 
with the blood running out of his head 
he turned to the bastards that shot him 
and these are the words that he said 
God bless my wife in the dear old Shankill 
God bless my home and family too 
God bless the flag that I fight under 
The Union Jack, red, white and blue" 
(for a slightly different version, see Jenkins 
1982: 37) 
Significantly in the contemporary version the final verse has changed 
to, 
"Will you bury me under the Red Hand 
will you bury me in ulster's clay 
Will you bury me under the Red Hand 
When my fighting for Ulster is done" 
There are many others songs popular in Loyalist pubs and clubs 
throughout Ballymacarrett which demonstrate an allegiance to an 
'Ulster' identity, or at least a duality of national consciousness 
which is not explicity 'British'. Consider the words of this song, 
"The Red Hand's my emblem 
the Sash is my song 
to the Republic of Ireland 
-We'll never belong 
We have only six counties 
, But we"re proud and true 
and will always be loyal to that Red Hand so true 
And the Red White and Blue boys 
That part of our cause 
It gave us our freedom religion and laws 
We'll fight to defend it 
with heart and with hand 
and we'll never be driven from this Ulster land" 
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This song indicates a significant move away from similar songs in the 
early part of the ý current phase of the conflict. Then most songs 
declared their loyalty to, and willingness ýto fight for 'the Red, 
White and Blue', rather than it being merely part of the reason for 
f ighting. 
I There remained however clear differences between the leadership's 
political ideas and concept of 'Ulster, and those of the rank and 
file. In the discourse of ordinary members Ulster' often meant 
something quite different, probably much closer to the way in, which 
DUP activists used the tem. , Some members did support the 
organisational political objectives especially following the 
publication of the booklet 'Common Sense' in January 1987. Again this 
proposed the establishment of a devolved government in Northern 
Ireland on a power-sharing basis. It will be discussed further in 
Chapter Nine, in the context of the overall loyalist reaction to the 
Anglo-Irish agreement. This gave politicially orientated members like 
Tom, a more legitimate role in the organisation. Tom himself was 
convinced that 'Common Sense' 'was the only way out of a civil war' 
and that Paisley and molyneaux 'had done nothingl.,, It also gave Tom a 
high profile especially in the pubs and clubs because as one person 
explained "he knows what the big boys (UDA leadership), are talking 
about. ` 
Tom was in little danger of isolating himself by-criticising the 
established unionist politicians. Hostility towards the unionist 
leadership was a fairly consistent feature of the thinking of- UDA 
members in East Belfast. There is an obvious: paradox to confront 
here. The ULDP have consistently failed to win-any significant level 
of support at the polls and as John McMichael the focal point in the 
UIDP admitted "most of the people in the UDA wouldývote DUP because 
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they come f rom working class areas" (Interview, Belfast, June 1985). 
Nevertheless there was often overt criticism of the unionist 
leadership in general and Ian Paisley in particular. To explain this 
it is first necessary to consider the sources of such criticisms. Two 
groupings which have had a profound effect on UDA thinking in this 
respect are The Loyalist Prisoners Aid, a support organisation for UDA 
prisoners and their families, and the loyalist ex-prisoner 
associations. Throughout the 1980s many UDA members have been 
disillusioned by the lack of support given to them by unionist 
politicians. This is especially true regarding several campaigns 
organised by Prisoners support groups regarding prison conditions and 
more recently in the campaign for the physical segregation of loyalist 
and republican prisoners. As an member of the UDA active in Loyalist 
Prisoners Aid explained, 
"Ninety-five percent of the people I know would 
never have seen the inside of a Prison if it wasn't 
for the present situation. The reason why they're 
in there is the Martin Smyths and the Bill Craigs 
and the Paisleys. Now if you listen... Paisley's 
still shouting about civil war... still wants to 
use the muscles of the paramilitary if it suits 
them. " 
(Robert, UDA member, LPA Worker) 
The views of those active in Loyalist Prisoners groups will be 
considered in more detail later in the chapter. There was another 
major source of criticism of the Unionist leadership from within the 
paramilitiaries. Again this was far from a coherent grouping, but in 
general, many UDA members still looked to the Unionist politicians for 
leadership, and felt that the leadership had failed them. So for 
example those active in the Loyalist ex-prisoners association 
continued to warn of the dangers of manipulation by the Unionist 
leadership, claiming that they had repeatedly plunged the community 
into turmoil 11 by their cul-de-sac politics" (Sunday NewsIlst January 
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1987). Such views sometimes found an airing in the uDAs magazine, as 
the following illustrates, 
"it can be safely said that in the last ten years 
not one constructive idea has emerged out of 
Paisley's head. Indeed his 'political tactics' and 
'know how, amount to little more than huffing and 
puffing... Ian Paisley has never actually led our 
people anywhere but has merely voiced and reflected 
their fears and opinions. He is merely the 
politics of reaction, coupled with blood-thirsty 
threats of things to come should the English ever 
betray Ulster to Eire. " 
(Ulster, May 1987: 4-5) 
This point was reinforced by this view from a UDA officer who was 
extremely hostile to Ian Paisley. He expressed it this way, 
"you know there's a lot of talk goes on. It's more 
of a talking war than a fighting war. I suppose 
it's more of a propaganda war than a physical 
war... too many people can play games with the 
situation and they can say whatever they want... 
make all kinds of threatening noises and gestures 
and talk about civil war... they're not even making 
any preparations for it, they don't even take it 
seriously themselves... they can't play about with 
people's lives like that. " 
(Nigel, UDA officer, and member of ULDP) 
Nigel was certainly prepared to 'fight' if a civil war situation ever 
did materialise. As the above indicates however he was convinced that 
the unionist politicans were not genuinely seeking a solution. Nor 
did he believe that the uDA should be at the beck and call of Paisley 
and the like'. Nigel believed that civil war was inevitable, but 
hoped that a solution could be found. He explained it this way, 
"The majority of the population is sick of the 
whole thing just going on and on and on... the 
politicians are becoming irrelevant... I think 
people would prefer to have a big bang and get it 
over with... I'm beginning to think that's 
inevitable. I had high hopes for several years 
that we would find an alternative... I think the 
people could be brought together but not Ulster 
Unionism and Ulster Nationalism... because it's 
about the national existence of Ulster... there 
can, t be any compromise, there isn't a way to 
compromise, it has to be one way or the other, you 
have to be either British or Irish. " 
(Nigel, UDA officer, and member of ULDP) 
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A similar point of view can'be seen in the following statement from 
another UDA member who had served a long prison sentence and was now 
active in Loyalist prisoners Aid. He reacted strongly to the calls 
during the summer of 1985 for loyalist paramilitary groups to become 
more active, following the re-routing of the traditional orange Parade. 
in Portadown away from a predominantly Catholic area of the city. 
Victor's reaction was as follows, 
"I'm quite delighted by the call of Ulster's men to 
arms being heard once again. I'm quite delighted. 
I wish they'd make more of them, because for every 
call that's made there's a greater chance that 
it'll be exposed for what it is and those people 
promoting them will be exposed for what they are... 
That anyone who says 'we will smash Sim Fein, when 
they haven't got the ability to do it... when the 
Rev. Martin Smyth can demand the right to walk 
through Oban Street right up to the day beforeýit 
happens and then back off... you've got to say to 
yourself, what in the name of God are these men 
playing at... I was delighted by the organisations 
response to the sabre rattling and the war cries - 
Their attitude of 'well you're not going to fight 
to the last drop of my blood, is quite right. Nor 
are we going to fight without me knowing what 
you're going to do or that you're going to be there 
along with me and seen to be there. " 
Later he explained his reason for this disillusionment, 
"At one time they influenced me very directly., The 
belief that Dentistsp Doctors, Solicitors, the 
Professions, Businessmen were people to be listened 
to... and 
gerefore they were the people to 
respect... it was one reason that made me as a, 16 
or 17 year old attend a rally in Ormeau Park with 
100,000 people where Bill Craig said shoot to 
kill, and in the Victoria Park where Ian Paisley 
said 'Ulster will fight and Ulster will be 
right, ... shoot means only one 
thing, kill means 
only one thing, fight means only one thing... that 
was probably my leanings anyway and only needed the 
push of officialdom to make that last step. So, 
whilst they might say they desired another form of 
reaction from me I felt the reaction they desired 
from me was the literal one so I became a member of 
the UDA, ended up in Long Kesh, served a fairly 
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heavy sentence... I had to lie in bed at night and 
question not just what I had done, but why I had 
done it and who had wanted me to do it. 
(victor, UDA member and Loyalist 
Prisoners Association worker, June 1986) 
The relationship between the UDA and Unionist politicians is far from 
a direct 'one. ' It is made more complex 'by the fact that although 
hostile to established unionist politicians several UDA activists were 
on good working terms with local party ' political activists, 
particularly the more 'Politically orientated councillors in the DUP. 
It was not for example unusual for Robert, the UDA welfare worker to 
send his clients to Colin, the DUP councillor. Robert would usually 
do this if he considered the case to be too complex or if it needed 
immediate action. This was partly a recognition of Colin's greater 
experience, and partly the understanding on Robert's part that people 
saw Colin as a real, politician who would get things done. As Robert 
put it, 
"Colin and I went to school together. many's a 
time we fought each other in the playground. Now 
Colin and I don't agree on a lot of things, but he 
knows if I send someone to him, it's for the right 
reasons and he's not likely to turn them away". 
(Robert, UDA member and LPA worker) 
The relationship was complicated still further by respect many 
DUP activists had for the local DUP member of Parliament. Even 
Victor, overtly hostile as he was to the DUP in general, and Ian 
Paisley in particular, was quite supportive of Peter Robinson. 
Robinson was, from 1974, the first full time secretary of the DUP, a 
councillor for Castlereagh from 1977, and MP for East Belfast from 
1979. Robinson has exerted an important influence on the party, as 
one commentator noted, 
a large number of those attracted to and 
recruited into the party through Robinson's efforts 
were different in a number of important respects 
180 
from the traditional Paisley follower of the early 
rabble rousing days. " 
(Ed Moloney, Irish Times, 19th Feb 1983) 
As Bruce (1986: 154-155) notes it is now commonplace to suppose that 
Robinson is one of -several of the younger generation of DUP officers 
who want to create a mass popular party by underplaying the party's 
evangelical dimension and emphasisingýpolitical action. Robinson was 
also, one of the few unionist politicians to be actively involved in 
the campaigns in support of loyalist prisoners in the early 1980s, 
during which time he appeared on the same platfom as several well 
known paramilitary leaders. This relationship between Robinson and 
the pararailitaries in Ballymacarrett was important in the realignment 
of loyalist politics in the period following the signing of , the 
Anglo-Irish agreement. Importantly the relationship between the UDA 
and Unionist politicians is not a, direct one and although close to 
Robinson, the UDA in Ballymacarrett were not under his control. One 
leading member expressed this forcibly when he said, 
"Are we Just tin soldiers, robots that somebody blows a whistle and we make the right noises, 
programmed to react, and we all come marching out, 
of the box and kick all round us... and when they (Unionist politicians) think its O. K. - that they've made their point - with the British Government, that they blew their whistles and we 
all neatly march back into our box... the trouble 
is that everytime we came out less and less of us 
went back in. " 
(Michael, UDA officer, East Belfast) 
The other important grouping in this respect were the support groups 
for loyalist prisoners. one member with similar views expressed it 
straight forwardly when he said, 
"there are very few politicians in prison and even fewer in Rose Lawn Cemetery" 
(Albert, ex Loyalist prisoner) 
Almost all of the UDA members active in Loyalist Prisoners support 
groups had themselves been convicted and served prison- terms for 
181 
paramilitary activities. Some had been the victim of Loyalist super 
grasses and although they had never been convicted, had served remand 
sentences in prison. To fully understand the role 'of Loyalist 
Prisoner support groups, and Loyalist Prisoner Aid in- particular, it 
is necessary to briefly outline Northern Ireland's prison system. In 
1972 . 'Special category status' was granted to 'political' prisoners. 
These prisoners were held in compounds, were allowed to associate 
freely, wear their own clothing and organise their own affairs on a 
day to day basis. - This allowed prisoners to, for example, conduct 
their own physical fitness classes, education classes and general 
recreation groups. on special days, in the Loyalist calendar, such 
as 'Remembrance Day' or the 12 July, the UDA would have parades in 
paramilitary uniform. Several years later, the British Goverment 
declared that special category had been a serious mistake. They 
announced that prisoners convicted of'-offences committed after lst 
March 1976 would not be granted 'political status'. 'From lst April 
1980 the Goverment announced that all convicted prisoners, regardless 
of offence would be housed in conventional prison accommodation. It 
was this withdrawl of the recognition of any political motivation by 
prisoners which is normally called 'criminalisation'. , In 1976 a 
general remission rate of 50% was introduced as part of this overall 
'criminalisation, policy. As Rolson and Tomlinson'point out, there, 
"has been a major change in the prison regime since' 
1976, whereby lifers are subjected to 'normal' 
prison conditions in the H blocks as opposed to 
those special category, conditions in the 
compounds. " 
(Rolson and Tomlinson, 1986: 163) 
The number of status' prisoners has consequently fallen from 1,476 in 
February 1976,581 of whom were Loyalists to 175 in 1985. While both 
the UDA and UVF continue to have special category, prisoners, 
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obviously the numbers continue to fall. Another major trend of the 
Northern ireland penal system is, that the numbers of those sentenced 
to life imprisonment has risen from 13 in 1969, to 181 in 1976, 
through 377 in 1980, to 421 in 1983. (Annual Reports on the 
Administration of the Prison Service, 1979-1983). There are also 
distinct differences -in the patterns between scheduled (political) 
prisoners and non-scheduled,, (non-political) prisoners. "Only 13% of 
scheduled ý prisoners are serving short tem sentences, while only 16% 
of non-scheduled prisoners are serving long tem sentences" (Rolson 
and Tomlinson, 1986: 166) 
Loyalist prisoner support groups are involved -in two main ways. 
Firstly they have increasingly organised in campaigns against the use 
of special powers interrogation methods, Diplock courts and more 
recently the use of informers. Secondly, prisoner support groups are 
involved in providing support for, prisoners themselves, --their family 
and relatives. They are also to a lesser extent concerned with the 
reintegration of ex-prisoners back into their community. , Loyalist 
Prisoners - Aid (LPA) in Ballymacarrett thus provided a -direct 
link 
between prisoners, their conamity and the State. It is important 
therefore to consider the strategies mounted by. the LPA and evaluate 
how successful they are in building ýthe above links. The two major 
campaigns in which the LPA were involved during the period of research 
were 'Justice for Lifers, ' and the separation' or segregation, issue. 
'Justice for Lifers, focused on the position of those loyalist 
prisoners' under 'detention at the Secretary of, State's pleasure' 
This refers to those being currently detained for an indefinite time 
because they were under 18 years of age when they were sentenced. 
Such prisoners were usually known quite simply as SOSPs. Another 
closely related campaign concerned the review procedures for those 
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sentenced to life imprisonment. Under British Law a life sentence can 
mean literally just, that. However, prisoners sentenced to life can be 
released on a conditional licence. Such conditions range considerably 
but usually involve close contact with a probation officer. The 
licence can be cancelled if the prisoner is considered to have 
suitably integrated into the community. On the other hand, if the 
prisoner is deemed to have behaved unsuitably, then the licence can be 
revoked and the person recalled to prison. 
Those under life ý sentence in Northern Ireland -have their case - 
reviewed at regular intervals. There are annual reports written by 
prison officers which assess the prisoner's attitudes, behaviour, his 
or her relationship with family, work performance and any official 
education courses which have been taken. Reviews begin atý'three years 
into a life sentence and further reviews are held at six and ten 
years. While the prisoner is informed that their case is being 
reviewed, and may submit a written statement, ýthey may, not appear 
before the actual review board. Should the review prove unsuccessful 
the prisoner is not given the reason, or told in what respect it has 
been judged that the prisoner has failed. The major complaint of many 
loyalist prisoners is that this procedure gives no indication why the 
prisoner has been refused and therefore the individual cannot change 
their- behaviour or attitudes. one ex-prisoner explained his major, 
grievances, 
"the board of assessment-needs to be widened, 
because you've Doctors, Prison officers, 
psychiatrists, middle to upper class people who 
don't know what the trouble is. The only violence 
, 
they see is on T. V. or read about it in the 
newspapers. It's got to be spread out to take in 
such as Trade unionists and the like. People who 
come from working class areas and are involved in 
-their own-way in the troubles, in trying to stop it. 11 
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we further explained that, 
"the men really resent the fact that there's a 
psychiatrist on it. I mean we live in troubled 
times... if you're going to do that the argument 
is... every British soldier should have been 
treated in the last war... every prisoner of war 
should have been treated by a psychiatrist, asking 
them why did they fight each other... there's a war 
going on here but the British Government doesn't 
accept it so that's why they make a big issue of 
having a psychiatrist. " 
(Billy, ex prisoner, member of LPA) 
Such reviews represent an overt form of social control within the 
prison to pressurise ? political, prisoners to conform to prison rules. 
As Rolson and Tomlinson suggest, 
it is clear that the main concern is to use 
the review procedure to control prisoners, 
particularly non-conforming or political 
prisoners. " 
(Rolson and Tomlinson, 1986: 168) 
The loyalist prisoner support groups had only limited success 
in bringing the case of SOSPs onto the main political agenda. 
Throughout the fieldwork period there was an intense series of lobbies 
by relatives of prisoners. By 1986, this precipitated the formati , on 
of a pressure group calling themselves 'Justice for Lifers'. They 
formulated their demands around the review procedure for lifers which 
they described as, "at best inadequate, and at worst atrocious" 
(Combat 22nd June 1985). They immediately sought to locate themselves 
in the community by claiming "This is a procedure affecting thousands 
of people, not only life-tem prisoners but also wives, children 
parents and other relatives" (Combat 22nd June 1985). one of the 
major claims regarding SOSPs was that they often had a low key role in 
pararailitary action. Because they were under 18 at the time, and in 
terms of paramilitary action were given littleresponsibility, usually 
acting as look-outs', or making sure the route was clear. There may 
be some truth in this. The following was given as a typical, example 
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of a SOSP, 
"Edward was a young lad of sixteen when joining a 
Loyalist paramilitary organisation. men of 
so-called standing, were raising the blood level of 
young impressionable youths with their rhetoric of 
a sell out and a call to arms in defence of 
Ulster's cause. At the age of seventeen Edward 
received life for taking part in a bombing. He has 
now served eleven years in prison. At 28 the best 
years of his life are passing him by he has studied 
hard, in most other countries young men like this 
with some screening would be allowed their freedom" 
The statement then gave some hint of the thinking of the Loyalist 
paramilitary group concerning the position of SOSPS, 
"I have deep suspicions that these young men have 
become complete pawns in a dirty political game 
being played out in Ulster" I -t 
(Combat Vol 3, No. 10) 
Nevertheless, the Loyalist Prisoner workers regarded it as a victory 
when Ken Maginnis, the official Unionist MP raised the matter in 
Westminster. He too argued that many SOSPs were gullible youngsters 
who, had been exploited by more experienced and more hardined Loyalist 
paramilitary members. (Hansard 24/5/84 OAc. 1231-2; 23/10/84 c. 664-8) 
Activity based on the position of lifers in Ballymacarrett was 
limited. There were several reasons for this. While those relatives 
engaged in the campaign were extremely vigorous the numbers involved 
in East Belfast were small. More importantly however although LPA 
workers were supposedly backing the campaign, the focal point was West 
Belfast. Not only this but its main activists were in the Loyalist 
Prisoners Welfare Association-(LPWA) who worked most closely with the 
UVF. As such, old tensions and suspicious between East and West 
Belfast and between the UDA and the UVF undermined effective action. 
This was far from the case in the other main campaign, in which 
LPA workers were involved, which surrounded the issue of segregation 
of loyalist and republican prisoners. 
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The official policy of the Northern Ireland Office is that the 
prison system should be fully integrated'. That is,, that loyalist 
and republican prisoners should be mixed in prison accommodation. The 
justification for this is that it provides a more effective tool for 
prison control and that security is more easily maintained. 
Integration can also be seen as central to the criminalisation policy 
of the British government. 
Loyalist protests in support of segregation actually began in 
1980 when six loyalist prisoners went on hunger strike demanding the 
return of special (political) status and total -segregation, from 
Republican prisoners in the maze prison. There were further protests 
in 1981, most notably when loyalist prisoners staged a rooftop protest 
on the roof of -a wing of Crumlin Road jail. Protests continued 
throughout the early 1980s, focused on the Maze prison (referred to by 
loyalist prisoners as 'Long Keshl). Here the UDA claimed that their 
members were repeatedly receiving death, threats from Republican 
prisoners. Protests culminated in October 1982 when loyalist 
prisoners smashed over 200 cells in the prison. There was also at 
this time the first attempt to involve unionist politicians in the 
campaign. It was supported by a few DUP Assembly representatives but 
almost imwdiately there was criticism from within the UDA of both the 
OUP and the DUP, for their lack of identification with loyalist 
prisoners demands. 
The LPA continued the campaign. In Ballymacarrett they 
distributed leaflets and made announcements in pubs and-clubs. The 
core of their arguments were simple -, that Loyalist prisoners were 
outnumbered by around 2 to 1 by Republican prisoners, and were 
therefore constantly in danger. As one UDA member expressed it, 
"to me, it's quite simple, you have a divided 
society here with two communities brought up with a 
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different background, different values... we are 
kept apart... you have a war situation here with 
hatred, bitterness and deep scars... Now how can 
you take the people who are supposed to be at the 
extremes of both communities on opposite sides of 
the war... how can you expect them to be integrated 
and accept it. " 
he argued his case forcibly, 
"there is separation of schools here, separation of 
churches, housing... well here we have the 
extremists in the prison and they're going to force 
them together - it's impossible. All we asked for is not political status, not that, although I think 
we should have that as well, all we ask is that 
prisoners should be under the same prison rules but 
separate, not separate prisons. " 
(Michael, UDA officer, June 1985) 
There was continued friction between Unionist politicians and 
those active in LPA in Ballymacarrett. The focus of this was that 
many in the UDA felt that the 'politicians, were ignoring them, or not 
giving the support they felt they deserved. As one Loyalist Prisoner 
Aid worker put it, 
"Paisley, Molyneaux and the rest of them - they've 
all come to fame on our backs, the backs of 
ordinary working class loyalists and now they're 
sticking their heads in the sand hoping we'll all 
go away. These are the same men who shouted 
'Ulster will fight'. They're part of the reason 
that so many are inside in the first place. " 
(Billy, UDA member and LPA worker) 
Another UDA member aired similar views when he said, 
"I would like to see the Loyalist people having one 
party. The official unionists and the DUP aren't 
worth tuppence. One is trying to outdo the other 
one in everything. The only time they've come 
together is when Sim Fein went to the poll in the 
council elections... but they don't worry about 
us... I'd love to see one of them doing time. " 
(Clive, UDA member, East Belfast) 
While a third loyalist ex-prisoner explained it this way, 
"When you come out of jail you, understand a wee bit 
more... I think the loyalist people are starting 
to wise up a bit. The days of Bill Craig and his 
'shoot to kill, ... men are still inside because of his sort and the politicians couldn't give a 
shit... they don't care about the ordinary 
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five-eight. If the Upper Newtownards Road (upper 
middle class area in East Belfast) is happy, 
they're happy. " 
(John, ex-Loyalist prisoner) 
Such views were extremely common'amongst UDA ex-prisoners themselves. 
Here one expressed his views on the relationship between prisoners and 
politicians, 
"men need representation on the outside... we've 
never got it from the M. P. s so welfare groups have 
to do what they can on behalf of the men... we've 
gone to great pains trying to get politicians 
involved but again they don't want to know. " 
(Albert, ex-Loyalist prisoner) 
One gave this view of Unionist politicians, 
"they're good at beating the big drum... 
agitating... a lot of them got elected on it but 
I've never seen them doing anything for Loyalist 
prisoners... I've never heard them making any 
sensible statements on behalf of Loyalist 
prisoners. " 
(Chris, ex-Loyalist prisoner, personal 
correspondence July 1985) 
Another said, 
"the men rely on welfare groups, very little on 
MPs, councillors, politicians. You could write 
them down on a bus ticket the numbers of 
politicians who helped. The welfare, groups are 
relied upon to put our case ... 11 (Billy, ex-Loyalist prisoner, member of LPA) 
one ex-prisoner expressed the basic difference in perspectives between 
prisoners and loyalist politicians as follows, 
"how can you go to politicians, when they just, think 
you're a criminal. " 
(John, ex-Loyalist prisoner) 
Such views clearly illustrate the tensions between loyalist prisoners 
and Unionist politicians. However those active in Loyalist welfare 
groups were rather more pragmatic in their outlook, as this member 
argued, 11 
"when you, 're in a prisonerls welfare group you go 
out and look for whatever support you can get... on 
the supergrass thing, to be fair Ian Paisley 
condemned it, so I can't take that away from him, 
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but the official Unionists didn't. I think they 
thought the supergrass system was 'dead on', the 
same as interment... so I suppose I feel closer to 
the DUP, but only because they're the best of a bad 
lot. " 
(Robert, LPA worker, East Belfast) 
Another UDA welfare worker was in agreement 
"I suppose I'd find myself more in line with the 
DUP than the official Unionists, but neither has a 
monopoly of brains or nice people... the DUP is 
sort of half way between us and the official 
unionists because the DUP don't necessarily accept 
the authority of Westminster... most of the people 
in the UDA would vote DUP because they come from 
working class areas and they think they'll do more 
for them. " 
(Victor, LPA worker, East Belfast) 
By continued pressure through lobbying, rallies and parades, Loyalist 
welfare groups kept the issue high on the agenda throughout 1984 and 
1985. Government opposition continued. Firstly, the prisoners 
demands ran counter to their policy of 'criminalisation'. Secondly 
the official response was that segregation would allow paramilitary 
organisations to operate in a 'cohesive and effective way' (Belfast 
Telegraph, 22nd August 1983) and segregation would allow for effective 
escape plans to be made. There were also claims that Loyalist 
prisoners were exaggerating the degree to which they were in danger. 
The campaign was eventually taken on -board by several Unionist 
polticians most notably Peter Robinson of the DUP, who appeared at 
several rallies with leading paramilitary figures. As Bruce noted, 
"when loyalist prisoners were campagining for 
segregation from republicans (a campaign which 
involved the tactic so loudly condemned when used 
by republicans: the hunger strike), DUP spokesmen 
were conspicuously more active than the officials 
in the promotion of the prisoners' case. " 
(Bruce 1986: 142) 
The role of the campaign was crucial. It was effectively 
organised by the loyalist paramilitary groups, the politicians only 
becoming involved in its latter stages., more importantly in 
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Ballymacarrett it effectively linked prisoners, their relatives and 
friends, and prisoners support groups to the wider community. It also 
moved the frame of reference from the individual experience of 
Loyalist prisoners, to communal or community experience and thus gave 
the UDA a more legitimate role in Ballymacarrett. The campaign also 
highlighted class divisions and tensions within loyalism, and the 
-. . mistrust the paramilitaries had of politicians. This can also be seen 
in the positions adopted concerning Isupergrasses'. on this issue too 
there were clear divisions surrounding claims of lack of support from 
Unionist politicians. Again it was the official Unionists who came 
under most criticism. For example in 1984 Alan Chambers, the 
publicity officer for the East Belfast Unionist Association argued 
that, 
"it is a nonsense to claim that because a 
substantial number of people charged under 
supergrass evidence have been acquitted, the system 
is useless, unfair or ineffective. " 
(The Voice of Ulster, June 1984: 4) 
Such views brought criticism from those active in LPA in 
Ballymaccarrett. One man who had himself been arrested on supergrass 
evidence explained, 
"it was sold to Loyalists as something that would 
destroy the IRA and in the end Loyalists became 
deeply involved... Harold McCusker said he didn't 
like the supergrass system but if it saved lives in 
his constituency that was OK. What they (unionist 
politicians) are really saying is that we don't 
like it but the police are going to use it and we 
can't go against the police... the politicians 
refused to look at the principle of the thing... 
what they were actually saying was, well they may 
not actually be guilty of this, but they're in the 
UDA or the UVF, but to hell with it let's get them 
out of the road. " 
He continued, 
"Unionist politicians have never been seen to stand 
up and say - that's wrong. it doesn't matter 
whether its affecting loyalists or republicans, as 
an issue it's wrong... plastic bullets... I can 
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understand that if security forces find themselves 
in a particular situation they have to use them... 
what'I don't understand is that if the police aim 
plastic bullets at people's heads then that's 
wrong. " 
He was also aware of the obvious comeback to such views within 
Ballymacarrett, 
"some people say I should be on the side of the 
Provos cause that's how they talk ... the trouble is too many Unionists are blinkered ... they don't want 
anything better, they just want to keep what they 
have... but what they have isn't good enough. " 
(Robert, LPA worker, East Belfast) 
While Robert's viewpoint was treated with some suspicion, criticism of 
Unionist politicians stance on supergrasses was widespread, as this 
statement indicates, 
"Loyalists have been betrayed. Not by those who 
have been seen as traditional enemies, but by 
elected representatives who, in private supported, 
them but now publicly castigate them. This is notý 
an entirely new phenomena, but is a serious attempt 
by the two major Unionist parties to intensify 
their support for the supergrass system, each in' 
their own way to obtain maximum support for their 
own law and order programmes... A policy of 
'Anything you can push we can push harder. "' 
(Combat February 1984: 1) 
Issues such as 'separation, and Isupergrasses',, had important 
consequences for the political consciousness of loyalist prisoners, 
their f lies, UDA members and LPA workers. They were in some ways 
however very special cases. Neither of the issues reflected all 
prisoners and their families. It is important therefore to consider 
the 'everyday' activities of Loyalist prison welfare groups. The LPA 
provide a wide range of 'day to day' support functions for the 
families of members in prison. These range from simple financial 
support, to the provision of food parcels and daily newspapers to 
those in prison. In recent years they have also provided summer 
holidays for the children of prisoners. one of the most basic 
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functions they provide is to arrange transport for prison visits. One 
journalist described graphically those taking the UDA bus to the maze 
prison, 
"A Dodge so old it once carried the wounded in the blitz,, which now trundles off to the jail three 
times a week from the UDA office and the Shankill. 
There were hard benches along the sides and folding 
wooden chairs to put in the central aisle for the 
overflow of passengers. most of them were women, a 
cross section of the poor. It was bitter cold and 
the bus unheated but 
' only one woman was 
dressed for 
it in a tatty old fur; the others, in their serious 
efforts to look nice, had put on pointed high heels 
and freshly ironed jeans with miserably inadequate, 
if gaily coloured, jackets. 
(Belfrage, 1988: 219-220) 
Such facilities provided the UDA with further- legitimation within 
Ballymacarett and it also provided the organisation with a reason to 
recruit new members. Often Loyalist Prisoners Aid workers had quite 
limited organisational goals. As one leading worker explained,, 
"What I try to do is to make sure that their 
(prisoners) families are looked after to the best 
of my ability. Now the most important thing to us 
and them is obviously to get to see their' families. 
(victor, LPA worker, East Belfast) 
Another explained his role, 
"I try to keep in close contact with the families, 
small things... so a child's birthday I try to make 
sure they get a, card, even prisoners I make sure we 
publish dates (birthdays) in our paper. That 
mightn't sound much but that's very important to 
prisoners that they're not forgotten. " 
II 
(Robert, LPA worker, East Belfast) 
Loyalist prisoners Aid also provided a means to recruit fringe members 
and for ex-prisoners to become reinvolved with the UDA. one loyalist 
Prisoners Aid worker explained, 
Nhen a prisoner is released the first thing we 
would do is get him a job... see when he's come'out 
as far as we're concerned hels, done his bit... but 
you get quite a few coming back and saying "well 
I'm done with that end of it' but I want to help 
the guys that are left. " 
(Victor, LPA worker, East Belfast) 
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a newly released prisoner explained, 
"I've haven't got too involved since I got out 
because I've got a wife and a little boy now... but 
I've done a bit, I've help collect for Loyalist 
prisoners, help run a dance down the club and sold 
some tickets. " 
(Richard, ex-Loyalist Prisoner) 
However in Ballymacarret the activities of LPA workers often expanded 
beyond this in the form of material provision for prisoners. As the 
wife of one prisoner put it, 
"I'm not sure what I'd do without them. Like they 
send him clothes, jeans and boots and sometimes 
running shoes that I couldn't buy. " 
(Janet, East Belfast Resident) 
Sometimes UDA involvement would go further as this LPA worker 
explained, 
"On a few occassions theýsons is growing up and 
getting a wee bit out of hand... well we would go 
down, not to lay a heavy hand, because they're not 
our kids. But we'd go down and say 'look give your 
mother a break,, 'your father's inside, do you want 
to end up with him?, We would sometimes take these 
kids on free holidays and the organisation pays for it. 11 
(Victor, LPA worker, East Belfast) 
The LPA are, of course, also responsible for the 'welfare, of those 
imprisoned and their behaviour during their sentence. There is a long 
tradition of sociological research into the effects of imprisonment. 
Most recently three major approaches have emerged. Firstly there are 
those structuralists who seek to establish links between capitalist 
development and types of punishment (Foucault 1977, Fitzgerald 1977) 
Secondly several writers have focused on the fact that traditional 
studies include virtually nothing about women (cf Carlen, et al 1985, 
Morriss 1987, 'Eaton 1988). Finaly there are those studies which have 
taken a social-psychological approach which mainly consider how 
individuals adopt survival tactics in prison (cf Banister et al 1973, 
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Heskin 1974, Bolton 1976) In part these build upon classic works 
which suggest that prisoners like other imates of total institutions 
are subject to increasing dependence (Goffman 1961). 
From the above literature it is possible to identify several key 
features of those serving sentences (particularly long term 
sentences). Loyalist prisoners, (like their republican counterparts) 
have adopted fairly sophisticated strategies for coping. There are 
two key aspects. Firstly how loyalist prisoners have dealt with this 
'increasing dependence' with the institution. Secondly how the links 
are maintained between 'prisoners, and the wider commity in 
Ballymacarrett. In the context of this thesis the latter is most 
important, however it is necessary to briefly consider the former as 
this cannot be seen in isolation. A key feature of the LPA is its 
ability to link UDA members within prison to the community outside. 
As one UDA member explained, 
"A guy's brought in off the street, he's lost, like 
a fish out of water. Never been in prison before. 
So if some guy walks up to him and says 'what's 
your name', 'come on', 'there's tobacco there's 
milk, tea-bags and sugar, it calms them. He says 
these people are going to be my friends and that's 
important. " 
(Tom, UDA member, East Belfast) 
An important part of this was a well organised structure within the 
prison. An ex-prisoner recalled his experience, 
"There's always a commander... if you were on 
remand and you were the commander and were 
sentenced you have a man picked out at least a 
month before your trial and you actually stand 
down... there's always a well organised command 
structure... it's the same when you are sentenced. " 
(John, ex-Loyalist Prisoner) 
One of the major roles of the prison in any society is to force the 
prisoner to conform to prison rules. often this is done by 
individualising them and by channelling this into forms which are 
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acceptable to the prison regime. A common feature of prison systems 
is how they discourage forms of collective identity and suppress any 
form of collective action. Several writers have conveyed this 
experience within the British penal system (Boyle 1977,1984, McVicar 
1974, Devlin 1985). 
Several UDA members indicated that there was a strong awareness of 
political identity and collectiveness amongst ex-Loyalist prisoners in 
Ballymacarrett, 
"'inside we are still fighting the same war as the 
people on the outside. " 
(James, ex-Loyalist Prisoner) 
"we're not criminals, we're no different, from the 
men who were sent inside 10 years ago, some of 
which are still inside... no one called them 
criminals.... we never were and never will be 
criminals, at the end of the day we were all 
fighting under the one banner. " 
(Stuart, ex-Loyalist Prisoner) 
"when I went in, in 1975,1 was 19 years of age, 
and I'd never been in trouble with the police 
before. So I didn't regard myself as a criminal... 
I believed in what I was doing. I thought it was 
necessary to help save our country. " 
(Billy, ex-Loyalist Prisoner) 
The following statement, although the person was actually describing 
prison conditions, clearly illustrates the differences UDA members 
perceive between themselves and 'ordinary' prisoners, 
"The British goverment is calling everybody in 
here a criminal, but they make the difference when 
it suits them. IDI wing in 'Crum' (Crumlin Road 
Jail) have a colour T. V. and birds, in their cages. 
They're allowed a record player... whereas a 
loyalist on remand in the Crumlin has absolutely 
nothing, no facilitiesýwhatsoever. They are 
criminals because they're in there for raping kids 
of 2 or 3 years old... our people are in A+C wings 
for defending their country. " 
(Clive, ex-Loyalist Prisoner) 
This had led several prisoners and ex-prisoners to radically rethink 
their political position. As this ex-prisoner expressed it, 
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"we've been educated in the last 10 years, by 
people being taken before courts which are 
illegal". 
(Billy, ex-Loyalist Prisoner) 
Another expressed it this way, 
"Protestant working class politics have grown up 
with the troubles, its been a process of self 
education... we've seen the wrongs regarding 
unionist politicians... it's like the time when the 
Maze prison was burnt we went to see Paisley and 
ask him for the lend of some of his buses to get 
relatives to the Maze and he wouldn't lend us 
them. " 
(Chris, ex-Loyalist Prisoner) 
Several loyalist ex-prisoners described their own personal experiences 
of this 'self-education'. One of them put it as follows, 
"It (prison) allowed me the ? hub of the wheel' 
effect as I like to think of it, where you're more 
aware of what's going on on the outside than the 
people on the outside. Because you're sitting 
watching the world go by, being fed information 
whether it's from the T. V. or visits or just by 
discussion amongst yourselves. You learn. " 
(Paul, ex-Loyalist Prisoner) 
Another recalled his experience, 
"above all I had to lie in bed at night with no-one 
to discuss things with. I said right there are a 
couple of things I've gotta do. Firstly I've got 
to beat this sentence, learn to live in here... 
Number two, we've got to look at why we're in 
here... that was one of the biggest traumas of my 
life. It wasn't overnight, and it was long and 
hurtful... I had to question, not just what I had 
done, but why I had done it and who wanted me to do 
it. of 
He expanded on the result of this, 
"I'm saying to myself, 'hold on a wee minute, I 
don't know the half of this, they never taught me 
this at school, this is new land then the thoughts 
which happen, really questioning and searching 
thoughts. " 
(Victor, LPA worker, East Belfast) 
This often involved the questioning of taken for granted values, 
especially as many UDA members saw themselves as 'fighting for 
Ulster,. This man's views summarise the position well, 
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"I was in there becuse I was fighting for my - country, but see every night, there's a man with a 
crown in his hat shutting your door... it makes you 
think seriously what it's all about. " 
(Billy, ex-Loyalist Prisoner, member of LPA) 
Few loyalist ex-prisoners who were interviewed claimed to have lost 
their commitment to the cause'. However the political socialisation 
within prison meant that their commitment was often mediated in a 
special way. For example the influence of ex-prisoners was apparent 
in preparing a policy document 'Innocent' which was widely distributed 
to UDA members in 1985. The main body of the document deals with what 
people can expect if they are arrested, the procedures within 'holding 
centres, concerning visits to the doctor, photographs, fingerprints 
and interview techniques. It also deals with how to conduct oneself 
while being interviewed and rights to silence etc. Howeve r the 
document also contains several passages which strongly indicate the 
thinking of those who prepared it. For example, ý, at one point it 
declares, 
"Citizens of our Province which is closely linked 
to what is supposedly the most democratic society 
in the free world find themselves the victim of 
draconian legislation. Legislation which when used 
in foreign countries, especially Eastern bloc 
countries is criticised and condemned by British 
politicians. These same politicians are prepared 
to see these same laws operate in Ulsterl Every 
person in Ulster should know his basic rights if 
the situation should ever arise when they are faced 
with the prospect of being arrested under the PTA 
(Prevention of Terrorism Act). Remember you do not 
need to be guilty of anything to find yourself in 
this predicament. " 
(Innocent n. d. : 2) 
it continues, 
"The time was when theLoyalists didn't care what 
was going on in the interrogation centres. Indeed 
the stories of brutality etc. related by Republican 
information sources were regarded as pure 
propaganda and not to be believed. others who 
believed the brutality stories said the Republicans 
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were only getting what they deserved., The thinking 
loyalist should have by now re-assessed the 
situation. " 
(Ibid: 2) 
One of the document's final passages gives a strong indication of 
contemporary thinking with the UDA, 
"The true loyalists of this country are under 
attack by all sides. Shunned by the ordinary 
citizens until they require help, ignored by 
politicians who once used them. Tortured 
physically and psychologically by the security 
forces. " 
(Ibid: 4) 
Of course not all Loyalist prisoners, or ex-prisoners,, adopted these 
views. Those in Ballymacarrett who did however tended to gravitate to 
Loyalist Prisoners Aid or other 'welfare' branches within the UDA 
structure. This political awareness and sense of solidarity was also 
transmitted to relatives and friends. One women explained, 
"My Billy is more certain he is right than when he 
went in. He hasn't really changed his ideas at 
all. 11 - (Juliet, East Belfast Resident) 
Another, 
"he's much more 'political' than he was. When he 
sees me he wants to know what's going on. What so 
and so said about this or that. It's hard to tell 
him because I don't really pay much attention to 
those sort of things. " 
(Janet, East Belfast resident) 
A third had this to say, 
"he's changed a lot since he went in. We had a row 
at my visit. I told him he was talking like a 
fenian... going on about socialism. " 
(Rosemary, East Belfast resident) 
It would be wrong to suggest that all (or even the majority), of UDA 
members supported this radical, line of thinking but the views of the 
41 more 'radical,, thinkers in the UDA did find an airing in the 
organisation throughout 1984 to 1986. Another example of this can be 
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found in the following statement from the UDA magazine 'Ulster", 
"Some people have told us that as a commity group 
we should 'keep out of politics'. But one of our 
aims as a c=nunity group is to widen the debate 
from mere constitutional issues to more pressing 
social issues which many Protestants and Catholics 
face. 
Many of those, including our politicians, who have 
tried to stifle the political debate, who have 
tried to claim groups such as ours are 'disloyal, 
are the same ones who stand by. ignoring the needs 
of the people... politics concerns every aspect of 
our lives -our personal relationships, the electric bill, power structures, the papers we read, the 
education we receive and who we receive it with, 
the dampness in the house - all deeply political. 
Commmity issues are not the preserve of 'comies, 
or rebels', and politics are not the preserve of 
politicians. " 
(Ulster, December 1985: 2) 
There were still many MA members however who saw themselves 
simply as soldiers'. Their views are well represented by the 
following statements from UDA members, 
"the fact is we feel under pressure. There are 
different pressures but one is a united Ireland 
which I feel is being forced on us so the only 
alternative we have is to defend what we believe 
in. You feel you're fighting in a war. " 
(Graham, UDA member, East Belfast) 
"I believe we have to fight against 
Republicanism... everybody in the organisation 
does. Everybody knows they're trying to push us 
into a united Ireland... that's the main reason I 
joined. " 
(Henry, UDA member, East Belfast) 
Some expanded on the reason why they were prepared to fight, 
"The Protestant people are the majority in this 
country but we're treated as a minority. If 
Catholics want something then they've got good 
grounds... they go along and say 'we are the 
minority we want this or that, and the rest of the 
world turns round and says 'look at that poor 
minority getting hammered... there isn't one thing 
since the troubles began that the minority have 
lost. They haven't given up one thing. " 
(Geoff, UDA member, East Belfast) 
200 
Another had similar views, 
"you show me where the Republicans have give a 
fraction of an inch or anything... the famous 
loyalist slogan is not an inch' isn't it, but it's 
the republicans who haven't given a fraction of an 
inch... we've lost our parliament, our police 
force... " 
(Paul, UDA member, East Belfast) 
Such 'militaristic, values still had an appeal for many. As one 
member put it, 
"while you're out on the street I suppose there's a 
sort of romanticism comes into it... great you're 
fighting for the cause. " 
(Henry, UDA member, East Belfast) 
Another explained, 
"I went out of my way to get involved. There was 
no real pressure put on me... I asked to get in... 
Then they asked me to do something for the 
organisation which I agreed to. " 
(Graham, UDA member, East Belfast) 
There have been significant structural changes in the military 
organisation of the UDA in response to such views. Concerned 
initially with growing political support and more lately wit# the 
Anglo-Irish agreement there has been increased pressure from within 
the organisation to respond by adopting a more military role. These 
feelings have been increasingly articulated in the pages of 'ulster', 
since the early 1980s. As one statement put it, 
"The only way that we can fight to preserve our 
destiny is to take control of our own affairs. " 
(Ulster, March 1981: 2) 
A member of the inner council explained the development in the 
following way, 
"First of all I think that there's greater and 
greater polarisation between the two communities. 
The turning point was really the 1981 Republican 
hunger strike. Since then there's been a growing 
polarisation and we don't see anything in the 
foreseeable future to close the gap. " 
(i. McMichael, interview, UDA, HQ, May 1985) 
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The UDA leadership initially concluded that 'the Loyalist people want 
a Loyalist army beyond what they see as established controlled 
groups'. The Ulster Defence Force (UDF) cam into existence as a 
'reserve army' to be used in a 'doomsday situation'. They we re 
established f ram within the UDA as a small 'professional army, which 
were to be trained in map-reading, target-shooting, tracking, and 
communication and significantly, political education. The new body 
was described to me as an 'officer corpl or a 'commando unit'. The 
reason for this new unit was explained in 'Ulster' in April 1985, 
"the Loyalist paramilitaries have realised the need 
for a tough, well trained and disciplined army to 
defend Ulster... we have been used by politicans 
for too long. We are regrouping and reorganising. " 
(Ulster, April 1985) 
It was later discribed in this way, 
"The Ulster Defence Force was formed in 1982 as 
part of the UDA's reorganisation progra=ie, 
comprised largely of young men, led by senior 
members with ex-army qualifications, this 
comparatively-new group is a well trained force 
which many believe is being held in readiness for a 
potential 'Doomsday, situation in Ulster. " 
(Ulster, July/August 1986) 
This notion of a 'final conflict' featured in the thinking of several 
more militarily orientated UDA members in Ballymacarrett. one officer 
explained his views, 
"we're not heading towards reconciliation but away 
from it... things are moving towards a civil war... 
people are beginning to accept the police won't 
beat the Provos. They're also beginning to realise 
that the police will do what they're told by the 
Government even if that government is in a 
conspiracy with the South... people here are 
feeling cut-off from the establishment that they're 
given all their loyalty to. " 
(Nigel, UDA officer, East Belfast) 
The UDA's military campaign was however headed by another grouping, 
the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). This grouping first cam to 
prominence in 1973 but for many years its exact composition was 
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unclear. Following , the, Republican hunger strikes in 1981, the 
relationship between the UFF, and the UDA became clearer. The then UDA 
commander illuminated the relationship, 
"The UFF consist of a group of people who are 
members of the Ulster-Defence Association and they 
-decided that the only'solution to the problem is a 
purely military one. And their attitude is, well 
to remove active Republicans and active 
nationalists who are trying to overthrow what 
exists here in the form of a government. People 
who are assassinating or bombing Ulster people. 
The UFF feel they are justified in taking military 
action against them. Now, if that's the type of 
action they do stay strictly to, and do bomb and 
shoot only active Republicans, no way would the UDA 
disapprove of it. We would have no objection to it 
whatsoever. " 
(A. Tyrie cited in Marxism Today, Dec 1981) 
Another leading member 'explained it this way, 
"I don't believe in the use of violence to bring 
about political ends, but I've quite a number of 
friends in prison and I certainly wouldn't condemn 
them or try to judge them or say they were wrong 
for what they did. They did acts that they 
believed were for the greater good. They did 
things that they wouldn't do'in a normal society. 
If they were living in Exeter or Cambridge, the 
same situation wouldn't arise. " 
(i. Mcnichael, cited in F. S. M. May 1987: 28) 
These views were reinforced by the 'coverage' given by 'Ulster' to UFF 
activities. The clearest example of this in recent years was when the 
UFF attempted to assassinate the Sim Fein President in March 1986. 
The next months copy of ulster, justified the shooting as follows, 
"Adams has continually - and will almost certainly 
continue - to support the use of violence and the 
armed struggle of the IRA. He refuses to condemn 
any action which is carried out in their name. So 
what else did he expect, other than to be a 
legitimate target for those who are bitterly 
opposed to all the IRA stands for? We feel that in 
this instance, there is justification for the - 
elimination of ý Provisional enemy. " 
(ulster, April 1984: 2) 
It is inportant to try and establish the extent to which this thinking 
has permeated the wider community in Ballymacarrett. The same copy of 
ILLUSTRATION 6.2 
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Ulster carried an interview with a IUDA Spokesman', and a cartoon 
showing Adams'as the person responsible for the planning of several of 
the more notorious incidents in the IRA campaign. Both were copied 
_: I and widely circulated in pubs and clubs 
in Ballymacarrett. The 
cartoon is shown in full on the next page. Part of the interview, 
justifying the shooting reads, 
"I would agree that sectarian killing is both 
futile and wrong, but I would not regard the 
shooting of Adams as 'sectarian'. I would find it 
hard to swallow that the people who shot Adams did 
so because he is a Catholic, but rather that he is 
the leader of a Republican terror-organisation, and 
therefore a combatant - or Isolider, in that 
conflict. It is unfortunate that the violence 
continues in Ulster, but the PIRA holds the key to 
ending it. As long as the IRA continues to wage 
war on Ulster Protestants then it is inevitable 
that the Protestant co=mity feels under siege, 
and that some young men will go out to do battle 
with the aggressors. " 
(Ulster, April 1984: 6, hand-circular East Belfast, 
1984) 
The overall tone of the article was that it is reported with a certain 
degree of pride in being able to mount the operation so effectively, 
and that the attack was justified in terms of the person being a known 
'republican'. This may be fairly obvious in the case of Gerry Adams 
but has been a consistent feature of the reporting of UFF 
assassinations since. For example, after akilling in November 1984, 
'Ulster' carried a statement-from the UFF, 
"Early this morning a unit of the Ulster Freedom 
Fighters assassinated (named person), an 
intelligence officer of the fascist-terror 
organisation - Provisional IRA (named person)'posed 
as a representative for Sim Fein and attended 
successive Sim Fein annual conferences in Dublin. 
Our campaign to seek out and destroy members of 
Republican terror-organisations will continue... 
(Ulster, December 1984: 7) 
This statement demonstrates clearly just how wide ranging and, flexible 
the notion of 'active Republican' can be. Itis also notable that in 
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the shooting of Adams, the UFF had arguably engaged in their greatest 
ever propaganda act. However there was still a great deal of effort 
put into justifying the act even within Ballymacarrett. 
However the relationship between residents and the UDA in 
Ballymacarett is often determined more by day to day events than by 
spectacular military activity. The relationship is a complex one, 
because, as this chapter indicates, the UDA in Ballymacarrett is 
composed of a number of groupings often pulling in contradictory 
directions. This was complicated still further as the groupings were 
far from discrete in terms of membership. Michael, the UDA officerl, 
for example, was active in the ULDP and welfare sections of the UDA. 
However he fully supported the UDA's military role which he saw as 
necessary, if unfortuhate. The hierarchical structure of the 
organisation also meant that members sometimes found themselves 
carrying out activities they were neither committed to, nor 
understood the value of. For example in February 1987, the UDA in 
Ballymacarrett (along with other areas) helped distribute free food 
from EEC 'food mountains'. In Ballymacarett the food was distributed 
from a local church hall and involved UDA members working closely with 
local community workers and the Salvation Army. Externally this was 
another situation which helped legitimise the welfare role of the UDA. 
Internally however it involved using the resources of the younger UDA 
members, many of whom were much more committed to the UDA's military 
role than its welfare or political one. There were also tensions 
concerning direction with those UDA members who had joined the UDF. 
Externally they were projected as an elite grouping'. Internally 
however it attracted the younger more military orientated members. 
while many of these understood, and were highly enthusiastic about the 
physical aspects of the training, they could not understand why they 
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had to attend 'political education' classes at which for example, they 
learnt about Cuchulainn and the specific interpretation of Ulster' 
history previously mentioned in this chapter. 
Since its formation the uDA's major task has been to legitimise 
itself in Ballymacarrett. Two key trends have emerged to do this. 
Firstly there is that grouping which supports a strong organisation to 
'protect' the community in Ballymacarrett, even if at times this meant 
'offensive, rather than defensive' action. others in the UDA have 
become more involved in welfare, political and community actions. It 
was the contradictions between these two elements which helped 
Ide-legitimise, the UDA in Ballymacarrett and reinforce their 
reputation as 'cowboys'. The UDA in Ballymacarrett had many faces and 
facets. Their activities ranged from community work to sectarian 
assassination, and from promoting a form of reconciliatory politics to 
preparing for a doomsday situation, and civil war. This manifested 
itself in the local arena as an organisation often seen to be openly 
divided and pulling in different directions. So for example those 
seeking to impose their military activity in the community sought to 
do so by punishing 'petty criminals, such as burglars and 
glue-sniffers. This role found little support in East Belfast and any 
form of alternative justice was largely opposed by local residents. 
Others ran "dances' and staffed 'advice centres'. These members, 
(always the weaker faction) wanted to direct the UDA towards 
involvement in local issues, such as housing, unemployment, facilities 
for young people and the elderly. The main problem was that those 
active in statutory welfare agencies and those working on a volunteer 
basis, found it extremely hard to differentiate between those UDA 
members who wanted to hold meetings to make young people aware of 
their benefits, and those in the UDA who threatened to 'knee-cap' them 
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for 'glue-sniffing'. Another example of the distrust of those active 
in local housing associations was given in Chapter Four. The problem 
was not extenuated by the esoteric political messages coming from the 
leadership and the grossly simplified 'exoteric, appeal to the mass 
membership. It is important to understand this in the following 
chapters which consider the 'political' characteristics of 
Ballymacarrett and the UDA's response to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 
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PART III 
They don't know about us in the Guardian or 
the Sunday Times. They don't want to 
know ... we're just loyalist extremists. We're 
never teasonable and we're never recognised. 
We're just a mass of extremists from West 
Belfast and they think that stretches from the 
Mourne Mountains to the Giants Causeway. They 
think there's a million of us swarming all 
over , 
the place, smothering all the wee 
innocent Catholics. But there aren't. 
There's a handful of us and we're' just 
fighting to survive... 
Look at me, do I look like a rich, influential 
member of the Protestant ascendancy? 
¼ 
Tom-Allen, a character in Graham Reid's play 
17he Hidden Curriculum, 
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CHAPTER SEVEN SURVEY OF BALLYMACAMETT RESIDENTS 
ý This chapter presents the results of the small scale survey of 
Ballymacarrett 'residents, which was introduced in'Chapter Three. A 
target sample of 300 residents were randomly selected from the 
electoral register for the two innermost wards of East Belfast. From 
this sample of 300,154 interviews of satisfactory standard were 
obtained. Those interviews which were unsuccessful can be accounted 
for as follows, in table 7.1. 
MBLE 7.1 REASCNS FOR UNSUCCESSFUL INTERVIEWS 
Unsuccessful interviews NO 
Not at home ' '17 5.1 
Vacant, demolished 11 3.7 
Refusal 105 35.0 
Institution 2 0.7 
Ill or Senile 3 1.0 
On Holiday- Away 8 2.6 
Successful interviews 154 51.3 
Total 300 , 100 
Of the 105 respondents shown as refusals, 96 were unwilling to start 
the interview, the remaining 9 answered less than half the 'Likert 
items. If electors who, could not be contacted are excluded from the 
calculation the response rate was 59.5%. 
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Likert items 
In the questionnaire (see Appendix A) questions 9-33, and 34-65 
were Likert items. Here, a statement was put to the respondent, and 
the person stated how much they agreed or- disagreed with it. I 
followed the system used by the Northern Ireland Attitude Survey 
(NIAS, based on 1978 responses) and offered respondents an even number 
of choices, thus excluding the 'uncertain' or 'don't know' categories. 
This was done in the hope that respondents would opt for either 
agreement or disagreement. 
Social Class, Socio-Economic Status 
As Ballymacarrett is a tightly knit working class community 
traditionally centered around the -shipyard it made little sense to 
classify occupations according to the, Registrar Generals 
Classification of Occupations. I decided -to use a classification 
based on that devised by Blackburn and Mann (1979) when studying the 
working class labour market in Peterborough. This resulted in the 
following eight-point classification: 
TIUME 7.2 OCCEIPATICNAL CLASSIFICATICK OF'RESPCNDENTS 
1. Registrar General Social Class I, II and III 
non-manual, clerical other than routine, Professional. 
2. Skilled not Registrar General Social Class III, but a restricted 
category including jobs for which apprentice training is available 
e. g. fitters, turners, carpenters, bricklayers. 
3. High Semi-skilled, specialist work without formal training but 
with a lengthy learning period, e. g. welders, testers, high 
routine clerical. 
210 
4. medium Semi-skilled, jobs with some measure of precision and 
knowledge- but which can be picked up quickly, e. g. drivers, 
storesperson with clerical duties, complex machining., 
5. Low Semi-skilled, precision of movement but with a negligible 
learning period, e. g. mates, assemblers, routine machining. 
6. Unskilled, neither acuracy or knowledge required e. g. cleaners, 
labourers. 
7. Other -Housewife, UDR member, RUC member, retired. 
8. Unemploye 
Reaction to the Questionnaire 
At the end of the interview, I noted several details concerning 
the interview itself. The length of interviews ranged from 12 to 67 
minutes. The 'conversational ability, of respondents was 'good' in 
51.1% of ý the interviews, 39%, were, average 'and 9.5 were recorded as 
'poor'. This compares with 43.5%, 45% and 11.4% respectively for the 
WAS in 1978. 
One criterion for judging the success of a questionnaire is 
usually thought to be the attitude of the respondent. This is shown 
below and again compared favourably with 'the NIAS. Firstly the 
attitudes of respondents before the interview. 
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MUM 7.3 ATTITUDE OF RESPCNDENTS BEEX)RE THE INTERVIEW 
NIM 
results 
Attitude M M 
Very interested 24.0- 21.1 
Interested 56.0 54.0 
Not very interested 16.0 20.9 
Antagonistic 2.0 0.5 
Nervous, uncertain 2.0 3.4 
Secondly the attitude of respondents after the interview, 
TABLE 7.4 ATTITME OF RESPCNDENTS AFTER THE INTERVIEW 
NIAS 
results 
%MM 
No change 73.0 66.0 
More interested, helpful 18.0 28.5 
Less interested, but still helpful 5.0 2.7 
Hurrying to get it over 4.0 2.4 
other 0.0 0.2 
Results 
The respondents were randomly selected except that 50% of those 
selected were women. of those who completed questionnaires 87 (56.5%) 
were male and 67 (43.5%) were female. This represents a male response 
rate of 58% and a female rate of 44.7% Some basic demographic details 
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Of Ballymacarrett were outlined in Chapter Four. 
Added to this can be the age structure of those responding. This 
can be compared to the 1981 census returns for the Ballymacarrett and 
Mount wards to give some idea of how representative the response was. 
TABLE 7.5 X; E STRUCTURE OF RESPCNDENTS COMPARED WITH 1981 
Age Sample Ballymacarrett Mount 
ward(1981) ward 
18-24 18.4 12.1 11.8 
25-29 24.3 5.4 5.9 
30-34 13.2 4.9 4.8 
35-39 5.9 4.8 4.7 
40-44 6.6 4.9 5.3 
45-49 9.2 4.9 5.1 
50-59 11.8 12.4 12.0 
Over 60 10.5 24.2 26.7 
As can be seen the sample was slightly over represented at the younger 
end of the scale and slightly under represented at the older end of 
the range. This may well be explained by the small sample size and 
perhaps the unwillingness of some older members of the community to 
take part in completing the questionnaire. There are also in 
Ballymacarrett distinct 'clusters' of older residents, (eg sheltered 
housing), which may well have been missed by random selection based on 
electoral registers. The occupational classification of respondents 
was as follows: 
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TABLE 7.6 OCCUPATICNAL CLhSSIFICATICt4 OF RESPCNDENTS 
Occupational status No 
Registrar General I, II and'III 2 
Skilled 18 
High Semi-Skilled 0,10 
Med Semi-Skilled 53 27 
Low Semi-Skilled 16 
Unskilled 23 
Other 21 
Unemployed 34 
missing 3 
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34.4 
1.3 
11.7 
6.5 
17.5 
10.4 
14.9 
13.6 
22.1 
1.0 
100% 
Those who were unemployed were asked their last job, and the pattern 
which emerged was as follows: 
TABLE 7.7 LAST JOB OF THOSE CUPMENTLY IMEMPLOYED 
Occupational status No % 
Skilled 10 35.8 
High Semi-skilled 4 14.3 
Med Semi-skilled 4 14.3 
Low Semi-skilled 4 14.3 
Unskilled 6 21.4 
There are two key features which emerge from this result. Employment 
in Ballymacarrett remains based in skilled and semi-skilled, largely 
male labour. However as can also be seen from the overall 
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unemployment rate of 22.1% the area has not been immune from economic 
recession. Furthermore within the unemployed, skilled workers (those 
whom the anti-imperialist left would describe as a labour 
aristocracy), have suffered high unemployment rates representing 35.8% 
of those unemployed. 
Another key feature of local social structure in Ballymacarrett 
was its physical continuity. This has already been referred to in 
Chapter Four. However to repeat its key features, 52.6% of responents 
had lived in East Belfast for more than 25 years, while a further 
34.6% had lived there for over 15 years. In addition to this 37.7% of 
those interviewed had lived in the same neighbourhood for over 25 
years, and 26.6% had lived in the saine neighbourhood for over 15 
years. There was also much evidence to suggest extended kinship 
patterns remained reasonably intact in Ballymacarrett. Over a third 
(34.4%) of those interviewed saw relatives, apart from those whom they 
lived with, on a daily basis. A further 18.8% saw relatives several 
times a week, while another 34.4% visited relatives weekly. Given 
this strong physical solidarity one would expect in broad terms a 
great deal of cultural homogenity. However it is the variations 
within this that we shall now examine. 
Firstly, it is necessary to establish political support and 
identity in Ballymacarrett in broad terms. Table 7.7 shows the 
response to primary national identity in Ballymacarrett. In his 
attitude survey in 1968, Rose identified the three most significant 
, national, labels amongst Protestants in Northern Ireland. The NIAS 
in 1978 suggests the tri-partite distinction had collapsed. The 
overall change is illustrated in Table 7.8. 
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TABLE 7.8 NATIONAL IDENTITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1968-78 
National Identity 
British 
Irish 
Ulster 
Protestants % 
Rose (1968) NIAS (1978) 
39 67 
20 8 
32 20 
In general terms this was the pattern which emerged in Ballymacarrett, 
TABLE 7.9 NATICNAL IDENTITY IN BALLYWW-ARRETT 
National identity % 
British 74.7 
Irish 1.3 
Ulster 14.9 
Sometimes Irish, sometimes British 0.6 
Northern Irish 8.4 
Total 100 % 
It would however be incorrect to suggest that at 23.3%, those claiming 
an 'Ulstert or 'Northern Irisht identity is insignificant. 
Furthermore PWC national identity. can only be fully understood if we 
consider the reserve position', of those people. National identity 
for many remains a rejection of what they are not. The unity of this 
form of identity can be seen -if we - consider the response to the 
question of which identity respondents relate to least, -as shown in 
Table 7.10. 
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TABLE 7.10 LEAST POPULAR NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Respondents 
Identity M 
British 0.7 
Irish 71.3 
Ulster 4.0 
Northern Irish 5.3 
Anglo-Irish 15.3 
Sometimes Irish, sometimes British 3.3 
Total 100% 
It is the second preference for national identity which begins to 
reveal the complex nature of national allegiances. The vast majority 
identifying strongly with the Ulster label. - This is shown in Table 
7.11 where over 70% chose Ulster as their second identity. There may 
be several- reasons for this. As the previous chapter- has shown the 
promotion of 'Ulster, is most readily associated with the UDA. 
However it is more likely that 'Ulster, ' is seen as a 'fallback' 
position should Britain ever declare its. intent to withdraw. (McAuley 
1986: 17) In 1985 the notion of independence was increasingly being 
reintroduced onto the agenda in the wake of the Anglo-Irish agreement. 
217 
TABLE 7.11 NATICNAL- IDENTITY - 2ND CHOICE 
National identity % 
British 11.1 
Irish 3.9 
Ulster 55.6 
Northern Irish 26.8 
Anglo-Irish 1.3 
sometimes Irish, sometimes British 1.3 
Total 100% 
In Ballymacarrett, the great majority adopted a British identity as 
their first choice; and an Ulster identity as their second choice. 
Table 6.12 shows an analysis of the socio-economic composition of 
those who expressed preferences for a national identity. The overall 
trend that upper-class Protestants are more likely to accept a British 
national identity, while the lowest socio-economic groups are more 
attached to a Ulster allegiance (Moxon Browne 1983.7) can be confirmed 
by Table 7.2. It also clear is that an allegiance to an Ulster, or 
'Norther Irish' identity is almost equally distributed within both the 
semi-skilled and unskilled groupings. The commitment to a 'British' 
identity is highest amongst skilled workers. 
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TABLE 7.12 NATICNAL IDENTITY BY OCCUPATICN 
M 
Skilled High Semi Med Semi Low Semi Un- 
Skilled Skilled Skilled Skilled 
British 83.3 50.0 77.8 68.8 73.9 
Ulster 11.1 30.0 11.1 18.8 18.8 
Northern Ireland 20.0 7.4 12.4 7.3 
Sometimes Irish/ 
Sometimes British 5.6 
Irish 3.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The NIAS survey found a general similarity between national identity 
and party support. Its main findings are reproduced in Table 7.13. 
In Ballymacarrett the differences were even less clear cut. As Table 
7.14 indicates an almost equal number of DUP and OUP supporters saw 
their primary national identification as British. 
TABLE 7.13 FIRST CHOICE NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE FOUR MIN POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND (NIAS). 
Party %British %Irish %Ulster %Other 
official Unionist 71.1 4.6 20.9 3.4 
Democratic Unionist 59.5 5.4 34.5 2.6 
Alliance 42.9 28.6 11.4 17.1 
Social Democratic 
& Labour Party 10.7 76.2 4.8 8.3 
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TABLE 7.14 FIRST CHOICE NATIONAL IDENTITY AND PARTY POLITICAL 
IDENTITY IN BALLYMACARRETT. 
Party %British %Irish %Ulster Vorthern 
Irish 
Official Unionist 78.0 14.6 7.3 
Democratic Unionist 78.8 1.3 16.3 3.8 
Alliance 50.0 25.0 25.0 
The similarity between the profiles indicates that it, is not national 
identity which. differentiates between DUP and OUP support in 
Ballymacarrett. As we shall see such differences are located in age 
profiles, socio-economic status, and key attitudes and perceptions of 
the party's ability. The, similarity in supporters national identity 
however partly explains the antagonism between the DUP and OUP at the 
local level. Both are seeking support from the same constituents. 
The Democratic Unionist party were clearly the most strongly 
supported political party-in Ballymacarrett with almost twice as many 
identifiers as the official Unionists. The actual question put to 
respondents was, of the following list of political parties which do 
you feel closest to? ' 
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TABLE 7.15 PARTY POýLi'TIC'A"L. I'Di"ZýHýF-IdkTICK IN BALLYMACARRETT. 
Political Party M 
Democratic Unionist 57.1 
official Unionist 29.3 
Ulster Democratic Loyalist Party 2.1 
Alliance 8.6 
others- 2.9 
Total ' 100.0 
If the 'Alliance Party, is taken as 'Unionist', 85% of those 
identifying with a political party supported one of the three major 
parties whose primary goal is the continuation of Northern Ireland's 
constitutional position within the U. K. 
This does not transfer directly into support for 
'the 
'political 
solutions, to the conflict proposed by those parties. Table 7.16 
shows the most acceptable solution to those in Ballymacarrett. 
TABLE 7.16 BEST CM%NCE OF A SOLUTIM To THE ITROUBLES IN NORTHERN 
IRELAND 
Solution M 
Integration 38.3 
Devolution - power sharing 20.9 
Devolution - non power sharing 20.7 
Independence 9.7 
United Ireland 1.3 
Don't know 9.1 
Total 100.0 
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From this it can be seen that 11.0% support policies which would 
change Northern Ireland's status within the United Kingdom, ' while 9.1% 
of -respondents could not offer any solution to the conflict. it 
should also be noted that the figures indicate that some -people in 
Ballymacarrett vote, or at least identify with political parties whose 
policies do not align, with their own personal options for solving' 
the political stalemate in Northern Ireland. 
There was considerable variance amongst party identifers as to the 
most acceptable solution, as shown in Table 7.17. 
TABLE 7.17 PARTY IDENTIFICATIM AND THE MOST ACCEPTABLE SOLUTICN. 
Solution official Democratic 
UnionistsM UnionistM 
Integration 43.9 41.3 
Devolution power sharing 17.4 27.8 
Devolution-non power sharing 19.2 18.6 
Independence 9.8 11.3 
United Ireland 0.0 0.0 
Don't knowý 9.8 1.0 
Total , 100.0 100.0 
one of the key features appears to be a considerable support for the 
continuance of direct rule from Westminister. This is at variance 
with the overall results of the NIM where support for direct rule in 
Northern Ireland stood at 15.8% (Moxon-Browne 1983: 85) It is also 
notable that over one quarter of DUP identifers contemplated some form 
of 'power sharing, as a solution, which does not fit neatly with the 
overall position of the DUP, either at a local level or within the 
wider framework of their politics. 
"I 
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Another common feature of political perspectives in Ballymacarrett 
was the general antipathy to any suggestion of a United Irealnd. The 
questionnaire gave respondents an opportunity to respond to the most 
popular set of reasons given for opposing an all-Ireland state. The 
first item was linked to the suggestion that in a United Ireland the 
'Protestant way of life would be lost'. The second item suggested 
that in a United Ireland the standard of living of those residing in 
the north would fall. The next item related to the idea that in a 
United Ireland the Roman Catholic Church would be dominant. The final 
item focused on the sense of 'British identity, and suggested that in 
a United Ireland, this British identity would be lost. Finally 
respondents were asked which of the above constituted their major 
objection to a unified Irish state. 
TABLE 7.18 REASCKS FCR OPPOSIM A UNITED IRELAND 
Reason 
Protestant way of life 
would be lost 
Drop in living standards 
% agreeing very strongly 
65.2 
50.4 
Fear the power of the Roman Catholic Church 43.7 
LOSS of British identity 81.5 
When asked to identify main reasons for opposing a United Ireland the 
results given were as follows: I 
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TABLE 7.19 MAIN REASON FOR OPPOSING A UNITED IRELAND. 
Reason 
Protestant way of life would be lost 14.1 
Drop in living standard 6.7 
Fear the power of Roman Catholic church 18.5 
Loss of British identity 60.7 
Total 100.0 
Again it is possible to consider this in terms of what party 
identifiers regarded as their major objections to a United Ireland. 
7WHE 7.20 PARTY IDENTIFICATICK AND THE MAIN OBJECTIM TO A UNITED 
IRELAND . Reason OUPM DTJP(%) 
Protestant way of life 
would be lost 17.5 15.0 
Drop in living standards 7.5 3.8', 
Fear of power of Roman 
Catholic Church 32.5 15.0 
Loss of British identity 42.5 63.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Examination of these figures in tables 7.18,7.19, and 7.20 shows that 
by far the biggest objection was the fear of the loss of 'British 
identity,. Given the strength of argument put forward by the 
anti-imperalist left in Ireland, that much of Protestant working class 
consciousness is related to the protection of economic privilege, it 
is surprising how little concern there is regarding living standards 
in Ballymacarrett. Their objections centre on a much wider 
ideological perspective surrounding the loss of 'identity'. 
So far this chapter has attempted to outline the political 
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identity and national consciousness of those living in Ballymacarrett. 
As has been seen. - there was a reasonable degree of overlap regarding 
both political identity and nationality between those identifying with 
both the DUP and the OUP. It is clear however that the majority of 
voters identify with the Democratic Unionist Party, and it is 
important to-identify the reason or this support. 
One possible explanation whichý may be given is that there is a 
strong correlation between religious belief, membership of the. Free 
Presbyterian Church and support for the DUP. Religious affiliation 
and beliefs play 'a much larger role in everyday life in Northern 
Ireland than in the- rest of the U. K. Rose indicated the extent to 
which relgion was taken seriously in Northern Ireland when he found 
that 7% of Protestants went to church more than once a week, and that 
39% were weekly church goers. - (Rose, 1971: 264) - The comparable 
figures for the NIAS were that 17.4% attended church more than once a 
week, while ' 72.4% attended once a week. The figures for 
Ballymacarrett are shown in Table 7.21. 
TABLE 7.21 CHURCH ATTENBANCE IN BALLMIACARRETT 
Frequency of, attendance 
More than once a week 11.0 
once a week 13.6 
Less than once a week 1.3 
Less than once a month 33.8 
Never 40.3 , 
Religiosity, as measured by church attendance is considerably lower-in 
Ballymacarrett than the Northern Irish average. Another indication of 
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this was the response to the question is religion becoming more 
important to people in Northern Ireland'. A majority, 66.7%, of 
respondents believed that itýwas not becoming more important, while 
only 7.2% of those interviewed agreed strongly with the statement. 
Of those interviewed however 98.0% identified with one of the 
Protestant churches. The two major, Protestant churches in Northern 
Ireland are the Church of Ireland which accounts for 35.6% of 
Protestants and the Presbyterian Church which - had a membership of 
46.5% (Moxon Browne 1983: 89) These were also the two major 
denominations in Ballymacarrett, although Congregationalists had a 
higher representation than would be expected probably because of the 
location of a large Congregationalist church in Ballymacarrett. 
TABLE 7.22 STRENGTH OF PR()TESTAW DENOIMMNATICNS IN BALLYMACARRETT 
Denomination M 
Church of Ireland 26.5 
Presbyterian 38.4 
Free Presbyterian 6.0 
Methodist 12.6 
Congregationalist 10.6 
Other 4.0 
None 2.0 
What is clear that while the membership of the Free Presbyterian 
church in Ballymacarrett stands at 6.0%, the DUP support stands at 
57.1% The point has been widely made of course that 'Paisleyism' is a 
much wider movement than membership of the Free Presbyterian Church. 
As the previous chapter has indicated many of those active in the DUP 
in Ballymacarrett were not involved primarily because of religious 
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conviction. Membership ' of the Free' Presbyterian church in 
Ballymacarrett however, usually resulted in identification with the 
DUP; 88.9% of Free Presbyterian voted for the DUP. As Table 7.23 
shows, however, the DUP had support from across the spectrum of 
Protestant denominations in Ballymacarrett. DUP support also remained 
firmly located across the class fractions of the PWC in East Belfast. 
This can'be 'seen in Table 7.24 where DUP identifiers were strongly 
represented in both the skilled and semi-skilled classes. The 
official Unionists on the other hand gained over a quarter of their 
support from unskilled workers. This may well be explained by the 
TABLE 7.23 PARTY IDENTIFICATICK AND CHURCH MEMBERSHIP IN 
BALLYMACARRErT 
Party 
Church Identification OUP M DUP 
Church of Ireland 31.7 23.8 
Presbyterian 29.3 40.0 
Free Presbyterian 10.0 
Methodist 17.1 12.5 
Congregationalist 14.6 10.0 
other 4.9 2.5 
None 2.4 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
227 
ThBLE 7.24 OCCUPATION AND PARTY IDENTIFICATIM -IN BALLYMACARREIV 
Party 
Occupation OUP M DUP (%) 
Skilled 2.6 16.5 
High Semi-Skilled 2.6 10.1 
Medium Semi-Skilled 23.1 16.5 
Low Semi-Skilled 7.8 13.9 
Unskilled 25.6 1.3 
other ý23.0 12.7 
Unemployed 15.3 29.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
traditional deference vote within the PWC to official Unionism. DUP 
support was also made up of 16.5% from a skilled manual background and 
29% of unemployed. one of the major- dif fe rences in party support in 
Ballymacarrett is age., The age profile of the DUP was almost the 
opposite of the official Unionists. The DUP had a much higher 
proportion of its support in the younger age group, while-the Official 
Unionists had a higher proportion in the older age groups. This is 
shown in table 7.25.1 
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TABLE 7.25 ME STFUMURE OF OFFICIAL UNICNIST AND DEmocRATIc uNIONIST 
SUPPORTERS IN BALLIWAACARRETr. 
I 
Age-group OLM M- DUP(%) 
Under 24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-59 
Over 6V 
Total 
10.3 '' 22.5 
12.9 46.3 
12.8 
43.5 12.6 
20.5 8.6" 
100.0 100.0 
It can be noted for example that while 64%'of OUP supportwas located 
in those over 45 years old, the equivalent figure for DUP identifiers 
was only 21.2. - Conversly, while the of f icial unionists Can - win only 
23.3% of their support from the under 34 age group, 68.8% of the DUP 
support was located in this younger age-group. This had wide reaching 
consequences, as the DUP were able to call on many enthusiastic-young 
workers. The DUP's much younger age profile may also partly explain 
their reputation for 'getting things done,. 
The chapter will now consider the perspectives of DUP supporters 
in detail and seek to identify now how they differ from official 
Unionist supporters. The first area considered will be reactions in 
Ballymacarrett to British goverment policies. The British goverment 
has administered Northern Ireland since 1972 under a system known as 
'direct rule'. A Secretary of State, for Northern Ireland is thus' 
responsible for almost all the functions and responsibilities of the 
former Northern Ireland "government. This 'system has operated 
continuously except for the period of five months in 1974, when the 
devolved, power sharing Assembly was in existence. There have since 
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1972 been-three attempts at internal settlement and a new form, of 
devolved government (Sunningdale, the convention and the Atkins 
initiative). At the time of the interviews the Northern Ireland 
Assembly was in its final months of operation. It was a minimalist 
plan, aimed at acceptance' and without any mention of power-sharing. 
The assembly was elected in October 1982, but only the Unionists took 
their seats. Because of DUP and OUP opposition there was little 
possibilty of reaching the second stage, which would have 'involved 
some fom of devolved goverment including all the political parties 
in Northern Ireland. 
High on the political agenda also was the examination of the 
'broader dimensions... (and) the totality of relationships between the 
two islands'. The process began on 21st May 1980, follo'wing a sumit 
meeting in London between Margaret Thatcher and Charles Haughey. The 
next meeting was that in December, which acknowledged that substantial 
progress had been made in many areas, including energy, transport, 
cross-border economic development and security. It was decided that 
senior officials should undertake joint studies regarding new 
institutional structures, security matters, and economic 
co-operation. The whole process was taken further in, November 1981, 
when the new Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald, and Margaret Thatcher 
announced the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Council. The f irst 
meeting of a new Anglo-Irish Governmental Council occurred during 
January 1982, and it met several times during the next 2 years. 
The summit however was under pressure f rom organised Unionist 
oppostion. In December 1980, Ian Paisley launched his 'Carson Trail, 
in opposition. The 1981 republican hunger-strike had strained 
Anglo-Irish relations. Throughout this time the New Ireland Forum, 
which was composed of the three major political parties in the Irish 
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Republic and the SDLP met. it produced a report in May 1984 and 
suggested three main constitutional structures. These were a 
federal/confederal state, a system of joint authority between Dublin 
and London, and a unitary state. The overall tenor of the report 
favoured the latter. Both the official Unionists and the Democratic 
Unionists rejected the Forum Report, publishing their own perspectives 
in 'Devolution and the Northern Ireland Assembly - The Way Forward, 
(UUAP, 1984) and 'The Unionist Case - the Forum Report Answered, 
(Allister, n. d. ). The assurance by Mrs. Thatcher in November 1984 
that none of the three major options was under active consideration 
did little to convince Unionists. The broader PWC reaction will be 
discussed in Chapter eight. Within Ballymacarrett the level of 
hostitlity and distrust of the British government was reflected in the 
results for Table 7.26 which shows responses to the question 'The 
British Government does not really care what happens in Northern 
Ireland so long as there is not too much civil unrest'. The vast 
majority agreed with the statement, 37% of those asked agreeing very 
strongly. 
TABLE 7.26 THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT DOESN'T CARE WHAT EAPPENS AS LCNG AS 
THERE ISN'T TOO MUCH CIVIL UNREST 
Attitude 
Agree 27.9 
Strongly Agree 20.1 
Very Strongly Agree 37.0 
Total: 85.0 
There were important variations by party identification. While 29.3 
of Official Unionist supporters agreed very strongly with the 
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statement, the equivalent figure for DUP supporters was'50.0% 
Another example of the strength of opposition to Anglo-Irish 
relations can be seen in the responses to the proposition that in any 
political solution to Northern Ireland the Irish Government should be 
consulted. It is worth noting that responses to this question were 
compiled three months before the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
at Hillsborough Castle on 15th November 1985. The results are shown 
in Table 7.27. 
IMBLE 7.27 IN ANY POLITICAL SOLUTION 70 NORTHERN' IRELAND THE IRISH 
GGIVE1001ENT HAS TO BE CONSULTED. 
Attitude (%) 
very Strongly Disagree 56.5 
Strongly Disagree 12.3 
Disagree 16.2 
Total: 85.1 
Again the strength of feeling against the proposition was stronger 
amongst DUP supporters (72.5%), than Official Unionist identifiers 
(51.2%). This can be, verified by the response to another question, 
suggesting that rthe British and Irish Governments should continue to 
meet to discuss Northern Ireland'. Over half of those responding 
disagreed very strongly with the proposition as Table 7.28 indicates. 
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TABLE 7.28 THE BRITISH AND IRISH GOVEEMNM SHOULD CONTINUE TO MEET 
M DISCUSS NCHMM IRELAND. 
Attitude 
Very strongly disagree 51.3 
Strongly disagree 12.3 
Disagree 19.5 
Total: 83.1 
There were again differences between DUP identifiers, 62.5% of whom 
disagreed very s trongly, and official Unionist supporters, 46A% of 
whom disagreed very strongly with the proposition. As such there are 
clear differences in the strength of opposition expressed by OUP and 
DUP identifiers in Ballymacarrett. However there did appear to be 
considerable confusion by Ballymacarrett residents when it came to. 
suggesting any positive proposals concerning a political solution. 
One notable result was the position concerning some form of 
power-sharing government. In general terms a very small majority 
(50.3%) were in favour of the proposition that any political solution 
will have to include arrangements for power-sharing'. It may again be 
useful to consider the support for power sharing in terms of party 
support. As pan be seen from Table 7.29 the majority of both DUP and 
OUP identifiers were opposed to any form of power-sharing. However 
there were considerable numbers within both parties who were prepared 
to at least contemplate some form of power sharing with nationalist 
political parties. 
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TABLE 7.29 PARTY IDENTIFICATIM AND 'PCWER-SHAPJIM? 
Attitude to 'Power sharing' 
Very Strongly Disagree 
Strongly Disagree 
OUP DUP 
M M 
27.5 30.0 
12.5 7.5 
Disagree 
Agree 
Strongly Agree 
Very Strongly Agree 
Totals: 
12.5 22.5 
42.5 30.0 
0.0 3.8 
5.0 6.2 
100.0 100.0 
Another related result was that there was almost total unity (95.5%) 
for the proposition that the Irish government should remove its 
constitutional claim over Northern Ireland. The vast majority of 
respondents felt that the Irish government had no role to play at the 
governmental level, in the future of Northern Ireland. Opposition to 
the development of Anglo-Irish agreement was found throughout both 
official Unionist and Democratic Unionist supports but was much more 
firmly located in DUP support. However the confused position was 
again illustrated by the responses to what those in Ballymacarrett 
thought should replace direct rule. A large majority of those 
interviewed (83.8%) thought it right that since they were the majority 
Protestants should have the last word in the affairs of Northern 
Ireland. There was however a wide range of opinion as to whether 'a 
return to the old Stormont system offered the best chance of a 
solution'. A majority (57.7%) believed that it did, but a 
considerable minority (42.3%) disagreed. The break down of party 
support for the idea was as follows. 
234 
TABLE 7.30 PARTY SUPPORT AND A RETURN TOI STORMONT SYSTEM. OF 
GOVERNMENT 
Attitude to a return to a OUPM DUP(%) 
Stormont system of Goverrment 
Very Strongly Disagree 0.0 3.9 
Strongly Disagree 2.5 110 
Disagree 15.0 29.9 
Agree 30.0 31.2 
Strongly Agree 22.5 3.9 
Very Strongly Agree 30.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
The commitment to a return to the Stormont system was stronger amongst 
OUP identifers. Given the age composition of DUP and OUP support in 
Ballymacarrett, 'it is possible that this stronger commitment is 
because many OUP supporters remember a Stormont goverment while many 
DUP identifers do not. 
Another area where differences in party support emerged was in the 
field of 'law and order?. As the previous chapters have shown the use 
of emergency legislation, the relationship between paramilitaries and 
the community and the position of Loyalist prisoners were all high on 
the agenda in Ballymacarrett. Respondents were under no illusion of 
the capabilities of loyalist paramilitary groups. most believed that 
under certain circumstances there would be an upturn in violence 
headed by loyalist paramilitary groups. So, for example 91.4% of 
respondents thought that 'if a united Ireland ever came about loyalist 
paramilitaries would be as much of a problem as the IRA,. There was 
not a strong tendency for respondents to regard loyalist. paramilitary 
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, members as 
I soldiers I or politically motivated in the same way as many 
UDA members regarded themselves. Just over one third (34.8%) believed 
the goverment should restore political status for paramilitary 
members who had been imprisoned. A substantial number, 38.9%, of DUP 
supporters agreed with a reintroduction of political status, while 
only 27.5% of OUP identifiers were in favour. 
A large majority of respondents were in favour of the separation of 
loyalist and republican prisoners in Northern Ireland's jails. The 
differences in support between DUP and OUP respondents were again 
marked. over half (53.8%) of DUP supporters agreed very strongly with 
separation. The equivalent figure for OUP supporters was 12.8% The 
relationship between DUP supporters and loyalist paramilitary group 
was again seen to be ambiguous when when we consider DUP supporters' 
views on capital punishment. Over three-quarters of all respondents 
(76.6) believed that capital punishment should be reintroduced for 
paramilitary members found guilty of murder. By far the bulk of 
support came from OUP identifiers, 95.1% of whom thought capital 
punishment should be reintroduced. However within DUP supporters 
71.4% supported its reintroduction. There were also differences 
concerning the use of Isupergrasses' in Northern Ireland. The OUP 
support was almost split equally on its legitimicy. DUP supporters 
however were strongly opposed to their use with 73.8% disagreeing with 
the use of supergrasses as illegitimate as Table 7.31 shows. 
There was overwhelming support from both DUP and OUP identifiers for 
the reintroduction of trial by Jury, with 79.4 of OUP supporters in 
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TABLE 7.31 SUPERGRASS SYSTEK IS LEGITIMATE 
Attitude OUPM DUP(%) 
Very. strongly disagree 17.5 38.8 
Strongly disagree 7.5 12.5 
Disagree 27.5ý 22.5 
Agree 22.5 10.0 
Strongly Agree 7.5 3.7 
Very strongly agree 17.5 12.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
TABLE 7.32 TRIAL BY JURY SHOULD BE REINTWXXXMID IN NORTEMEN IRELAND 
Attitude -OUPM 
DUP(%) 
Very Strongly Disagree 0.0 ý5.0 
Disagree 5.1 -1.3 
Disagree 15.4 20.0 
Agree 33.3 30.0 
Strongly Agree 12.9 11.3 
Very Strongly Agree 33.3 32.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 
favour and 73.8% of DUP identifiers supporting the idea. 
There was clearly a range of political attitudes within Ballymacarrett 
while there is a basic consensus on basic issues, such as the 
continuance of the Northern Irish state, the outcome of talks between 
Dublin and London and security. on other matters such as the use of 
supe rgrasses, however, viewpoints vary considerably. on these issues 
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many respondents in Ballymacarrett felt much closer to the DUP than to 
the Official Unionist. The DUP are of ten seen to be willing to do 
something as opposed. to the mainly middle class official Unionist 
party. one of the basic divisions is age. Another may be the 
political self identity of those in Ballymacarrett. For example 70.5% 
of Official Unionist identifiers described themselves as 'Unionists' 
and 29.3% as #Loyalists'. With DUP identifiers however this was 
reversed; 66.3% described themselves as Loyalist and 33.7% as 
unionists. 
The self description Unionism is of course bound up with self 
perception of being part of the British nation. For Loyalists however 
there is a willingness to place the interests of those who live in 
Northern Ireland above the United Kingdom as a whole. , This can be 
illustrated by the responses to two propositions put to respondents. 
The first was that if they 'had to choose between loyalty to 'Ulster' 
and loyalty to the British Government, Loyalists-would choose Ulster. 
A large majority (70.0%) of DUP identifiers agreed very strongly with 
this, while only 39% of OUP supporters did so, as shown in Table 7.33. 
TABLE 7.33 LOYALISTS SHOULD CHOOSE ULSTER RATHER THAN THE BRITISH 
GOVERNMENT. 
Attitude OUPM DUP(%) 
I 
Very strongly agree 39.0 70.0 
Strongly agree 24.4 16.3 
Agree 36.6 12.5 
Another indication of how Loyalist identity differs to a Unionist one 
can be seen in Table 7.34 which shows the results when respondents 
were asked to consider the proposition that if Britain withdrew then 
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Northern Ireland should claim independence rather than join the Irish 
Republic. While the majority of both OUP and DUP, identifiers agreed 
with this, support was much stronger in the DUP where 87.5% very 
strongly agreed. 
TABLE 7.34 IF BRITAIN, WITHDREW NORTHERN IRELAND SHOULD CLAIM 
INDEPENDENCE 
Attitude OUPM DUP(%) 
Very strongly agree 40.0 87.5 
Strongly Agree 17.5 6.3 
Agree 30.0 6.3 
Deeply inherent in the concept of loyalism is the idea that force may 
be justified to achieve a desirable goal (or to prevent some other 
group achieving theirs). This was readily identifiable when OUP and 
DUP supporters were asked which tactics they regarded as legitimate 
(see Table 7.35) 
TABLE 7.35 wHicH CS DO YOU CONSIDER AS LEGITIMATE TO MAINTAIN 
YOM BRITISH IDENTITY 
Tactic OUPM DUP(%) 
Electoral Politics 98.7 98.8 
Civil Disobedience 68.8 63.5 
Protest marches 37.9 61.5 
Strikes 23.4 57.5 
Rioting 4.7 45.8 
Armed conflict 14.4 48.9 
Civil War 9.6 52.8 
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Thus while 69% of official Unionist identifiers and 63% of DUP 
supporters regarded civil disobedience as legitimate, the disparity 
between the groups widened as they progressed towards civil war on the 
scale. The identification, of DUP supporters as loyalists and their 
perception of the DUP as the party most willing to take 'action' was 
to be increasingly important in the realignments of Unionist politics 
in Ballymacarrett after November 1985. In general terms this chapter 
has highlighted how both OUP and DUP identifiers share the same 
ideological and political parameters. However, within these 
parameters both OUP and DUP supporters-construct different attitudes 
to common problems. They also construct different attitudes to the 
means by which these problems may be resolved. 
CHAPTER EIGHT TWO CASE STUDIES: HOUSIM AND THE 1985 LOCAL ELECrICNS 
-I 1ý I 
The previous chapters have considered the different ideological 
perspectives of those active in the Democratic Unionists and the 
Ulster Defence Association in Ballymacarrett. This chapter will 
outline how such ideological differences manifest themselves in the 
politics of everyday, life in Ballymacarrett. Two areas will be 
considered, the first concerns the politics of residence in 
Ballymacarrett, the second -local party politics in the form of the 
1985 local council elections. The chapter will also draw some 
distinctions between the 'public' and 'private' political domains in 
Ballymacarrett. 
The first part of the chapter will discuss the relevance of 
physical segregation in Ballymacarrett, -and how this partly accounts 
for the continuance of inequalitites in access to political, economic 
and welfare issues. In the widest sense, segregation refers to the 
overall organisation of social life. As Chapter Four indicated, it is 
involved with forms of interaction, avoidance, the construction and 
strengthening of a group identity and the way in which social, 
economic and political activity is structured. Such themes have been 
expanded upon within the context of Belfast by Boal (1974,1975,19781 
1980), and Boal, Poole and Murray (1976) and Boal and Douglas (1982). 
Such works have tended to lean on the measurement of the empirical 
features of segregation. Consequently, there has been, a, lack of 
discussion of the results of segregation in social, political and 
economic terms, or a reluctance to discuss the social meaning, of 
sectarian division. 
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, It is possible to identify another approach to the social 
relations of physical -segregation. Urban structure may also be seen 
as a factor in class formation or fragmentation (Harvey 1975,1987). 
The major argument from such writers is that it is the relations of 
production. and consumption which structure residential space. As 
Harvey explains, capitalist development has to, 
"Negotiate a knife edge path between preserving the 
exchange values of past capital investments in the built 
bulk environment and destroying the values of these 
investments in order to open up fresh room for 
accumulation. -Under capitalism there is a perpetual 
struggle in which capital builds a physical landscape 
appropriate to, its own condition at a particular moment 
in time, only to have to destroy it, usually in the 
course of a crisis at a subsequentýpoint in time. " 
(Harvey 1978: 124) 
The statement may marginalise the degree to which sectarianism is 
itself deeply embedded in the relations of production and consumption 
in Northern Ireland. However it is important to stress that physical 
segregation is not merely dependent on the dynamics of indigenous 
groups. Local capital has been in severe decline in Northern Ireland 
since 1945. As Chapter two has indicated, since the end of World War 
Two, monopoly capital greatly increased control over production on an 
international scale. The logic demanded by the increased accumulation 
by the new monopoly capital, resulted in new industrial sites being 
developed around the edge of Belfast and the abandonment of the inner 
city. Belfast's physical structure remained almost untouched until 
the early 1970s. Subsequently there was widespread physical 
redevelopment in the wake of Belfast's resurrected urban motorway. 
Planning blight rapidly spread to inner-city working class areas, both 
loyalist and nationalist, and the decline was compounded by the rapid 
population movements described in Chapter Four. At this juncture the 
rapid politicisation of the PWC undermined any acquiescence to the 
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government. There was. in many PWC districts a growing awareness that 
problems such as poor housing conditions were 'created, at least in 
part by the policies of the Belfast Corporation (Weiner 1975). In 
Belfast from the early 1970! s there was an, interpellation of the inner 
city crisis and the crisis'of the legitimacy of the state. This led 
to the direct intervention, of the British state in the day to day 
management- of the crisis. one major result was that powers over 
housing were centralised in the form of the Northern Ireland Housing 
Executive (NIHE). Planning powers were allocated to the ministry of 
Development which subsequently became the Department of the 
Environment (DOE). Currently the DOE (NI) has responsibility for land 
use planning, roads, conservation, water and sewage. The NIHE 
remains, in theory, -a semi-autonomous body, its funding coming from 
loans from central goverment on its revenue account. 
In response to this reorganisation there was a rapid expansion in 
the number- of community groups in Belfast. Since then, community 
groups, and groups articulating specifically housing issues, have 
remained an important feature of PKC communities. Importantly it is 
through such housing groups and committees that the PWC often 
ýirticulate specific class issues, involving theý class bias of 
Belfast's urban planners or the meekness of local politicians in 
challenging the needs of capital. There are however clear limitations 
to such community action. Sectarianism, or the pressure to find 
accommodation with it, means that any overt articulation of working 
class demands is often limited. In the case study which follows, both 
class and sectarian perspectives are articulated by Ballymacarrett 
residents. Such views exist not to the mutal exclusion of the other, 
but concurrently. 
The main'response of the state to housing conditions in-inner-city 
243 
Belfast has been., in the - form of housing redevelopment and in the 
renovation of housing which has been declared, as unfit.,, Throughout 
the latter part of,, the,, 1970's and 1980's housing redevelopment has 
been coordinated and, structured in a series of redevelopment ýareas. 
This has been complemented by a'series of Housing Action Areas (HAAS) 
which are intended to improve - housing which is of poor quality but not 
deemed to have reached, the critical, level of 'unfitness'. The growth 
of community organisations in Belfast in the 1970s concerned with 
housing paralled the development of such groups elsewhere. As Barker 
pointed out, at the time, 
"the 'local amenity movement"in Britain is a wide 
ranging, diverse and overlapping collection of local 
voluntary groups who seek, to, take an interest in some 
aspect of their home surroundings, their neighbourhood, 
village town or area... Those who have joined a 
'community action' group or a residents association of 
some kind have done so in the hope of improving their 
lot by public political pressures on the authorities" 
(Barker 1976: 7) 
Much resident group activity in Ballymacarrett arises from 
conflict between council house occupiers and the landlord, in this 
case the NIHE. Such activity is reasonably widespread. Some 
indication of this is given by the size of the umbrella group for 
housing committees in East Belfast, the Amalgamation of Housing 
Associations, which comprises 22 groups. Residents,, in inner East 
Belfast share a common housing experience and landlord. A shared 
dissatisfaction over housing provision and discontent over rising 
rents, heating provision and the standard of redevelopment work have 
all provided the basis for mobilisation in Ballymacarrett. In some 
areas this has resulted in widespread support for community action, 
the lobbying of local councillors and demonstrations against the state 
as resource providers. 
Such issues are local concerns. This has been turned into action 
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in a variety of ways. -For such presure to be successful, communities 
or-their representatives are in conflict with decision, makers and the 
providers of such- resources, in this case the NIHE. The bargaining 
position of community groups,, upon local political machines is 
dependent firstly upon the strategies adopted by community groups and 
secondly the receptivity, of councillors'and the possibility of winning 
the support of- a majority on Belfast City Council. There is 
obviously (or at least there should be) a two way interaction between 
community organisations and -local 'political representation. In 
Ballymacarrett, important ties are often formed by the same individual 
working between community organisations and other groups, sometimes 
paramilitary organisations but more 'often a local political party, 
especially the Democratic Unionist Party. 
Furthermore the degree of success of local community groups is 
obviously relative to the degree to which they can influence and 
manipulate the local system. This in itself is partly dependent on- 
the strength and level of organisation of the community group. It is 
also dependent upon the level of legitimation credited to them by 
local residents, local political organisations and politicians. The 
different strategies adopted by community groups range from the 
collaborative to the confrontational. As Chapter Five has indicated, 
DUP councillors are much more likely to endorse the full range of 
these strategies compared with their Official, Unionist counterparts'. 
There was also a strong local feeling that most DUP councillors, 
because they lived in -the area, often in Redevelopment or Housing 
Action areas, were 'part of the community, and better understood and 
were more sympathetic to complaints over housing and local resources. 
This feeling was strengthened because the ex-chairperson of the East 
Belfast Amalgamation of Housing Associations had become a DUP 
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councillor for the area, and was still the secretary of his local 
housing association. f AS one person active in conmmity groups in 
Ballymacarrett put it, 
"the politicians all through the years, they promise, a 
lot but they don't come across with much... the one 
exception is Alan (DUP councillor). He's always done 
his best and delivered the goods" 
, 
(Martin, Committee member, Tower Street HAA) 
while another had this to say of another DUP councillor, 
"Colin isn't a bad fella. Before he became involved in 
the DUP he was one of the hardest workers around here 
when he was working, with housing groups... he still 
spends. a lot of-time working for us. To me the 
politicians are worse than useless cause they use groups 
as a platform, but Colin's the best of a bad bunch. " 
(Paul, Committee member, Lord Street HAA) 
Comm. mity groups and community action arose in loyalist areas of 
Belfast, as elsewhere - in -the United Kingdom, because of a growing 
awareness of the failure of local interests to be properly represented 
in the political system. 
In this sense housing, housing associations and community groups 
in Ballymacarret represent the clearest example of the loyalist 
workers in conflict with capital. It is however, uncommon for such 
conflicts to be direct or head to head. Both seek to negotiate the 
apparatus of the state to influence political decision makers. The 
confrontation is of course unequal. The NIHE who represent the 
state's property interests have more straightforward access to the 
formal channels of decision-making. Community groups, who are forced 
to use lobbying as their major tactic, are mainly reactive and rarely 
have the ability to command a direct response from the state. on the 
other hand, capital can both lobby and offer tangible benefits in the 
form of new jobs, buildings etc. However builders and property 
developers, even state property developers in the shape of the NIHE 
need planning permission. They also need be involved in public 
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consultation. It -is, at 'this juncture that commmity groups in East 
Belfast seek to influence events. Such participation is itself 
controlled by the state---and limited to such imitative participation 
exercises as surveys, public meetings, the public display of plans, 
maps, models, and the distribution of explanatory statements 
concerning Redevelopment Areas. 
politicised many activists in 
explained, 
Nonetheless such exercises have 
Ballymacarrett. As one person 
I 
"In 1974 we formed the Ballymacarrett Housing 
Association..., since then, welve had our moments... they 
(NIHE) don't always do what we want or ask, but 
sometimes therels, good: consultation... we've learnt a 
lot. In 1974 we all thought that when the Housing 
Executive showed us a plan we all thought we had to 
accept it but in the last few years we've learnt we can 
oppose it 11 
(Edward, Committee member, East Belfast Amalgamation of 
Housing Associations) 
Another described a similar process when she said, 
"when we first had a meeting, when we first formed the 
Alberthridge Road Tennants Association we took all they 
said in. They offered us to put back one house for 
every six that was there. Now we'd tell. them where to 
go... but then we didn't know any better. " 
(Stephanie, Committee member, East Belfast Amalgamation 
of Housing Associations) 
While another said, 
"we've found that anything we've been able to do for 
people in the area concerning housing we've done it for 
ourselves... the only way of getting things done is by 
forming yourself into committees and finding out for 
yourselves. " 
(Martin, Committee member, Tower Street HAA) 
one local housing committee member described the following situation, 
"There were 382 houses demolished in this neighbourhood 
and only 97 were put back, which is very small... we 
were one of the first (housing associations) in East 
Belfast so we accepted it, but now we are saying to 
others, no-way', make sure they promise to give us back 
what we want or they won't knock our houses down. " 
(Edward, Committee member, East Belfast Amalgamation of 
Housing Associations) 
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Such concerns overlapped with a more general concern regarding the 
breakdown of the community, in Ballymacarrett. This in itself 
motivated many of those active in housing associations as the 
following statement illustrates, 
"The place has gone down the hill badly. People got 
depressed looking at the blocked up houses and the 
dampness and all, so that when the chance came and the 
(NIH) Executive offered them a house they took it 
no matter where it was. out of desperation they took 
these houses... but more-and more people are trying to 
get back onto the (Newtownards) Road especially from the 
likes of Ballybeen, TLAlycarnett, places like that. 
Women living in those places still do all their shopping 
on the road. You see it in the shops and the local 
papers, people looking for swops, trying to get back to 
the Newtownards or Alberthridge Roads. " 
(Greta, East Belfast resident) 
Another resident put it more simply, 
"East Belfast is wrecked... everybody's been forced to 
move out of the area into Ballybeen or Tullycarret 
because there isn't enough room for them where they used 
to live. " 
(Roger, East Belfast resident) 
Such views meant that the number of houses being replaced (referred to 
as 'Put back rates') was high on the agenda for many housing commmity 
groups, as the following illustrates, 
"If you don't fight the Housing Executive for what you 
want then they go ahead and build the type of houses 
they want... their architects will sit down and draw up 
these lovely wee plans with model people and model trees 
that look lovely... then they build them at the expense 
of getting rid of three quarters of the people in the 
area who have lived there all their lives and their 
people before them lived there all their lives. That's 
why I got involved. " 
(Edward, Committee member, East Belfast 
Amalgamation of Housing Associations) 
Another put it this way, 
"what we need in Ballymacarrett is to keep people as 
neighbours... people were used round here to just 
walking out of one house and into another. The big door 
(front door) was never closed, but now all the doors on 
all the estates are closed... they're destroying all the 
neighbours. " 
(Stephanie, Committee member, East Belfast Amalgamation 
of Housing Associations) 
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The following comment was also typical, 
"What I'm afraid of and what a lot of people in East 
Belfast are afraid of is the community in East Belfast 
as it was 15 or 20 years ago is getting smaller and 
smaller. There's not a quarter of the people left there 
was then... the Housing Executive would have built their 
houses and kept all the streets they knocked down. Kept 
the new houses in their old streets, like terraced 
rows... to 
(Martin, Committee member, Tower Street HAA) 
Even the following Committee member of one housing association who was 
broadly supportive of the NIHE policy in the area was critical of 
'put-back rates', 
"everybody knows they (NIHE) can't house everybody that 
was in the area, the main reason being the old houses 
were all kitchen houses... two up, two down with no 
bathroom and the toilet was outside... nobody should 
have to have an outside toilet and everybody should have 
a bathroom which is what they're doing. Because of that 
they can"t put back the same amount of houses... but 
they plan all these things but they never dream that its 
necessary to ask the opinion of the people in the 
area... just wee things, like the type of doors and the 
type of working kitchens... they just don't come and 
consult people... they could probably get away with it 
if they put more houses back they could definitely do 
that... if they ever talked to people here they'd know 
that's what they wanted. " 
(Paul, Committee member, Lord Street HAA) 
One example of how such perspectives came together in Ballymacarrett 
surrounded Redevelopment Area 54 (RDA54). The development area 
covered housing which was well established by the 1890's. Indeed the 
area had in fact changed little since the 1900's with the exception of 
some housing which was built in the immediate World War II period to 
replace houses destroyed by the blitz. The 1980s saw a rapid-decline 
in the infrastructure of the area, with an increase in bricked up and 
derelict housing. The area however still contained a large number of 
community facilities, including two churches and a Gospel Hall, a 
working mens club, and a girls club, where a full time worker 
organised activities for 10-20 year old girls. The area contained 372 
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houses, 294 of which were occupied. Of the dwellings 93% had been 
J 
declared as unfit, 52% of residents occupied dwellings with no bath, 
and 33% ocupied dwellings with no hot water. The original NIHE 
proposal was to clearlthe, area'to provide Ballymacarrett with an open 
'green' recreation area. ' This led to widespread protests not only 
about the destruction of, the local community but also that the 'put 
back' rates would be, still further reduced. Protests from residents 
and co-ordinated action' with other housing associations in 
Ballymacarrett eventually led to the NIHE conceding, and providing 
housing in the area. 
In Ballymacarrett members of the PWC have over the past 15 years 
consistently struggled for the right to be consulted in the design and 
management of state housing. This process has to'some extent involved 
the state incorporating such protests by channelling such 
resistance into a more controllable form. Housing committees however 
do represent one form of PWC articulation of class, issues. There were 
several' further examples of this from community activists on housing 
issues. As one person put it, I 
"What they keep trying to, do is to tell us what we want. 
Like they say wouldn't it be nice if we had a few 
benches here, -and a wee park and a few trees. Half the 
time the politicians, especially the official Unionists, 
go along and say 'yes' 'yes' wouldn't that make the 
district lovely. But that's not what people want. Most 
people round here just want a neighbour next door who 
they know, they want more people who used to live here 
not open landscaped areas as they're called... the young 
people only vandalise them anyway. " 
(Edward, Committee member, East Belfast Amalgamation of 
Housing Associations)) 
another gave a specific example, 
"The DOE told us they were going to make a green area of 
Hunt Street, Hind Street, that area and we opposed it 
very strongly and they shelved it, and said they'd use 
it for houses... they need to put more houses back... to 
keep people together. " 
(Stephanie, Committee member, East Belfast Amalgamation 
of Housing Associations)) 
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The following statement by a committee member of PDA also demonstrated 
this perspective, 
"The first people to get out are the young, especially 
if they can afford a mortgage in Bangor or 
Castlereagh... but it's the old folk... they can't 
move..., they're dependant on public sector housing. So 
what do the Housing Executive do? They're building all 
these three, bedroom houses and putting old age 
pensioners into them and that's wrong... a lot of people 
around here got me to go along to the official Unionist 
candidate and complain. Do you know what she said? 'But 
it's improving Belfast'. They don't give a damm about 
the working class people. All they're worried about is 
how the place looks. " 
(Martin, Committee member, East Belfast Amalgamation or 
Housing Associations) 
Such issues highlight what many residents regard as the class bias of 
Belfast's planners and state housing agency. They also focus on the 
level of acquiescence to, 'harmful, redevelopment plans by local 
politicians, especially the official unionists. 
There are, however, clear limitations to an expression of class 
issues by community action in Ballymacarrett. Sectarianism, or the 
pressure to find an accommodation with it, means any overt 
articulation of working class demands is severely restricted. , In 
discussing the relationship between PKC-, communities and the state, 
played out within the area of housing redevelopment, the role of 
sectarian division must also be discussed. 
As Chapter Four indicated the main physical sectarian division in 
Ballymacarrett is where the 'Catholic', Short Strand meets 'Protestant' 
East Belfast. This can clearly be seen in map 8.1 which shows the 
position in detail on the Ballymacarrett - Short Strand interface. 
Both sides of this interface have been subject to a process of 
physical segregation, involving the movement of both Protestant and 
Catholic families away from the outskirts of their own regions towards 
their respective core areas. Following this there was a sequence of 
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desertion of houses, vandalism of these houses and dereliction. Such 
a pattern was common on sectarian interfaces throughout Belfast. 
Redevelopment in Ballymacarrett. partly occured within this context. 
One of the first major scenes of redevelopment in Ballymacarrett 
affected the Short Strand, more than any Protestant core district. 
The construction of the Bridge-End flyover and the major roads serving 
it resulted in the demolishing of six streets which had been occupied 
by about 2,000 mainly, Roman Catholic residents. As a consequence most 
of the inhabitants moved to the large Catholic estates in the west of 
the city. 
The results of the building of the flyover also began to concern 
"Protestant" 'Ballymacarrett however. This commmity was experiencing 
its own diaspora, with a rapid outflow of people,, especially the 
young, largely to estates on the eastern fringe of the city, as well 
as growth centres such as Bangor and Antrim. Due largely to physical 
violence, this population movement was most readily observed at the 
immediate interface areas. one result was that in the Bryson Street, 
Newtownards Road interface, houses which were being vacated by 
Protestants were reoccupied -by Roman Catholic families. Wi th the 
context of the rpolitics of territory', this was projected as the lose 
of housing belonging to 'Protestant Ballymacarrettl 'to the other 
side,. This gave rise for the first time to talk of an attempt to 
Ide-Protestantisel East Belfast. This was compounded by the further 
demolishing of 'Protestant' houses around Madrid Street and their 
replacement by another feeder road to the flyover. This issue was 
partly responsible for explaining the development of housing groups in 
Ballymacarrett. As one loyalist newspaper put it, 
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"Thousands of homes could be built on the flattened 
wastelands of Protestant areas. They should certainly 
materialise before the (Housing) Executive gets its 
greedy hands on further loyalist districts and thus 
completes the plan to de-Protestantise the capital 
city. " 
(The Orange Standard, Nov 1983: 7) 
In Ballymacarrett there is widespread suspicion, especially by those 
living on the Short Strand interface, " that those living in the 'Short 
Strand intended to expand their comrmnity eastwards at least as far as 
Templemore Avenue. Redevelopment was perceived as one way in which 
the residents of the Short Strand could achieve this goal. It is for 
this reason, that many housing groups are particularly concernedvith 
'put back' rates. 'That is the number of existing houses which are 
replaced after redevelopment. These are 'often seen as adversely 
affecting loyalist areas, as the following quotation, discussing the 
"put back' rates throughout Belfast explains, 
"Nothing similar has happened in'the Republican areas of 
Belfast, where the vast house building schemes have been 
initiated and special care taken to ensure that 
re-development areas such as the markets, Short Strand, 
Lower Falls and the-, 'Bone' area have had the same r 
of houses put back into them after redevelopment. " 
(Orange Standard, Nov, 1983: 6 emphasis added) 
One local housing activist had this'to-say, 
"In Protestant areas like this, the Newtownards or 
Alberthridge Road they only put back three or four 
(houses) for every ten they take away... itts even worse 
on the Shankill where they only put about two back. On 
the Falls they put ten back for every ten'they knock 
down. In the markets on the Short Strand its the same, 
about eight or ten put back... its obvious they're 
trying to get the Prods out, to make them move out to 
Tullycarnett and places like that. " 
(Edwardi Committee member, East Belfast Amalgamation of 
Housing Associations) 
In understanding the role of housing action groups in Ballymacarrett 
this notion of Ide-Protestantisation' plays a leading role. - The 
politics of residence involves two major relationships. Firstly, as 
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has been outlined, 
1 
the activities of housing associations reflect a 
negotiation of class forces involving the management of state housing 
and the break-up of, traditional communities. Secondly, however, 
housing associations also represent an attempt. to negotiate sectarian 
space in Ballymacarrett. often this involves an acute awareness by 
residents of physical segregation at the micro level, and the 
significance of strictly drawn demarcation lines and divisions. , It 
also involves the attempt by, the State to use physical space to 
control, or at least make, more manageable, sectarian divisions. As 
has bben previously noted one ofthe major sectarian . 1flashpoints, in 
Ballymacarrett is the Lower Alberthridge Road/Woodstock Road - Short 
Strand interface. Part. of the DOE redevelopment plan for this area 
involved the widening, of the Lower Alberthridge Road to a dual 
carriageway. Although the plan suggested the whole road be widened, 
the only part of the road actually upgraded was-along the immediate 
sectarian interface. To reinforce this physical space on either side 
of the Alberthridge Road dual carriageway, the DOE has undertaken a 
programme of Ilanscaping'. This has involved, for example, the 
provision of walled flower beds, bench seating and enclosed areas. 
The redevelopment on this (Protestant) side of the Alberthridge Road 
was to be comprised of totally non-residential facilities such, as 
commercial, industrial and recreation buildings. This led to 
widespread protests from local housing associations, and eventually 
these plans were replaced by an old peoples' home, sheltered housing 
and Alberthridge Congregationalist Church which had previously been 
located on the Short Strand side of the Alberthridge Road. Overall 
these redevelopment initatives were justified by, the DOE and the NIHE 
as serving trafffic planning, road improvement and environmental 
needs. However many activists in the Protestant community saw these 
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decisions merely as a way of imposing a physical barrier isolating the 
Short Strand from the surrounding community. Such a strategy would 
not be uncommon in the context of Belfast. As one commentator noted 
in his study of'r-edeve'lopment, in Protestant West Belfast, while there 
was general opposition to the upgrading of roads, which threatened the 
community and the infrastructure of the Shankill Road, in fact some 
welcomed the proposed new motorwayý"as being a useful military barrier 
between themselves and, the Catholic Unity Flats" (Weiner 1980: 63). 
Another opposed the plan because he recognised that "the (elevated) 
I 
motorway would separate -the Protestant and Catholic communities 
in 
West Belfast permanently". (Tom Donnally, SDLP representative cited in 
Weiner 1980: 67). 'There are some parallels with the situation in 
Ballymacarrett. In particular, ýdevelopment on the 'Catholic' Iside 
of 
the Alberthridge Road (RDA26 and RDA27) was totally residential, again 
fuelling Protestant housing. association groups' discontent concerning 
accusations of Ide-Protestantisation, and low 'put-back rates'. 
There are two further main sectarian interfaces surrounding Short 
Strand - those on the Bryson Street/Madrid Street interface and the 
main Newtownards Road interface. Bryson Street is a long residential 
street. It is important because it marks the consolidation of 
sectarian divisions in Ballymacarrett. up to the time of large scale 
population movements of the early 1970s the streets around Bryson 
Street had been mixed. Today the area to the east of Bryson Street is 
exclusively 'Protestant', while the western side are exclusively 
'Catholic'. There was a considerable spread of opinions, however most 
Protestant residents supported ýthe Northern Ireland H. E. closure of 
the roads at the Bryson Street - Beechfield Street - Madrid Street 
crossover (see map 8.1) as they felt this offered protection to the 
Protestant cormnunity, although this in turn was challanged by several 
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residents. 
In broaa terms 
'tne 
NIHE and DOE have sought to structure the 
interface in a manner which would reduce overt sectarian conflict and 
allow the security forces' easy access. Those most affected on the 
Protestant 'side of 'the interface formed the Tower Street Housing 
Association. Initially Plans-for redeveloping the area were presented 
to residents as the'llatest. design in high quality housing' arranged 
in a small 'courtyard systeml 
-and, _y1th 
the back of the houses facing 
Bryson Street (as"' opposed, 16o 
terraced housing running parallel). - It 
was only when this", Ied. to, further complaints concerning a cut in put 
back rates that another. ', reason emerged. This was indicated in the 
Tower Street HAA Action-Plan. 
"In considering the, problem of screening to Bryson 
Street it is felt-that by allowing 'Special Design' 
terraced'rows of houses and flat units to back onto 
Bryson Street, the courtyards can be-totally enclosed 
and the building line retained to an acceptable degree, 
the screening effect being achieved by the building mass 
itself. These... 'special design, single aspect flat 
units forming the ends of terraces with gable ends 
fronting on to Bryson Street. " 
(NIHE 1980: 16) 
It would be incorrect to suggest that most working class protestant 
residents did not openly support a scheme, which involved overt 
segregation of the communities in Ballymacarrett. many perceived a 
direct threat from the Short Strand. However much of redevelopment 
was presented to residents, either in terms of a maximisation of land 
use or in terms, of improved traffic flow and improved traffic 
planning. As a result of this several of the streets on the Short 
Strand side were made one way. As one local housing activist put it: 
"the plans for RDA Tower Street have as much to do with motor cars as 
I have to do with the man in the moon" (Martin, Committee member, 
Tower Street HAA). Housing associations as representatives of the PWC 
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in Ballymacarrett often focussed on the quality and cost of housing in 
East Belfast. Such groups camot be viewed however simply as a 
response to working-class demands for improved living conditions. 
They also reproduced sectarian ideology and values and the attempt to 
defend sectarian physical and social space. Neither focus excluded 
the other. Both groups and individuals were -capable of 'viewing 
housing issues in class terms, in straightforward sectarian terms, or 
a mixture of the two. This can be demonstrated by the following case 
study of Cluan Place. 
The physical and social position of Cluan Place must be considered 
in relation to the newly developed 
, 
Clandeboye Estate in 
Ballymacarrett. The detail of the sectarian geography of the area 
can be seen in map 8.2. Cluan Place has several important- features. 
It is a 'Protestant" street on the 'wrong, side, of the sectarian 
division of the Alberthridge Road, as such it represents-an outpost of 
loyalist Ballymacarrett into the Short Strand. This position remained 
secure before redevelopment, because the existence of a bus and tram 
station and a small industrial estate created a physical space between 
the two communities. After redevelopment, Cluan Place became a 
cul-de-sac which did not lead directly into the Short Strand but which 
was also isolated from the core Ballymacarrett residential area. This 
needs some further explanation as there is no overt reason why the 
Protestant residents of Cluan place should choose to live in an 
isolated position on the wrong side of the physical sectarian divide. 
-This is particularly true because the arrangement means they are 
separate from the-rest of the Protestant community, in Ballymacarrett. 
One possible explanation is that those living -in Cluan Place 
experience a greater sense of security, as they are less likely to be 
exposed to the - events which affect the rest of the Protestant 
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community, in Ballymacarrett. There is theoretically less likelihood 
of a physical invasion in Cluan Place as there is no direct route of 
escape to the attacker. What follows demonstrates this is far from 
the case. 
The initial redevelopment plans for the area proposed building a 
new housing development in the former industrial area around the north 
of Cluan Place. It was proposed that this new estate be 'mixed' and 
this was accepted by both communities as it was unlikely to alter the 
existing territorial balance. The new estate was to form an area of 
integrated housing between the 'Protestant' streets on the south and 
the 'Catholic, area to the north. Partly because the population 
movements outlined above, the overwhelming demand for housing came 
from the Short Strand in order to relieve -its severe housing 
congestion. -Once it became obvious that they would be in a minority, 
many Protestants who were offered houses in the new development 
refused to take them up. Clandeboye estate became almost exclusively 
Catholic, occupied largely, although not- exclusively,, by former 
occupants of the Short Strand. ýThis,, radically affected the 
perceptions of the -Protestant community. Although there was no 
physical takeover, of streets, the development of Clandeboye estate 
was perceived as an expansion into Protestant working class territory 
by Catholics. In particular those living in Cluan Place saw 
themselves as the last bulwark against a take over of the area. They 
especially regarding the development of Catholic housing into the 
former neutral area of the tram and bus station as an overt example of 
expansionism by the Short Strand. There was widespread resistance to 
the new development articulated by both DUP and UDA representatives as 
well as local community activists . and housing associations. The 
resulting compromise by the planners meant that the Clandeboye estate 
258 
development was halted - at Cluan Place, where ' an eight foot 
lenvironmental wall' was built to segregate the two, - communities. 
Since the creation of the wall, however, a constant claim f rom 
those living in Cluan Place has been that they have been under 
physical attack from those on the Short Strand side of the wall. As 
one, woman resident explained, 
"they're making it hell for us, throwing stuff at 
us every night. No-body could stick it. They want 
us out. But there's no way they're shifting us. " 
(Victoria, Cluan Place resident) 
while another claimed that, 
"Its like Flanders field. My husband was sitting 
out the back the other day and a bit of iron that 
they'd filed just missed him. " 
(Helen, Cluan Place resident) 
Almost all the residents of Cluan Place told similar stories. What is 
of major importance is not that such missiles, usually stones, 
bottles, bricks, were directed at Cluan Place from the Short Strand 
but how this was interpreted by -those living in Cluan Place, ", Most 
residents perceived such incidents as part of a-conspiracy to remove 
them from their homes. As one resident said, 
"What they are trying to do is to force the Protestants 
out so that this will become a republican district. " 
(Mary, Cluan Place resident) 
Another claimed, 
"they're trying to get us out so that they can take over 
this whole end of East Belfast. " 
(Fiona, Cluan Place resident) 
These views were reflected in the UDA magazine 'Ulster,, when it 
claimed, 
I 
"The residents of Cluan Place are being forced out of 
their homes by well-orchestrated acts of intimidation. " 
(Ulster, July/August 1985: 27) 
Despite a recognition of such widely held views by the UDA, the 
residents did not turn directly to them for protection. The residents 
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committee rather approached the RUC to increase patrolling and local 
loyalist politicians in an attempt to force the Housing Executive to 
raise the existing wall. This campaign continued from 1983 to 1985 
without success. By the summer of 1985, there was obvious tension 
between those living in Cluan Place and their political 
representatives. one person explained, 
"I thought that they (politicians) would have done a lot 
more but they only began to show their faces after we 
got in the news and in the press. In fact the day Peter 
Robinson arrived the residents chased him and those that 
were with him. " 
(Fiona, Cluan Place resident) 
Another had this to say, 
"Living in Cluan Place has made me see a lot of things I 
never though about before. Like the politicians are all 
talk. They promise you everything in public, they'll 
sort the whole thing out and then they drop you like hot 
bricks. " 
(Adele, Cluan Place resident) 
The RUC also found themselves under criticism. The main response from 
the police revolved 'around the idea- that the missile throwing 
represented "acts of individual vandalism rather than any organised 
attempt to enforce a population move" (Alex, RUC officer). They also 
argued that to increase police patrols to a more regular basis would 
increase the possibility of attack on such patrols. ý Such, attitudes 
held little weight with those living in Cluan Place. As one person 
said, 
"the only thing they tell us to do is to board up our 
windows and the type of grills to put up on our windows 
to stop them getting smashed" 
(Mary, Cluan Place resident) 
Another claimed, 
"The RUC aren't giving us any protection. The best 
advice they could give me was to move. I ask you what 
are you supposed to say to that. " 
(Fiona, Cluan Place resident) - 
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It was only after the residents had become totally frustrated with 
both their local political representatives and the police that they 
approached the UDA. Even then they did so reluctantly. As this 
resident explained, 
"A crowd of us met round our house one night. Somebody 
suggested that we go up and see x from the UDA, but 
people didn't really want that. In the end we did 
contact him, because nobody else was doing anything. " 
(Adele, Cluan Place resident) 
Finally the approach was only made because one of the local UDA 
officers was known personally to several people living in Cluan Place. 
The UDA reacted enthusiastically issuing a statement which claimed, 
"that should these cowardly attacks continue, (the 
UDA) will have no other recourse but to ensure that 
Cluan Place will be defended by every possible means 
available. " 
(Hand circular to Cluan Place residents reproduced in 
Ulster July/August 1985: 27) 
The UDA's links with residents of Cluan Place remained tenuous. 
Originally they had been quite close because a loyalist paramillary 
leader had lived in Cluan Place before he was assassinated. With his 
death such links had been eroded. In, fact, the local housing 
committee had made a definite effort to exclude paramilitary 
representatives. one committee member explained the relationship as 
follows, 
"I think we made it very clear at the beginning that we 
didn't want paramilitary involvement. If we needed them 
we told them we would come for them. When the committee 
was formed they tried to take it over. They tried to 
take over the office bearers, the Chairman, Treasurer 
and things like that. We all got together and met them 
and told them we didn't mind if they wanted to be on the 
committee representing some area of housing groups but 
we certainly weren't going to let them get into the 
office seats. " 
(Fiona, Cluan Place resident) 
Another recalled the same events, and how local residents excluded 
paramilitary representatives from the local housing committe, 
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'The night of that meeting I suppose we were quite 
devious... we all met that night early on in X's house. 
We thought it was the only way... and we worked out who 
would vote for who and who would stand for what. When 
we arrived at the meeting the paramilitaries were all 
there and I thought, 'Christ we're going to be 
outnumbered here'. When it came to the elections Y was 
chairing so things worked well. Not one of them even 
got on the committee... they knew damned well we had 
fixed it. " 
(Adele, Cluan Place resident) 
However, by 1985 many residents had clearly reached the' point where 
they felt the UDA were needed. Those residents however, perceived a 
very limited role for the UDA. This demonstrates some of the 
community's ambivalence towards the UDA. Residents sought to invoke 
the UDA muscle to protect them from attack but this did not mean that 
they were prepared to fully support the UDA. As mary, someone who 
fully endorsed making contact with the UDA explained, 
"We need the UDA to back us, we've been fighting a 
losing battle... things'are getting worse... the thing I 
wouldn't ask the paramilitaries to do is to help control 
the young people round here. I'd be afraid they'd be 
too vicious and I don't approve of kneecapping and 
things... " 
(Mary, Cluan Place resident) 
Those living in cluan Place who contacted the UDA saw the 
paramilitaries, role in terms of 'crisis management'. The LMA could 
legitimise their role only in terms of protectors of the community and 
then only because the residents perceiVed the RUC as having failed to 
do their job properly. UDA members were extremely willing to take on 
the role of protectors, especially as direct confrontation with the 
Short Strand had receded throughout the 1980s. It is important to 
note however that this was the only legitimate role for them. This 
was to become increasingly obvious as Ballymacarrett responded to the 
Anglo-Irish agreement. 
In August 1986 the East Belfast Amalgamation of Housing 
Associations had further mixed news from the Northern Ireland Housing 
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Executive. The decision was, f inally taken to increase the boundary 
wall between Thistle Court and Bryson Street. However there was 
increasing concern f rom, within the housing associations at delays in 
the building of new houses just off the Alberthridge Road. As their 
spokesperson put it, 
"The NIHE must give a fim commitment that this scheme 
will go ahead regardless of what financial restrictions 
may be faced in the next financial year. The people of 
this area have waited long enough and had too many 
promises broken. " 
(East Belfast News, August 21 1986) 
Housing and the politics of residence are important focuses within 
Ballymacarrett. Such issues reflect the fragmented response of the 
Protestant working class to the crisis. At one level there is a clear 
expression of class issues, and the attempt to protect their working 
class community. Residents seek to find expression over their 
dissatisfaction with housing provision and local conditions. At 
another level the 'politics of residence' represents an expression of 
sectarianism, an overt concern with the Ide-Protestantisation' of 
Ballymacarrett and an attempt to maintain physical boundaries and 
divisions. These perspectives are not exclusive, and responses can 
reflect a mixture of both class and sectarian consciousness. Housing 
issues and housing associations also reflect an attempt by Protestant 
workers to influence control within the public arena. There is of 
course a much more public face to politics in Ballymacarrett and it is 
this which will now be considered, in the form of the 1985 local 
government elections. . 
Like all local government elections this must be seen in the 
context of wider political issues. The major Unionist concern at the 
time was the developing relationship between the British and Irish 
governments. 
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Throughout the early- 1980's there had been a series of meetings 
between the Irish andýBritish Prime Ministers. In November 1981 the 
decision was made to form an Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council. 
This was to involve -regular meetings between the British and Irish 
Governinents at ministerial and official -levels where matters of 
'common concern' would-be discussed. In 1982 Anglo-Irish governmental 
relations were put under pressure f rom, the Falklands war and it was 
1983 before the next Anglo-Irish summit occured. That year also saw 
the formation of the New Ireland Forum in Dublin. 
The Forum was inspired by the SDLP. Its major momentum came from 
Catholic and Nationalist political parties in an -attempt to set an 
agenda to achieve Irish unity by consent and to assure Northern 
Protestants that their identity and'-interests would be protected in a 
new Ireland State. The New Ireland Forum Report was published in May 
1984. one of the Reports major recommendation was that, 
"The particular structure of political unity which the 
Forum would wish to see established is a unitary state, 
achieved by agreement and consent, enbracing the whole 
island of Ireland and providing irrevocable guarantees 
for the protection and preservation of both the Unionist 
and Nationalist identities. A unitary state on which 
agreement has been reached would also provide the ideal 
framework for the constructive interaction of the 
diverse cultures and values of the people of Ireland. " 
(New Ireland Forum Report, May 1984, paragraph 5.7) 
The Report also proposed a Federal/Confederal state and a system of 
joint authority as options as to how, Unionist and Nationalist 
identities could be accommodated in a new Ireland. The leadership of 
both Unionist parties reacted strongly to the New Ireland Forum 
Report. The official Unionists published their own proposals in a 
paper called 'The Way Forward' while the Democratic Unionists" 
response was published in 'The Unionist Case: The Forum Report 
Answered'. Two further papers 'Opportunity Lost, by the official 
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Unionists and Ulster the Future Assured' by the Democratic Unionists 
were published, all of which were obviously critical of the Forum 
Report. Bothý'the official Unionists and Democratic Unionists focused 
on the proposal of joint authority. As the official Unionists put it, 
"It is in the-provocative nature of the introduction of 
joint authority that-the real danger lies. Unionists 
would see it as a first step to ý United Ireland. The 
sight of Irish policemen on Northern Irish streets would 
inevitably produce a tremendous reaction. The direct 
involvement of Irish officials in governing Northern 
Ireland would be a source of great resentment. The 
tensions thus created would be readily exploited by 
terrorist oganisations on both sides of the divide in 
Northern Ireland and the joint authority goverment 
would then be faced with trouble on two fronts which it 
could not conceivable cope with. " 
Further, 
"It is a measure of the Forum's lack of understanding of 
Northern unionism and, therefore, a clear 
demonstration of the way in which it tackled its task, 
that it would put forward such a nonsensical 'solution' 
to the problem. It is simply unbelievable that any 
serious student of Northern Ireland would imagine that 
such an idiotic scheme could work. " 
(P. Smith Opportunity Lost 1984: 4) 
The Democratic unionists also criticised joint authority (referred to 
as joint sovereignty). As their paper put it, 
"In proposing Joint sovereignty, in relation to which 
the consent of Northern Ireland has neither been sought 
nor given, its sponsors side-step their previous 
comittment to attaining consent by pretending that 
Joint Sovereignty does not really alter the British 
Citizenship of those in Northern Ireland who desire that 
citizenship, but, without prejudice, affords to those 
who do not the alternative of Irish citizenship. Indeed 
some would even take the Ulster Unionist to be such a 
fool as to expect him to believe that joint sovereignty 
would strengthen the British 'guarantee' to Northern 
Ireland by adding to it the 'guarantee' of the Republic 
of Ireland that the British connection will continue. 
This is a palpable lie and deceit. Joint Sovereignty 
unalterably reverses Northern Ireland's constitutional 
affiliation as part of the United Kingdom and delivers 
it out of the United Kingdom irretrievably half-way to 
an All-Ireland Republic; and this without the least 
consent of the people of Northern Ireland. " 
The document then explained DUP fears in detail, 
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ý"Given the overt breach of the Constitution Act which 
would be involved in instant and openly declared Joint 
Sovereignty, it seems more likely that the exercise of 
shared and-joint authority wilLevolve by degrees. This 
strategy would be followed till the point where Joint 
Sovereignty becomes a tangible reality. The key to the 
gradualist scenario is to, be found in the infamous 
Anglo/Irish process whereby All-Ireland harmonisation is 
to be perfected over a period of time. What started 
with the Dublin summit declaration of 8 December, 1980, 
of a joint London/Dublin examination of the totality of 
relationships within these islands', has moved through 
Joint Talks to Joint Studies to Joint Action and will 
assuredly move by Joint Institutions to Joint 
Sovereignty... 
When Dublin has thus surreptitiously been entwined in 
exercising authority, jointly with London, in every 
facet of Ulster life, the Joint Sovereignty that had 
then evolved in practice would be formalised in law and 
treaty as the penultimate step to an All-Ireland State. 
It matters not whether it, is achieved by decree or 
degree, for the concept is an anathema to the Unionist 
people of Northern, Ireland. " 
(Allister, et al, 1984: Section 3, paras 6 and 8) 
Both the OUP and the DUP declared their absolute oppostion to an Irish 
dimension, and in response called for some form of devolved 
government. Their opposition marked a slight coming together of the 
Unionist leadership in their opposition to the Forum Report. Unionist 
fears seemed largely to be dispelled however when the British and 
Irish governments next met at a summit meeting in November '1984. 
Reacting to the Forum Report proposals Margaret Thatcher declared, 
"I have made it quite clear - and so did Mr. Prior when 
he was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland - that a 
unified Ireland was one solution that is out. A second 
solution was confederation of the two states. That is 
out. A third solution was joint authority. That is 
out. That is a derogation from sovereignty. We made it 
quite clear when the (Forum) Report was published. " 
(cited in Fortnight No. 210: 7) 
Such comments were received with dismay by the government of the Irish 
Republic. one leading southern magazine under the headline "Outi Outi 
Out", described it as the "Collapse of Anglo-Irish Relations" 
(Magill, December 1984). Another conmentator described the meeting in 
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these terms, the 
Summit, once hailed as a new dawn in Anglo-irish 
relations turned out to be a complete rout for the 
Dublin government. Margaret Thatcher completely, 
frankly and, in her view, realistically rejected even 
the spirit of the New Ireland Forum Report. " 
(Toolis 1984: 4) 
Thatcher's statement was welcomed by the Unionist leadership. 
Throughout early 1985 both Paisley and Molyneaux had made approaches 
to John Hume and the'SDLP to take their seats in the Northern Irealand 
Assembly. It represented an attempt by the Unionist leadership to 
move the agenda away from any Anglo-Irish dimension back to a Northern 
Ireland context. Thatcher's statement seemed to dispel all the 
worries within unionism concerning an increasing Anglo-Irish 
dimension. Their main focus was internal to Northern Ireland and 
their major worry was the expected growth in electoral support for 
Sim Fein and the fear that they would become the majority 
representatives of the Catholic electorate. As Peter Robinson put it, 
there were several important 'realities' to consider, 
"First there is the Thatcher reality, accepted and 
agreed by Dr. Fitzgerald in the communique after the last Chequers summit. This is that Northern Ireland 
shall remain part of the United Kingdom as long as that is the wish of its people. We all know what that means but let me spell it out. 
Any structures set up in Northern Ireland will recognise 
Ulster as an entity within the United Kingdom. This 
must be accepted without any burning of the edges, 
without circuitous and circumventive small print or 
surreptitious language. In constitutional law this 
principle is a legitimate and honourable ordnance, a 
self-evident trust, and incontrovertible reality. They 
call it the right to self-determination. 
(Robinson 1985: 5) 
The Official Unionists also believed increasingly that any wider 
Anglo-Irish dimension was no longer a reality. They put their 
emphasis on the proposals contained in 'The Way Forward', highlighting 
three proposals, 'a form of partnership in a devolved administration', 
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"a bill of rights' and an acknowledgement by Unionists of the 
legitimacy of the Irish identity and tradition'. The following 
statement by the Official Unionist general secretary explained their 
position at the time, 
"So the door was opened and Nationalists might 
reasonably have been expectedýto try and push it a 
little further. In fairness, the Irish Governrent 
warmly praised our publication, but the leadership of 
the SUP behaved as if it hadn't happened and tied 
themselves instead to the strategy which came a croppe 
at the ThatcheF, 7FI-tzgerald sumit" 
985: 6 emphasis added) 
In Ballymacarrett several political activisits remained suspicious. 
As one DUP councillor argued, 
"The reassurance by Margaret Thatcher worries me. 
Because if you can watch them coming in your front door 
you're not watching'them at the back door. Since the 
Forum you've got Hurd and Fitzgerald meeting each other. 
That worries me... 11 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
Another DUP councillor explained his concern, 
"We aren't being told what's going on. Dublin wants 
some security input. They want to control the RUC and 
disband the UDR and to have an input into the courts, 
The reality of what's going on is being hidden. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
Such voices of dissent however were*in a small minority. 
For most any possibility of AnglO Irish political cooperation had 
been completely deflated by Thatcher's statement. As the Belfast 
Newsletter put it, 
"Dublin's influence is likely to be almost totally 
excluded from the affairs of Northern Ireland. " 
(June 8th 1985, Editorial) 
This can be clearly seen by the manifestos of both the major unionist 
parties for the May 1985 local government elections. - It was the 
political development of Sim Fein which was seen as the major target 
of both parties. In a personal message from James Molyneaux to 
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voters, priority was given to organising a concerted policy of 
opposition to Sim Fein. Under the banner headline 'Put Sim Fein out 
of Business', Molyneaux declared, 
"The IRA continue to wage, war with impunity, seeking to 
destroy the, democratic. process by physical and political 
aggression.., -, We, reject the larmalite and ballot paper' 
stra 
, 
tegy-of Sim. Fein. -, We, want ýto put Sim Fein out of 
_business. 'I-jý, 
(Ul sterýunionist', Pa rty'e'16ction literature) 
The Of f icial, Unionist manifesto ý'stated their priorities even more 
clearly, 
% 
"'Without, apology, we, 'see. security as the paramount issue 
in this election. 
Ulster goes, to. the polls once more against a background 
, 
of murder and destruction, with-the architects of 
violence masquerading as a democratic party. 
ýBy I their voies, the people of Ulster must show that the 
. Sim Fein'strategy cannotwork! 
, 
In truth the primacy of. 'politics can never be 
established. or'sustained, in, an atmosphere of war and 
we are at'war. 
(The. Ulster Unionist Party., - Election Manifesto, May 
1985) 
The overall tone of the manifesto , can be judged by listing the 
sub-headings-to its main-sections: 'The Threat to Democracy', 'An End 
to Direct Rule, 'The Northern Ireland Assembly', 'Practical 
Partnership', 'Keeping ",, Ulster British'. It is only in the final 
section that, any mI ention is, made of the Anglo-Irish process. Even 
then, the official Unionists claimed success for all but haltingýthe 
process, 
"The Ulster Unionist Party in Parliament was widely 
credited for Mrs. Thatcher's firm rejection of the 
principal proposals of the Forum Report last November. 
.... we believe our endeavours were responsible for a 
postponement of a meeting between Mrs. Thatcher and the 
Prime Minister of the Irish Republic last February. " 
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it added, 
"As this campaign opens we face a welter of speculation 
as to when the two Premiers will meet and what they will 
discuss... ' 
Summits cost lives and we invite you in this election to 
underpin our demand for an end to summitry. " 
(The Ulster Unionist Party Election Manifesto, May 
1985) 
Such concerns were however seen as secondary. It was Sim Fein who 
were the main target. The OUP printed thousands of glossy posters 
portraying Sim Fein's president, Gerry Adams and one of its 'leading 
officials Danny Morrison as members, of the IRA council (see page 
opposite).; The-poster asked the question, "The IRA army council - or 
your next District Council? " and in bold letters carried the slogan 
"Put Sim Fein out of business" the OUP campaign theme. As one 
leading official unionist put it, 
"We believe Sim Fein must be branded with the stamp of 
illegality. We believe the continued activity of Sim 
Fein is an assault on the democratic process which 
weakens and undermines society. " 
- (Millar cited in The Guardian 12/5/85) 
The themes recurred throughout official Unionist election 
literature. The Pottinger 'team' stated 8 major principles, the first 
three of which were maintenance, of the union', a 'defeat of 
terrorism', and the call for a 'devolved government' which rejected 
'any form. of special privileges for those opposed to our British 
citizenship' (i. e. non-power sharing devolved goverment). The more 
general CUP campaign literature again put 'security' and 'fight 
against Sim Fein' at the top of the manifesto, when it declared, 
"Ulster lives and breathes by the ballot box but we must 
never take democracy for granted: eternal vigilance 
remains the price of freedom. we believe freedom and democracy in Northern Ireland are, under greater fire now than at any time in the past 15 years. 
Provisional Sim Fein and the IRA Army Council - which 
are one and the same - operate under cover of the law to bring the law into contempt... 
270 
Sim Fein must be proscribed and all those who serve as 
a front for terror branded with the stamp of illegality 
and unacceptability. " 
(Ulster Unionist Party, Keeping Ulster British, Election 
Manifesto, May 1985: 2) 
The Democratic Unionist Party also targeted Sim Fein under the 
headline, 
'The Battlelines are Drawn, Democracy V SiM Fein' 
they declared, 
"The IRA, front-men of Sim Fein will be seeking to abuse 
their position in Councils to support and advance the 
IRA campaign of murder and destruction. They must be 
challenged whenever they raise their heads. The 
Democratic Unionist Party stands ready to meet the 
challenge thrown down by the apologists for murder. our 
record clearly shows that we have the ability and 
experience to ensure that the representatives of the 
gunmen, who come to this election with the ballot box in 
one hand and the armalite in the other are devastated 
and humiliated. " 
(Ulster Electon Bulletin, May 1985: 1) 
Another section of the election address read, 
"In many areas Sim Fein candidates, who believe in 
politics by day and guns by night, will be attempting to 
gain a strong foothold in the local council... it is 
-absolutely vital therefore that there is a strong 
uncompromising team of DUP councillors elected... to 
confront spokesmen for murder and to prevent them from 
using the council chambers as a platform for their lying 
propaganda. " 
(Ulster Election Bulletin, May 1985: 1) 
In a personal message to voters in East Belfast, Ian Paisley put it in 
even more straight forward terms, 
"In the forthcoming local government election the 
determination of the Ulster people will again be 
measured in terms of the total DUP vote compared toýthe 
total Sim Fein vote... Anything less will be pounced 
upon by our enemies and. portrayed as a weakening in 
Unionist resolve. Accordingly I ask all who supported 
me in the European Election to ensure that they record 
their vote for the DUP candidates in the local 
Government Election. I also appeal to others who share 
our desire to humiliate Sim Fein to join us in amassing 
an overall DUP vote of such proportions that Sim Fein 
will be totally swamped. Let us determine to deal Sim 
Fein another mortal deflating body blow. " 
- (East Belfast Post, May 9,19845: 5) 
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In a further election bulletin the DUP declared, 
"The merchants of murder must receive their answer in 
clear and unmistakeable terms. Ulster needs at this 
time men and women in the local councils who can and 
will stand up to the IRA front men - men and women who 
will not shirk their responsibilities or run away when the going gets tough. We need councillors who will 
stand firm and speak out for the long suffering law 
abiding people of the province. The DUP has proved that it is the only party which can be trusted with the task 
of smashing Sim Fein. 
(East Belfast Election Bulletin, may 1985: 1) 
The DUP literature again reinforced the idea that they, were the only 
party which could be trusted and that the official Unionists were not 
sincere in the battle against Sim - Fein. The election bulletin 
continued, 
"Alas, --recently the official Unionist councillors in 
Coleraine Borough Council refused to back a Dup motion 
to ban Sim Fein. Banning Sinn Fein is one way to put 
them out of business. " 
(Ulster Election Bulletin, May 1985: 1) 
In the same way as the Official Unionist election literature, it was 
only after they had targeted the political development of Sinn Fein, 
that the DUP made any mention of a 'sell out to Dublin'. The 
following identifies the DUP position clearly, 
"Since 1980 when Mrs Thatcher initiated the Anglo-Irish 
process with Charles Haughey there have been ongoing 
talks about the future of Northern Ireland. These talks 
about our future have been behind closed doors and 
against the will of the people of this province. In - spite of assurances from the Goverment that the 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland is safe, 
talks with Dublin continue. What is the point of such 
talks if as the Goverment says there is nothing to talk 
about? The answer surely is that there is treachery 
afoot. " 
(East Belfast Election Bulletin, May, 1985: 3) 
Again the DUP literature sought to set them apart from the Official 
Unionists, 
"We (the DUP) cannot follow ther complacent line 
advocated by the Leader of the official Unionist Party 
who publicly stated that 'the union is in safe hands, 
and that there is no need for Unionist to get alarmed, 
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and appealed for a cool approach. - How can we remain 
cool and unalarmed when our very heritage and freedom is 
at risk. " 
(Ulster Election Bulletin, May 1985: 2) 
For the DUP the answer was quite clear, 
"On may 15th, the back stabbing British Goverment and 
its officials must be given the answer. The DUP is seen 
as the barrier to the successful delivery of a United 
Ireland deal. A massive vote for DUP candidates will be 
a timely warning across the bows of Government that we 
will resist stoutly any summer summit sellout. " 
(Ulster Election Bulletin, May 1 985: 2) 
Elsewhere the DUP manifesto called for: the creation of jobs by 
helping 'small local industries instead of fly, by night 
multinationals, increased funding of education, health and social 
services'. The manifesto also called for local opinion polls to be 
taken on the opening of council facilities on Sundays. In a noteable 
difference from the official Unionists, they also promoted more rights 
for prisoners administrative separation and definite sentences for 
those detained at the Secretary of State's pleasure. Despite some 
clear differences - such as the DUP's emphasis on being the only party 
voters could trust and the restatement of economic policies outlined 
in Chapter Five essentially the agendas set by both the Official 
and Democratic Unionists were remarkably similar. Sim Fein's 
decision to field a large number of candidates and to take their seats 
if elelected prompted both Unionist parties to make 'smashing Sim 
Fein' (DUP) and 'putting Sim Fein out of business, (OUP) theirnumber 
one campagin issue. Both parties gave a low, priority to the 
'Anglo-Irish process'. Both assumed that the process was not 
advancing and the Thatcher goverment was insensitive to Dublin's 
commitment in the Forum Report. 
Given the similarity in their manifestos it is important to try 
and identify the main differences between the official and'Democratic 
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Unionists campaigns in the 1985 local election. Some ý of the more 
obvious differences were in the type of candidates who were standing 
and the electioneering strategies involved. All three DUP candidates 
lived in Ballymacarrett. One was a serving councillor with a 
reputation for being highly active. The other two candidates, 
standing for the first time were both employed by Harland and Wolff, 
and each was involved with their local housing association. , DUP 
activists made much of this. At one pre-election meeting a DUP East 
Belfast committee member explained one of the major differences, 
"Take this area. ' You've got a woman from Carryduff, 
standing under a false address on the Cregagh Road, a 
man from Shandon Park and a man from Sandy Row, all 
standing for the official Unionists in Pottinger. With 
us (the DUP) you've got A who works in the shipyard, B 
comes from the Newtownards Road and C comes from Jocelyn 
Avenue ... thats why the DUP have growing support in East- 
Belfast ... because we're local and get in and mix 
amongst the people. That's why you should vote for the 
DUP". 
(David, DUP member, election meeting May 12th 1985)- 
Election workers emphasised on the doorstep constantly how DUP 
candidates were 'part of the communityl and that they were, 'ordinary 
people'. As well as the general literature the DUP produced'for the 
election, they also produced a series of leaflets specific to each 
electoral area. In Pottinger, one side of these, was taken up by the 
general DUP manifesto. The other side of the leaflet however showed 
photographs of each of the candidates and gave detailed biographical 
notes stressing their links with East Belfast. In comparison, the 
Official Unionist material was less well produced and gave no personal 
details of the candidates. The pivot of the DUP election campaign was 
their ability to mobilise a large number of election workers., - These 
workers spent a great deal of time in close personal contact with 
voters. Workers saturated small physical districts in Ballymacarrett, 
to distribute literature and, to promote the virtues of the DUP. Most 
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often they were asked questions comparing DUP'candidates with those of 
the OUP, and most often campaign work ers sought support for all 3 DUP 
candidates in no particular order. The emphasis was on encouraging 
the elector to 'vote DUP -1- 2 31 (first three preference votes) and 
there was little advice given to transfer votes to Official Unionist 
candidates. The emphasis on the IDUP team' -was made easier because 
all three candidates had a high profile in Ballymacarrett. The DUP 
campaign workers were also mainly young and extremely enthusiastic. 
Given the age-profile of DUP *party support, outlined in earlier 
Chapters, this is easily understood. DUP campaign workers also called 
on houses regardless of party affiliation. In contrast OUP workers 
only called- on the homes of known supporters. There was 'however 
little overlap between the two sets of campaign, workers. There was a 
clear, if unwritten, demarcation, the DUP concentrating on the 
innermost wards and the OUP on the more suburban outer wards. It is 
also noteworthy that not all DUP workers were party members or were 
experienced in such matters. Although the official DUP emphasis was 
on the team' several workers had been recruited because they -knew 
individual candidates -well or had worked with them on community 
issues. one such campaigner was Victor, the UDA's'prisoner, welfare 
worker. As he explained, 
"I've known Colin for years, we went to school together, 
we fought each other on the way to and the way back from 
school, we've played football up and down the entry in 
our time. Now I'm no great fan of a lot of people in 
the DUP as you know, but Colin is basically a decent 
fella and I think he'll do a good job if he gets in. " 
(Victor, LPA worker) 
The fact that Colin had been extremely active in community work was 
important in his support. At one point he gave an example of his 
relationship with the local community, 
"People came here before I was a councillor and they'll 
still come here if I'm not... I once tried to give up 
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some years ago ... to be honest it came to a sticky patch in my marriage ... I was out every night in the week, so I stopped. People were coming to the front door and i 
was having to say 'sorry I can't really help you,. Then 
one Sunday night an old woman came to the door with the 
tears tripping her and I couldn't turn her away... I got 
the Housing Executive emergency services out and fixed 
her up... two days later her sister came to me and said 
, can you help, ... then it was somebody else... and before I knew it the whole thing had started again. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
The attempt here is not to romanticise inner city working class life, 
rather to identify forms of party support for the DUP which are not 
avaialble to the OUP. The DUP strategy was to focus on local issues 
and to stand candidates who were well known in tightly-knit working 
class communities. The DUP campaign culminated the night before the 
election with a motorised cavalcade around Ballymacarrett, with all 
the candidates in attendance, and with many workers on the ground 
calling from house to house. 
In general, the major features of the election were the wide 
spread support for Sim Fein and secondly the controversy over the 
introduction of identification requirements before voting. The 
average turnout was low and there was a clear swing in the popular 
vote away f rom the DUP towards the OUP. The former collected only 
155,353 first preference votes tp, the latter's 188,174. The breakdown 
of the party vote in Belfast in 1981 and 1985 can, be, seen in Table 
8.1. 
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TABIE 8.1 BREAKDOWN OF PARTY VMW IN BELFAST IN 1981 AND 1985 
LIOCAL ELECTIMS 
1981 1985 
FIRST PREFS. SHARE OF VOTE FIRST PREFS. SHARE 
M M 
Official Unionists 30685 23.7 28165 24.4 
D. U. P. 33433 25.8 23052 19.9 
SDLP 18227 14.1 16479 14.2 
Sinn Fein - - 18077 15.6 
Alliance 17164 13.2 13286 11.5 
Workers Party 4927 3.9 4432 3.8 
other Unionist 8727 6.7 10058 8.7 
Independents 16409 12.7 2098 1.8 
Valid Poll 129638 115647 
Turnout 55.9% 53.2% 
In Belfast the overall vote for the DUP was disappointing, 5.9% down 
on the 1981 figure. As one defeated DUP candidate put it, 
"The prods just did not come out, Big Ian is going to be disappointed. He was predicting a'miracle. 11 (Pauline Wittley cited in The Irish News 17/5/85) 
In Pottinger however although the turnout was only 48.95% the DUP 
polled extremely well. The DUP took 49.2% of the first preference 
votes compared with 26.3% for the OUP. The DUP had two candidates 
elected on their first preference votes and their third on the second 
count, as can be seen in Table 8.2. 
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TABLE 8.2 RESULT OF POTTINGER. ELECMPAL AREA - FIRST PREEERINCE 
1985 LOCAL ELECTION 
Electorate 25,084 (6 seats) 
Valid Vote 11,848 
Quota 1,755 
Name Party No of % of first 
Votes preference 
votes 
M. Clarke Official Unionists 1,999 16.9 
F. J. Cullen Workers Party 303 2.6 
S. J. Dempsey Labour and Trades Union 218 1.8 
R. Ireland M. Empey official Unionists 1,117 9.4 
D. W. Ervine Progressive Unionists 394 3.3 
M. J. Jones Alliance 1,019 8.6 
F. Leslie Democratic Unionists 2,224 18.8 
C. Maginness SDLP 340 2.9 
J. O'Donnell Sim Fein 566 4.8 
J. Stewart Communist Party 61 0.5 
J. Walker Democratic Unionists 1,153 9.7 
S. Wilson Democratic Unionists 2,454 20.7 
11,848 100.0 
ELECTED 
FIRST COUNT M. Clark OUP 
F. Leslie DUP 
S. Wilson DUP 
2ND COUNT J. Walker DUP 
7TH COUNT R. Empey OUP 
8TH COUNT M. Jones Alliance 
when the voting returns are examined it is clear that the transfer 
votes from F. Leslie and S. Wilson went directly to J. F Walker to 
allow him to be elected on the second count. It is also clear that 
there was not a high level of transfer between DUP voters and OUP 
candidates, the second official Unionist not being elected until the 
seventh count. The tactic of emphasising a team approach and 
encouraging supporters to vote IDUP-123" seemed to have paid off for 
the DUP in Pottinger. 
By far the most far-reaching consequence of the election for 
unionism was the imediate post-election pact signed by leaders Jim 
I 
*, A, 
A Message to the Ulster People from 
Jim Molyneaux and Ian Paisley 
Why We- Must Put Sinn Fein Out Or Business 
: 'ILLUSTRATION 8.2 
Ulster lives and breathes by the ballot box. But the democratic proccss demands that all particip. ants adhere 
to the rules. 
Constitutional parties seek their obj)ectives by way of peaceful persuasion. Howe 
- ver. they are all bound by 
the freely expressed wish of the people. 
Sinn Fein IRA know no such constraint. By their own admission murder is the cutting edge of their political 
philosophy. They would force the people into submission! 
'niat is why, on the l7th of May. we formed a pact to isolate and ostracise Sinn Fein representatives in our 
Council chambers. 
Today we reaffirm our determination that the Sinn Fein presence in our District Councils cannot and will not 
be tolerated. and renew our pledge to thwart their attempt to subvert and destroy the democratic process from 
within. 
In our endeavour we are confronted by a duplicitous Government and a hostile press. 
The Secretary of State declines- any dealings with Sinn Fein but expects the elected representatives of the 
Ulster people to treat with them. Ministers refuse to meet Council delegations which include Sinn Fein 
Councillors but at the same time sanction their appointment to Boards responsible for the education and 
welfare of our people! 
Such duplicity cannot be accepted. Such double standards cannot endure. 
Our local government laws were not designed to meet the situation whi I ch no%ý obtains. Nonetheless, in 
answer to Mr. Hurd's challenge, we shall take recourse to law and explore every legal avenue or loophole in 
aid of our campaign. 
If nothing else, that campaign will accentuate our demand that the law be changed. 
Of course we will be told that our campaigen is ill-conceived or even counter productive. Certainly the 
Government is hoping for a cooling off period pending a return to normal business. 
But there is nothing normal about the Sinn Fein presence. 
Already the Chairman of Fermanagh District Council has endorsed the IRA's "armed st - ruggle" whilst his 
counterpart in Omagh has publicly confirmed the circumstances in which he considers the murderof his own 
Council employees would be justified. 
This fight with Sinn Fein therefore is literally of life and death importance. 
Our reverence for life, and our rc. spect for Ulster's dead, makes acquiescence impossible and unthinkable. 
We have joined forces in a battle in which, for us, there is no discharge. As Unionists we know that if this 
battle is not won then the whole war is lost. 
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Molyneaux and ian Paisley and pledging unity in the council chambers 
to oppose Sim Fein? s newly elected councillors. As they put it, 
"We are rock solid on the Union and to the maintenance 
of the same, we stand pledged. We stand united in the 
face of the cormon foe and repudiate Dublin interference 
in Ulster affairs... 
As far as Sim Fein is concerned we are pledged, as all 
our councillors utterly and totally to oppose them at 
every opportunity. We have a massive mandate to do 
this. 
There will be no fraternising with these godfathers of 
gumen, bombers and murderers... 
We call on all those within Northern Ireland who believe 
in the ballot and reject the bullet to renew their 
effort and to achieve a solution to our problems firmly 
within Northern Ireland. We dedicate ourselves afresh 
to that task. " 
(j. Molyneaux and I. Paisley cited in Belfast 
Telegraph 17.5.85) 
The full statement is reproduced on the opposite page. Not everyone 
in Ballymacarrett was convinced by the merits of the unionist pact. 
As one of the newly elected DUP concillors put it, 
"In the long term we've got to look to our own (DUP) 
resources because we can't depend on the official 
unionists to keep up the kind of pressure that's needed. 
It's a pit... if legal ways could be found I've no doubt 
the CUP would support it but I'm not sure there are any 
foolproof legal ways. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor, may 1985) 
Another DUP councillor aired similar views when he said, 
"I'm fairly cynical because I don't think the official 
Unionists ever intended to have a pact that works. One 
of the marks of official Unionism has been that they 
want to keep up their respectability and any pact that 
is going to deal properly with Sim Fein involves losing 
respectability and taking risks. I can't think of 
anybody in the OUP that's prepared to take risks of any 
sort. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
The DUP's 1985 election campaign in Ballymacarrett illustrates the 
extremely complex relationship between the parliamentary party and its 
grass roots support. The DUP in East Belfast consistently upheld the 
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strength of their Floyalityl and 'steadfastness',, particularly in 
comparison with local official Unionist representatives. The DUP in 
Ballymacarrett also consistently defended the -rights of the PWC 
especially on housing issues and community matters. Moreover success 
in community work and housing issues provided the DUP with increased 
support and people prepared- to work for, and stand for election, for 
the DUP. Much of the success of the DUP in Ballymacarrett, was because 
they could successfully transcend both the public and private spheres 
of politics. It is also because they can successfully redefine the 
agenda so that private politics is subsumed into the public arena. 
The period following the 1985 local elections saw a regrouping of 
unionism. This was met with confusion and some anger by local DUP 
representatives in Ballymacarrett. Although they were prepared to 
support the pact to defeat SiM Fein in the council chambers, they 
remained hostile to local official Unionist representatives. The pact 
however did provide the momentum for the reconstruction of unionist 
hegemony. This was to assume extreme significance-within a, very short 
time. 
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CHUTER NINE THE PFUNMANT WORKING CLASS AND THE ANGM-IRISH AGREEKEM 
The previous chapters have considered the politics and ideology 
within the community of Ballymacarrett. This chapter illustrates how 
local politics and institutions are linked with institutions and 
politics at the level of the Northern Irish state. This is examined 
through the Unionist response to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In 
particular this chapter highlights those activists in Ballymacarrett 
already in trodu ced and the roles they played in theý campaign against 
the Agreement. 
The newly elected representatives to Belfast City Council had a 
much more immediate problem that the developing framework between the 
British and Irish governments however, The major concern of 
Balymacarrett's Unionist councillors was to make -effective -their 
campaign of opposition against the newly elected- Sinn Fein 
representatives. In the eighteen unionist dominated councils 
throughout Northern Ireland, OUP and DUP councillors adopted a joint 
series of tactics to isolate Sim Fein within the council chambers. 
The main tactics of Unionist representatives was to attempt, to prevent 
Sim Fein councillors from speaking ý-at meetings,, and from being 
elected to the standing orders and sub-committees where most of the 
major council business took place. -,, - " -1 11 
It was -- Craigavon council who provided the vanguard of the 
unionist opposition. They voted to 'suspend all future meetings. 
Throughout Northern Ireland unionist controlled councils followed 
their example, suspending, monthly meetings and refusing to carry out 
council affairs. In Belfast, however-the unionist pact was immediately 
threatened when a majority of OUP councillors opposed a DUP motion to 
suspend council meetings. - For the DUP this -was 
further evidence of 
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the duplicity and weakness of the Official Unionists. , As one 
Pottinger DUP councillor put it, 
"Look at them (Pottinger Official Unionists) a few weeks 
ago, they were running round East Belfast telling 
everyone they were going to crush Sinn Fein. D for 
example, she's just a blue-rinse Tory. There's no way 
she's going to crush anybody. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
Another DUP councillor saw the official unionist claims as a pretence. 
He expressed it as follows, 
"I think the official Unionist has always been loath to 
get involved in any active politics, especially if it's 
confrontational. I'm quite happy to do it... the 
official Unionists won't distance themselves too much. 
They way deplore what's going on but they won't distance 
themselves too much. That comes back to the, hypocrisy 
of them. They know what they told the voters and they 
know what the people feel but they've never had the guts 
to translate that feeling into action. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
Craigavon council, continued to take the lead in unionist protests. 
They set up a special committee,, excluding Sim Fein members,, which 
was to conduct the majority of council business. At this stage the 
campaign entered a'new phase. Unionist tactics were declared illegal 
by the High Court in Belfast, which deemed the expulsion of Sim Fein 
councillors as unlawful and void (Connolly and Knox 1988: 90). Another 
tactic promoted by unionist members of Craigavon council was to ask 
all councillors to sign a declaration denouncing violence. When all 
the non-unionist, members of the council refused to sign they were 
expelled from council chambers. Again this decision was challenged in 
the courts and again it was declared illegal. 
For six months after the local goverment elections it was this 
campaign against Sinn Fein councillors which provided much of the 
momentum for unionist politics. It represented, a slight regrouping 
within unionism. The allegiance of both OUP and DUP councillors to 
each other was an inherently unstable one. Local councillors remained 
282 
, 
divided over tactics and long standing tensions emerged. In 
Ballymacarrett, DUP councillors remained suspicious of their OUP 
-counterparts, 
both in terms of their commitment to "action, and their 
-willingness to represent ordinary people'. These themes were to 
--re-emerge 
during the campaign against the Anglo-Irish agreement. 
By late 1985, however, the exclusion campaign aainst Sim Fein 
members had become marginal to mainstream unionist concerns. on 15 
November Mrs Thatcher and Dr Fitzgerald met at the third of a series 
of meetings of heads of goverment in the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Council. The two premiers signed a formal and 
binding agreement, whose major aims were to be 'promoting peace and 
stability in Northern Ireland; helping to reconcile the two major 
traditions in Ireland; creating a new climate of friendship and 
co-operation between the people of the two countries; and improving 
co-operation in combatting terrorism'. much has been written 
concerning the actual wording and discourse of the agreement (cf Kenny 
1986: 96-104) Most of the initial focus was on 'article one', which 
concerned the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. In general, 
the Agreement was regarded by unionists as an extremely thinly 
disguised form of joint sovereignty between Dublin and London. 
Despite British government assurances, unionists believed that the 
Dublin goverment was to be given a major and executive role in the 
intergovernmental conference. 
It is difficult to express unionist reaction. Bew and Patterson 
perhaps understate it as one of 'shock and dismay' (1987: 49). The 
most articulate statement of unionist disbelief came from Harold 
mcCusker MP in the House of Commons, and is worth reproducing at 
length. 
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"The agreement deals with my most cherished ideals and 
aspirations. on three occasions in the week prior to 
the signing of the agreement, on the Tuesday, Wednesday 
and Thursday, I stood in the House, having been told in 
essence by foreign journals what the agreement 
contained, and it was denied to me that an agreement 
existed, or had even been reached. 
I went to Hillsborough on Friday morning... I stood 
outside Hillsborough, not waving a Union flag -I doubt 
whether I will ever wave one again - not'singing hymns; 
saying prayers or protesting, but like a dog and asked 
the Goverment to put in my hand the document that sold 
my birthright. They told me that they would give it to 
me as soon as possible. Having never consulted me, 
never sought my opinion or asked my advice, they told 
the rest of the world what was in store for me. 
I stood in the cold outside the gates of Hillsborough 
castle and waited for them to come out and give me the 
agreement second hand. It is even more despicable that 
they would not even send one of their servants to give 
it to me. I had been told three hours before that it 
would be brought out to me. At 2.45. p. m., 15 minutes 
after the press conference had begun, I asked a 
policeman whether he would bring me the declaration that 
betrayed everything that I had ever stood for. A senior 
police officer went into Hillsborough Castle, asked for 
the document and brought it out to me. 
I felt desolate because as I stood in the cold outside 
Hillsborough Castle everything that I held dear turned 
to ashes in my mouth. " 
(cited in Kenny 1986: 103) 
The overall theme of these views was also expressed by Colin, the 
Pottinger DUP councillor who put it this way, 
"Previously the whole problem was Sim Fein and the 
council. That was the main problem. Previously the 
Protestant people have believed they have two enemies, 
now they believe they've three. First is the enemy 
without - the southern government, the second is the 
enemy within - the Nationalist community within Northern 
Ireland. Now we have more enemies - the Northern 
Ireland office, the British Government and most 
especially Margaret Thatcher. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
While Alan had this to say, 
"it's been very traumatic, all the certainties that we 
had in life have been taken away and we've been left in 
a quandary. First of all whether we are British, 
whether or not we have any friends or whether or not we 
are about to be sold into a United Ireland. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
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The following statement captures the overall mood within Unionism 
well. 
"By 15th November 1985, the British and Irish 
Governments had'thus created a deep-, sense of foreboding 
in the majority Unionist community in Northern Ireland. 
Something terrible was about to happen - something so - 
terrible that majority leaders could not be consulted 
because both governments knew that Unionist rejection 
was a certainty. What was about to happen was so 
terrible that extra troops were on standby to fly to 
Northern Ireland on short notice and contingency plans 
had been made to cope with a general strike in the 
Province. What was about to happen was so terrible that 
the British government was-letting it be known that Mrs 
Thatcher, the 'Iron Lady' had determined to 'face down, 
majority Unionist opposition in the Province just as she 
had already faced down the Argentinians and striking 
miners. And when the Agreement finally came, to 
unionists it-was, indeed, terrible. " 
(P. Smith n. d.: 6) 
Unionist hostility was quickly manifested and precipitated a huge 
rally at Belfast City Hall on November 23 1985, which was attended by 
anything up to 280,000 people. It was Ian Paisley who came to the 
fore at this public forum, his rhetoric and style dominating the other 
main speaker James Molyneaux. For some this raised the spectre of 
loyalist unity a la 1974. As these commentators put it, 
"The situation on the streets is plainly deteriorating 
and the likelihood of an all out confrontation - whether 
by gradually escalating disorder or by an indefinite 
strike like that of 1974 - is increasing. " 
(Hadden and Boyle, Fortnight 5/12/ 1986: 9) 
However while loyalist protests continued they did not progress as a 
unified force. Deep rooted division' within unionism meant that 
Unionist solidarity was extremely superficial. The remainder of this 
chapter will discuss this factionalism in the context of the first two 
years of the campaign against the Anglo-Irish agreement. In 
particular it will discuss the role played by those activists in 
Ballymacarrett who have already been'introduced. 
Essentially there were three core elements to the Unionist 
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response. The campaign against the Anglo-Irish agreement was 
organised at the national level, at the local government level and on 
the streets. 
Politically, Unionist reaction highlighted several key issues. 
Connolly and Loughlin identify three 'specific areas of Unionist 
protest: the involvement of Dublin in the offices of Northern Ireland; 
the process by which, the. -agreement was arrived at, which excluded 
the 
Unionist commmity; and finally the "undemocratic, nature of the 
agreement, foisted upon the 'Unionist people'. (Connolly and Loughlin 
1986: 55). It was this undemocratic' nature of the agreement which 
provided the initial -focus of Unionist reaction. The leadership 
, called for a referendum to-be held, arguing that this should be on the 
same basis as the devolution referendums in Scotland and Wales in 
1978. Unionist representatives further promised to 'reconsider their 
roles, in both the N. I. Assembly and local councils. Unionist demands 
for a referendum were ignored by the British government. In response 
'the Unionist leadership called for the resignation of all 15 Unionist 
MPs at Westminster, to force a mini-general election, in Northern 
Ireland. Unionists further claimed that the subsequent results should 
be regarded as a referendum'. The resulting byý-elelctions were held 
on 23 January 1986 where the CUP and DUP stood agreed candidates on a 
joint manifesto, part of which stated, 
"This election is not about sending a representative to 
the House of'Commons, our-MPs got the endorsement in 
June 1983. This election is about one issue - the 
Anglo-Irish agreement. " 
(Unionist Election Bulletin, Jan 1986: 1) 
It is slightly difficult to fully assess the el ection results as a 
referendum. only 15 out of the 17 seats were contested and supporters 
of the agreement were in several cases only given the opportunity to 
vote for 'Peter Barry,, 
ý fictitious candidate put forward by 
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Unionists-to make the by-election possible. - Overall however Unionist 
candidates obtained 418,230 votes, around 44%. of the electorate. 
The results were used as a justification for an intensification 
of the anti-agreement campaign. The Unionist leadership, under the 
name of the 'Unionist Joint Working Party", issued a 'Call to Action'. 
They claimed it was, 
"up to us all to demonstrate beyond doubt that we will 
not be trampled on in this manner and that in no 
circumstances will we ever accept Dublin Rule. " 
it continued, , 
"Next Monday is your opportunity to do so, by joining in 
a massive Province-wide DAY OF ACTION AND PROTEST. We 
are asking you to play your part in sending an 
unmistakable signal to Westminster that Ulster means 
business. " . 1ý 
(Hand-circular,, East Belfast, 1/3/1986) 
Much of the post strike comentary concerned the level of violence and 
intimidation and the fact that the RUC had failed to keep many roads 
open, or had co-operated with pickets (Holland and Taylor, 9/3/1986, 
N. I. Justice and Peace Commision, Report No. 1). That there was open 
intimidation, threats and some more serious incidents with vehicles 
being burned and police officers stoned is beyond doubt. In some 
districts of Belfast including the Shankill Road and Ballymacarrett 
the police found themselves under sporadic gunfire from loyalists. 
However it would be incorrect as several comentators have done to 
suggest a high degree of co-ordination between these events (News 
Letter 4/3/1986). In East Belfast, for example, most of the violence 
Was Conducted by gangs of young people most of whom had only 
tangential contact with the paramilitaries. That is not to say that 
they could have operated without the tacit support of the UDA or that 
the UDA in Ballymacarrett was unaware of what was happening. However, 
the paramilitaries in Ballymacarrett did not orchestrate or coordinate 
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such events. The rpolitics of -violence' and its specific context in 
Ballymacarrett will be discussed later. what is of importance here is 
that the 'Day of Action, exposed se vere contradictions within the 
, Unionist solidarity, movement. Divisions quickly emerged, both within 
and between the two major Unionist parties, and importantly between 
political unionism and the paramilitaries. 
The UDA had made it clear from the signing of the agreement that 
unlike 1974, this time they expected Unionist politicians to take the 
lead in any protests. The UDA's strategy remained based on the 
'doomsday scenario, outlined earlier and the UDA demanded it should be 
the politicians who would declare when this point had been reached. 
Before the 'Day of Action, both of the Unionist party leaders had 
publicly committed themselves stating that there would be no road 
blocks or intimidation of those wishing to go to work. In the face of 
the resulting widespread complaints about intimidation the RUC openly 
criticised both party leaders. The next big Unionist show piece,, 
the anniversary rally against the agreement in November 1986, was also 
marked by street protests and violence. As a result the Unionist 
leadership decided to exclude paramilitaries -from any -further 
involvement in protestsýand specifically from involvement in the next 
mass action on 11 April 1987. 
There were several dimensions to this split. The long-standing 
divide between the official Unionists and loyalist paramilitary groups 
re-emerged. Such differences have been widely documented. The 3rd 
March protests also exposed divisions between the UDA and the DUP. 
As in 1974 there was - an implicit recognition that if the 
anti-agreement campaign was to succeed it would require the total 
commitment of a broad Unionist class alliance, not only Protestant 
workers, but also petty bourgeois and middle class Unionists. Paisley 
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had made this explicit just before the 'day of action?, when he wrote, 
"on Monday we do mean business. I am making an appeal 
to all sections of the community. There are people in 
this commmity who agree with what we are doing but do 
not want to play a part in any action. They are 
prepared to take the benefits that will come as the 
result of a successful campaign, but they are not 
prepared to make any sacrifices to assist that campaign. 
I know that it is the common people who will bear the 
burden of the action, but I say to the middle classes 
and to the upper classes of this province 'You cannot, 
Pilate like, wash your hands of all responsibility and 
receive from the community the benefits of its labours 
without also shouldering your responsibility at this 
time. " 
(Protestant Blue Print Vol I, No. 33) 
Elsewhere Paisley outlined his vision of the result of such unified 
resistance. 
"There will be total and absolute withdrawal of consent 
from (her) goverment in Northern Ireland. The entire 
population will be mobilized and there will be a massive 
campaign of civil disobedience... The machinery of 
government is in the hands of the ulster people - civil 
servants, government offices, goverment officials, the 
police force. All these people as well as the man on 
the street will cease to co-operate and when they do 
Margaret Thatcher will not be able to govern Northern 
Ireland. " 
(cited in Newsweek, 16/12/1985) 
What Paisley was attempting to do was to reconstruct Unionist hegemony 
under his control. In the early days of the protests he appeared to 
be succeeding. As one commentator explained, 
"If the agreement accomplished anything initially it was 
to unite Unionism as it had not been united for nearly 
20 years. Even during the Sunningdale experiment 
consitutional unionists were divided, with the UPNI 
helping to form the Executive whilst the other Unionists 
tried to bring it down. " 
(McGimpsey 1987: 8) 
or as Bew and Patterson put it, 
"Although the history of Protestant politics and 
ideology is replete with divisions on democratic and 
class issues, on the national question, even in its more 
humane and liberalised post-Forum form, there is no 
significant intra-Unionist division. The liberals and 
neanderthals make common cause. " 
(Bew and Patterson 1987: 45) 
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It was clearly believed' that as in' the UWC strike it would be ý the 
paramilitaries who would provide "the 'cutting edge' of Unionist 
protests. 'Key elements within the UDA however, quickly excluded 
themselves from the direct control of the Unionist leadership. - The 
UDAI's indisposition to the Unionist leaders was based on recent 
experiences with loyalist politicians, particularly those Involving 
loyalist prisoners (see Chapter Six). It was also partly a result of 
the attempted political reorganisation within the UDA since the 11977 
strike'. Signs of such disillusionment emerged as, early'as January 
1986 and can clearly be seen in the following statement, 
-"In view of... the lack of a real plan to deal with the 
constitutional crisis we find ourselves in, we, the 
Ulster Nation, are entitled to ask, whatbur Politicians 
have been doing since last November and where they are 
going? While they dither, others wait with increasing 
impatience, and concern. " 
(Editorial, Ulster, Jan 1986)' 
In the immediate aftermath of the 'Day of Action', the UDA had made 
their lack, of confidence in the unionist leadership overt, 
"What we lack is a clear and decisive leadership, and a 
co-ordinated plan of action. " 
In an extremely thoughtful statement the spokesperson continued, 
"Of course there are those who will not lend themselves 
to unconstitutional tactics and have already set. 
limitations to their resistance and the time will come 
when a split will develop. But the split will not, as 
many believe, be a parting of the Official Unionists and 
the DUP. It will cut across both parties and almost 
every other loyalist organisation. Loyalists will divide on the issue of how far they are prepared to go. " 
(J. McMichael, Fortnight 24 March 1986: 5) 
The campaign against the Anglo-Irish Agreement could only be 
maintained as a defensive political move. Unionist unity could only 
remain intact as long as the Protestant working class believed that 
the campaign and the unionist political leadership would be effective 
in representing their interests. Within a few months of the agreement 
290 
being signed it became clear that the UDA were determined to act in an 
autonomous manner, Unionists, and Paisley in particular, were forced 
to look elsewhere for the organisation of ýmass ranked loyalists. It 
soon became clear that -this role would be filled by : another 
organisation, the Ulster Clubs'. 
The origins of the Ulster Clubs predate the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, in the Loyalist Action Committee formed in July 
1985 to co-ordinate protests against the re-routing of Orange ý order 
paradesý- - From this committee grew, the United Ulster Loyalist Front 
(UULF) who organised at a local level through the 'Ulster Clubs'. The 
leadership of the Ulster Clubs was strongly impregnated with , the 
values, and attitudes of traditional unionism as they were expressed at 
the peak of the struggle against Home Rule before World War One. In 
an, "attempt to recreate the old Unionist Alliance the --Ulster -Clubs 
leader Alan-Wright played directly on the Unionist heritage as the 
following illustrates, 
"(We) need to have what Carson had which was a people's 
army to make this country totally ungovernable to bring 
this goverment to its knees... ulster men and women are 
not prepared to let Dublin have a say at all in Northern 
Ireland. The price we are being asked to pay is 2,500 
deaths,, 18 thousand maimed and Dublin involved in every 
decision which is pro-nationalist, anti-loyalist. That 
price is far too high and we are not prepared to sit 
idly by any longer and pay that. We will take whatever 
steps are necessary. Carson had his army. Thank God it 
wasn't needed. I believe Ulster needs that one united, 
effort and if force is necessary we must prepare now. " 
-(Alan Wright, Fortnight 10th February 1986: 5) 
The 'Ulster Clubs were instrumental in organising mass rallies, 
demonstrations and mass pickets. They declared they would, - 
"embark upon a province wide recruitment, of men willing 
and prepared to take direct action when required. " 
(News Letter, 11 November 1986) 
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The Ulster Clubs played a major role in the realignment of Unionist 
opposition, but by doing so further weakened the unionist alliance. 
Politically the Ulster clubs represented the more reactionary elements 
of the provinces business connunity. In particular Wright was 
supported by the rural petty bourgeoisie. The Ulster clubs also 
attracted elements of the old Unionist Alliance whose social and 
political- influence had been steadily undermined since 1969, such as 
the Orange Order whose traditional role had been the maintainence of 
the Protestant community. The Ulster clubs also took up the defence 
of 'Protestantism', one of their central demands being an end to the 
erosion of their 'Protestant heritage'. As such there was a 
considerable overlap between support for, and activists in, the Ulster 
clubs and the rural element of the DUP. Both were small town based 
and put a -strong emphasis on religious tradition and their Protestant 
heritage. Hence the Ulster clubs had a membership of around 10,000, 
but were poorly supported in Belfast and almost non-existent in 
Ballymacarrett. 
There was another major difference between the Ulster clubs and 
the UDA. The Ulster clubs had suggested that if necessary the 
opposition campaign would have to be taken to its logical conclusion. 
That is, if Northern Ireland was to be forced out of the union it 
should claim the right to political self determination and declare a 
unilateral declaration of independence. It was expressed by Alan 
Wright as follows, when he claimed, 
"The right to self determination for the Ulster people, 
to maintain the union as long as its in our best 
erest, to combat the encroachment of I--r'i-sTT- 
nationalism, and to unify the talents, abilities, and 
resources at our disposal. " 
(Fortnight 10th February 1986: 4) 
emphasis added 
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Such a view was a long way however from the UDAI s concept of a 
negotiated independent Ulster. As the campaign against the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement continued it became apparent that the UDA would 
have an important role to play. It also became apparent that their 
role would not be as unionism's 'boot-boys', that the UDA were 
increasingly seeking to develop: a political role. Under the 
leadership of several key members of the UDA's inner council a small 
group came together to promote their own policy in the aftermath of 
the Anglo-Irish agreement. It was this grouping that UDA activists 
such as Robert and Victor in Ballymacarrett were sympathetic to. The 
major intellectual output of the group was a document called 'Common 
Sense'. Politically it can be regarded as a direct descendant of the 
UDA's previous policy document 'Beyond the Religions Divide'. The 
core of the proposals rested on the formation of a devolved goverment 
in Northern Ireland based on a form of power-sharing. Places on the 
governing executive would be allocated in proportion to the number of 
votes each party received. Elsewhere the document claimed the desired 
wish would be that when the constitutional issue was settled, 
political divisions -would manifest 
themselves around "social and 
economic" doctrine rather than Unionist versus Irish Nationalist or 
Catholic versus Protestant" (Common Sense 1987: 7) Another, part of the 
document expanded on this ideology, 
"There is no section of this divided Ulster community 
which is totally innocent or indeed totally guilty, 
totally right or wrong. We all share the responsibility 
for creating the situation either by deed or by 
acquiesence. Therefore we must share the responsibility 
for finding a settlement and then share the 
responsibility of maintaining good government. " 
(Commn Sense 1987: 2) 
Launching the document, a UDA spokesperson claimed that adopting 
such policies would allow politicians to be released from 
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"the treadmill of border politics and tackle the 
real enemies of social deprivation, economic 
recession, unemployment and housing. " 
(cited in the Belfast Telegraph 29th January, 
1989) 
Elsewhere one of the documents authors argued, 
"with an agreed written constitution - something there 
has never been - politics would no longer be dominated by the border, and would gradually develop into issues 
on economic and'social issues. " 
(J. McMichael, Fortnight, April 1987: 14) 
Common Sense stated a clear alternative, 
"the pragmatic alternative to co-determination is to 
fight a bloody civil war and let the victor dictate the 
rules by which we live. " 
it concluded, 
"the most dangerous thing to do, and unfortunately the 
most popular would be to do NOTHING. " 
(Common Sense 1987: 8, emphasis in original) 
Of major importance regarding UDA thinking and the Commonsense 
document was that it marked a clear statement to both the OUP and DUP 
that the paramilitaries were not under their control. Throughout the 
early phase of the anti-agreement protests, both Paisley and 
Molyneaux had indicated that it was they who were keeping the 
paramilitaries in check. The production of 'Common Sense' confirmed 
that the UDA regarded themselves as an autonomous grouping and that 
their concept of independence was far removed from that of the Ulster 
Clubs. In fact much of the momentum of commonsense came from 
increasing hostility towards the Unionist leadership in general and 
Ian Paisley in particular. The following statement captures this 
feeling well, 
"It can safely be said that in the last ten years not 
one constructive idea has emerged out of Paisley's lead. 
Indeed his 'political tactics' and 'know how' amount to 
little more than huffing and puffing... Paisley has 
never actually led our people anywhere but has merely 
voiced and reflected their fears and opinions. He is 
merely the politics of reaction, coupled with blood 
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thirsty threats of things to come should the English 
ever betray Ulster to Eire. ". 
V (Ulster, May, 1987: 4) 
Such feelings were widely held as the following statements f rom UDA 
members in Ballymacarrett indicate, 
"The problem with the leadership is that everybody 
agrees they oppose the agreement but nobody can agree 
how they're,. going to defeat it. " 
(Nigel, UDA officer) 
"The problem is loyalist politicians, -all of them, can, 
play silly buggers because they don't have to suffer the 
consequences. It's all much of a game to them... it's 
always the same... you can write down what they're going 
to say before they say it. " 
(Michael, UDA officer) 
The influence of Common Sense on mainstream Unionism was 
considerable. At best the Unionist campaign against the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement was making little advancement. At worst it had ground to a 
complete standstill. In an attempt to revitalise the campaign, the 
two main party leaders commissioned their deputy leaders, Peter 
Robinson and Harold mcCusker and the chief executive of the OUP, Frank 
Miller as a 'Task Force'. Its ordinance was to assist the leadership 
in drawing up plans for a continuing campaign. They were also to 
examine where any consensus lay amongst Unionists. The formation of 
this 'task forcet amounted to a recognition of several crucial 
features of contemporary Unionism. Firstly, the campaign had 
manifested itself in an entirely negative manner, epitomized by the 
slogan 'Ulster Says No'. Secondly, the report admitted the campaign 
had lost much popular support. This will be further discussed below. 
Thirdly it recognised that the trump card of the Unionist Alliance -a 
prolonged strike, marshalled by the UDA - was not theirs to play. 
The first part of the report was published as 'An End to Drift, 
in July 1987. It dealt with alternatives to the agreement. Implicit 
in the report was a recognition of its encumbrance to 'Common Sense' 
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As Wilson put it, "The uDA plan had broken the ice and demonstrateci 
that no Unionist looking to an accommodation with 'the minority, need 
look over their shoulder for a paramilitary challangell (Wilson, 
1987: 7) The 'End to Drift, report itself put it this way, 
"Many, in addition to the UDA would clearly be prepared 
to contemplate SUP participation in the goverment of 
Northern Ireland provided the SDLP agreed to forfeit the 
role of the goverment of the Irish Republic as 
custodians of the national interest. " 
(An End to Drift, 1987: ) 
The report"s endorsement of 'power sharing', although it never used 
the term, brought its authors into direct confrontation with the party 
leadership. Molyneaux, remained sympathetic to integration, but his 
party remained increasingly divided between those supporting this 
policy and those supporting devolution. Such divisions had existed 
for several years. However the disagreements over tactics and 
Unionism's faltering campaign had reopened old divisions. In 
particular the campaign for equal citizenship emerged, led by OUP 
politician Robert McCartney, blaming the 'devolutionist dinosaurs, for 
unionisms failed campaign, and claiming that the solution would be for 
full integration and that 'British' political parties be allowed to 
organise in Northern Ireland (cf McCartney 1986, B. Clifford 1985, 
1986, A Clifford (ed) n. d. ) 
Paisley meanwhile continued to condemn any notion of power 
sharing, - 
"In the midst of Ulster's turmoil certain people are 
now advocating as the only way forward seats in any future government of Northern Ireland as of right for 
republicans whether SDLP or Sim Fein. In other words, the old power sharing of Brian Faulkner and the 
Sunningdale agreement in another guise. Let me make it 
crystal clear the DUP will have none of it. " 
He made his position clear when he warned, 
"Talk of compromise by some Unionists is the talk of 
surrender. " 
(cited in Fortnight, September 1987: 7) 
a 
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The party leaders did ýhowever reluctantly accept the report's 
recommendations and in late 1987 entered into a series of talks with 
the British government to'explore the possibility of some alternative 
. to the Agreement. 
There was another major dimension, to Unionist political protests, 
the' Unionist leadership `also" targeted local councils for increased 
,, protest action. 
In f t'the council chambers were seen as the ac 
-1 , 4,1 1- 
flagship of Unionist protests because, after the closure of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly,,, the councils were the only forum where 
Unionists had any politi, cal control. 
Unionists sought' to,, 
develop the tactic of council adjournments 
and suspensions that they had originally used to protest against the 
presence of Sim Fein councillors. Such tactics produced little 
practical effect. Despite the adjournments, the main functions of the 
council were still working as normal - leisure centres and parks 
remained open, refuse collections were still made, births, deaths and 
marriages were still being registered, the work of the Cemeteries 
Department carried on and the councils 13 permanent community centres 
were still being funded. All of this was possible because the Town 
Clerk had been vested with the authority to run such affairs. 
The protest entered a new phase however in early 1986 when a new 
district rate had to be struck. This lay beyond the jurisdiction of 
the Town Clerk, requiring the authorisation of a full council meeting. 
In the light of this the Alliance Party took the Unionists to court 
over both the adjournment policy and the legality of the huge 'Ulster 
Says No, banner which had been erected across the front of the Belfast 
City Hall. In both instances the court found in favour of the 
Alliance Party: that the banner was illegal because of the lack of 
TRAITORS ONE &TRAITORS AýL, `, ý 
At this crucial time Unioniit Solidarity is essential. Sadly, two Official, 
Unionist Councillors, both representatives of Castle Ward, acting in concert with 
three other quisling members of the Official Unionist Party have betrayed the'- 
Unionist cause. Their action must be looked at in the same light as that of the 
infamous Col'Lundy who was prepared to hand the garrison over to the Roman 
pist Monarch James ll-. hordes of thý Pa 
To find enough words to express adequately the revulsion most Loyalists 
have for such useless garbage would require the resources of the world's largest 
library and the use of an abundance of dictionaries. Only then would it be 
possible to highlight the disgust and contempt which the vast majority- of 
Unionists have for such carpet-baggers. Some of the words which might be 
used are those which Ulster people normally reserve for hypocritical political 
mavericks - twisters, shysters, tricksters., scabs, curs, swine, lice, vermin, rats, turn 'coats, ' deceivers, _ apostates. renegades, collaborators, quislings, fifth 
columnists, deserters, blacklegs, rebels, reprobates, blackguards, scoundrels, 
cheats, liars, undesirables, chisellers, imposters, defectors, double dealers. 
If we were to refer to such despicable people as being disloyal, unfaithful, 
saboteurs, or traitors that would not adequately describe the malevolence of 
these self seekers who have used the Unionist Pa! ty to achieve public office 
thereby satisfying their craving for publicity, position and honours. They are 
egotists; whose loyalty is to themselves. 
Call With, WritaTo, orTelephone any or-all of the Despicable Five. 
MARGARET CROOKS 
1 Orpen Park, Finaghy, Belfast BT10 OBT. Tel: Bel. 611998 
JOHN CARSON 
20Cardy Road, Greyabbey, Co. Down BT222LT. Tel: G'abbey41-0 
ALFRED REDPATH 
15 Waterloo Gardens, Belfast BT154EX. Tel: Bel. 771061-"' 
WILUAM CORRY 
45 Hawthornden Road, Belfast BT4 3JJ. Tel: B 61.653393- 
DOROTHY DUNLOP 
9 Knockdene Park North, Belfast BT57AA. Tel: Bel. 656076/59150 
DON'T DELAY - CALL TODAY 
Contemptible " Conspirant Cowardly Dastard Renegade 
Abhorrent Odious Rabbit Useless Ebriated,, _, ', Reprobate Riff raff Oaf Nauseous Despicable 
Spurious Ragged Offensive Ufigant Polecat -' 
Oblique Yellow Kaleidiscope Obnoxious Abominable 
Nefarious Substandard Peccant Twister 
'' , Hypocrite " 
REMEMBER-D on't delay, Ca 11 today ... andtomorrow ... andthedayafter ... and.. -. Remember the Despicable Five 
Traitors one & Traitors all 
The traitors in the City Hall. 
ILLUSTRATION 9.2 
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planning permission; and that the adjounment policy was illegal 
because Unionist councillors were being derelict in their duties. The 
court ruling had a further consequence. It meant that the tactic of 
transferring responsibility to the Town Clerk to authorise ongoing 
expenditure was no longer possible. This had serious consequences. 
It meant that the Town Clerk was unable to renew tenders, and by April 
he had warned that both oil for heating council buildings and fuel for 
council vehicles were near exhaustion. Another serious outcome was 
that money could not be issued to the various community and voluntary 
groups funded by Belfast City Council. The situation was only 
resolved in the short term when the Northern Ireland Office announced 
that the DOE had sent an official to work as an lipso facto, 
commissioner to release cheques and sign tender renewals. 
The situation however was far from, resolved. Unionist 
councillors were faced with increased pressure from the courts 
including the possibility of a E25,000 fine. Faced with this, five 
official Unionist councillors (including three from East Belfast) 
broke ranks, and went against party policy and voted with Alliance, 
Sim Fein, the SDLP and the Workers Party to resume normal business'. 
Reaction from other Unionist councillors especially the DUP was fierce 
and immediate. In a hand-circular distributed throughout 
Ballymacarrett, the despicable five' were described as follows, - 
"If we were to refer to such despicable people as being, 
disloyal, unfaithful saboteurs, or traitors that would 
not adequately describe the malevolence of these 
self-seekers who have used the Unionist Party to achieve 
public office thereby satisfying their craving for 
publicity, position and honours. They are egotists 
whose loyalty is to themselves. " 
(Hand-circular, East Belfast, April 1986) 
ga 
Belfast City council business was still far from normal. A new 
Lord Mayor, Sammy Wilson from the DUP was elected in June 1986, and 
under this new momentum Unionist councillors took part-in a wide range 
of disruptive tactics. officially Belfast City Council had abrogated 
its adjournment policy, although only a very limited amount of 
business was being discussed. As Connolly and Knox explain, 
"Cognisant of possible future court action a limited 
number of items were dealt with from council agenda and 
proceedings were deferred, normally without reference to 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement; ostensibly not an adjournment 
policy. A general purposes and finance committee was 
established to carry out a general review of the entire 
committee structure of the council with a view to 
denying Sim Fein seats. " 
(Connolly and Knox 1987: 93) 
This new tactic meant that the huge backlog of work which had built up 
during the adjournment phase --could not be dealt with. In turn, this 
meant that by August 1986, the government had, for a second time, to 
appoint an official to authorise expenditure. Central to this was 
again the issue of the funding of community groups. The' crisis 
focused on Belfast, partly because of the-legal action by the Alliance 
Party, and partly because of the size of the grant aid allocated by 
Belfast City council (E460,000 for 1985/86: Belfast City Council 
Reference Guide). The grants which had been issued to community 
groups in April were due to expire' in October, again raising the 
spectre of job losses. Again there was overt tension between Official 
and Democratic unionist councillors, the latter demanding that cuts be 
made. However privately some members of the DUP were sceptical about 
the benefits of this tactic and that'job losses were not what they 
expected or wanted. one of these was Colin from Ballymacarrett. 'East 
Belfast-- Community Centre for example employed 50 people all of whom 
were likely to be made redundant if the grants were not forthcoming. 
As a councillor Colin was coming under pressure from those arguing 
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that if the Unionist councillors continued with their -protests it 
would be ordinary members of the PWC who would suffer. Colin was 
himself sympathetic to such views, and made this clear when he said, - 
the whole protest is going nowhere. It's not 
affecting the Northern Ireland office and we're 
certainly not going to smash SiM Fein by refusing them 
car parking tickets at the City Hall. The only people 
it's affecting are people round here, ordinary 
Protestant people. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
The Unionist pact came under even greater pressure when official 
Unionists in North Down Council voted to 'resume normal business', 
arguing that the adjournment campaign had run its full course. In an 
effort to hold the anti-agreement pact together, both Unionist leaders 
wrote to their councillors urging unity, and informing them that the 
North Down defectors had been expelled from the Official Unionist 
Part. However as the Belfast Telegraph noted, 
"The apparent unanimity hides a deep unease within the 
Unionist ranks that the situation is being allowed 
to drift by the parties, by the political leaders, and 
by the Government. " 
(Editorial, Belfast Telegraph, 2nd September 1986) 
Outside Belfast councils reacted in different ways. In October, 
1986, the government had to intervene in Castlereagh Council to 
maintain services. The DUP responded by calling a special council 
meeting to overturn the decision. However within a few weeks the OUP 
had reversed this decision and issued contracts for council work. 
Relationships between the two parties were becoming openly hostile 
towards each other. 
By the -end of 1986 local government protests against the 
agreement entered their final phase. The Executive of the Official 
Unionist Party proposed mass resignation of councillors. As a tactic 
it had already been approved by the DUP. Response to the idea from 
councillors was extremely patchy. As several councillors pointed out 
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there were severe weaknesses in the tactic. If resignations caused a 
council to be left with a quorum it could still co-opt other members. 
If however resignations left a council without a quorum then the 
government could appoint commissioners. Such a tactical- decision 
however did not arise. official Unionist councillors rejected the 
tactic and voted not to resign. - 
The two parties were now openly divided. Official Unionist 
councillors in Castlereagh, Lisburn , Antrim and Coleraine resumed 
normal business, in opposition to the DUP in each council. In, Belfast 
Official Unionist councillors dropped the adjournment policy and opted 
for what they called an "abstentionist strategy'. , This involved 
non-attendence at council and committee meetings except where 'vital 
issues' were at stake. Dup councillors decided to attend only one 
meeting in three to register their attendance and withdraw. They also 
placed written resignations with Ian Paisley which he could use at any 
time he saw f it. The overall Unionist policy was at best in 
disharmony, at worst, in complete disorder. 
The Unionist leadership made one desperate attempt to 
Consolidate the protest campaign at a local political level. on the 
direction of both party leaders, councillors undertook a new approach 
of using a quarter penny in the pound rate to fund the campaign 
against the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Even this, however, could not 
disguise the schisms within Unionism. In early 1987 Official 
unionists agreed that councils should only meet twice a year, to 
record their discontent. This proposal was rejected by the DUP. This 
was the second major strategy proposed by the OUP which had been 
repudiated by the DUP. Divisions became acute when Belfast City 
Council struck its new district rate for 1987/88. - 
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By March 1987, the joint campaign had run its course. The 
declared objective of the protest was 'bring local goverment to a 
standstill'. Unionist protests continued but without co-ordination or 
effect. As the protest lost its mom ntum, its-declared aims became 
more and more diluted. once the protest entered a confrontational 
phase, involving illegal tactics the OUP was always likely to concede 
ground. The DUP in general were willing to continue with such 
protests. However given their special relationship with their 
electorate they were increasingly under pressure from their own 
supporters. In particular their electorate in places like 
Ballymacarrett, believed that such protests were damaging to the 
'ordinary people, of loyalist Belfast. 
Overall Unionists had chosen a difficult arena within which to 
challenge the agreement. Northern Ireland's councils have extremely 
limited powers, which meant that Unionist councillors- never had the 
leverage to make the government reconsider the Agreement. For this 
reason many thought the best hope of bringing down the Agreement was 
to challenge it on the streets. It is this to which we shall now 
turn, specifically to the events in East Belfast. 
Ballymacarrett like other Unionist communities in the city 
reacted strongly to news of the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. 
Feelings of betrayal were widespread, as was the expression that the 
Anglo-Irish agreement was the 'thin edge of the wedge' towards an 
all-Ireland. As Peter Robinson put it "The Anglo-Irish Agreement has 
4 
pushed us into the window ledge of the union" (cited in Moloney and 
Pollak 1986: 390). This view was widely felt in Ballymacarrett as the 
following statements indicate, 
"There's no doubt that this is all designed to weaken 
Unionism and the Unionist position. we are, now no 
longer as 'British, as people in other parts of the UK. 
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The agreement has made us second, third or even fourth 
class British citizens. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
"The thing I fear most is that the crow-bar has been 
pushed into the crack and that we're on our way out of 
the union. The lever being used to widen the crack is 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement. " 
(Brian, DUP councillor) 
"There were quite a few people didn't trust the British 
government before the Anglo-Irish Agreement. But they 
were seen as heretics. I was shouted down at a council 
meeting one night because I called X an English man 
sitting up in his castle dictating to us. I was told 
they were our ministers and they wouldn't betrýy us. 
The same people who were shouting at me are now standing 
beside me at protests. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
emphasis added 
"It's the beginning of a process that will 'Irishise, 
Northern Ireland from the inside and that gradually the 
whole status of Northern Ireland will change. The Irish 
tradition will be played up and up and up and the 
loyalist role will be put down, down, down. " 
(David, DUP Branch member) 
"The south has established a beach head in Northern 
Ireland. They couldn't get a Federal or a 32 county 
Ireland - but they've got better than that. What 
they've got now is joint authority. They've got a daily 
say in the governing of Northern Ireland and they don't 
even have to pay for it. The British government pays 
for it all. 
(Frank, DUP, Branch member) 
An indication of how the Anglo-Irish Agreement affected attitudes in 
Ballymacarrett can be obtained from tables 9.2 to 9-15. These are 
drawn from. a panel study in which the same respondents were 
reinterviewed as the original sample. They show the changes in 
attitudinal means for these respondents between 1985 and 1986. In all 
124 people responded to the follow up questionnaire, eleven of whom 
were excluded because they had changed their party affiliation between 
the two surveys. It is worth noting that in 1986 all of these 
respondents identified with the DUP. Previously 4 had supported the 
OUP, while 7 had expressed no party affiliation. What figures do show 
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are the responses of OUP identifiers and DUP identifiers who replied 
to both questionnaires. Attitudes were measured on the same 6 point 
scale as for the original sample (see Table 9.1). The mean scores on 
a number of key questions can be compared below, 
TABLE 9.1 ATTITUDE SCALE 
Strongly very Strongly 
Agree 
Disagree 3 Agree 5 
Very 2 Disagree 4 Strongly 6 
Strongly Agree 
Disagree 
TABLE 9.2 
The British Goverrunent does not reallv care what the outcome 
is in Northern Ireland as long as there isn't too much civil unrest 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 4.56 5.00 
DUP 5.19 5.51 
TABLE 9.3 
Since they are a majority it is only right that Protestants 
should have the last word of how Northem Ireland is to be ruled 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
CUP 4.88 5.08 
DUP 5.06 5.16 
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TABLE 9.4 
in any political'solution to Northern Ireland the Irish 
Goverment has to be consulted 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 1.80 1.57 
DUP 1.74 1.66 
TMLE 9.5 
The British and Irish Governments should continue 
to have high level meetings at which Northern Ireland 
should be discussed 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 1.95 1.50 
DUP 1.88 1.46 
TABLE 9.6 
The Irish goverment should remove its 
constitutional claim to Northern Ireland 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 4.89 5.54 
DUP 5.66 5.80, 
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TABLE 9.7 iI 
The best chance of a-solution to the situation is to 
-return to the old Stormont system of Goverment 
Party 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 4.63 4.63 
DUP 3.87 3.90 
TABLE 9.8 
Anv Dolitical solution to Northern Ireland's Droblems 
will have to include an arrangement for Catholics 
and Protestants to share power 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 2.90 3.42 
DUP 2.89 2.88 
From the above tables a number of key trends emerge. overall 
there was an almost uniform -'hardening' of positions within 
Ballymacarrett. There were however differences between the two sets 
of party supporters. while both OUP and Dup identifiers felt that the 
British government didn, t really care about Northern Ireland, this was 
more strongly felt amongst DUP supporters. This was consolidated in 
the wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The significance of this will 
be discussed later. As tables 9.4 to 9.6 indicate both DUP and OUP 
supporters were extremely resistant to any involvement by the Irish 
Goverment. This attitude was also clearly intensified after November 
1985. As table 9.7 indicates, Protestant working class OUP supporters 
more strongly advocated a return to a devolved Stormont system of 
government,, than did DUP identifiers. This tendency remained constant 
across the two samples. official Unionist identifiers were also more 
willing to contemplate the notion of 'power sharing, in 1986. DUP 
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supporters were less willing to tolerate the concept although there 
was no noticeable change between 1985 and 1986 (table 9.8). 
one important set of attitudes concerns the possibility - of 
independence for Northern Ireland. 
9.11. 
TABLE 9.9 1, 
This can be seen in tables 9.9 to 
If Britain withdrew, Northern Ireland should 
claim independence rather than join with the Irish Republic 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 4.77 5.27 
DUP 
TABLE 9.10 
5.50 5.81 
Northem Irish Protestants and Northern Irish Catholics 
have more in common with each other than with the 
people of the Irish Republi 
Par 1985, (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 3.66 3.76 
DUP 3.67 3.89 
TABLE 9.11 
If they had to choose between beinq loval 
to the British government and 'Ulster, 
Loyalists would choose Ulster 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 5.02 5.35 
DUP 5.55 5.64 
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All three tables indicate a higher degree of willingness to 
contemplate independence, although it should be noted that table 9.9 
proposes the notion of independence as a 'fall back' position should 
Britain withdraw. This is important because in the period immediately 
after the Anglo-Irish agreement independence was reintroduced on to 
the agenda. As indicated earlier many Unionists saw the Anglo-Irish 
agreement as the first step on a road to a United Ireland. There was 
also a widespread and increasing feeling amongst Ballymacarrett 
residents that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would lead 
to an increase in loyalist violence. This is seen in Tables 9.12 and 
9.13. 
TABLE 9.12 
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without 
the consent of all parties involved would lead to 
an increase in violence by Loyalists 
Partv 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 5.00 5.35 
DUP 5.50 5.64 
TABLE 9.13 
If a United Ireland was ever to come about the 
Loyalist paramilitaries would be at least 
as much of a problem as the IRA are toda 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 4.85 5.19 
DUP 5.09 5.15 
This must be considered alongside the wider set of options which 
Ballymacarrett residents saw as being legitimate to defend the British 
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way of life in Northern Ireland. 
TABLE 9.14 
Justifiable actions to defendthe British 
way of life in Northern Ireland 
(% supporting) 
CUP SUPPORTERS' DUP SUPPORTERS 
1986 1585 1986 1985 
Option 
Electoral Politics 100.0 (98.7) 98.4 (98.8) 
Civil Disobedience 73.1 (68.8) 88.5 (63.5) 
Protest Marches 73.1 (37.9) 86.9 (61.5) 
Strikes 53.8 (23.4) 65.6 (57.5) 
Rioting 19.2 ( 4.7) 54.1 (45.8) 
Armed Conflict 15.4 (14.4) 62.3 (48.9) 
Civil War 15.4 ( 9.6) 62.3 (52.8) 
Table 9.14 compares responses for the same group in 1985 and 1986. 
There were still clear differences in the tactics supported by OUP and 
DUP supporters. one final observation of significance is the view 
concerning the role of the security forces. Here there was a clear 
movement away from outright support for the security forcest itself 
locked in the notion that the security forces and Unionists were 'on 
the same side' toward a more critical stance. 
TABLE 9.15 
The Securiýy Forces are doing their job well 
Par 1985 (mean scores) 1986 
OUP 4.51 3.62 
DUP 3.98 3.59 
Some of the differences in attitude mean scores are small but given 
that the PKC are often seen as homogeneous such differences are 
significant. 
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overall the existence of such views as those above, meant that in 
Ballymacarrett as elsewhere, the initial reaction to the agreement was 
marked by a concentration of political forces. Initailly this took 
the form of ad-hoc groupings to co-ordinate protests and 
demonstrations, The main responsibility for organising this fell on 
local councillors of the DUP and OUP. There was also involvement by 
the UDA and members of the Ulster Workers Council 1861 committee. 
This latter organisation was an attempt to reconstruct the workplace 
grouping which had successfully co-ordinated the 1974 UWC strike. In 
1986 however it fulfilled a more limited role. Its base remained 
located in what remained of Northern Ireland's engineering industry. 
In particular its 40 strong council membership was based in 
Ballylumpford power station and in Ballymacarrett most of its 
membership was drawn from Harland and Wolff. Not all factions within 
the ad-hoc co-ordinating committee however met with each other 
regularly or on an equal footing. From the beginning, for example, 
OUP councillors were happy to meet with DUP representatives or with 
those working in local community groups. Local OUP representatives 
however were reluctant to meet with or co-ordinate action with local 
paramilitary members. This was not just a matter of crude class 
divisions or personalities. The DUP/UDA grouping were committed to 
'direct action, such as organising 'flying pickets, to harass 
government ministers. The OUP representatives in Ballymacarrett were 
estranged from such ideas. Although some individuals cut across it, 
the general pattern of interaction between the groups involved 
followed the pattern shown in Fig 9.1 below. 
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OFFICM 
UNIONISTS 
FIG 9.1 INTERACTION BETWEEN GROUPS INVOLVED IN ORGMISING 
PROTESTS AGAINST THE ANGED-IRISH AGREEMENT IN BALLYMACARRETT 
Another tension originated from the continued suspicion on the part of 
DUP councillors concerning the comitment of their counterparts in the 
OUP. As the DUP councillor put it, 
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"The two parties have come together. I have no doubt 
that there are a lot of people in the official Unionists 
who would love to have some way out of having to take 
direct action... the differences are still these. our 
willingness to take direct action is much greater than 
theirs. When it comes to action we've been the ones 
who've done it. They may have sat down and planned it 
with us but they've sat back and waited for us to go out 
on the streets. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
Another DUP councillor expressed the differences between the two 
parties as follows, 
"The official Unionists still see themselves as the 
Tories of Ulster politics and believe the British 
government would never do anything to ham Ulster, never 
do anything to ham us. I believe they were suffering 
from an illusion and it's been proved to them. They 
still believe the illusion, that Maggie Thatcher is 
going to say some day that these people would be right. 
There's no way they'll go out there and challenge 
Thatcher. No way they'll take action. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
It was against this background that protests in Ballymacarret were 
organised. Most of the early protests, such as the rally at the 
Belfast City Hall on November 23 1985, were organised centrally. It 
was only by the time of the 'Day of Action and Protest' on 3 March 
1986 that the co-ordinating group in Ballymacarrett had become 
ef fective locally. The group centred on several DUP activists who 
originated a plan to lead a march to Belfast City Hall to meet up with 
several other groups. The plan immediately caused dismay with several 
of the group's members and particularly with OUP councillors, because 
under new legislation all such demonstrations had been declared 
illegal. The situation was partly resolved on the suggestion of one 
of Ballymacarrett's DUP councillors. This was to stage a mock 
funeral, to symbolise the 'death of democracy, in Northern Ireland 
since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Apart from its 
political significance, the idea of a 'funeral' was more acceptable to 
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the OUP as funerals wereexempt from the newly introduced legislation. 
It was still the DUP-who took the leading role in the demonstration. 
All of the DUP's councillors in., East Belfast attended, most of whom 
took turns to carry'the coffin along with other members of the DUP 
East Belfast branch. ý In contrast few of the OUP representatives in 
Ballymacarrett attended, only one of whom marched at the head of the 
parade. Although several UDA members attended the march there were no 
leading members present and"the'paramilitaries took little to do with 
its overall organisatich of . 
'the mock funeral. most UDA members were 
involved elsewhere on pi cket lines and at the mass demonstration 
outside Harland and Wolff shipyard gates. In fact the UDA's resources 
in Eallymacarrett were at full stretch, as they were also committed 
elsewhere to helping local community groups and in 'welfare' work such 
as providing food for old age-pensioners. Part of the reason for this 
was the UDA leadership's wariness of the Unionist leadership and 
partly it was because they were trying to fulfil the different facets 
the UDA had tried to adopt since 1974. In Ballymacarrett this meant 
that on the Day of Action most UDA members were given a free rein by 
the local command. 
It was however the increasing violence during and following the 
'Day of Action, which most clearly identified the contradictions 
within Unionism. This was most readily seen in Ballymacarrett in the 
campaign against members of the RUC. This mainly took the form of 
attacks on the homes of RUC officers many of whom for security reasons 
lived in loyalist areas of Belfast; Throughout early 1986 the Ruc had 
been increasingly involved in a number ofý large scale street 
confrontations with loyalists. 
, 
Most of these in fact were not in 
Belfast but centred on Portadown where there were continuing loyalist 
protests against the rerouting of Orange order parades (Routledge, 
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1986: 18). ''The demonstrations had begun before the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. During the summer of 1985, the banning of a number of 
Orange order parades had precipitated street protests, rioting and 
confrontations with the RUC. The protests continued during 1986 
against both the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the re-routing of the 12th 
July Orange demonstration away from the 'Tunnel,, the main Catholic 
area of the town. On several occassions the protests had degenerated 
into rioting and in the most serious of the incidents a loyalist 
protester, Keith White, had been killed by a plastic bullet fired by 
an RUC officer. 
, one result was that the sporadic attacks which had been taking 
place on the homes of RUC officers in loyalist areas became more 
widespread, and continued to increase in frequency. As Ryder says 
"the, attacks reached epidemic proportions at the end of the month 
after the Secretary of State banned an Apprentice Boys march through 
Portadown" (Ryder 1989: 328). ' In Ballymacarrett attitudes towards, the 
RUC could be seen in some of the graffiti which appeared throughout 
the area, 
11RUC paid in punts" 
11RUC were (sic) green uniforms" 
"RUC-gardi - walk hand in hand" 
"RUC submit to Thatchers Treachery" 
"Hermon is a traitor" 
moreover there were several badges in circulation describing the Ruc 
as 'Hermon's Vermin, and describing them as 'Pigs, (see opposite 
page). Attacks on Police homes' continued, forcing the RUC to set up 
an emergency housing unit at its Headquarters in Belfast. By the end 
of 1986 there had been, 564 reported incidents and'120 families had 
been forced to leave their homes (Ryder 1989: 330). The situation was 
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not eased when the Unionist leadership placed advertisements in the 
local newspapers calling for the RUC to stage a 'Curragh like revolt'. 
The message claimed the Anglo-Irish Agreement, 
"radically alters the role of RUC officers, 'who 
were employed and who took an oath to Itruely 
serve, ' our Sovereign. Now you are being asked to 
serve a second master - the Government of an Irish 
Republic which spawned the provisional IRA and 
which still harbours the murderers of so many of 
your gallant colleagues -ý- and all within the 
framework of a code of conduct to be dictated by 
Dublin. - 
(joint statement signed by I. Paisley and J. 
Molyneaux 
reproduced in Protestant Blue Print Voll, No. 34 
7/3/1986) 
The Police Federation responded by appealing to Unionist politicians 
to use their influence to halt attacks on RUC homes. The appeal drew 
an immediate condemnation of all such attacks by the official Unionist 
leader, James Molyneaux. No such condemnation however was forthcoming 
from the DUP, although Peter Robinson the deputy leader said he 
'regretted such attacks'. For some this could be seen simply as 
another example of the DUP's more aggressive stance and the continued 
use of a rhetoric which sanctioned violence. (Smyth 1987: 172-180, 
Moloney and Pollak, 1986: 390-402). 
This is however too simplistic a construction of the relationship 
between the DUP and the Protestant working class. This can be 
explained more fully if we consider the role of the DUP in 
Ballymacarrett during this time. As elsewhere in the city there were 
several police homes Iburnt out' in East Belfast. -There were also 
many cases (largelyý unreported in the press) of stoning and 
confrontations between the RUC and youthsýin Ballymacarrett. The DUP 
representatives in Ballymacarrett steadfastly refused to condemn such 
events. A clear statement of this was given by the DUP councillor 
when he said, 
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"The police are being used to enforce policy many of 
them don't agree with. The trouble is if you can't get 
at Tom King or Maggie Thatcher its the poor police 
officer on the ground who suffers. I'm sorry we've 
reached this position. I wouldn't condemn it because I 
understand the anger and frustration. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
While another DUP councillor put it this way, 
"where we differ from the official Unionists is that we 
(the DUP) have condemned the lot. We say that it"s 
wrong for the police to fire point blank plastic bullets 
as it is for loyalists to throw petrol bombs at 
policemen's homes. The official Unionists have only 
condemned one side and said it is wrong for ordinary 
loyalist people. The O. U. s are supposed to take the 
same attitude as us to the Anglo Irish Agreement. The 
differences become clear when people go out and defy 
'Dublin Rule, and it turns to violence. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
This viewpoint was confimed by another prominent DUP member, 
"The officials say that violence is wrong. I say it's 
totally justified. I think that's a consistent point of 
view. its hypocritical to say smash the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement but when you defy it people criticise you for 
doing it. " 
(David, DUP Branch member) 
It is important to try and understand the reasons for such 
perspectives among activists in Ballymacarrett. There were two clear 
themes underlying these perspectives. Firstly many were convinced 
that the republican violence had paid off, resulting in the 
formulation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Such a view was widespread. 
As one DUP member put it, 
"Maggie Thatcher signed the Anglo-Irish agreement 
because she doesn't want another bomb in Brighton, or 
wherever they have their next conference. " 
(Frank, DUP Branch member) 
While one paramilitary member said, 
"I think the Brighton bombing hardened it all up and 
Thatcher said 10h no we don't want anymore of this in 
England'. So we ended up with the Anglo-irish 
Agreement. " 
(Robert, UDA member) 
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The other strong underlying theme was that the RuC were being used 
politically to enforce the Anglo-Irish Agreement. As this DUP 
councillor put it, 
"The RUC are being used as a battering ram to force 
Barry's laws down the throats of the Ulster people. " 
(Brian, DUP councillor) 
Again this feeling was widespread as the following statements 
indicate, 
"The police are having a rough time. They're being used 
as pawns... The last thing the British government wants 
is to have to send British soldiers in to enforce the 
Agreement... they don't want British soldiers killed... 
it's unpopular in England. They don't mind Policemen 
getting burnt out of their homes, or shot, or kicked 
about the streets. After all they're just 'paddies, the 
same as the rest and provided the police are kept in the 
front line the government's happy. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
Another DUP representative put it like this, 
"Policemen have a duty to the local communities they 
live in and not let themselves be used... the police are 
willingly or unwillingly being used by their political 
masters and the Chief Constable. " 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
While another said this 
"there's nowhere for us to go. It's Maggie Thatcher 
causing the violence on the streets at present. Its 
O. K. for her to say we should accept it (Anglo-Irish 
Agreement), but the fact that she's got to try and get 
the police to make it work shows what people round here 
think. " 
(George, DUP Branch member) 
The strength of such views is indicated in table 9.15. The 
perspective was far from universal, however, particularly amongst 
local community workers. This was partly the consequence of the DUP 
led campaign in Belfast council, described earlier, which threatened 
community workers, funding, which had alienated the DUP from this 
support. In particular Colin, the DUP councillor whose background was 
in community work was subject to individual criticism. Others simply 
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believed that the campaign against the RUC was misplaced. As one 
resident put it, 
"At the minute I feel very angry towards the DUP. I 
mean we all know there's a bad element in the police... 
but to hit the ordinary policeman who's just being paid 
to go out and do a day's work isn't right. " 
(Stephanie, East Belfast resident) 
Another commmity worker had this to say, 
11... they (DUP) are glad of the RUC protecting us but 
they won, t come out and condemn it... There's a lot of 
violence around the street. It's made a lot more work 
for us ... therets 
been a lot of policemen's houses 
burnt ... they're 
(DUP) lucky wetre not near an election 
because the people won't vote for them... people have 
lost faith in their politicians. " 
(Harry, community worker, East Belfast) 
As the campaign continued those feeling a lack of guidance by 
politicians intensified, especially as the campaign appeared to many 
to be failing. At least one DUP councillor recognised this when he 
said, 
"You've got all the signs of people being totally 
disillusioned with political life saying 'you 
politicians are really irrelevant, ... to an extent I 
agree with them. We've asked people to do all the 
political things and we are no further on. " 
(Brian, DUP councillor) 
Another-argued, 
"In fact we've been told it doesn't matter what you 
do... you'll not change this agreement. People are 
saying there must be another way... the agreement came 
about as a result of violence, you haven't been able to 
get rid of it through politics... maybe violence is the 
way to get rid of it. " 
(Alan, DUP councillor) 
This view was supported by the DUP councillor who had closest links 
with the UDA in Ballymacarrett, when he, said, 
"I admit I associate with theýparamilitaries... Don't 
get me wrong. I know they're no angels. I've told X 
(local commander) that most people round here think the 
UDA's a bunch of gangsters. But if constitutional 
politics fail they'll end up talking with the 
paramilitaries. 11 
(Colin, DUP councillor) 
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The growing feeling of disillusionment with loyalist politicians was 
not eased by the relative failure of the Day of Defiance on 11 April 
1987. The UDA were excluded from its organisation. Di rectly 
following the day the UDA issued a statement calling for the 
resignation of the Unionist leadership describing them as the tired 
old men of Ulster politics'. It claimed that the Unionist leadership 
had, 
"presided over the gradual defeat and humiliation of the 
loyalist population, and indeed, if they had been part 
of a government in power their term of office would be 
seen by all to have been a disastrous one. " 
of Ian Paisley it said, he 
"is an empty vessel - full of air, yet empty. His mind 
is sterile and barren. He offers our people nothing... 
it is obvious to all that Paisley, in the midst of our 
greatest crisis since 1912, knows not what to do. " 
(Ulster, May 1987: 5) 
By the summer of 1987 any semblance of a unified Unionist campaign 
against the Anglo-Irish agreement had evaporated. The lack of 
confidence in the political leadership to co-ordinate an effective 
response gave rise to conditions which legitimised an increase in 
sectarian killings and violence. Although several individuals in both 
the uDA and Dup in Ballymacarrett remained on good terms the 
co-ordinating comuittee described earlier dissolved in acrimony. 
It is important to try and outline the overall pattern to the 
initial reconstruction and later disintegration of Unionist hegemony. 
It was the DUP at both the national and local levels who best 
articulated PWC reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. unlike the 
bulk of the official Unionists, the DUP have constantly questioned the 
policy of relying on the British Parliament to guarantee the 
constitutional position of Northern Ireland. Itisa common vi ew 
amongst DUP members that it has been the actions of the DUP in the 
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past, and particularly the action of Ian Paisley which has stopped 
Westminster ? selling out' Ulster into an All-Ireland. The DUP were 
thus able to present the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement as a 
continuity of these views and another example of Westminster's 
attempted treachery, as the following statement indicates, 
"Whereas the British Government, in an elaborate play on 
words, has maintained that the Agreement has not altered 
the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, in that, 
whatever else has changed, we are still part of Her 
majesty's dominions, the plain truth is the status of 
Northern Ireland has been changed by the Hillsborough 
Agreement. " 
(Allister 1987: 45, emphasis in original) 
The signals to DUP supporters were clear. The PWC could not rely on 
promises made by the British Goverment. As Millar (1978) has pointed 
out any obligation by Ulster loyalists to the Westminster parliament 
is conditional. In broad terms the DUP regarded the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement as a 'default' on the goverment's promises and therefore 
they could absolve their duty to obey the law. They expressed it as 
follows. The DUP, 
"reaffirms the party's total and undivided commitment to 
stepping up the campaign of opposition to the Agreement 
which has effectively established joint authority over 
this province. Democracy has been rejected by the Prime 
Minister. The next step is up to her and the Northern 
Ireland office. They know the terms and conditions on 
which we will talk. We will not be going back on them. 
The government must agree to stop implementing the 
agreement while a round table conference is convened. 
If the 22yernment persists in forcing this undemocratic 
an unworkable a5reement down the throats of the Ulster 
r 
upon tneir own neaas. Tne ulster Unionist people are 
not turning for the rice of acquiescence is the 
destruction of Northern Ireland as part of the United 
Kingdom. " 
(Protestant Blue Print, Vol 1 No. 35,14/3/86, emphasis 
added) 
It was this perspective which legitimised DUP organised protests 
against the Agreement. The DUP at both the national and local level 
were also able to continue to portray the Official Unionists as 
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'weak', particularly as several of their representatives were 
unwilling to carry out protests in Belfast City council or in street 
protests. 
The DUP were to the front in such protests. The DUP has always 
been more willing to undertake actions which are on the brink of, or 
even outside of constitutional politics. DUP councillors and 
activists in Ballymacarrett organised a wide range of action, such as 
street demonstrations, flying pickets', parades and 'Days of 
Protest'. In part the level of success of these activities was 
irrelevant. It was the DUP who appeared to be taking action to 
'defend Ulster against its enemies'. Another factor was the self 
projection of the DUP as unified. Even if they disagreed with party 
policy DUP representatives were unlikely to articulate this in a 
public arena. The OUP, however, even after the signing of the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement appeared divided. The official Unionist party 
has always been a coalition of factions. Since direct rule, when they 
lost political power and control of patronage there has been much 
internal dissent concerning political direction. In Ballymacarrett 
their unwillingness to take part in protests was ruthlessly exposed by 
the DUP. 
In the initial wake of the Anglo-Irish Agreement Unionist 
hegemony did reconstruct around the DUP. However important elements 
of the PWC, particularly those represented by the UDA excluded 
themselves from the process. As the protests continued and were seen 
to be ineffective against the Agreement, there was an increasing 
articulation from within the PWC that they were suffering at the hands 
of the Unionist political leadership. Two years after the signing of 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement unionists at all levels remained extremely 
hostile to any wider role of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental 
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Council. Because of this, Unionism at a national level was able to 
maintain some semblance of a common purpose. At the local level in 
Ballymacarrett no such deception was possible. Here the fragmented 
response of the Protestant working class to the crisis,, meant the 
fragile cross class unity could not be maintained. 
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CHAPTER TEN CONCLUSICIN 
This thesis has identified the politics and ideology of a section 
of the Protestant working class in Belfast. In particular it has 
outlined the politics and ideology of those active in the Democratic 
Unionist Party and the Ulster Defence Association in the PWC community 
of Ballymacarrett. Ideology marks out the framework of, thought, in 
Northern Irish'socipty by which protestant workers make sense of, and 
give meaning to, their social and political worlds. Such ideas do not 
occur at random or in an isolated manner. Rather such ideas are 
linked within a definite discursive space. This provides the 
Protestant working class with the orientations and parameters within 
which they think, express themselves and legitimise political action. 
These parameters enable protestant workers to make sense of, , and 
interpret, the events and the relationships around them. It is these 
frameworks which impose a- certain logic in looking at the world and 
which structure and confine the concepts, ideas and language used by 
the Protestant working class. 
Social, and political thought is not open, ended. - As the, thesis has 
indicated there -, is a diverse range of views within the , Protestant 
working class. These views however, 'no matter how widespread the 
thoughts and concepts involved, and no matter how diverse the language 
within which they are expressed, remain restricted by -the cultural 
world in which they exist. Every person constructs his or her own 
particular world view. - They do so out of the range of, ideas to which 
they are exposed. This range of ideas, however is itself limited. 
Such ideas fall into broader collective patterns which are, diffused 
throughout society. while it is impossible to map out the, entire 
variety of individual perspectives it is -possible to indicate the 
broad contours of social thought which dominate the Protestant working 
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class world. This was clearly seen in Chapter Four which outlined the 
main reference points in recent history by which many Protestant 
workers construct their analysis of the Northern Irish conflict. 
Northern Irish society has, since the outbreak of the current 
phase of the conflict, experienced complete destabilisation of 
political and ideological relations. The hegemony of the Unionist 
ruling class has been broken and internal contradictions have 
clarified and intensified. This has allowed Protestant workers to 
intervene directly in the political struggle. Much of this 
intervention has remained confused and contradictory. It is possible 
to identify four central concepts which comprise Protestant working 
class ideology: community, national identity, sectarianism and class 
identity. There are both positive and negative elements to this 
ideology. The main positive function of ideology is to provide the 
major categories, concepts, images, ideas and language by which people 
make sense of their social and political worlds. Individuals thus 
develop a certain consciousness of place and the world in which they 
exist. There is also a negative function to ideology, in that all 
such perspectives are highly selective, excluding those 'facts' which 
do not "fit' neatly into the world view under construction. Both 
these positive and negative features of loyalist ideology have been 
encountered throughout the thesis. 
What is necessary is to account for the internal construction of 
Iloyalism, as an ideology, and the logic which shapes its contemporary 
direction. To construct Iloyalism' in its popular form must involve 
charting the limits and boundaries of that ideology, how it imposes on 
what is being included and what is omitted from the formulation of 
this ideology. As Chapters one and Two have indicated many Marxists 
writing from an anti-imperialist perspective have sought to compare 
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the ideology of Protestant workers against a template of 'pure class 
consciousness'. This is the analysi s arti'culatedý'by Bell, Farrell, 
Sim Fein, the 'Troops out, and 'Time To Go' movements and most of the 
revolutionary groupings in Britain. Such analyses have become 
intertwined. with, and been determined by, traditional nationalist 
perspectives on Ireland. The following statement explaining Unionist 
reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement encapsulates these positions 
well, 
"The temptation for'Socialists (here) watching the 
scenes of sectarian violence is to take a (similar) line 
of a plague on both your houses. That would be a tragic 
mistake for two reasons. For all the criticisms that 
can be made of the IRA they are engaged in confronting 
the British state, not butchering Protestant 
workers ... Secondly 
it is vital socialists place the 
blame not on those fighting the sectarian set-up which 
the British ruling class created and maintains in 
Northern Ireland. 
The IRA are fighting a system which denies decent homes 
for Catholics, allows Orange marches to terrorise their", 
streets and bars them from jobs in Shorts and elsewhere. 
The UFF, UDA, Peter Robinson and Ian Paisley are 
fighting to maintain every piece of that Sectarian 
state. 
Of course the price for these sectarian divisions is 
paid by all workers in Northern Ireland ... Protestants 
and Catholics suffer but figures show Catholic workers 
suffer far more ... unity cannot be built without clearly 
opposing the British state and the set up its troops 
prop up. " 
(socialist worker, 23 August 1986) 
The passage is far f rom unique. It is representative of those 
who see imperialism as central to the Northern Irish crisis. It is 
important to identify the basic tenets contained within the short 
passage. Firstly it offers support, even if it is criticall support, 
for the IRA in their struggle against British Imperialism. Secondly 
it argues that the Northern Irish state is artificially created, based 
on sectarianism, and therefore impossible to reform. Thirdly, British 
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troops are seen as the main obstacle to an All-Ireland State being 
created. Fourthly, and following on from the previous points, there 
can be no progressive action which does not challenge the British 
State. Fifthly, Protestant working class resistance is seen as based 
on marginal privilege. Finally it projects complete unity within 
unionism, or certainly between the unionist leadership -and loyalist 
paramilitary organisations. As this thesis has indicated, there is no 
necessary unity of purpose or common ideology between paramilitary and 
party political organisations within working class unionism. 
A more serious objection is that such an analysis projects 
Protestant working class consciousness and ideology as stable and 
homogeneous, that I'there is a unity of ideological thought between 
those active in the political organisations of the Protestant working 
class. To properly construct Protestant workers' ideology must 
involve some attempt to account for their everyday, values i everyday 
beliefs and everyday conceptions of the world. Protestant working 
class ideology is fragmentary, internally contradictory and built on 
the incomplete forms of thought which ordinary people use to make 
sense of their everyday lives. Thus to -explain certain key events, 
such as the housing issues referred ý to in Chapter Eight, 
Ballymacarrett residents draw on several related ideas. They may seek 
to explain such events by drawing on sectarian ideologies (a 
confrontation with republicans from the Short Strand), or class 
ideologies (the provision of, better', homes for working class people). 
or community ideologies (the attempt to maintain Ballymacarrett as a 
traditional community) or -even national ideologies (the 
de-Protestantisation of Northern Ireland). Ballymacarrett residents 
may draw on any or all of these to explain the position 'housing, 
occupies in their social world. It is within these frames of thought 
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that everyday political calculations and decisions are made. 
It is this terrain of 'common sense' ideas which is- profoundly 
structured by ideology. People in Ballymacarrett, as elsewhere, are 
not logical or consistent over long periods in their political 
thinking. What is consistent is the set ý of ideas to which people 
return, in this case Unionism, or at least anti-united Ireland. This 
'common sense' political thinking is made up of historical- reference 
points, incomplete borrowings from, a variety of ideas,, diluted or 
confused ideologies, prejudices, inherited wisdom, ideas and values. 
It is this which enables working class supporters of the DUP on the 
one hand to talk about upholding democracy,, while on the other 
refusing to work with elected Sinn Fein -councillors. It also explains 
how they can simultaneously promote stronger 'law and order' policies 
and campaign against 'Thatcherite cuts'. 
The reproduction of 'common sense' ideas in Ballymacarrett also 
helps explain the success of the DUP in the area. one of the major 
appeals of the DUP is its promise to defend 'Ulster', in whatever is 
its current hour of need. -In-the context of this thesis this is best 
seen in the reaction to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The 
evidence for this 'defence, is based on reference to strong links with 
the past. Particularly those elements of Irish history which have 
been selected to fom the coherent self conception suggested in 
Chapter Four. - It is this direct, 
link into this strong -collective 
identity and the broad sets of ideas within the community, which 
explains the DUP success. It also partly explains the political 
failure of the UDA. In trying to construct a new independent'identity 
they are working directly against the self conception and 'common 
sense' ideology of the Protestant working class. -As Chapter Five has 
shown, support for the uDA in Ballymacarrett is conditional, best seen 
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in terms of , crisis management'. Within the context of everyday 
values and beliefs in Ballymacarrett it is the DUP who are best able 
to articulate social and economic issues, most notably housing and 
benefit work. 
How can such a perspective explain other aspects of PWC ideology, 
such as sectarianism? Gramsci (1971: 323-343,419-425) has argued 
that, -there are two, types of ideology, 'philosophy, and 'common sense'. 
The relationship between them, is extremely complex. Philosophical 
thought can diffuse into everyday wisdom, and common sense belief can 
sometimes, achieve philosophical consistency. Gramsci further argued 
that attention must focus on those ideologies which influence the 
thought and action of the mass of the people. It is this which helps 
form mass consciousness and provides ideas and categories within which 
, spontaneous, social thought occurs. By adopting this perspective as 
a starting point it is possible to shift the focus away from a highly 
systematised , political doctrine -towards an analysis. of the way in 
which political ideas are absorbed into 'common sense' and practice. 
It is in this way we can begin to understand the role of sectarianism 
in PWC ideology. Sectarianism must be regarded as part of an ideology 
which has the capacity to shape and re-shape lcomnon sense'. 
The formulation of sectarianism is one clear. example of the 
relationship between philosophy and ideology. The relationship 
between philosophy and common sense is always in Gramscian terms, 
ultimately political. - To be effective, ideas must be organised. To 
be organised it is necessary to formulate how ideas circulate,, how 
thought is produced and how the circulation of such ideology is 
controlled. Central here are the relations of power, forceo consent 
and the combination between them. All ideology operates on -the 
political terrain. Here it is necessary to introduce - some notion of 
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the institutional domain of politics, the operation of goverment, 
political institutions and the state. This too is culturally 
specific. Political relationships are not confined to conventional 
politics. What is defined-, -as political at any given point, what is 
included or excluded, what is seen as legitimate or illegitimate is 
ideologically constructed. It is only. if we accept this that local 
politics in Belfast can be placed in their proper context. As Chapter 
Eight indicated, local goverment has little real power in Northern 
Ireland. Even so, -its basic elementsr elections, political parties 
and political programmes are important because they reinforce 
ideologically-constructed boundaries to politics including their 
sectarian element. 
One of the major strengths of adopting such an approach is that 
it clearly avoids the wider forms of historical materialism, adopted 
by those anti-imperialist analysts who conceptualise political action 
as a reflection of material interests. The traditional Marxism oLthe 
Irish left reduces PKC ideology ý to a wholly dependent status, a 
deliberate conspiratorial'-'cover up' for class interests. --'Gramsci has 
made the weakness of this position clear when he-said, 
"Politics in fact is at any given, time the reflection of 
the tendencies of development in the structure, but it 
is not necessarily the case that these tendencies must 
be realised. A structural phase can be concretely 
studied and analysed only after-it has gone through its 
whole process of development and not during the process 
itself, except hypothetically ... From this it can be deduced that a particular political act may have been an 
error of calculation on the part of the-leaders of 
dominant classes ... mechanical historical materialism does not allow for the possibility of error, but assumes 
that every political act is determined, immediately, by 
the structure, and therefore as a real and permanent (in 
the sense of achieved) modification of the structure" 
(Gramsci, 1971: 420) 
Gramsci was concerned with establishing the autonomy-of the 
political as-a dimension which was not reducible to economic material 
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interests. Classes for Gramsci carried their own world view which 
influenced their actions and their view of material interests. 
Hegemony had to be actively produced. This involves not only the 
ability to coerce a subordinate class to conform, but also the ability 
to exercise a special type of power: to frame alternatives and to win 
and shape consent, so that the legitimacy of the dominant class seems 
natural,, spontaneous and normal. The DUP in Ballymacarrett can be 
seen in these terms. Though they often presented themselves as 
unified, ý there were clear contradictory elements: there ýwas one DUP 
for the politically motivated members, one for its religiously 
motivated members. Although it has not been dealt with in detail in 
this thesis, there were also clear differences between the rural 
following of the DUP and its urban support. 
If we accept that Gramsci is, correct when he argues- that 
ideologies have the organisational capacity he projects, it becomes 
necessary to ask by what mechanisms this takes place. Following 
Althusser it is possible to argue that ideology,, is a system of 
representations, of myths and concepts which are endowed with a 
historical existence and a role in a given, society (Althusser, 1969). - 
Althusser further suggests that ideology is not a question-of a 
consciously held set of beliefs but rather ideologies are systems of 
representations, which work in a structured manner. Ideology works 
unconsciously through the acceptance of certain values as pre-given 
and 'obvious'. In this, sense ideology provides Protestant workers 
with their core values and the pre-suppositions by whichAhey make 
sense of, and organise their everyday lives. , These structures work 
internally and recruit members of the PWC into accepting a particular 
world perspective. To fully explain this it is necessary to return to 
Althusser and introduce that category he called 'the subject', a 
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category in which we all exist as social beings. This is of course a 
socially constructed category. The precise mechanism of recruitment 
he called linterpellation', whereby a person is both named and 
positioned. Individuals thus recognise that they are being addressed, 
and submit themselves to the consequences of this positioning. 
There are clear examples of this process of 'spontaneous 
identification, throughout the thesis. For example those activists in 
both the DUP and UDA introduced in Chapters Five and Six. DUP members 
often referred to the 'people of Ulster'. Strictly speaking this is 
all the people of the old nine-county province of Ulster. In theory 
DUP members use it to refer to all the citizens of the Northern Irish 
state. In reality however it refers to the Unionist population of 
Northern Ireland. The situation is however even more complex. UDA 
members also often referred to the 'Ulster people'. For some this 
merely meant the same as the DUP. For others however it was used to 
refer to everyone living in Northern Ireland, for example when 
appealing to the nationalist population to help form an independent 
Ulster state. However in practical terms such a discourse excludes 
the nationalist population. They too are subject to a process of 
spontaneous identification, the discourse of which is more likely to 
make reference to the North of Ireland or the six counties. When 
someone speaks of the Ulster people' Unionists automatically 
recognise their place within that discourse and the sorts of 
characteristics that discourse involves. Most members of the PWC can 
recognise themselves as the potential authors of such statements. In 
an interpellation like the 'people of Ulster' Unionists recognise 
clear principles of unity. This unity is constructed to include 
certain ideas and to exclude others. 
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it is this particular formulation of an interpretation which 
gives unionism its appearance of unity when viewed from the -outside. 
An example of this was in the immediate post Anglo-Irish Agreement 
period which was rejected many times on public platforms in the name 
of the Ulster People'. Such an interpellation both identifies and 
sets limits. It does not include those nationalists and republicans 
who rejected the agreement nor any unionists who may have accepted it. 
I 
The words Ulster People clearly set the criteria for inclusion and 
exclusion, which themselves are dependent on discursive criteria and 
ideological location. If this theme is developed it is possible to 
identify more clearly the ideologies which unify unionists. The 
concept of interpellation has been advanced by Laclau (1979). in 
considering ideology he moves away from the standard Marxist 
conception of particular ideologies as an expression of certain 
classes or class factions. Different classes share the same 
ideological and linguistic parameters. Different ideologies cross and 
are sometimes structured around the same concepts but can take 
different meanings from them. One of the essential features of 
Unionism is that it is essentially antP in character. It is 
anti-all Ireland, anti-republican, it may be anti-Catholic. As a 
positive ideology this manifests itself as 'Britishness' or a 'British 
identity'. Central elements in Unionist ideology have no necessary 
, 'class belongingness'. Many of its central concepts such as the 
people,, 'democracy', anti-all Ireland, do not belong to any one 
class or ideological discourse. The position of such terms in 
discursive formations cannot be reduced to crude class terms. These 
ideological terms are multi-discursive, the ideology of 'Britishness' 
mobilises across class, gender, urban and rural divisions. They have 
become articulated in the Unionist bloc which developed Northern Irish 
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society in a particular social and economic direction underpinned as 
it was by a specific alliance of class forces. Certain political 
groupings dominate certain areas of political discourse. Again this 
could clearly be seen in the Unionist response to the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. Unionists constantly referred to it being the first step, 
or the thin edge of the wedge to a united Ireland. Such discourse 
aroused all the different fears held by the factions of the Unionist 
bloc, and initially mobilised a unified reaction. 
Loyalism as an ideology located in the Protestant working class 
consists of the ideologies of several class factions. The core of a 
serious analysis of PWC politics must involve the notion of 
ideological dominance and subordinance within loyalism. Hegemony 
operates through ideology, it is not universal nor pre-given to 
sustain the rule of a particular class. It must be won, reproduced 
and sustained. There are several key ideologies within loyalism. 
Loyalist ideology is constructed so as to draw on class, community, 
sectarianism and national identities. All these are subordinate to 
the dominate ideology of 'Britishness'. 
Hegemony can never totally absorb the working class into the 
dominant order. Society is not one-dimensional. At a given point 
Unionist hegemony may be strong and cohesive, at another point it may, 
weaken. The Protestant working class has consistently 'won space' 
from the dominant culture. Many of their institutions have been 
negotiated over time. This is seen in the form of the PKC community 
or neighbourhood where the PWC has won space for their own form of 
life. It is within such spaces that the PWC have come to exert the 
, informal social control' which defines the behaviour and attitudes 
which are appropriate for groups which live in them. It is against 
this background that the origins of the DUP and the UDA as the main 
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organisations representing the PWC must be seen. The class identity 
of the PWC is never settled or fixed. The balance of class forces 
-, remains open. 
This forms the basis of a negotiated version of the 
dominant system within which the PKC exist, where 
"dominant values are not so mch rejected or opposed as 
modified by the'subordinate class as a result of 
circumstances and, restricted'opportunities" 
(Parkin, 1971: 92) 
The reproduction of divisions within Northern 11reland's working class 
is not restricted to sectarian relations. There are other forms of 
division, such as those based on gender, age and employment patterns. 
It is however sectarianism which is the crucial form of relationship 
of domination and subordination which divides the working class. It 
also gives rise to a range of experiences for both Protestant and 
Catholic workers. The experience of being working class is still 
relevant to Protestant workers. There are clear examples of this 
throughout the thesis. Capitalism and sectarianism have disorganised 
the working class in Northern Ireland. In their response sectarian 
consciousness does not negate class awareness or vice-versa. They 
co-exist within the same ideology. 
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APPENDIX 
SECHON A 
Ql SEX 1. Male 2. Female 
Q2 MARITAL STATUS 1. Married 2. Single 
3. Widower/Widow 4. Separated 
Q3 AGE 1. Under 21 
2. 22-35 
3. 36-50 
4. Over 50 
Q4 Occupation 
(Please give a s full a description as possible) 
4(a) If unemployed 
How long since last ful l time job 
What was last full time job 
Q5 where did you complete your full time education 
1. At Secondary/Intermediate School 
2. At Technical School 
3. At Grammar School 
4. At Public/Boarding, School 
5. At College of Education 
6. At Polytechnic/University 
7. No Secondary Education 
Q6 How long have you lived in East Belfast 
1. 0-5 years 
2. 6-10 years 
3. 11-15 years 
4. 16-20 years 
5. 21-25 years 
6. Over 25 years 
Q7 flow long have you lived in this neighbourhood 
1. 0-5 years 
2. 6-10 years 
3. 11-15 years 
4. 16-20 years 
5. 21-25 years 
6. Over 25 years 
FCA 
OFFICZ Lk 
() 
( 
() 
I() 
() 
Q8 How often do you see any of your relatives, apart from those who 
also live in the house 
SECTION B 
SHOW CARD 
I. Daily 
2. Weekly 
3. Several times a week 
4. Monthly 
5. Less than once/month 
6. Never 
1. British 
2. Irish 
3. Ulster 
4. Northern Irish 
5. Anglo Irish 
6. Sometimes Irish, sometimes British 
7. Other 
Q9 Which of these terms best describes the way you think of yourself 
Q10 Which would be your second choice 
Q11 Which of these terms are you least likely to call yourself 
Q12 Would you say that the way you live your life has got more in 
common with 
I. 
2. 
3. 
SHOW CARD 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
The people in England and Wales 
The people in Scotland 
The people in the Irish Republic 
Unionist 
Loyalist 
Alliance 
Socialist 
Nationalist 
Republican 
Don't know 
None 
Q13 Which of the following would you say best describes your political 
position concerning Northern Ireland 
If I or 2 go to Questions 14 
If 3 to 8 go to Question 19 
() 
(' ) 
c. ) (I) 
C) 
1( ) 
IC) 
SECTION C 
I AM NOW GOING TO READ A NUMBER OF STATEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE 
ABOUT THE SITUATION HERE. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO TELL ME HOW YOU 
FEEL ABOUT EAý11 ONE, WHETHER YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE AND HOW STRONOLY. 
THE ANSWERS WILL BE TREATED IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE, SO PLEASE BE 
FRANK. THERE ARE NO CORRECT ANSWERS AND NO INCORRECT ONES, I AM 
SIMPLY INTERESTED IN WHAT YOU THINK, YOUR OWN OPINION. 
SHOW CARD 1. VERY 
2. ! 1, T1? 01-JG1, Y 1) 1 
3. DMAGREF 
4. AGIM. " 
5. S)TROPIGIX AGREE 
6 ITET77 STRnN(', T*, Y 'APREE, 
Q14 AS a Unionist/LoyaliSt I object to a United Ireland because I fear 
that the Protestant way of life would be lost 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
Q15 As a Unionist/Loyalist I object to a United Ireland because I fear 
my standard of living would go down 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
Q16 As a Unionist/Loyalist I object to a United Ireland because I fear 
the power of the Roman Catholic Church 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
Q17 As a Unionist/Loyalist I object to a United Ireland because I fear 
I would loose my BRIT1.1,11 idenity 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
Q18 Which is your main objection 
1. Protestant way of life 
2. Drop in living standard 
3. Power of Roman Catholic Church 
4. Loss of 11ril, it; h identity 
NOW SOME MORE STATEMENTS, PLEASE TELL ME IF YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE 
Q19 The British Government does not really care what the outcome is in 
Northern Ireland as long as there isn't too much civil unrest 
. 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
Q20 
Q2 I 
Since they are a majority it is only right that Protestzints sRould 
have the last word on how Northern Ireland is to be ruled 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
In any political solution to Northern Ireland the Irish Government 
has to be consulted I 
I. 2.3.4.5.6. 
Qý2 British withdrawal from Northern Ireland without the consent of 
all the parties involved would lead to an increase in violence 
by Loyalists 
Q2 3 
Q24 
() 
1 2.3.4. S. 6. 
If they had to choose between being loyal to the British Government and 
loyal to 'Ulster', Loyalists would choose Ulster 
1.2.3.4. * 5.6. 
The Irish Government should make abortion and divorce legal in the 
Republic I 
I. 2.3.4.5.6. 
Q25 Northern Irish Protestants and Northern Irish Catholics have 
more in common with each other than with the people of the Irish 
Republic 
I. 2.3.4.5.6.1 () 
Q26 If a United Ireland was ever to come about the Loyalist paramilitarins 
would be at least as much of a problem as the IRA are today 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
SECTION D 
Q27 In the long term, which of these do you think offers the best chance 
of a solution to the problems of Northern Ireland 
SHOW CARD 1. Being much more closely tied in with 
Great Britain 
2. A more independent form of Government within 
the United Kingdom 
3. A move towards a completelyindependent 
Northern Ireland state 
4. Being more closely tied into the Irish 
Republic 
5. Some form of independent fedral Ireland 
6. Don't know 
7. other - state what 
Q28 Which of this list would you see as the least likely soXutionýto the, 
Northern Ireland problem 
SECTION E 
THERE HAVE BEEN VARIOUS STEPS SUGGESTED WHICH THE BRITISH AND 
IRISH GOVERNMENTS MIGHT TAKE IN ORDER TO HELP BRING ABOUT A 
SOLUTION TO THE CURRENT SITUATTON HERE PLEASE TELL ME WHETHER 
YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE FOLLOWING AND WHETHER STRONGLY OR 
SLIGHTLY 
Qý2 9 The Irish Government should remove its constitutional claim to 
Northern Ireland 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
Q30 The British Government should restore 'political status' for 
some offences in Northern Ireland 
I. 2.3.4.5.6. 
Q31 The British and Irish Governments should continue to have high-level 
meetings, at which Northern Ireland should be discussed 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
Q32 The Irish Government should agree to extradition, that is to 
hand over to the authorities in Northern Ireland people accused of 
politically motivated crimes here 
1.2.3.4.5.6. 
Q33 The British'Government should implement a policy of separation of 
'Loyalist' and 'Republican' prisoners in Northern Irish goals 
SECTION F 1.2.3.4.5.6. 
Q34 Which of these political parties in Northern Ireland do you feel 
closest to 
SHOW CARD 1. Official Unionist Party 
2. Democratic Unionist Party 
3. Ulster Democratic Loyalist Party 
4. Progressive Unionist Party 
5. Vanguard Unionist Party 
6. The Workers' Party 
7. Northern Ireland Labour Party 
8. Social Democratic and Labour Party 
9. Sinn Fein 
10- All 1 nnre 
11. None 
12. ()t, h(, -r Please state 
Q35 Have you voted for any of these parties in the last 10 years 
Q36 Have you voted for any of these parties in the last 5 years 
Q37 If you had been living in Enqland, Scotland or Wales during 
the last election which party would you have voted for 
SHOW CARD 1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Conservative 
Labour 
Liberal 
Social Democratic Party 
Scottish/Welsh Nationalist 
other (state 
None 
Don't know 
C 
C- 
SECrION GI 
I WOULD NOW LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR RELIGIOUS BELIEPS 
Q38 Could you tell me to wh 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
ich church you belor 
Roman Catholic 
Church of Ireland 
Presbyterian 
Free Presbyterian 
Methodist 
Congregationalist 
Other (state 
None 
Atheist/Agnostic 
Don't know/refuse 
Q39 On. average how often have you been to churc 
1. More than I/week 
2. I/week 
3. Less than I/week 
4. Less than I/month 
5. Never 
IF YOU THINK OF THE PEOPLE YOU KNOW IN EACH OF THE FOLLOWING 
GROUPS, WHAT PROPORTION WOU LD YOU SAY ARE THE SAME RELIGION AS 
YOURSELF 
Q40 Close Friends 1. All SHOW CARD 
Q41 Neighbours 2. Most 
Q42 Relatives by marriage 3. Half 
Q43 People you work with 4. Less than half 
5. None 
6. Don't know 
C 
SECTION H 
AND NOW A FEW MORE STATEMENTS ABOUT NORTHERN IRELAND, AGAIN I 
WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE AND HOW STRONGLY 
Q44 The best chance of a solution to the situation is a return to 
the old Stormont system of Government 
I 
P) 
) 
) 
) 
1 2.3.4. 5.6. 
i 
(- ) 
Q45 Capital punishment should be reintroduced for those paramilitaries 
who have been found guilty of murder 
1.2.3.4. 5.6. 
Q46 Local politicians should put more emphasis on 'bread and butter 
issues rather than the constitutional issue 
1.2.3.4. 5. b. 
Q47 Trial by jury should be brought back for all cases in Northern Ireland 
1.2.3.4. 5.6. 
Q48 If Britain withdrew, Northern Ireland should claim independence 
rather than join with the Irish Republic 
1.2.3.4. 5.6. 
Q49 It is a good idea to mix Protestant and Catholic children in tile 
same school 
1.2.3.4. 5.6. 
Q50 Any political solution to Northern Ireland's problems will have to 
include an arrangement for Catholics and Protestants to share p? wer 
1.2.3.1 4. 5.6.1 ( 
Q51 The 'supergrass' system is a legitimate methoa to convict terrorists 
1.2.3.4. 5.6. 
0 --^. v w 
SHOW CARD FINALLY, SOME MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR GENERAL VIEWS, 
AGAIN I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW wnETIIER YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE 
AND HOW STRONGLY 
Q52 The Trade Unions have too much power 
1.2.3.4.5. 6. 
Q53 The Welfare State should gradually be run-down 
1.2.3.4.5. 6. 
Q54 The 11-plus examination should be abolished 
1.2.3.4.5. 6. 
Q55 Income tax should be increased in order to strengthen the 
National Health Service 
1.2.3.4.5. 6. 
Q56 There is too much talk today about women's liberation 
2 1 . 3.4.5. 6. 
Q57 Abortion should be left to the individual conscience 
1.2.3.4.5. 6. 
Q58 Religion is becoming more important to people in Northern Ireland 
1.2.3.4.5. 6.1 ( 
Q59 Nationalised industries should be 'sold off' to private owners 
1.2.3.4.5. 6. 
Q60 The security forces are doing their job well 
1.2.3.4.5. 6. 
Q61 A bill of rights should be introduced in Northern Ireland as Soon 
as possible 
1.2.3.4.5. 6. 
Q62 Unemployment is usually the fault of the individual 
1.2.3.4.5. 6. 
Q63 In general working people are fairly treated by their employers 
I. 2.3.4.5. 6.1 C 
Q64 If-you think of the people in the neighbourhood in which you li ve, woulc 
you say that you know 
1. nearly everyone 
2. quite a few people 
3. only two or three of them 
4. hardly anyone 
Q65 Which of the following do you regard as justifiable ac tions to 
defend the British way of life in Northern Ireland 
SHOW CARD 1. Electoral Politics 
2. Peaceful civil disobedience 
3. Protest Marches 
4. Strikes 
5. Rioting 
6. Armed Conflict 
7. Civil War 
